By 19 September 1945, with the close of WWII, the first echelon of the Regiment was on the way to Japan for occupation duty. The original home base was in Nagoya, Japan. In January 1946, the regiment moved to Otsu, Japan, on Honshu Island, where the Regiment’s mission was occupation duty and keeping combat ready. The regiment remained here until 5 July 1950.

June 1950

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean "People’s Army" swarmed across the 38th Parallel in an unprovoked, surprise attack on the Republic of South Korea. Across the Sea of Japan, the atmosphere was laden with mounting tension, and all eyes were turned, with a look of grave concern, toward the enigmatic little peninsula lying to the west. At this time, the 35th Infantry "Cacti" Regiment was stationed in South-Central Honshu on occupation duty.

The implications of this invasion were brought home to the members of the 25th Division as they assisted in the processing of civilian evacuees brought to Japan from Korea. One thousand forty-four (1,044) of these civilians were provided billets, transportation, clothing, and medical or financial aid, if needed.

The United States 24th Infantry Division, then occupying the southernmost Japanese Island of Kyushu, was ordered to Korea to intervene in the fighting. On 1 July 1950, the order to move was received and the 2nd Battalion of the "Cacti" set out for the city of Kokura, on Kyushu, to form the 25th advance group. As the units of the 24th Infantry Division departed for Korea, the 35th moved into positions they vacated. The transfer was completed by 5 July.
Pursuant to a radio message from the Eighth Army Commander, received early in the afternoon of 5 July, the 25th Infantry Division made preparations for moving to Pusan, Korea, to engage in an effort to halt the aggression. Several types of ships belonging to the various members of the United Nations Council were utilized to transport the Divisional units to Pusan.

Major General William B. Kean, 25th Infantry Division Commander, accompanied by the advance party of his staff, traveled by plane from Osaka to Pusan on 8 July 1950. Upon arrival at Pusan, Brigadier General Crump Garvin was contacted, and arrangements for the reception of the Division were completed. General Kean and a small party then flew to Taejon for a conference with Major General William F. Dean, Commander of all US Forces in Korea, and plans for the employment of the Division were discussed. Between 10 and 18 July 1950, the U.S. 25th Division, with its three regiments—24th, 27th, and 35th—arrived during 10–15 July 1950 at Pusan.

General Walker ordered the 25th to bolster ROK (Republic of Korea) defenses of the central mountain corridors. The Division’s initial objective was the relief of the 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. The zone of responsibility included as its left boundary the city of Taegu, and extended generally north and east to include Yechon. All approaches into this area were to be blocked. The mission included the defense of the airfield at Yonil and the port of Pohang Dong.

The first Division Command Post to be established in Korea was opened in the primary school building at Yongchon on 13 July 1950. Division CP personnel traveled via rail and motor from Pusan to Yongchon during the early morning hours, and in the small villages along the way, the native school children jubilantly waived American and South Korean flags and sang patriotic songs to welcome their allies. Banners of welcome to the UN Forces were stretched across the roads along the way.

On 13 July, the Cacti Regiment, with the direct support and the 64th Field Artillery, landed at Pusan, on the southern tip of Korea, to go into action against the Communists. Units of the Regiment were in action within a few hours after landing.

The 35th Infantry Regiment "Cacti", commanded by Colonel Henry G. Fisher, bivouacked in the vicinity of Yongchon. The next night, the Cacti moved into positions in the Pohang Dong area, with one battalion positioned near Kyong-ju. During the next critical weeks, the Regiment participated in the desperate fight to maintain the Pusan Defense Perimeter.
During the night of 15 July, the 35th RCT, now the 35th Infantry Regiment, moved from a bivouac area near Yongchon to positions in the vicinity of Pohang Dong and Kyong-ju.

On 20 July, the Division was ordered to assemble east of and astride the Hamchang-Sangju-Kumchon road, and to relieve the ROK 1st and 2nd Divisions in that zone. The zone was approximately twenty-seven (27) miles wide, and had to be defended by seven (7) battalions. Much of it could be covered only by reinforced patrols along the main avenues of approach. Movement was hampered by numerous obstacles, which included narrow roads, small bridges, rough, mountainous terrain, overtaxed rail traffic, and washouts of roads and bridges.

Several days of fighting—bitter, grueling fighting—ensued. The Division withstood repeated attacks by the numerically superior forces of a fanatical enemy. The battle in Korea, at this stage, was a fight against time and terrain until reinforcements could be brought in. The Tropic Lightning” Division was the first unit to withstand the pressure of the enemy armored columns and to slow them down.

Elements of five enemy divisions and one brigade were opposing the 25th Division. Total strength of these units was estimated at 30,800. Supporting this formidable force were an estimated forty-four (44) 76-mm gun, fifty-six (56) 120-mm guns, fifty-four (54) 82-mm mortars, and approximately sixty (60) T-34-type tanks.

General Kean and his 25th Division had to guard two main approaches to Sangju if he was to secure the town. First was the main road that crossed the Mun'gyong plateau and passed through Hamch'ang at the base of the plateau about fifteen miles due north of Sangju. Next, there was the secondary mountain road that crossed the plateau farther west and, once through the mountains, turned east toward Sangju.

On the first and main road, the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, held a blocking position northwest of Hamch'ang, supported by a platoon of tanks from A Company, 78th Tank Battalion, and A Battery, 90th Field Artillery Battalion. Colonel Fisher was unable to concentrate his two-battalion regiment here for the defense of Sangju because the 1st Battalion had no sooner arrived on 25 July from P'ohang-dong than it was sent posthaste the next day to reinforce the 27th Infantry Regiment on the next north-south line of communications westward.

Thus, in effect, one battalion of U.S. troops stood behind ROK units on the Hamch'ang approach.

On the second road, that leading into Sangju from the west, the 24th Infantry Regiment assembled two, and later all three, of its battalions.

The 2d Battalion of the 35th Infantry took up a hill position northwest of Hamch'ang and south of Mun'gyong on the south side of a stream that flowed past Sangju to the Naktong. On the north side of the stream a ROK battalion held the front line. Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, Assistant Division Commander, insisted that F Company of the battalion should be inserted in the center of the ROK line north of the stream, and this was done over the strong protests of Colonel Fisher and the battalion commander, Lt. Col. John L. Wilkins. Wilson thought the
American troops would strengthen the ROK defense; Fisher and Wilkins did not want the untried company to be dependent upon ROK stability in its first engagement. Behind the ROK and F Company positions the ground rose in another hill within small arms range. Heavy rains had swollen the stream behind the ROK's and F Company to a torrent that was rolling large boulders along its channel.

On 22 July the North Koreans attacked. The ROK's withdrew from their positions on either side of F Company without informing that company of their intentions. Soon enemy troops were firing into the back of F Company from the hill behind it. This precipitated an unorganized withdrawal. The swollen stream prevented F Company from crossing to the south side and the sanctuary of the 2d Battalion positions. Walking wounded crowded along the stream where an effort to get them across failed. Two officers and a noncommissioned officer tied a pair of twisted telephone wires about their bodies and tried to swim to the opposite bank and fasten a line, but each in turn was swept downstream where they floundered ashore a hundred yards away on the same bank from which they had started. Some men drowned in trying to cross the swollen river. The covering fire of a platoon of tanks on the south side held off the enemy and allowed most of the survivors eventually to escape. In this fiasco, F Company lost 6 men killed, 10 wounded, and 21 missing.

