



WELCOME TO "A WALK WITH THE 35TH"



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OPERATION PAUL REVERE I


10 May to 31 July 1966

With the close of Operation Longfellow, and with relatively well prepared and defended lines of communications and supply, Gen. Walker turned his attention to the area west and south of OASIS. With the coming of the rains also came reports of increased enemy movement from their sanctuary in Cambodia.

Operation Paul Revere would eventually evolve into four phases. The primary difference between each phase was not the area of operations but under whose command the 3d Brigade Task Force would operate.

The first four months in Viet Nam had given the 1/35th and 2/35th Inf battalions valuable experience in conducting search and destroy operations, preparing defensive positions, and conducting aerial combat assaults (CA). Until now the weather had been cooperative, but now it was time for a change. A change in the area of operations (AO) and an introduction to the monsoon season's rains.

AREA OF OPERATIONS - PAUL REVERE



Bounded on the west by the Cambodian border; on the east by Highway 14; east-west grid line YA-ZA 50 on the north; east-west grid line YV-ZV-AQ 60 on the south. The AO was further divided into subsectors of 10,000 sq. meters for command and control.

When Operation Longfellow terminated, the 3d Bde was ordered into the area west of Oasis; stretching from the Cambodian border to Highway 14, north to the east-west grid line YA-ZA 50 and south to the east-west grid line YV-ZV-AQ 60. Comprising over 5,000 square kilometers, the area was simply too large to take and hold territory. As a result, the AO was divided into sectors, 10,000 meters square, so as to allow for a systematic search for the enemy.

The units spent a little over a week preparing for the beginning of Operation Paul Revere. The 3d Bde Task Force headquarters was initially located at OASIS. During the period from 11 May to 24 May, operations began with the deployment of the 1/14th to AO 29, the 1/35th to AO 46, and C Troop 3/4th Cav with one company from the 2/35th to AO 38. The 2/35th (-) and Co B, 1/69th Armor were in reserve and conducted patrolling around the Brigade base camp. All units generally maneuvered in a westerly direction to search out the enemy.

With little or no contact by the 24th, the units were shifted westward. The 1/14th to AO 27. The 1/35th to AO 52 and AO 53, and the 3/4th Cav into AO 37. During this time the brigade accounted for 7 VC and NVA KIA and discoveries of caches and structures were insignificant. (OP Rpt. 3d Bde 1 May-31 Jul 1966)

That all changed on the morning of 24 May, when operating about ten kilometers southwest of its camp at Plei Djereng, a CIDG patrol, vicinity YA760470, ran into an enemy force estimated at two battalions. Two CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Group) companies reinforced the patrol, and together they fought throughout the day. The next day, the 2/35th was air assaulted into AO 3 in support but failed to make contact.

ENEMY SITUATION



Lt Col La Ngoc Chau, Commander of the 66th NVA Regiment, moved his unit across the Cambodian border into South Vietnam in early May 1966. (Intelligence reports listed LTC Chau as the Commander of the 66th as late as November 1965) The 66th had three infantry battalions assigned: the 7th, 8th and 9th. Each battalion contained approximately 450 officers and men. Because of the heavy losses experienced during the Ia Drang campaign against the 1st Air Cav, many of the line units were made up of untried and inexperienced personnel fresh out of the Ho Chi Minh pipeline. In addition, the 66th carried an anti-aircraft battery of 12.5mm, tripod mounted, heavy machineguns.

The mission of the 66th was to attack the Special Forces camp at Plei Djereng, unite with two other regiments of the NVA 325th Div, also infiltrating eastward into the Central Highlands, and exploit any success against American and South Vietnamese forces that might be developed. Failing this, he was to move back across the border to the sanctuary provided by Cambodia.

The 66th NVA Regiment established a base camp about ten kilometers inside South Vietnam and 1000 meters to the north of a swampy clearing that was later to be designated by the 2/35th as LZ 10 ALFA. The Commander placed elements of his force around that clearing and at other sites within the vicinity of his headquarters that might serve as landing zones for the American helicopters. At the clearing closest to his base camp, (LZ 10 ALFA) he positioned five tripod-mounted 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns, and firing pits were dug into the swampy ground along the tree line and camouflaged. The infantry units that comprised the main body of his regiment, and other troops not required in the Headquarters area or occupied with defense of possible LZ's, were moved to the east along the stream and parallel ridges that formed the middle avenue of approach to Plei Djereng. (Col Stan Tyson, HHC 2/35 1966)

27 May 1966

The 2/35th Infantry conducted a heliborne assault into AO 11 and 12 with companies A and B at LZ 12A (YA 908385). The battalion (-) landed at LZ 11A (YA 873369). Companies A and B later closed to LZ 11A after conducting search and destroy operations to the northwest and southwest, respectively.


Based on a terrain analysis, the valley associated with LZ 10A (YA 769376) appeared to be a likely area for use by enemy forces, hence Company B was directed to prepare for a heliborne assault into LZ 10A 28 May 1966. (Annual Historical Supplement, 2nd Bn, 35th Infantry, 1966)

The 2/35th Bn Fwd was established at Landing Zone (LZ) 11 ALFA and consisted of the Headquarters and Command Group, Company C, Reconnaissance Platoon, and an attached Battery from the 2/9th Artillery Battalion. In addition to the artillery that was dedicated to a specific infantry battalion, additional fire support was available and "on call" from batteries of 155mm and 8-inch Howitzers at Bde Fwd and 175mm Cannons located at the Special Forces camp at Duc Co.

In the early morning of the 28th, the Bn/HQ Firebase LZ 11A was attacked, and we managed to get a machine gun with our 81mm mortars. That machine gun had the Bn HQ pinned down, and we got a direct hit on him. LTC Phil Feir talked with me that morning and I told him we were packing only about 12 rounds as we humped the mortars and that we would be more effective if we had ammo flown into the LZ. He ordered up an ammo lift for that night just before the LZ 10A of B Co. We didn't expect to need it all on 10A as we didn't expect to stay on the LZ that night. We were cleaning up from the attack on the Bn HQ when we got the word of heavy contact on 10A. Feir sent the mortars and A Company right away and diverted the ammo to 10A. That was fortuitous as we used all of it and then some. (Ray Pollard, Wpns Plt Ldr: B/2/35)

LZ 10 ALFA 28-29 May

28 May 1100H




Standard Operating Procedure, SOP, dictated that each heliborne assault was preceded by a preparatory barrage fired by the 105mm Arty Battery supporting the Bn. The thirty to fifty round artillery prep was positioned to destroy or disrupt any enemy around an LZ and to buy time for the first lift to get in and place its troops on the ground, secure the LZ and provide security and support for subsequent lifts. However, the prep for 10 ALFA was plotted in error using incorrect map coordinates and was fired on a clearing some 3000 meters to the south. Thus, the assault at 10 ALFA went in without artillery support. Although that in itself could have been critical, it actually served as an advantage for the troops from Bravo Company.

When the helicopters carrying Lt Robert Ponder's 1st Plt landed in the three to five inches of water that covered much of the LZ, the element of total surprise worked in Bravo's favor, and the NVA soldiers who were supposed to be manning the five

12.7mm anti-aircraft weapons that had been positioned around the clearing were not in the water filled pits, but were back from the guns on higher and drier ground. Men from the 1st Plt captured two of the guns before their crews could react to the assault landing. Fire fights erupted around the other three positions, and they were quickly overrun. The NVA took immediate action by committing men to reinforce their unit fighting to recapture their guns and regain control of the LZ.

The second lift, carrying Capt Maisano and his Command Group, an 81mm mortar section, and part of the 2nd Plt, Lt Michael Glynn, came in under fire and joined the action. With fire fights breaking out all along the unit's restricted perimeter, Bravo called for fire support from the artillery. In so doing, the support mission ringed the LZ and precluded the rest of his company from coming in. Trail elements were forced to return to 11 ALFA. Bravo Co (-) was on its own to deal with the situation on the ground for the better part of two hours. **(MAP 1)**

After the initial contact, which resulted in four casualties, the LZ appeared secure; however, as DUSTOFF medevac aircraft attempted to land, extremely heavy ground fire was received from the NW. The DUSTOFF aircraft was driven off with several hits. The estimate of enemy strength was raised to a reinforced platoon. Following the DUSTOFF incident, the volume of fire declined, although occasional sniper fire and AW fire continued to be triggered by movement of friendly troops.



Following the initial DUSTOFF attempt, 52nd Avn. Bn gunships (Buccaneer 6) made repeated passes firing both machineguns and rockets into the wood lines running north and south. Particularly heavy fire was delivered against a machine gun which was firing across the flank of the 1st Plt from the SW and could not be reached by friendly small arms fire. The gunships, however, did not suppress enemy fire to the degree required. Friendly positions were marked with smoke and two A1E aircraft strafed and dropped napalm on the machinegun position. Still, the machinegun continued in action. Another flight (F4 jet aircraft) appeared on the scene and shortly thereafter neutralized the enemy position with 500-pound bombs. The A1E's meanwhile were effectively suppressing enemy fire to the north.

Immediately following the air strike, the 1st Plt maneuvered a squad to the southwestern portion of the LZ and made contact with two NVA. Both fled into the woods to the west. A large number of packs and equipment plus, one

12.7mm anti-aircraft weapon were found. The latter was returned to the company CP. The squad continued a clockwise sweep of the entire LZ. A second anti-aircraft gun was found virtually destroyed by the airstrike. Discovery of guns #3, #4 and #5 followed in quick succession as the sweep was completed. (Annual Historical Supplement, 2nd Bn, 35th Infantry, 1966)

1255 HOURS

The force applying pressure against the LZ broke contact and withdrew into the heavy forest to the north. Artillery and tactical air support were placed on hold, and Capt Maisano called for the remaining lifts of his unit to join him. Within an hour, Bravo Co had completed its insertion, and the perimeter was secured and expanded.



Bravo reported to Bn Fwd that the area was relatively quiet, that two NVA prisoners had been taken, and that five 12.7mm anti-aircraft machineguns had been captured. One POW could speak a little English, but he would say nothing as to the size or designation of the NVA force that Bravo had stirred up.

The prisoner acknowledged he was a member of the company assigned to defend the LZ and that his Company Commander had killed himself when he failed to recapture his guns. Unit casualties up to that point were light and none of the wounded required

immediate evacuation. After an unsuccessful attempt to determine just what size unit his 1st Plt had dropped into, Capt Maisano notified LTC Feir that following a resupply for his 1st and 2nd Platoons, he would be ready to move as directed.

1430 HOURS

The remainder of Company B was lifted into the LZ. With the exception of some automatic weapons fire at the aircraft, this lift was carried out without major incident. On the ground, the 1st Plt put down a base of fire to the north. Enemy fire ceased as the aircraft departed. The perimeter was then reorganized and captured enemy equipment and gear were consolidated at the company CP.

Company B then began a sweep to the north to clear the area and obtain a body count. The initial count totaled ten. Sweep elements then moved out some 150 meters and returned; however, upon return, sniper fire again came from a bunker position at the north end of the LZ. Because the sweep elements of the 1st and 2nd Platoons were mixed, a consolidated squad attacked the bunker with grenades. Two NVA were KIA and two were captured. Both POW's were returned to the Brigade CP. Because of this action, another sweep was generated. This sweep likewise generated sniper fire from the NW. Snipers accounted for two friendly WIA. The 3rd Plt maneuvered against the snipers, later determined to number two, and suffered one KIA and seven WIA, including the Plt Leader who later in the day died of wounds. The snipers, both of whom were excellent marksmen, were firing one semi-automatic and one automatic weapon from positions concealed behind trees. Both were killed by M-79 and M-60 MG fire. (Annual Historical Supplement, 2nd Bn, 35th Infantry, 1966)

1600 HOURS

The action at 10 ALFA was being monitored at both Battalion and Brigade Forward's. From the casualty reports that had come in, the capture of the 12.5mm's and the obvious conclusion that they belonged to a unit much larger than an isolated company of NVA and presaged the presence of a sizable force, it was readily apparent that Bravo was into a situation that could not be resolved unless additional help was sent in. Even if the relief force closed on the LZ before dark, if the NVA felt their losses were worth the effort, the troops defending 10 ALFA could be in for a long and difficult night. An extraction under fire was not an option. The decision was made that Company B would hold in place and that reinforcements and resupply would be airlifted to the LZ. In that other 2/35th units were not immediately available for the relief mission, Gen Walker tagged the 1/35th for a rifle company, and Alfa Co, Capt Tony Bisantz Commanding, was ordered to move immediately to a pickup point and to await their transportation.