The next morning five enemy tanks crossed the river and moved toward Hamch'ang. Artillery fire from a battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion knocked out four of the tanks. The fifth turned back across the river, and there an air strike later destroyed it.

The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, was still in its position when it received orders on 23 July to withdraw to a point 5 miles north of Sangju. Enemy aircraft appeared for the first time on 25 July, when two Yak planes attacked elements of the 35th RCT as it moved into the Division Zone, after having been relieved by units of another division in their previous area. On the 28th the battalion fell back 2 miles more, and the next day it moved to a position south of Sangju. On the last day of July the 35th Infantry was ordered to a blocking position on a line of hills 8 miles south of Sangju on the Kumch'on road. In eleven days it had fallen back about thirty miles on the Sangju front. In these movements it did little fighting, but executed a series of withdrawals on division orders as the front around it collapsed.

One of the major problems of the retreat was the volume of refugees moving through Eighth Army lines. Their numbers were greater during July and August 1950 than at any other time in the war. During the middle two weeks of July about 380,000 refugees crossed into ROK-held territory. The North Koreans often exploited the situation by launching attacks that began with herding groups of refugees across minefields and then following up with tanks and infantry. The enemy also infiltrated U.S. Army lines by wearing the traditional white civilian clothing and joining groups of refugees, thus enabling him to commit a variety of surprise attacks on American soldiers. The commanders of the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions attempted unsuccessfully to control the volume of refugees and enemy infiltration by searching displaced civilians and limiting the times and routes available for their movements. In late July General Walker, with the cooperation of ROK authorities, set explicit rules for the organized removal of refugees to the rear by the ROK National Police. By the end of July the ROK
government had established fifty-eight refugee camps, most of them in the Taegu-Pusan area, to care for the homeless. But even with these efforts, refugees continued to hamper the movement of U.S. and ROK troops throughout the battlefield.

Until ordered to a new front, the 25th Division contained the enemy in its zone, thus gaining time for the United Nations Forces to strengthen their defenses. United States air, ground, and sea forces were united in an effort to stem the tide of the Red invasion of South Korea. Mass movement of evacuees from the front was an ever-present problem and proved to be a tremendous factor in favor of the accomplishment of enemy intelligence and espionage. North Korean soldiers, disguised as peasants, possessed the same general appearance, spoke the same language, and bore the same family names as the civilian evacuees themselves, and could not be differentiated from the other "People in White," called PIW's, as they continued to infiltrate into and through our lines. These incognito tactics were carried a step further: on occasion, North Korean soldiers were found to be dressed in US Army uniforms and bore US Army weapons and field equipment.

KOREA - August 1950

The 27th and 35th Regiments of the 25th Division had received their third battalions early in August with the transfer to them of the two battalions of the 29th Infantry.

A Red force had swept virtually unopposed down the west coast, the entire length of the Korean Peninsula, and was dashing madly across the southern tip in a race for Pusan. The "Tropic Lightning" Division was again called upon to stop this onslaught. On 2 August, the entire 25th Division was shifted approximately one hundred and fifty (150) miles to the south in a matter of hours. The men and equipment were transported from the northeastern flank of the Pusan line to the southwestern flank.

Every means available was used for this veritably miraculous move, which ultimately saved Pusan from inevitable capture. The main party of the 25th Division command post arrived at Masan at 2115, 2 August, after an all-day ride. Of the combat units, the 35th Infantry moved first, closing at Masan at 1000, 3 August. The 24th Infantry arrived at 1930 that evening. General Kean reached Masan during the day and assumed command of all the U.N. troops south of the Naktong River. The 25th Division completed the 150-mile move by foot, motor, and rail within a 36-hour period. General Walker said that this "history making maneuver" saved Pusan.

The new scene of operations for the Division was the Chinju-Masan corridor.

The North Koreans had four possible avenues of advance leading to Pusan that could result in the defeat of U.S. and ROK forces, and in August they tried them all simultaneously. These approaches went through Masan south of the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers, through the Naktong Bulge to the rail and road lines at Miryang, through Kyongju and down the east coast corridor, and through Taegu.

During the first week of August General Walker decided to launch the first American counterattack of the war in the Chinju-Masan corridor. One of his purposes was to break up a suspected massing of enemy troops near the Taegu area by forcing the diversion of some North Korean units southward.
In recognizing the critical nature of the situation in the southwest and in acting with great energy and decisiveness to meet it, General Walker and his staff conceived and executed one of the most important command decisions of the Korean War.

On 6 August Eighth Army issued the operational directive for the attack, naming Task Force Kean as the attack force and giving the hour of attack as 0630 the next day. The task force was named for its commander, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, Commanding General of the 25th Division.

Altogether, General Kean had about 20,000 men under his command at the beginning of the attack. Task Force Kean was composed of the 25th Infantry Division, with the 24th and 35th Infantry Regiments. The 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade were attached to the 25th. It included two medium tank battalions, the 89th (M4A3) and the First Marine (M26 Pershings). With the addition of the 29th Infantry Regiment, the 25th Division now had three infantry battalions in each of its regiments, although all were understrength. The 27th Infantry Regiment and the 8th Field Artillery Battalion were in Eighth Army reserve after their relief at the front on 7 August.

The Chinju-Masan corridor is limited on the south by the Korean Strait, on the north by the Nam River from Chinju to its confluence with the Naktong, fifteen miles northwest of Masan.
Masan, at the head of Masan Bay, is at the eastern end of the corridor; Chinju, at the western end of the corridor, is 27 air miles from Masan. The shortest road distance between the two places is more than 40 miles. The corridor averages about 20 miles in width.

The topography of the corridor consists mostly of low hills interspersed with paddy ground along the streams. South of the Nam, the streams run generally in a north-south direction; all are small and fordable in dry weather. In two places, mountain barriers cross the corridor. One is just east of Chinju; the main passage through it is the Chinju pass. The second and more dominant barrier is Sobuk-san, about eight miles west of Masan.

The early summer of 1950 in Korea was one of drought, and as such was unusual. Normally there are heavy monsoon rains in July and August with an average of twenty inches of rain; but in 1950 there was only about one-fourth this amount. The cloudless skies over the southern tip of the peninsula brought scorching heat which often reached 105° and sometimes 120°.

The army plan for the attack required Task Force Kean to attack west along three roads, seize the Chinju pass (Line Z in the plan), and secure the line of the Nam River. Three regiments would make the attack: the 35th Infantry along the northernmost and main inland road, the 5th Regimental Combat Team along the secondary inland road to the Much'on-ni road juncture, and the 5th Marines along the southern coastal road. This placed the marines on the left flank, the 5th Regimental Combat Team in the middle, and the 35th Infantry on the right flank.

The 5th Regimental Combat Team was to lead the attack in the south, seize the road junction five miles west of Chindong-ni, and continue along the right-hand fork. The marines would then follow the 5th Regimental Combat Team to the road junction, take the left-hand fork, and attack along the coastal road. This plan called for the 5th Regimental Combat Team to make a juncture with the 35th Infantry at Much'on-ni, whence they would drive on together to the Chinju pass, while the marines swung southward along the coast through Kosong and Sach'on to Chinju.

The 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 5th Marines, on the night of 6-7 August, were to relieve the 27th Infantry in its front-line defensive positions west of Chindong-ni. The 27th Infantry would then revert to army reserve in an assembly area at Masan.