1615 HOURS

Immediately upon returning to Oasis, Maj Stan Tyson was told to report to Gen Walker in the Operations Center at Bde HQ. He was briefed on the situation at 10 ALFA and was told that LTC Feir had requested that he command the relief force. Once on the ground at the LZ, Tyson was to take command of both units and their attachments and serve as the TASK FORCE (TF) Commander. The mission was to conduct the defense of the LZ, and as soon as the situation allowed, to resume offensive operations. The elements of the TF were Companies B, 2/35th, and A, 1/35th, two 107mm (4.2) mortar squads and in total, numbered eleven officers and 258 men. All infantrymen of Alfa Co were issued double basic loads of ammunition, and additional ammunition was loaded on to be distributed to Bravo. The flights to pick up Capt Bisantz's troops were inbound, and just enough time was available for Tyson to pick up a PRC-25 radio, borrow an M-16 and an extra magazine from SFC Clarence Crawford, Admin Sgt, 2/35th Infantry, fill his canteen, and get to the helicopter pad.

1700 HOURS




The seriously wounded were lifted out of the LZ by the Brigade CO's helicopter. Prior to this, two DUSTOFF ships had been driven off by enemy fire. One of these had received several hits. Additional wounded subsequently were lifted out without incident by two 52nd Aviation Bn gunships. The enemy was believed to have withdrawn. Resupply was requested. Information was then received that Company A, 1st Bn, 35th Infantry would be lifted into the LZ as a reinforcing element and would be placed under OPCON of the 2nd Bn, 35th Infantry. The 2/35th Executive Officer (Major Wallace "Stan" Tyson) was lifted into the LZ to command the two-company task force and to accomplish the mission of holding the LZ the night of 28 May 1966. (Annual Historical Supplement, 2nd Bn, 35th Infantry, 1966)

Flying as a hitchhiker in one of the supporting gunships, Maj Tyson arrived at the LZ with the first lift of Alfa Co, 1/35th. Fortunately, the landing coincided with a break in the action, and the entire unit got in without incident. "The pilot told me he didn't plan on staying long enough to land, and the Huey made a quick pass following the last troop carrier. The ship flared, I jumped from the skids, and I saw Capt Maisano motioning from his CP at the edge of the trees on the south side of the LZ. As the gunship climbed out, the downwash of its rotors blew the poncho from the body of one of Bravo's soldiers lying among the dead and wounded at the unit collection point. At that time, Capt Maisano's casualties totaled three killed and twenty-two wounded. As the remaining flights came in to complete the insertion, casualties were evacuated on the departing ships, including the two POWs and the five 12.7mm's."

As Alfa Co, 1/35th arrived, they were directed into their portion of the perimeter, and as they took up positions just inside the tree line, Bravo Co compressed. Each of the rifle companies occupied about half of the perimeter, with Alfa on northwestern end of the oval and Bravo on the southeast. The heavy mortars were mounted on the rising ground in the southern portion of the open area. After making contact with Bn Fwd and giving a quick update on the situation, and knowing that darkness

would come early in the jungle, my first priority was to walk the perimeter to ensure that the troops were in the best defensive positions available and that they were taking full advantage of any material at hand to strengthen their line. I talked with individual soldiers and saw that the composition of the ground did not lend itself to digging in. Much would depend on using fallen logs and piles of loose stone as fortifications. The standing trees gave an added measure of protection in that they precluded the NVA from placing machineguns well back from the perimeter and bringing it under fire. Instead, the only effective fire could be brought to bear by individuals who had worked their way close enough to the defense to fire as soldier against soldier.



Captain's Maisano and Bisantz had tied their flanks together, and Bravo's Claymore mines and trip flares were shared with Alpha and placed into position. Both units had moved their 81mm mortars out to join with the 107's in the only area that would allow the overhead clearance necessary for the mortars. Each mortar had fifty rounds of high explosive (HE) and a combined total of twenty-five flares. Empty ammunition boxes filled with rock and mud served as a makeshift parapet around the tubes. Because of their exposure, casualties within the mortar sections were considerably higher than with their counterparts along the perimeter. **(MAP 3)**

Lieutenant James Brothers, Artillery Forward Observer (FO), attached to Bravo, was pressed into service as the TF FO. He registered defensive fires around the TF with the 2/9th's 105mm's from LZ 11 ALFA covering three sides of

the LZ and with the remaining portion to the northwest covered by fire from two 175mm cannon at Duc Co, some nine miles to the south.

Under better conditions, the TF could have covered a much larger area; however, considering the heavy forest and dense undergrowth, it was necessary to compress the perimeter to ensure that a cohesive all-round defense could be established. With the exception of one platoon, all positions were just inside the tree line and above the water level of the LZ. Even so, even the shallowest prone shelter quickly filled with water. Bravo's 2nd Plt had to bend back across an open portion of the southeast end of the position, and though partially exposed, their line was able to make use of a small ridge of ground that was mostly above water. Since only a few of the men had anything to dig with, positions were constructed with logs, stones and anything else that was available.

Major Tyson completed checking the perimeter at dark, giving each company commander orders to maintain a 50% alert status until 0150hrs and a 100% alert status from 0150hrs until dawn. The moon rose early the 28th and stayed bright until about 2300hrs, when the clouds obscured it. (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

We had heard it was hot, but we didn't know the situation yet. Our chopper landed and we deployed to the far side of the LZ . . . away from the 2/35th. My platoon, 3rd platoon, was setting up positions when Major Tyson, 2/35th XO came by to inspect the positions. It was getting dark and it was overcast. Major Tyson came from my left and disappeared into the forest and the darkness. He was moving down the line to our right. It turned into the darkest night I ever experienced in Viet Nam. That old saying about not being able to see your hand in front of your face . . . well, at 10 ALFA it was true. (Richard Hunter, 3/A/1/35)

ENEMY SITUATION

When the artillery preparation started to fall around the clearing 3000 meters from the site selected for the Headquarters element of the 66th NVA, Lt Col Chau assumed an assault was in progress and that American troops would soon be landing at that location. Because most of his strength was moving along the trail to the east, he started to deploy other troops available to block American movement northward from that LZ. When the actual landing occurred only 1000 meters from his Headquarters, he was caught off balance, and found it next to impossible to recall and redirect his troops back through the forest once they had been committed to the farther location.

As such, the force available to reduce the American presence was not sufficient to do the job, and the necessary strength was not able to reassemble until after the remainder of Bravo was safely on the ground. The 66th NVA was caught on the "horns of a dilemma". As long as the American unit sat astride its route back into Cambodia, it no longer had the freedom to continue movement to the east and possibly be boxed in by more such units being inserted on its flanks and across its route of march. Further, it could not withdraw its forces back across the border without anticipating considerable difficulty as long as the Americans were in a blocking position.

A new opportunity for success was in the offering in that the Americans had presented the 66th with a more lucrative target than the Special Forces camp - that being Bravo Co and any reinforcements that were sure to be sent in to assist the surrounded unit. With that in mind, the majority of the NVA units that were moving against Plei Djereng were recalled. One company sized element was left behind and was sent to exert pressure against the 2/35th Fwd base at LZ 11 ALFA. Long before the first units returned and were able to mount any sort of sustained effort against the defense at LZ 10 ALFA, the remainder of the TF was in position, and the early advantage enjoyed by the 66th NVA had been lost.

29 MAY 0001 - 0430 HOURS


Shortly after midnight, several of the LP's in positions forward of the northern portion of the perimeter reported hearing movement to their front. The majority of the activity was forward of sectors manned by Alfa's and Bravo's 3rd Platoons. The alert status was increased to fifty percent; however, it was doubtful that any of the US troops were taking advantage of an opportunity to get any sleep at that time. As LP reports of the activity picked up, the TF went on 100%. The units were instructed to be prepared for a renewed attack that would probably come shortly after the moon passed below a ridge of high hills southeast of our position.

Just as the moon started to slide from sight, a voice called out from the darkness and demanded: "Americans, you have two hours to surrender or die."

Almost at once, a second voice responded from along the Alfa line with, "Charlie, you have two hours to kiss my ass!"

Any growing apprehension along the line was quickly relieved by the laughter that broke out across the perimeter. For obvious reasons, the 66th NVA concluded that the TF had refused the two hours they had offered.

At 0115, a trip flare was ignited forward of Alfa's 2nd Plt, followed almost immediately by another trip going off to Bravo's front. As sounds of movement parallel to the LZ continued, the men in the LP's along the northern sector were instructed to return to the perimeter.



The sounds of men moving through the heavy undergrowth could be clearly heard by the men along the foxhole line. Bn Fwd had been kept aware of the status of the TF through hourly Sit Rep's, and when Lt Brothers called for artillery flares, the Battery responded with an immediate fire mission. It was quickly discovered that the flares served to the NVA's advantage because our backs were to the open area and were silhouetted against the light. The flares were shut down, and a flare ship that was offered for assistance was refused. The fire mission was changed to HE, and for a brief period, the movement ceased. The most prominent peak to our southeast was designated as "Chu Ba" on the map, and at one point, the full moon looked to be balanced upon it's tip like a ball on a seal's nose.

The LP located about 50 meters in front of the 2nd Platoon of Alfa Co reported hearing noises of movement to their front. Everyone in the TF was alerted and mortars were fired into the area. A few minutes later they reported seeing movement to their right front, estimating it to be a company sized unit. Following instructions, each of the four men on the LP opened fully automatic fire with their M-16 rifles and dropped back to the perimeter. Almost immediately the NVA initiated assault fire on the 3rd Platoon's position.

The 2nd Platoon's listening post had caused the NVA to prematurely trigger their attack while they were still 70 to 80 meters from the perimeter. The 3rd Platoon's listening post was directly in the path of the enemy and was immediately pinned down. The Fire Team leader on the LP gave orders to withdraw to the perimeter. Meanwhile, the 3rd Platoon had demonstrated excellent fire discipline, holding their fire as the ineffective NVA fire swept over their heads. A characteristic of the fight that night and all the next day was that the NVA heavy machine guns, which they normally use with devastating effectiveness, often fired high – sometimes seven or eight feet above the ground. The American forces capitalized on this the next day, moving frequently under the enemy's "grazing" fire at a low crouch.

Three of the four men on the 3rd Platoon's LP returned safely to the perimeter, followed closely by the enemy assault formation which continued forward and came into view of the men of the 3rd Platoon. On order they opened fire and quickly broke up the enemy assault. After the initial firing slacked off, Lt. Conner, the 3rd Platoon leader who was getting his baptism of fire, accompanied by the Fire Team leader from the LP, crawled forward of the perimeter in an attempt to find the missing man. They found him, seriously wounded, and dragged him back inside the perimeter.

Their safe return seemed to signal another enemy assault, this one better organized than the last. The enemy leaders could be heard, haranguing their soldiers, forcing them to attack. This assault was preceded by about a 20-round mortar barrage which impacted behind the 3rd Platoon, at the edge of the LZ, causing no casualties. This time the enemy advanced to within hand grenade range, and after several minutes of intense small arms firing and exchanging of hand grenades, the NVA were again forced to withdraw. (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

The respite was short lived, and within a few minutes, the attack was renewed. The attacking force followed a similar pattern throughout the rest of the night. As each attack was beaten back, the NVA would break contact, and the firing would die down. Several times during the breaks in the action, the sounds of men cheering in the distance could be heard, and their cheers would be answered by those of the enemy who were regrouping closer to the perimeter. As the farther groups closed, their cheers would merge with those to our front, a single voice would order them forward, and another assault would be launched against the line.

This went on for a while, then they withdrew for a while, then you could hear whistles blowing and them shouting, and they'd rush us again. Several times they got as close as 10-15 meters from us, but we drove them back every time. We fired hundreds of rounds of artillery right in front of us, and thousands of M-16 rounds. They got close enough to throw grenades in on us, but we did the same and ours worked better.



Guns of the 2/9th Artillery provide fire support for the men at 10 Alfa.

As the night progressed, the scope of the attack broadened to include the defensive sectors of the 2nd Platoon, Alfa, and the 1st Platoon, Bravo. By this time, constant artillery support was being requested, and both the 107mm and 81mm mortars reported they were starting to run low on HE rounds. Several times units were reminded that as an NVA effort broke and ceased firing, the TF had to do the same in order to ensure that the ammunition that was left would carry until daylight and last until the possibility of resupply.