While Task Force Kean attacked west, the 24th Infantry Regiment was to clean out the enemy from the rear area, giving particular attention to the rough, mountainous ground of Sobuk-san between the 35th and 5th Regiments. It also was to secure the lateral north-south road running from Komam-ni through Haman to Chindong-ni. Task Force Min, a regiment-sized ROK force, was attached to the 24th Infantry to assist in this mission.

On the eve of the attack, Eighth Army intelligence estimated that the N.K. 6th Division, standing in front of Task Force Kean, numbered approximately 7,500 effectives. Actually, the 6th Division numbered about 6,000 men at this time. But the 83d Motorized Regiment of the 105th Armored Division had joined the 6th Division west of Masan, unknown to Eighth Army, and its strength

A light machine gun squad of the 35th Inf moves in on target to provide support for advancing riflemen.
brought the enemy force to about 7,500 men, the Eighth Army estimate. Army intelligence estimated that the 6th Division would be supported by eighteen (18) 76-mm guns, eighteen (18) 122-mm guns, and an estimated twenty-five (25) tanks.

On the right flank of Task Force Kean, the 2d Battalion of the 35th Infantry led the attack west on 7 August. Only the day before, an enemy attack had driven one company of this battalion from its position, but a counterattack had regained the lost ground. Now, as it crossed the line of departure at the Notch three miles west of Chungam-ni, the battalion encountered about 500 enemy troops supported by several self-propelled guns. The two forces joined battle at once, a contest that lasted five hours before the 2d Battalion, with the help of an air strike, secured the pass and the high ground northward.

After this fight, the 35th Infantry advanced rapidly westward and by evening stood near the Much'on-ni road fork, the regiment's initial objective. In this advance, the 35th Infantry inflicted about 350 casualties on the enemy, destroyed 2 tanks, 1 76mm self-propelled gun, 5 antitank guns, and captured 4 truckloads of weapons and ammunition, several brief cases of documents, and 3 prisoners. Near Pansong, Colonel Fisher's men overran what they thought had been the N.K. 6th Division command post, because they found there several big Russian-built radios and other headquarters equipment. For the 35th Regiment, the attack had gone according to plan.

The next day, 8 August, the regiment advanced to the high ground just short of the Much'on-ni road fork. There Fisher received orders from General Kean to dig in and wait until the 5th Regimental Combat Team could come up on his left and join him at Much'on-ni. While waiting, Fisher's men beat off a few enemy attacks and sent out strong combat patrols that probed enemy positions as far as the Nam River.

The 3d Battalion of the 5th Regimental Combat Team, rolling westward from Pongam-ni on the morning of 11 August, had joined the 35th Infantry where the latter waited at the Much'on-ni crossroads. From there the two forces moved on to the Chinju pass. They now looked down on Chinju. But only their patrols went farther.

The ground gained in the offensive was not retained as the Division was ordered by Eighth Army to fall back to a defensive line. The Reds had shifted the greater pressure of their attack to the north. The attachments were pulled away to reinforce the now more heavily embattled units to the north and east across the Eighth Army front.

On 13 August, preparations were begun for the assumption of a defensive mission. The most readily defensible feature was the mountainous area from Chindong-ni on the coast, north to the point of the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers. This was an over-extended front of approximately twenty-five (25) miles. The southern portion of the
"Pusan Perimeter" would be firmly guarded, and thus, would withstand further onslaught by the Red assailants.

On 14 August, after a week of fighting, Task Force Kean was back approximately in the positions from which it had started its attack. The 35th Regiment held the northern part of the 25th Division line west of Masan, the 24th Regiment the center, and the 5th Regimental Combat Team the southern part. The Marine brigade was on its way to another part of the Eighth Army line. In the week of constant fighting in the Chinju corridor, from 7 to 13 August, the units of Task Force Kean learned that the front was the four points of the compass, and that it was necessary to climb, climb, climb. The saffron-colored hills were beautiful to gaze upon at dusk, but they were brutal to the legs climbing them, and out of them at night came the enemy.

Also, on the 14th, a reinforced company of the 35th Infantry, 25th Division, took up a defensive position south of the Naktong River at Namji-ri Bridge, relieving units of the 27th Infantry there. Responsibility for protecting the bridge passed from the 24th to the 25th Division.

At 1550, 16 August, in a radio message to General Kean, Eighth Army dissolved Task Force Kean. The task force had not accomplished what Eighth Army had believed to be easily possible—the winning and holding of the Chinju pass line. Throughout Task Force Kean's attack, well organized enemy forces controlled the Sobuk-san area and from there struck at its rear and cut its lines of communications. The North Korean High Command did not move a single squad from the northern to the southern front during the action. The N.K. 6th Division took heavy losses in some of the fighting, but so did Task Force Kean.

Even though Task Force Kean's attack did not accomplish what Eighth Army had hoped for and expected, it nevertheless did provide certain beneficial results. It chanced to meet head-on the N.K. 6th Division attack against the Masan position, and first stopped it, then hurled it back. Secondly, it gave the 25th Division the much needed psychological experience of going on the offensive and nearly reaching an assigned objective. From this time on, with the exception of the 24th Infantry, the division troops fought well and displayed a battle worthiness that paid off handsomely and sometimes spectacularly in the oncoming Perimeter battles. By disorganizing the offensive operations of the N.K. 6th Division at the middle of August, Task Force Kean also gained the time needed to organize and wire in the defenses that were to hold the enemy out of Masan during the critical period ahead.

Syngman Rhee, the President of the Republic of South Korea, later cited the 25th Division for outstanding and heroic performance of duty on the field of battle during the first days of the month of August 1950. The Division was awarded the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for the unprecedented shift on the night of 1-2 August, from the Army's right to left flank; for its rapid organization of the defense of the Masan area; and for its counterattack against three (3) North Korean Divisions in the Chinju area.

From Komam-ni a 2-mile-wide belt of rice paddy land extended north four miles to the Nam River. On the west of this paddy land a broken spur of P'ilbong, dominated by 900-foot-high Sibidang-san, dropped down to the Nam. Sibidang provided excellent observation, and artillery emplaced in the Komam-ni area could interdict the road junction at Chungam-ni. Colonel Fisher, therefore, selected the Sibidang-Komam-ni position for his 35th Infantry Regiment in the northern part of the 25th Division defense line. The 35th Regiment line extended from a point two miles west of Komam-ni to the Nam River and then turned east along that stream to its confluence with the Naktong. It was a long regimental line—about 26,000 yards.
The part of the line held by the 35th Infantry-covering as it did the main Masan-Chinju highway, the railroad, and the Nam River corridor, and forming the hinge with the 24th Division to the north-was potentially the most critical and important sector of the 25th Division front. Lt. Col. Bernard G. Teeter's 1st Battalion held the regimental left west of Komam-ni; Colonel Wilkins' 2d Battalion held the regimental right along the Nam River. Maj. Robert L. Woolfolk's 3d Battalion (1st Battalion, 29th Infantry) was in reserve on the road south of Chirwon from where it could move quickly to any part of the line.

South of the 35th Infantry, Colonel Champney's 24th Infantry, known among the men in the regiment as the "Deuce-Four," took up the middle part of the division front in the mountain area west of Haman.

Below (south of) the 24th Infantry and west of Chindong-ni, Colonel Throckmorton's 5th Regimental Combat Team was on the division left. On division orders, Throckmorton at first held the ground above the Chindong-ni coastal road only as far as Fox Hill, or Yaban-san. General Kean soon decided, however, that the 5th Regimental Combat Team should close the gap northward between it and the 24th Infantry. When Throckmorton sent a ROK unit of 100 men under American officers to the higher slope of Sobuk-san, enemy troops already there drove them back. General Kean then ordered the 5th Regimental Combat Team to take this ground, but it was too late.

It soon became apparent that the enemy 6th Division had shifted its axis of attack and that its main effort now would be in the northern part of the Chinju-Masan corridor just below the Nam River. General Kean had placed his strongest regiment, the 35th Infantry, in this area. Competent observers considered its commanding officer, Colonel Fisher, one of the ablest regimental commanders in Korea. Calm, somewhat retiring, ruddy faced, and possessed of a strong, compact body, this officer was a fine example of the professional soldier. He possessed an exact knowledge of the capabilities of the weapons used in an infantry regiment and was skilled in their use. He was a technician in the tactical employment of troops. Of quiet temperament, he did not court publicity. One of his fellow regimental commanders called him "the mainstay of the division."

The 35th Infantry set to work to cover its front with trip flares, but they were in short supply and gradually it became impossible to replace those tripped by the enemy. As important to the front line companies as the flares were the 60-mm mortar illuminating shells. This ammunition had deteriorated to such a degree, however, that only about 20 percent of the supply issued to the regiment was effective. The 155-mm howitzer illuminating shells were in short supply. Even when employed, the time lapse between a request for them and delivery by the big howitzers allowed some enemy infiltration before the threatened area was illuminated.

Lt. Col. Arthur H. Logan's 64th Field Artillery Battalion, with C Battery, 90th Field Artillery Battalion, attached, and Captain Harvey's A Company, 88th Medium Tank Battalion, supported Colonel Fisher's regiment. Three medium M4A3 tanks, from positions at Komam-ni, acted as artillery and placed interdiction fire on Chungam-ni. Six other medium M26 tanks in a similar manner placed interdiction fire on Uiryong across the Nam River.
The FIRE test came to the Regiment in August when the "Cacti" held the key to the vital Chungam-ni-Masan route. The enemy, who had confidently moved quantities of weapons and ammunitions into the break were forced to abandon it and flee, leaving many dead and wounded on the field of battle.

The Communists, still believing the "Cacti" could be smashed, commenced their attack at 0430 on the morning of the 18th. Enemy shells fell for two hours. US troops had to contend with continuous sniper fire from the rear, as well as from Reds who had infiltrated behind the lines during the night.

The enemy attack came at approximately 0630. At that time, an estimated battalion struck Company "A", and forced the unit to give ground. Company "C" was ushered in and ejected the foe, restoring all positions. As the fighting continued, two additional companies of South Koreans were sent in to bolster the right flank.

In the pre-dawn hours of 18 August an enemy attack got under way against the 35th Infantry. North Korean artillery fire began falling on the 1st Battalion command post in Komam-ni at 0300, and an hour later enemy infantry attacked A Company, forcing two of its platoons from their positions, and overrunning a mortar position.

After daylight, a counterattack by B Company regained the lost ground. This was the beginning of a 5-day battle by Colonel Teeter's 1st Battalion along the southern spurs of Sibidang, two miles west of Komam-ni. The North Koreans endeavored there to turn the left flank of the 35th Regiment and split the 25th Division line.

On the morning of 19 August, A Company again lost its position to enemy attack and again regained it by counterattack. Two companies of South Korean police arrived to reinforce the battalion right flank. Against the continuing North Korean attack, artillery supporting the 1st Battalion fired an average of 200 rounds an hour during the night of 19-20 August.

After three days and nights of this battle, C Company of the 35th Infantry and A Company of the 29th Infantry moved up astride the Komam-ni road during the morning of 21 August to bolster A and B Companies on Sibidang. While this reinforcement was in progress, Colonel Fisher from a forward observation post saw a large enemy concentration advancing to renew the attack. He directed artillery fire on this force and called in an air strike. Observers estimated that the artillery fire and the air strike killed about 350 enemy troops, half the attack group.

The North Koreans made still another try in the same place. In the pre-dawn hours of 22 August, enemy infantry started a very heavy attack against the 1st Battalion. Employing no artillery or mortar preparatory fires, the enemy force in the darkness cut the four-strand barbed wire and attacked at close quarters with small arms and grenades. This assault engaged three American companies and drove one of them from its position. After three hours of fighting A Company counterattacked at 0700 and regained its lost position.

The next day, 23 August, the North Koreans, frustrated in this area, withdrew from contact in the 35th Infantry sector. Having discovered that moving to Masan through the 35th was no easy task, the Reds made no attack on the unit during the next few days. But the bitter fighting was not over.

At the end of August the North Korean People's Army also planned a crushing blow against the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions in the southern part of the Pusan Perimeter. The enemy's 6th
Division would attack through Haman, Masan, and capture Kumhae, fifteen miles west of Pusan. Aerial observation revealed a continual flow of hostile reinforcements and a build-up to the front. Prisoners of war told of a forthcoming attack to capture Pusan, the United Nations’ vital supply base.

Just before midnight, on 31 August, an intense artillery barrage was received almost simultaneously along the entire Division front. A major, determined assault was launched against the 25th Division line. The vicious enemy fought without standards of human decency. This force consisted of the 6th and 7th North Korean Divisions, the 83rd Mechanized Regiment, elements of the 4th North Korean Division, elements of 105th Armored Division, and their supporting units.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT KOREA September 1950

The 35th Infantry-The Rock of the Nam

The dog days of August had given way to September. Casualties during the next two weeks were to be the greatest of the Korean War. To the men of Eighth Army, these were to be the worst of "the days along the Naktong." And, as if to envelop this deadly clash of arms with a misery of nature's own making, the elements brought to the battlefield blackened skies and torrential rains. It was the end of the summer monsoon season.

Aerial reconnaissance in the last week of August had disclosed to Eighth Army exceptional enemy activity behind the lines opposite the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions in the southern part of the Pusan Perimeter. Ominously, the enemy had built three new underwater bridges across the Nam River in front of the 35th Infantry in the 25th Division sector. Aerial bombing only temporarily and partially destroyed these bridges, for they could be repaired overnight.

Eighth Army intelligence credited the North Koreans with having moved one or two new divisions and about twenty tanks to the Hyopch'on area on the west side of the Naktong River opposite the U.S. 2d Division. On 28 August the Eighth Army intelligence officer warned that a general attack "may be expected at any time along
the 2d Division and 25th Division front," aimed at severing the Taegu-Pusan railroad and highway and capturing Masan.

In the left center of the 25th Division line, Lieutenant Colonel Paul F. Roberts' 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, held the crest of the second ridge west of Haman, 1 mile from the town. From Chungam-ni, in North Korean territory, a secondary road led to Haman along the shoulders of low hills and across rice paddy ground, running east 1 mile south of the main Chinju-Masan road. It came through Roberts' 2nd Battalion position in a pass 1 mile west of Haman. Late in the afternoon of August 31, observers with G Company, 24th Infantry, noticed activity 1 mile in front of their positions. They called in two air strikes that hit this area at dusk. US artillery sent a large concentration of fire into the area, but the effect of this fire was not known. All US units on the line were alerted for a possible North Korean attack.

With this tense situation as the setting, the N.K. I Corps, before midnight 31 August, started its great offensive. As the final hours of August gave way to the first hours of September, North Korean soldiery crossed the lower Naktong at a number of points in a well-planned attack. From Hyongp'ung southward to the coast, in the zones of the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions, the enemy's greatest effort struck in a single massive coordinated attack.