During all this, Alfa Co's mortars had been delivering steady fire into the area in front of the 3rd Platoon. The Heavy Mortar Platoon had been firing at a greater range, attempting to knock out the NVA mortars. Battery A, 2-9 Arty had started firing battery volley fire as soon as the attack started, adjusting back and forth in the area in front of the 3rd Platoon. They were to fire over 650 rounds in

support of TF TYSON that night – an awful lot of work for five artillery pieces. The artillery support is even more impressive when one considers that the battery position came under small arms and mortar attack at the same time the attack was launched on 10 ALFA. Several of the cannoneers were wounded manning their guns in defense of a unit twelve kilometers away. (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

Around 0330H, Alfa reported one of the squads on its 3rd Plt line had run out of ammunition, and without coordinating with anyone, had withdrawn into the perimeter. Capt Bisantz indicated it was possible that several NVA had passed through the gap and were inside the defensive circle. The word was passed that everyone was immediately to get into a prone position, and the 81's were told to hang a flare directly overhead. Instructions were given to shoot anyone on his feet when the "lights" came on. The parachute flare popped, and by the blue-white light that exposed the scene below, it was determined that the position had not been penetrated. However, several NVA had succeeded in reaching the positions where the squad had been and were eliminated by fire teams closing from opposite sides of the breach. The errant squad was rounded up and resupplied, was returned to its position, and the continuity of the perimeter was restored.

29 May 0415 HOURS

The NVA broke contact and withdrew to the north of the LZ. At this time, it was estimated the TF had been in contact with an element of about battalion strength. The artillery continued to work along the threatened portion of the line, and as the action fell away, was shifted to harassing fires to the north and northwest. The 105's had been served without interruption despite an abortive ground attack that was launched out of the darkness against Bn Fwd at 11 ALFA. The infantrymen of Capt Michael Tryon's Charlie Company defending the base had little difficulty dealing with the attacking force.

The problem of ammunition resupply along the line became more acute as the night progressed. The M-79mm Grenade Launcher seemed to be the weapon of choice because of its area effect. The units were cautioned to stretch out their supply of M-79 rounds, because once those on hand were gone, there were no more. Ammunition was redistributed from casualties who had been removed to unit collection points and from the uncommitted portion of the line to those who needed it most. Bn Fwd was notified that if the attacks were renewed and continued to carry the weight of those experienced thus far, by daylight the ammunition situation would be serious and that an early resupply was critical.

Surprisingly enough, TF casualties remained light throughout the night, two KIA and nine WIA, probably because most of the troops were prone and the NVA were forced to fire at muzzle flashes rather than at individual soldiers. However, for that same reason, most of the wounds received during the darkness were head and shoulder hits. When it became apparent the NVA were probably going to either withdraw completely or at least wait until daylight to resume their action, the TF was returned to a fifty percent alert, and LPs were reestablished forward of the perimeter.

29 May 0610 HOURS

As dawn broke, the fog started to lift in the area; however, the Medevac helicopter at Brigade Base remained grounded by fog at that location. The 3rd Plt was directed to move forward on-line to sweep the battlefield of the previous night. This they did, finding numerous dead NVA soldiers, weapons and equipment. After Lt. Conner had moved forward about 100 meters, he asked for assistance in conducting the sweep. Lt. Everette Light, commanding the 1st Plt on the west side of the perimeter, as directed to bring half of his platoon across the LZ to assist the 3rd Plt. The two units linked up and continued to sweep eastward.

Shortly after they started forward again, Lt. Connor reported finding a stack of enemy bodies alongside an intermittent stream. At this time the Medevac ship arrived, and the wounded were

loaded aboard. Just as the loading was completed, firing started east of the perimeter in Bravo Co's sector. Lt. Connor was ordered to immediately pull back to the perimeter with Lt. Light. The order was acknowledged, and they started to move back. The enemy fire against Bravo Co. increased but was not yet of major proportion. Suddenly an intense firefight broke out in the area in front of Alpha Co., and radio contact with Lt. Connor was lost. (Capt. Bisantz, A/1/35)



(MAP 5) Right after dawn we were ordered to pick up our line and sweep our front, collecting weapons and counting bodies. We stood up and cautiously moved down a slight, wooded slope, all in line. The slope in front of us was absolutely strewn with NVA bodies, weapons, and pieces of bodies from the artillery. We moved about 150-200 meters (not sure today) down this slope to a dry creek bed, where we found scores more bodies where our shells had caught them moving up to attack us. At the creek bed we found a barely alive NVA soldier who had been horribly wounded by our artillery. I asked our medic if he would make it back to our lines, and he just shook


his head no.

We turned around and began making our way back to our line. Each of us were carrying AK-47's and SKS's slung over our shoulders. As we approached where our line had been (maybe 50-75 meters away), a burst of machine gun fire tore into us from our front and on each side. At first, we thought our own guys were firing on us as we approached the perimeter. Within a few moments, however, it became clear that after we had moved down to the creek bed, the NVA crept behind us and our line. My platoon sergeant, SFC George Williams was shot in the neck right in front of me, and something hit me in the head and knocked me head over heels. To this day I can remember exactly what it felt like; like getting hit square in the head with a baseball bat. I landed on my back and couldn't see out of my left eye because my scalp was hanging down over it, bleeding. I found out later we'd been hit with one of their heavy MGs that they pulled around on two wheels. A round had hit the left side of my head and creased my skull. (Larry Conner, Plt Leader, 3/A/1/35)

We all looked around waiting for someone to give the order to "move out." Someone yelled, "Alright, move out!" Everyone started moving out on-line . . . keeping abreast and in sight of everyone else as much as we could. We walked just a few meters and there was a shot on my right. Then another. An NVA was moving across our front . . . running from right to left. He was empty handed with no gear and running fast. He fell. Then another NVA ran out, again from right to left. Another shot . . . and another. He fell right in front of the 1st squad positions, into what turned out to be a stream bed about 75 yards out. It never occurred to us that we were being baited out, away from our perimeter. We proceeded outward to the streambed where we found 30 to 40 bodies scattered about. We found an NVA still alive but seriously wounded. He was dying. Within a few minutes he was gone. Then there was sporadic firing back at the LZ. 3rd Platoon got the word to turn around and head back to the LZ to support the perimeter that was under probing attack. We picked up and carried some NVA mortar rounds and tubes that we had found at the streambed. We were going to take them back to the CP for the "count." It was about 8:00 am on the 29th.