That night the North Koreans launched The Great Naktong Offensive against the entire UN force. The NK 6th Division advanced first, hitting F Company, 24th Infantry, on the north side of the pass on the Chungam-ni-Haman road. The ROK troops in the pass left their positions and fell back on G Company to the south. The North Koreans captured a 75 mm recoilless rifle in the pass and turned it on American tanks, knocking out two of them. They then overran a section of 82 mm mortars at the east end of the pass. South of the pass, at dawn, First Lieutenant Houston M. McMurray found that only 15 out of 69 men assigned to his platoon remained with him, a mix of US and ROK troops. The North Koreans attacked this position at dawn. They came through an opening in the barbed wire perimeter which was supposed to be covered by a man with a M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, but he had fled. Throwing grenades and spraying the area with PPSh-41 "burp gun" fire, the North Koreans quickly overran the positions. Numerous officers and non-commissioned officers attempted to get the men back into line, but they would not follow these orders. In one instance South Korean troops killed their own company commander when he tried to stop them from escaping.

Shortly after the North Korean attack started most of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, fled its positions. One company at a time, the battalion was struck with strong attacks all along its front, and with the exception of a few dozen men in each company, each formation quickly crumbled, with most of the troops running back to Haman against the orders of the officers. The North Koreans passed through the crumbling US lines quickly and overran the 2nd Battalion command post, killing several men there and destroying much of the battalion's
With the 2nd Battalion broken, Haman was open to direct North Korean attack. As the North Koreans encircled Haman, Roberts, the 2nd Battalion commander, ordered an officer to take remnants of the battalion and establish a roadblock at the south edge of the town. Although the officer directed a large group of men to accompany him, only eight did so. The 2nd Battalion was no longer an effective fighting force. Pockets of its soldiers remained in place and fought fiercely, but the majority fled upon attack, and the North Koreans were able to move around the uneven resistance. They surrounded Haman as the 2nd Battalion crumbled in disarray.

When the North Korean attack broke through the 2nd Battalion, the 1st Battalion commander ordered his unit, which was about 3 miles south of Haman on the Chindong-ni road, to counterattack and restore the line. Roberts assembled all the 40 men of the disorganized 2nd Battalion he could find to join in this counterattack, which got under way at 07:30. Upon contact with the North Koreans, the 1st Battalion broke and fled to the rear. Thus, shortly after daylight the scattered and disorganized men of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Infantry had fled to the high ground 2 miles east of Haman. The better part of two regiments of the NK 6th Division poured into and through the Haman gap, now that they had captured the town and held it.

At 14:45 on September 1, Kean ordered an immediate counterattack to restore the 24th Infantry positions. For 30 minutes US Air Force aircraft struck North Korean positions around Haman with bombs, napalm, rockets, and machine gun fire. They also attacked the North Korean-held ridges around the town. Fifteen minutes of concentrated artillery fire followed. Fires spread in Haman. Infantry from 3rd Battalion moved out in attack west at 16:30, reinforced by a platoon of tanks from A Company, 79th Tank Battalion. Eight tanks, mounting infantry, spearheaded the attack into Haman, capturing the city easily, as most of the North Korean troops had abandoned it. North Koreans in force held the ridge on the west side of the town, and their machine gun fire swept every approach. North Korean fire destroyed one tank and the attacking infantry suffered heavy casualties. But Check’s battalion pressed the attack and by 18:25 had seized the first long ridge 500 yards west of Haman. By 20:00 it had secured half of the old battle position on the higher ridge beyond, 1 mile west of Haman. Just 200 yards (180 m) short of the crest on the remainder of the ridge, the infantry dug in for the night. It had recaptured Haman and was pushing back to the 24th’s old positions.

The North Koreans attacked Haman daily for the next week. Following the repelling of North Korean infiltration on September 7, the North Korean attack on Haman ground to a halt. The North Koreans, racked by logistical and manpower shortages, focused more heavily on their attacks against 24th Infantry positions on Battle Mountain, as well as 35th Infantry positions at the Nam River. 24th Infantry troops at Haman encountered only probing attacks until September 18.
Meanwhile, the men of Colonel Fisher's 35th Infantry held the northern part of the 25th Division line, approximately 26,000 yards of it from the Namji-ri Bridge to the Chinju-Masan highway. The regiment was responsible for the highway. Colonel Fisher considered his weakest and most vulnerable point to be a 3-mile gap along the Nakto River between most of F Company on the west and its 1st Platoon to the east. This platoon guarded the Namji-ri cantilever steel bridge on the division extreme right at the boundary with the 2d Division across the Nakto. Colonel Fisher's 35th Infantry command post was on the east side of the Chirwon-Chung-ni road about midway between the two towns.

Half an hour before midnight, 31 August, an enemy self-propelled high-velocity gun from across the Nam fired shells into the position of G Company, 35th Infantry, overlooking the river.

Within a few minutes, enemy artillery had taken under fire all front-line rifle companies of the regiment from the Namji-ri Bridge west. Under cover of this fire a reinforced regiment of the N.K. 7th Division crossed the Nam River and attacked F and G Companies, 35th Infantry. Other enemy soldiers crossed the Nam on an underwater bridge in front of the paddy ground north of Komam-ni and near the boundary between the 2d Battalion, led by Lt. Col. John L. Wilkins, Jr., holding the river front and Lt. Col. Bernard G. Teeter's 1st Battalion holding the hill line that stretched from the Nam River to Sibidang-san and the Chinju-Masan highway.

In the low ground between these two battalions at the river ferry crossing site, Colonel Fisher had placed about 300 ROK police. He expected them to hold there long enough in case of a major attack to serve as a warning device. Guns from the flanking hills there could cover the low ground with fire. Back of Komam-ni he held the 3d Battalion (still technically the 1st Battalion 29th Infantry) ready for use in counterattack to stop an enemy penetration should it occur.

Unexpectedly, the ROK police companies near the ferry scattered at the first enemy fire. Half an hour after midnight enemy troops streamed through this hole in the line, some turning left to take G Company in flank and rear, and others turning right to attack C Company, which was on a spur of ground west of the Komam-ni road. The I&R Platoon and elements of C and D Companies formed a defense line along the dike at the north edge of Komam-ni where tanks joined them at daybreak. But the enemy did not drive for the Komam-ni road fork four miles south of the river as Colonel Fisher expected him to do; instead, he turned east into the hills behind Fisher's 2d Battalion.

The position of B Company, 35th Infantry, on 1,100-foot-high Sibidang-san, flanking the Masan road two miles west of Komam-ni and giving observation over all the surrounding country, was certain to figure prominently in the enemy's attack. It was a key position in the 25th Division line. The enemy's preparatory barrage there lasted from 1130 to midnight. Under cover of it two battalions of the N.K. 13th Regiment, 6th Division, moved up within 150 yards of the American foxholes. At the same time, enemy tanks, self-propelled guns, and antitank guns moved toward Komam-ni on the road at the foot of Sibidang-san. An American Sherman
On the crest of Sibidang-san, an antipersonnel mine field stopped the first enemy infantry assault. Others followed in quick succession. They were met and turned back with the fire of all weapons. By 0230 the B Company riflemen were stripping machine gun ammunition belts for their rifles. The 1st Platoon of C Company, at the base of the mountain behind B Company, met the emergency by climbing Sibidang-san in forty-five minutes with an ammunition resupply for the company. Just before dawn the enemy attack subsided. Daylight disclosed a great amount of abandoned enemy equipment scattered on the slope just below the crest, including thirty light and three heavy machine guns. Among the enemy dead lay the body of the commanding officer of the N.K. 13th Regiment.