We did an about face and headed back towards the LZ. 3rd squad was in front and 1st squad bringing up the rear. "Junior" Bonner, Kit Frazier, Pace Caldwell, Dick Snyder, Bob White and I were taking up

the rear. Sporadic small arms fire broke out in front of the platoon. It sounded like AK's. One shot, then two, then a series of automatic fire. Most of us thought it was our own guys on the perimeter shooting at us. We were so close to our own perimeter and this sort of thing had happened before to other units. After all, we couldn't have been more than 100 meters from the perimeter . . . only 100 meters from safety . . . from our own people.



We couldn't have been more than 30 yards from the 3rd squad, yet we couldn't see anyone. Then grenades started exploding. Someone yelled, "They're PAVNS! They're PAVNS!" Then grenade after grenade exploded . . . some of theirs, some of ours. I could hear the AK's clearly now. I could hear M16's returning fire. I could see the smoke. 1st squad dropped the NVA mortar shells, along with the tubes, and rushed forward to help. We rushed forward to see Lt. Light, 1st Platoon Leader, lying on the ground, next to a small tree, with blood coming from his forehead. Lt. Light yelled at us to move up front . . . to help out.


We moved forward, under fire. I could see members of the 2nd and 3rd squad only 5 to 10 yards in front of us. We moved forward again, firing . . . rifles, shotguns, and grenade launchers. We moved into a position where we could support the rest of the platoon. We were all within 5 or 10 yards of each other, but because of the heavy underbrush, once we were in the prone position, we could only tell the other persons position by their voice, or screams, and by the sounds of the M-16.

I moved forward and to the right of Sgt Jesse Spencer. Pfc. Walter Wetzel, 2nd squad, was laying down behind a small tree about 12 inches in diameter. I moved forward until my helmet was almost touching his crotch. Sgt Spencer was right next to him with his right arm draped over Wetzel's left leg. All three of us were trying to get behind the same small tree. It was obvious by now that we were pinned down under heavy machine gun fire, with lighter automatic weapons and riflemen in support.

Pace Caldwell was a few feet to my left. I could see blood coming from his shoulder. Bob White moved to the right, in line with the rest of us. Dick Snyder moved to my left along with Kit Frazier and Junior Bonner. I lost sight of them after a few seconds. On my right was "Freeman," one of the machine gunners. He was shot thru the hand and the machine gun was damaged. He was saying something to me that I couldn't hear when another bullet hit his thigh. I thought it was an incendiary round because I could see smoke coming from his wound as he moaned in pain. Within seconds, Freeman was hit again. I looked at Bob White and saw his head jerk and hit the ground. I thought he was dead. Then he lifted his head and adjusted his helmet. Bob White was hit twice more in the helmet before it was over.

As Jesse Spencer, Walter Wetzel, and I, lay behind this small tree, I briefly looked up and saw bullets coming thru the tree, tearing it apart. A bullet came across Wetzel's butt. He started to get up from the

intense pain of the wound on his butt. Spencer and I grabbed him and yelled at him to stay down. Thinking they had us zeroed in, Spencer and I crawled to the left of Wetzel looking for another, much bigger tree. I don't know where Sgt Spencer went, but I never found that bigger tree. There just didn't seem to be any trees big enough out there that morning.



Things stayed that way for what seemed like hours. Them firing at us . . . Us firing at them. It was clear the 3rd platoon was at a serious disadvantage. It became an issue of just hanging on until help could arrive. Some of us were out of ammo. Some of us had one or two rounds left. I had three shotgun shells left. Some of the guys picked up AK's from dead PAVN's because they had run out of 5.56 ammunition. Both machine guns were out of commission. And just when we thought things couldn't get any worse someone yelled out, "They're standing up. They're getting ready to charge!" I remember thinking about having a shotgun and not having a bayonet mount, and how I had left my .45 back at my position before we moved out to sweep the area. (Richard Hunter, 3:A/1/35)

Lt. Kelsey, 2nd Plt, was ordered to bring the major part of his platoon to the 3rd Plt's sector. At this time Conner's location was not known precisely, so Kelsey was told to move east in an attempt to find him. Almost immediately Kelsey and his men engaged in a firefight with about 50 NVA who were advancing toward Bravo Co.'s position. At that moment, Lt. Light crawled to the Company Commander and told him that Lt. Conner and about 15 men were pinned down by a large enemy force. Lt. Light also had been pinned down and wounded in the head, but by crawling for about 100 meters had managed to get back to the perimeter.

Lt. Kelsey was ordered to break off engagement and move north to assist Lt. Conner. Guided by Lt. Light, Lt. Kelsey's platoon quickly overwhelmed the enemy force - killing about 20 in the process. Lt. Conner's group had been hit hard with seven men being killed initially and eight to ten others pinned down by a heavy machine gun only 20 feet away. (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

Then, like something out of some Hollywood movie, I saw a soldier named Wolfgang Wagner, coming towards me in a crouch. It told me 2nd Platoon had reached us. They swept in from our right and took out the machine gun and provided cover while helping us withdraw with our wounded. The battle raged on after 3rd platoon was brought back inside the perimeter. (Richard Hunter, 3:1/A/35)

Lt. Kelsey's men covered the evacuation of the dead and wounded and captured enemy material (which included a CHICO AM radio, one heavy barrel machine gun on wheels, two light machine guns and numerous AK47 Assault guns. No time was taken to search the enemy dead as the situation in Bravo Co.'s sector was rapidly deteriorating, and it was imperative to re-establish the perimeter. The enemy's main assault began just about the time Lt. Kelsey got to the perimeter. His men stopped where they were, roughly at a right angle to the perimeter and started firing at the flank of the attacking enemy. They maintained this position the rest of the day, delivering flanking, enfilade fire against the NVA. As the enemy took cover from Bravo Co.'s fire by crouching behind anthills and trees, Kelsey's men kept picking them off from their open flank. (Capt. Bisantz, A/1/35)

As the two companies resumed their positions, the NVA closed rapidly behind them and renewed their efforts against the perimeter. Over the next four hours. the NVA effort slowly expanded to the flanks so as to involve more and more of the TF. Even so, the NVA force never attempted to involve the entire perimeter at any one time. With the advantage of interior lines, even though harassed by random sniper fire, the uncommitted portion of the defense still served as a ready source for reinforcements and limited ammunition resupply for the more engaged positions within the circle.