At daybreak, 1 September, a tank-led relief force of C Company headquarters troops cleared the road to Sibidang-san and resupplied the 2d Platoon, B Company, with ammunition just in time for it to repel a final North Korean assault, killing seventy-seven and capturing twenty-one of the enemy.

Although Colonel Fisher’s 35th Infantry held all its original positions, except that of the forward platoon of G Company, it nevertheless was in a dangerous situation. Approximately 3,000 North Korean soldiers were behind its lines. The farthest eastern penetration reached the high ground just south of Chirwon overlooking the north-south road there.

Haman Breakthrough

On the 25th Division’s right flank and north of the Haman breakthrough, the 35th Infantry Regiment at daylight, 1 September, still held all its positions except the low ground between Komam-ni and the Nam River, which the two companies of ROK police had abandoned at midnight. In a counterattack after daylight, K Company and tanks had partially regained control of this area, but not completely. Large numbers of North Koreans, by this time, however, were behind the battle positions of the 35th Infantry as far as the Chirwon-ni and Chung-ni areas, six miles east of Komam-ni and the front positions. The North Koreans continued to cross the Nam River after daylight on 1 September in the general area of the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions. Aerial observers saw an estimated four companies crossing there and directed proximity (VT) fuse-fire of the 64th Field Artillery Battalion on the crossing force, which destroyed an estimated three-fourths of it. Fighter planes then strafed the survivors. Aerial observers saw another large group in the open at the river later in the day and directed artillery proximity fuse-fire on it with an estimated 200 enemy casualties.

The 35th Infantry was now surrounded by enemy forces of the N.K. 6th and 7th Divisions, with an estimated three battalions of them behind its lines. Speaking later of the situation, Colonel Fisher, the regimental commander, a professional soldier, trained at West Point, and a regimental commander in World War II, said, "I never intended to withdraw. There was no place to go. I planned to go into a regimental perimeter and hold."
During the predawn hours of 1 September, when the N.K. 7th Division troops had swung left after crossing the Nam River to roll up that flank, widen the gap, drive the American troops from their hill positions overlooking the Nam River, and secure a broad bridgehead for the division, the first American unit they encountered was G Company, 35th Infantry, at the north shoulder of the gap. While some enemy units peeled off to attack G Company, others continued on and engaged E Company, two miles downstream from it, and still others attacked scattered units of F Company all the way to its 1st Platoon, which guarded the Namji-ri Bridge. There, at the extreme right flank of the 25th Division, this platoon drove off an enemy force after a sharp fight. By 2 September, E Company in a heavy battle had destroyed most of an enemy battalion.

On 1 September 1950, the Reds hit the "Cacti" 2nd Battalion with an estimated enemy regiment, cutting off Company G, and causing them to fight off the encircling Reds for two days without let-up. Of all the 2d Battalion units, G Company received the hardest blows. Before dawn of 1 September enemy troops had G Company platoons on separate hills under heavy assault. Shortly after 0300 they overran the 3d Platoon, Heavy Mortar Company, and drove it from its position. These mortar-men climbed Hill 179 and on its crest joined the 2d Platoon of G Company. Finally, an American armored column blasted its way through the Communists to reach the encircled Company. No officers were left, and but 40 enlisted men remained as combat effective. The tanks brought the survivors back, where they took up positions on the line with the parent battalion.

Meanwhile, the 3d Platoon of G Company, on a low hill along the Nam four miles from its juncture with the Naktong, was also under close-in attack. After daylight, Capt. LeRoy E. Majeske, G Company commanding officer, requested artillery concentrations and air strikes, but the latter were slow in coming. At 1145, the enemy had almost reached the crest of the hill, and only the narrow space covered by the air identification panel separated the two forces. A few minutes later Majeske was killed, and 2d Lt. George Roach, commanding the 3d Platoon, again reported the desperate situation and asked for an air strike. The Air Force delivered the strike on the enemy-held side of the hill, and this checked the assaults. But by this time many enemy troops had captured and occupied foxholes in the platoon position and from them they threw grenades into other parts of the position. One of the grenades killed Lieutenant Roach early in the afternoon. SFC Junius Poovey, a squad leader, now assumed command. In this close fight, one of the heroes was Cpl. Hideo Hashimoto, a Japanese-American, who edged himself forward and threw grenades into the enemy holes, some of them only ten to fifteen feet away. By 1800, Sergeant Poovey had only 12 effectives left in the platoon; 17 of the 29 men still living were wounded. With ammunition almost gone, Poovey requested and received authority to withdraw into the main G Company position. After dark, the 29 men, 3 of them carried on stretchers, escaped by timing their departure from the hill with the arrival of friendly tanks which engaged the enemy and diverted attention from the beleaguered men on top. The group reached the G Company position on Hill 179 half an hour before midnight.

The series of events that caused General Kean to change the direction of DeChow's attack toward Komam-ni began at 0100, 3 September. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, protruded farther westward at this time than any other unit of the U.N. forces in Korea. Back of its positions on Sibidang-san the main supply route and rear areas were in enemy hands, and only in daylight and under escort could vehicles travel the road. On Sibidang-san the battalion had held its original positions after the heavy fighting of pre-dawn 1 September, completely surrounded by barbed wire, booby traps, and flares, with all supporting weapons inside its tight perimeters. The battalion had the advantage of calling by number for previously zeroed and numbered protective fires covering all approaches, which were quickly delivered. An hour after midnight an unusually heavy enemy assault struck the battalion. The fight there
continued until dawn 3 September, when the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, counted 143 enemy
dead in front of its positions, and on that basis estimated that the total enemy casualties must
have been about 500 men.

In this night-battle the 64th Field
Artillery Battalion gave invaluable
support to the 1st Battalion and
became directly involved itself in the
fighting. About fifty North Koreans
infiltrated before dawn to A Battery's
position and delivered a banzai-type
assault. Enemy soldiers employing
submachine guns overran two
artillery-machine gun perimeter
positions, penetrating to the artillery
pieces at 0300. There, Capt. Andrew
C. Anderson and his men fought
hand-to-hand with the North
Koreans. Some of the guns fell
temporarily into enemy hands and
one North Korean scrawled on a
howitzer tube, "Hurrah for our
Company!" But the artillerymen
threw the North Koreans out, aided greatly by the concentrations of fire from C Battery, 90th
Field Artillery Battalion, which were placed within fifty yards of the battery and sealed off
effemy reinforcements. In defending its guns in this night battle, A Battery lost seven men
killed and twelve wounded-about 25 percent of its strength.

Although the 25th Division generally was under much less enemy pressure after 5 September,
there were still severe local attacks. On 6 September Colonel Check's 1st Battalion, 27th
Infantry, moved north from the Haman area to join Murch's 2d Battalion in the clean-up of
enemy troops back of the 35th Infantry and below the Nam River. Caught between the 35th
Infantry on its hill positions along the river and the attacking 27th Infantry units, large
numbers of North Koreans were killed. Sixteen different groups reportedly were dispersed
with heavy casualties during the day. By morning of 7 September there was clear evidence
that survivors of the N.K. 7th Division were trying to escape across the Nam River. The 25th
Division buried more than 2,000 North Korean dead, killed between 1 and 7 September behind
its lines. This number did not include those killed in front of its positions. About 9 September
Colonel Fisher traveled over these rear areas where fighting had been intense. He was
astonished at the number of North Korean dead that littered the fields. Speaking of that
occasion he has said, "The area of Trun in the Falaise Gap in Europe couldn't match it. Flies
were so thick in some areas it limited vision."