The attackers came in uncoordinated bunches - not in the human waves of the Chinese in the Korean War - but in groups of 10 to 15 up to mobs of 75 to a 100. They would charge - yelling, throwing grenades and shooting - and move straight against the perimeter without any effort to take advantage of the ground and cover. Many of the enemy were cut down by the concentrated fires of the defenders, the mortars and artillery. Others were stopped by the door gunners of helicopters that were attempting to resupply the position and the gunships that roared in every time there was a break in the artillery support.

The assault on the southeast aide of the perimeter, in Bravo Co.'s sector had not been affected by the engagements of Lt.'s Conner and Kelsey, and the enemy rapidly closed to within hand grenade range. The mortars, which were located in the open about 35 meters behind the perimeter were out of action almost immediately as the fire of the NVA cut down the crews anytime they manned their guns. Unable to man their tubes, the mortarmen became riflemen, some crawling forward on their stomachs to reinforce the line, others firing from their own positions. (Capt. Bisantz, A/1/35)

29 May 0830 HOURS

Sixty percent of the perimeter became actively engaged in the defense, and because of constant heavy contact along the line, and the danger of ground-to-air fire, the resupply ships were diverted to 11 ALFA pending a break in the action. After an hour of continuous effort, the NVA broke off and retired into the forest. As was the previous experience, there would be breaks in the fighting that might last from ten to up to thirty minutes. To take advantage of any opportunity the lulls might present, the resupply ships and Medevac's were placed in orbit nearby, and at 0945, with the first break in the action, three ships flying at tree top level and "hellbent for breakfast" came into the LZ. They off-loaded 107mm and 88mm mortar ammunition, along with small arms and rounds for the M-

79 Grenade Launchers. Alerted that the ships were inbound, wounded were moved from the collection points closer to the touch down areas. TF wounded filled those ships to capacity.

A second effort was made to resupply at 1015, but the aircraft were driven off by heavy ground to air fire. Rather than abandon the mission completely, the helicopters made one more pass and the door gunners "kicked out" their loads at 20 feet and about 110 knots. That became the final resupply for the morning. No more aircraft were able to land at 10 ALFA until late in the afternoon.

By 1000hrs, the enemy had launched four full scale attacks against the perimeter, each time getting to within hand grenade range before being repulsed. As happened the previous night, each attack was preceded by loud shouting and screaming. At one time the NVA set up an 82mm mortar in direct view of Alfa Co's CP group, who were actually on the perimeter. Two men were assigned responsibility for the weapon and spent the next two hours killing each NVA who attempted to go near the mortar.

By this time friendly casualties had begun to mount, and small arms ammunition was running low. The north and west side of the perimeter, already low in numbers, sent all but a bare minimum of their ammunition across the LZ to Alfa Co. headquarters from where it was distributed down the line. An extra machine gun from Alfa's 1st Platoon was also brought across to strengthen the defense.

A resupply helicopter had been standing by awaiting a lull in the fighting which never came, until finally, when informed that the situation was critical, the pilot volunteered to go in with the resupply. Accompanied by two gunships to give suppressive fire, the resupply was made and a few of the more seriously wounded were evacuated. However, the resupply was expensive. One of the gunships was hit by ground fire and had to circle back and crash land in the LZ. The crew escaped the burning helicopter seconds before it blew up. While all this was going on, the enemy launched another assault. This too was beaten back as the fresh ammunition supply helped to increase the friendly rate of fire. (Capt. Bisantz, A/1/35)



Fighting would become so intense the mortar platoons would have to grab M-16's, and fire into the woods, defending their own positions. I believe 6 helicopters were shot down by enemy ground fire. I remember, as we were defending the LZ and laying down fire, looking back over my shoulder to see one of the door gunners jump from about 20 feet up because his chopper had been hit and was in full flames. That particular chopper was carrying a supply of ammunition and exploded like a fireworks display. It wasn't a very big LZ and seeing those choppers scattered in the LZ made it look even smaller. Cloud cover gave way and A1E's were finally able to give us air support. I saw an F105 flying up and down the base of the mountain strafing the NVA positions. (Richard Hunter)

Late in the morning, an NVA unit numbering around forty broke from the tree line directly in front of Bravo's 2nd Plt. That unit was positioned across the open southeastern end of the LZ and was back from the tree line some twenty-five or thirty meters. It appeared that the NVA expected to close with Bravo at the tree line, and failing to meet the expected resistance, their momentum carried them out into the open. They were immediately taken under fire and finding themselves exposed, became confused and began milling around. A mortar round fired by Bravo's 81mm's landed at their leading edge, and the front ranks of the NVA turned and ran back into the others. Some of them made it back into the woods, others broke left or right. Those that ran to their right moved parallel to the line, and

then for some distance, stayed within easy visual range of the men in position. The majority of this group became casualties in short order. Of the ones that moved to their left, two automatic weapons teams were able to establish themselves in the trees about 100 meters out. Their fire downed at least one helicopter before they were eliminated. That Huey lost most of its hydraulic fluid but made it into the LZ without further damage and without injury to the crew. As were their predecessors, they were added to the troops on the line.

29 May 1200 HOURS

Just after noon, a Forward Air Controller (FAC) checked into the net and asked if we could use two A1E Skyraider's that were out looking for "targets of opportunity". He indicated the fixed wing aircraft were carrying rockets and napalm. Lt Brothers had the artillery shut down, and the machineguns that had been set up back in the trees to our southeast were designated as the target. Men at opposite ends of the LZ threw smoke grenades to indicate a line of flight, and a compass heading of 140 degrees from the center of the LZ with an estimated distance to where the guns were located were passed to the FAC. The planes made two rocket runs and received return fire each time. The FAC called for the napalm, and as the first A1E made its pass, the aluminum tanks hit well beyond the target. The trail aircraft became disoriented, made a 90-degree error in its flight path, and came in over the LZ on a north to south run. The TF CP group was alerted to the impending danger when one of the nearby troops cried out, "God Almighty, look out!"

The A-1E, at tree top height, released its tanks as it passed over the far side of the perimeter. The tanks impacted directly on the TF CP. The right tank hit exactly five feet in front of the position, and the blast, metal and flame went over and spread out beyond it. The left tank fell about ten meters farther in and hit a large tree, with its napalm passing over most of the men on the ground beneath it and on into the trees. Of the eleven men around the CP, nine were injured. Lieutenant Brothers received third degree burns on his back, and 1st Sergeant Harry Miller, Bravo, who at the moment of impact, was working with a soldier who had just been wounded, had only enough reaction time to raise his hands to cover his face. In spite of receiving severe burns on his hands and face, his eyes were not injured, and within several weeks, he returned to duty with the company.