Heavy rains caused the Nam and Naktong Rivers to rise more than two feet on 8 and 9
September, thereby reducing the danger of new enemy crossings. At this juncture one of the
ironies of the Korean War occurred. On the 8th, American jet planes (F-82's) mistakenly
bombed the Namji-ri Bridge over the Naktong and with one 500-pound bomb destroyed the 80-
foot center span. Only the bridges north of the juncture of the Nam with the Naktong were
supposed to be subject to aerial attack at this time. Lieutenant Vickery's 1st Platoon of F
Company, 35th Infantry, had effectively defended the bridge-the link between the U.S. 2d and
25th Divisions-throughout the enemy offensive. The platoon had become so closely identified
with this bridge that in the 25th Division it was called "Vickery's Bridge." Vickery had placed
one squad on the north side of the bridge. From the south side it was supported by the rest of the platoon, a tank, and one 105-mm. howitzer, fondly called "Peg O' My Heart."

Some of the local commanders thought that had the North Koreans bypassed this bridge and crossed the Naktong farther east there would have been nothing between them and Pusan. However, North Korean attacks against Vickery's men were a nightly occurrence. The approaches to the bridge on the north side were mined. At one time there were about 100 North Korean dead lying in that area. One morning a pack of dogs were tearing the bodies when one of the animals set off a mine. That scattered the pack and the dogs in their wild flight set off more mines. Pieces of dog went flying through the air like rocks.

For the gallantry displayed in preventing the North Koreans from breaking through to the port of Pusan, the 35th Infantry Regiment and its attached and supporting units were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation embroidered NAM RIVER.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT

September 1950: The Pusan Perimeter Breakout

The Inch'on landing was a classic hammer and anvil tactic, designed to demoralize and cut of the North Korean Army troops putting so much pressure on the perimeter at Pusan. The mission of the 25th Division was to engage and tie up the North Korean 6th Division in its zone at the left flank. From there she would drive west and north, destroying the enemy caught between themselves and the forces at Seoul.

Essentially, the Eighth Army offensive constituted more of a holding attack, allowing the X Corps to make the main effort. Walker's forces would then need to link up quickly with the X Corps to cut off a large body of North Koreans in the southwestern part of the peninsula. Walker anticipated that the news of the Inch'on landing would have a demoralizing effect on the North Koreans while boosting the spirits of his troops. For that reason, he requested that the Eighth Army delay its attack until the day after the Inch'on landing.

The initial forward movement in the general offensive to break out of the "Pusan Perimeter" was begun on 16 September. The enemy was credited with some of the most stubborn resistance yet encountered. Flame-throwers, grenades and bayonets were required to dislodge him from well-prepared entrenchments. Fighting continued at a steady rate until 18 September. The 35th RCT soon gained ground. Northeast of Chungam-ni resistance began to stiffen.

On 19 September the 35th Infantry on the right, or northern, flank met light resistance until it reached the high ground in front of Chungam-ni. There, in cleverly hidden spider holes, enemy troops fired on 1st Battalion soldiers from the rear.

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The 35th's 1st Battalion pushed on to a point two miles north of Chungam-ni, while its Company C was ordered to clear out a pocket of Reds in dug-in positions on a ridgeline. It was during this attack that Sergeant William R Jacelin was posthumously awarded the United States Congressional Medal of Honor.
Sergeant William R. Jacelin, Company "C", 35th Infantry Regiment, United States Army, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against the enemy near Saga, Korea, on 19 September 1950. His company was ordered to secure a prominent, saw-toothed ridge from well-entrenched and heavily armed forces. Unable to capture the objective on the first attempt, a frontal and flanking assault was launched. Sergeant Jacelin led his platoon through heavy enemy fire and bursting shells, across the rice fields and rocky terrain, in direct frontal attack on the ridge in order to draw fire away from the flanks. The unit advanced to the base of the cliff, where intense hostile fire stopped the attack. Realizing that an assault was the only solution, Sergeant Jacelin rose from his position, firing his rifle and throwing grenades as he called on his men to follow him. Despite the intense enemy fire, this attack carried to the crest of the ridge, where the men were forced to take cover. Again he rallied his men and stormed the enemy strongpoint. With fixed bayonets, they charged into the face of strong anti-tank fire and engaged the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. After clubbing and slashing this force into submission, the platoon was forced to take cover from direct frontal attack by a self-propelled gun. Refusing to be stopped, Sergeant Jacelin leaped to his feet, and through sheer personal courage and fierce determination, led his men in a new attack. At this instant, a well-camouflaged enemy soldier threw a grenade at the remaining members of the platoon. He immediately lunged and covered the explosion with his body to save those around him. This incredible courage and willingness to sacrifice himself for his comrades so imbued them with fury that they completely eliminated the enemy force.

The next day the 1st Battalion captured Chungam-ni, and the 2d Battalion took the long ridgeline running northwest from Chungam-ni to the Nam River. To the south, heavy fighting on the 25th Division’s left flank kept the 27th Infantry busy as it tried to move forward.

On the twenty-first, three miles southwest of Chungam-ni, the 35th Infantry captured the well-known Notch. She then moved rapidly west eight air miles without resistance to the high ground at the Chinju pass, only to be blocked by 6th Division elements protecting the unit’s withdrawal across the Nam River and through Chinju some six miles to the west.

In a move to reposition the 27th Regiment from the 25th Division's south flank to its north flank, General Kean formed Task Force Torman, a special task force under Capt. Charles J. Torman, commanding officer of the 25th Reconnaissance Company. The task force moved through the 27th Infantry on the southern coastal road at Paedun-ni the evening of the 23d. The 27th Regiment then began its move from
that place to the division's north flank at Chungam-ni. The 27th Infantry was to establish a bridgehead across the Nam River and attack through Uiryong toward Chinju.

On the morning of 24 September Task Force Torman attacked along the coastal road toward Chinju. North of Sach'on the task force engaged and dispersed about 200 enemy soldiers of the 3d Battalion, 104th Security Regiment. By evening it had seized the high ground at the road juncture three miles south of Chinju. The next morning the task force moved up to the Nam River Bridge, which crossed into Chinju. In doing so one of the tanks hit a mine and fragments from the explosion seriously wounded Captain Torman, who had to be evacuated.

Meanwhile, on the main inland road to Chinju the N.K. 6th Division delayed the 35th Infantry at the Chinju pass until the evening of 23 September, when enemy covering units withdrew. The next day the 35th Infantry consolidated its position at the pass. That night a patrol reported that enemy demolitions had rendered the highway bridge over the Nam at Chinju unusable. On the strength of this information the 35th Regiment made plans to cross the Nam downstream from the bridge. Under cover of darkness at 0200, 25 September, the 2d Battalion crossed the river two and a half miles southeast of Chinju. It then attacked and seized Chinju, supported by tank fire from Task Force Torman across the river. About 300 enemy troops using mortar and artillery fire, served as a delaying force in defending the town. The 3d and 1st Battalions crossed the river into Chinju in the afternoon, and that evening Task Force Torman crossed on an underwater sandbag ford that the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion built 200 yards east of the damaged highway bridge. Working all night, the engineers repaired the highway bridge so that vehicular traffic began crossing it at noon the next day, 26 September.