None of the wounds from the fire or exploding tanks were fatal, but because of them, six men were eventually evacuated from country. The two who were not burned had avoided injury, one by dashing out into the open so that the tanks passed over and hit behind him, and the other, by diving into a water-filled foxhole. The PRC-25 that had been serving as the TF net control station was destroyed, and the Artillery radio was pressed into immediate service to notify the FAC of the error and to call off any subsequent runs.

29 May 1300 HOURS

A Bravo company medic came to the CP area and told Capt Maisano that Pfc Donald Evans was dead. The soldier, with the Company 81mm mortars, had been hit in the legs - a bullet passing through one and almost removing the kneecap from the other. Instead of allowing himself to be removed to the relative safety of the company collection point, he chose to stay with the mortars and keep his tubes in action. When an assistant gunner was killed, he reorganized the gun crew and talked the loader and ammunition bearers through the laying and firing procedures. Pfc Evans stayed with the guns until, after receiving at least one more wound, he died from loss of blood and shock.

29 May 1400 HOURS - REINFORCEMENT

Bn Fwd passed the word from Gen Walker that LTC Kingston and the relief force had completed marshaling and would be arriving at the LZ around 1500. At the time the information reached the TF,

the NVA effort was once again increasing, and as had been the case throughout the attack, was concentrating against the 3rd Platoons of Alfa and Bravo.

The danger of ground to air fire against the incoming flights was acute, and suppression of that fire was critical to the success of the relief. Bn Fwd was requested to report when the first in bound lift was five minutes out. At that time, the majority of the troops on the ground would be moved from the portion of the line least committed to the area of heaviest contact. Maximum suppressive fires would be laid down in order to prevent the enemy from directing his fire against the ships as they were on short final and landing. It was requested that once the soldiers exited the aircraft, they move to the northern portion of the perimeter and take up positions there, because by that time the defenders would be down to their last rounds of ammunition. Once the TF was committed to the suppressive course of action, the first two lifts had to come in, regardless of fire, in order to keep the TF situation from becoming disastrous.

Ammunition was redistributed and wounded were replaced by filling in with men from the opposite side of the perimeter as much as practical. The two Company Commanders were briefed, and when the first lift was four minutes out, men were moved across the perimeter and joined the platoons in contact. The troop lifts, escorted by gunships providing covering fire from their rocket pods and offside door gunners, came in under fire, but without loss. LTC Robert Kingston and Major Fred Delisle, Battalion S-3, Opns Officer, arrived with the second lift, and the command of the TF was turned over at that time.

As the battle progressed, more choppers arrived carrying reinforcements, which included the 1st/35th Battalion Recon Platoon and Company "C", of the 1st/35th, plus more artillery and supplies. It was now about 3 or 4 p.m. on the 29th of May 1966. All but intermittent sniper fire had stopped. The LZ had 3 rifle companies, plus a reinforced Recon Platoon: however, "A" Company 1st/35th and "B" Company 2nd/35th, together, didn't quite make up a full rifle company.

29 May 1600 HOURS



The build-up continued rapidly with little enemy opposition until about 1400hrs. when the LZ was hit with a mortar attack. Four helicopters were unloading at the time and immediately took off. One of the helicopters flew directly over one of the exploding mortar rounds and settled directly back into the LZ. The other three escaped. Before the last enemy round had detonated, the mortars in the LZ began firing counter battery fire. A radio telephone operator on the east side of the perimeter had heard the enemy mortar fire and quickly adjusted Alfa Co.'s mortars into the area. Following this incident, the remaining resupply was done on the fly with individual aircraft touching down for only a few

Helicopters of the 52nd Aviation Bn land at LZ 10A

seconds at a time.

At 1300hrs. Bravo Co, 1st Bn, 35th Infantry commanded by Captain Timothy J Crotty had been lifted into LZ 10B, about 2.5 kilometers northwest of LZ 10A. Their landing was unopposed, and the company patrolled southeast, joining the battalion in LZ 10A at about 1600hrs. As they moved into their sector of the perimeter, the enemy launched his last and most damaging mortar attack. This attack of approximately 18 to 20 rounds was not directed against the LZ, but against the perimeter, which, due to the increased forces in the LZ, was now located about 50 meters into the wood line from the edge of the LZ. The mortars impacted directly on the battered 3rd Platoon of Alfa Co causing some 15 casualties, six of which were serious enough to warrant immediate evacuation. (Capt Bisantz, A/1/35)

When darkness fell, the sounds of the battle across the LZ died down except for the occasional staccato bark of an enemy AK-47 or the heavier ripping sound of a friendly M-60 machine gun's reply. We heard voices calling out, but at that distance we couldn't tell what was being yelled or who was doing the yelling. The entire night was a series of ghostly shadows cast by overhead flares and bursts of automatic weapons fire where NVA troops were probing the perimeter.

SUMMARY

Casualties for the Task Force amounted to sixteen killed and eighty-eight wounded, almost thirty-nine percent of its total strength. For the 66th NVA Regiment, 241 bodies were found in the forest around the original perimeter, and information was received that on 2 Jun, an NVA unit had passed through a Montagnard border village with walking wounded and carrying over 100 litter cases. The most glaring tactical errors made by the PAVN Commander was that he committed his forces piece-meal and did not wait until his returning units were of sufficient numbers to concentrate and break the defensive perimeter. Further, by not involving the full defensive circle, he did not challenge the movement of men and ammunition within the position used to shore up threatened portions of the line. Headquarters, IFFV did not show the 66th NVA on the list of enemy units "in country" again until after the first of 1967.





**DROPPING A 105MM
HOWITZER INTO THE LZ**




LOADING A UH-1D



ON PATROL

CAPTURED WEAPONS



**LT GEN HEINTGES, DEP CMDR
MACV, AND BRIG GEN WALKER,
CMDR 3D BDE TF, LOOK OVER
WEAPONS CAPTURED DURING
OP PAUL REVERE**



**GEN WESTMORELAND
CONGRATULATES MEN
OF B CO, 2/35TH**