On 24 September Eighth Army had altered its earlier operational order and directed IX Corps to execute unlimited objective attacks to seize Chonju and Kanggyong. To carry out his part of the order, General Kean organized two main task forces with armored support centered about the 24th and 35th Infantry Regiments. The leading elements of these two task forces were known respectively as Task Force Matthews, formerly Task Force Torman, and Task Force Dolvin. Both forces were to start their drives from Chinju. Task Force Matthews, the left-hand column, was to proceed west toward Hadong and there turn northwest to Kurye, Namwon, Sunch'ang, Kumje, Iri, and Kunsan on the Kum River estuary. Taking off at the same time, Task Force Dolvin, the right-hand column, was to drive north out of Chinju toward Hamyang, there turn west to Namwon, and proceed northwest to Chonju, Iri, and Kanggyong on the Kum River.

Three blown bridges west of Chinju delayed the departure of Task Force Matthews (formerly Task Force Torman) until 1000, 27 September. The task force, made up of A Company, 79th Tank Battalion and the 25th Reconnaissance Company, was followed by the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, with the rest of the regiment behind it. Matthews reached Hadong at 1730.

In a sense, the advance of Task Force Matthews became a chase to rescue a group of U.S. prisoners that the North Koreans moved just ahead of the pursuers. Korean civilians and bypassed enemy soldiers kept telling of them being four hours ahead, two hours ahead—but always ahead. At Hadong the column learned that some of the prisoners were only thirty minutes ahead. From Hadong, in bright moonlight, the attack turned northwest toward Kurye. About ten miles above Hadong at the little village of Komdu the advanced elements of the task force liberated eleven American prisoners. They had belonged to the 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment. Most of them were unable to walk and some had open wounds.
The next day, 28 September, the task force rescued 86 American prisoners in Namwon from their Korean captors. Bearded and haggard, most were bare-footed and in tatters, and all were obviously half starved. They had caught up with the American prisoners.

Task Forces Matthews and Blair cleared Namwon of enemy soldiers. In midafternoon Task Force Dolvin arrived there from the east. Task Force Matthews remained overnight in Namwon, but Task Force Blair, the main 24th Infantry group, continued on toward Chongup, which was secured at noon the next day, 29 September. That evening Blair's force secured Iri. There, with the bridge across the river destroyed, Blair stopped for the night and Task Force Matthews joined it. Kunsan, the port city on the Kum River estuary, fell to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, without opposition at 1300, 30 September.

Meanwhile, eastward of and generally parallel to the course of Task Force Matthews and the 24th Infantry, Task Force Dolvin and the 35th Infantry moved around the eastern and northern sides of the all but impenetrable Chiri-san area, just as the 24th Infantry had passed around its southern and western sides. This almost trackless waste of 750 square miles of 6,000 to 7,000-foot-high forested mountains forms a rough rectangle northwest of Chinju about thirty by twenty-five miles in dimension, with Chinju, Hadong, Namwon, and Hamyang at its four corners. This inaccessible area had long been a hideout for Communist agents and guerrillas in South Korea. Now, as the North Korean forces retreated from southwest Korea, many enemy stragglers and some organized units with as many as 200 to 400 men went into the Chiri Mountain fastness. There they planned to carry on guerrilla activities.

Lt. Col. Welborn G. Dolvin, commanding officer of the 88th Tank Battalion, led Task Force Dolvin out of Chinju at 0600, 26 September, on the road northwest toward Hamyang, the retreat route taken by the main body of the N.K. 6th Division. The tank-infantry task force included as its main elements A and B Companies, 89th Medium Tank Battalion, and B and C Companies, 35th Infantry. It had two teams, A and B, each formed of an infantry company and a tank company. The infantry rode the rear decks of the tanks. The tank company commanders commanded the teams.

Three miles out of Chinju the lead M26 tank struck a mine. While the column waited, engineers removed eleven more from the road. Half a mile farther on, a second tank was damaged in another minefield. Still farther along the road a third minefield, covered by an enemy platoon, stopped the column again. After the task force dispersed the enemy soldiers and cleared the road of mines, it found 6 antitank guns, 9 vehicles, and an estimated 7 truckloads of ammunition in the vicinity abandoned by the enemy. At dusk, the enemy blew a bridge three miles north of Hajon-ni just half an hour before the task force reached it. During the night the task force constructed a bypass.

The next morning, 27 September, a mine explosion damaged and stopped the lead tank. Enemy mortar and small arms fire from the ridges near the road struck the advanced tank-infantry team. Tank fire cleared the left side of the road, but an infantry attack on the right failed. The column halted, and radioed for an air strike. Sixteen F-51 fighter-bombers came in strafing and striking the enemy-held high ground with napalm, fragmentation bombs, and rockets. General Kean, who had come forward, watched the strike and then ordered the task force to press the attack and break through the enemy positions. The task force broke through on the road, bypassing an estimated 600 enemy soldiers. Another blown bridge halted the column for the night while engineers constructed a bypass.

Continuing its advance at first tight on the 28th, Task Force Dolvin an hour before noon met elements of the 23d Infantry, U.S. 2d Division, advancing from the east, at the road junction
just east of Hamyang. There it halted three hours while engineers and 280 Korean laborers constructed a bypass around another blown bridge. Ever since leaving Chinju, Task Force Dolvin had encountered minefields and blown bridges, the principal delaying efforts of the retreating N.K. 6th Division.

When it was approaching Hamyang the task force received a liaison plane report that enemy forces were preparing to blow a bridge in the town. On Colonel Dolvin's orders the lead tanks sped ahead, machine-gunned enemy troops who were placing demolition charges, and seized the bridge intact. This success upset the enemy's delaying plans. The rest of the afternoon the task force dashed ahead at a speed of twenty miles an hour. It caught up with numerous enemy groups, killing some of the soldiers, capturing others, and dispersing the rest. At mid-afternoon Task Force Dolvin entered Namwon to find that Task Force Matthews and elements of the 24th Infantry were already there.

Refueling in Namwon, Task Force Dolvin just after midnight continued northward and in the morning reached Chonju, already occupied by elements of the 38th Infantry Regiment, and continued on through Iri to the Kum River. The next day at 1500, 30 September, its mission accomplished, Task Force Dolvin was dissolved. It had captured or destroyed 16 antitank guns, 19 vehicles, 65 tons of ammunition, 250 mines, captured 750 enemy soldiers, and killed an estimated 350 more. It lost 3 tanks disabled by mines and 1 officer and 45 enlisted men were wounded in action.

In crossing southwest Korea from Chinju to the Kum River, Task Force Matthews had traveled 220 miles and Task Force Dolvin, 138 miles. In the wake of Task Force Dolvin the 27th Regiment moved north from Chinju to Hamyang and Namwon on 29 September and maintained security on the supply road. This same day, 29 September, ROK marines captured Yosu on the south coast.

Now, the ticklish and unspectacular task of destroying enemy pockets must be accomplished. As the units swept in zones of responsibility, they also assisted in the screening of the local populace, and bolstered the local Korean civilian authorities. The new mission was begun with self-confidence and determination. The "Cacti" started its fourth mission along with the rest of the Tropic Lightning Division, mopping up in the Kunsan-Taejon Areas.

As MacArthur had anticipated, the North Korean Army was cut off and in retreat. By 23 September the enemy cordon around the Pusan Perimeter had been destroyed. The North Korean soldiers in the south had disintegrated as an effective military force; while some escaped to the north and others became guerrillas in the south, most were casualties. The breakout from the Pusan Perimeter cost the Eighth Army 790 killed and 3,544 wounded. But X Corps and Eighth Army soldiers had captured 23,000 enemy personnel and killed thousands more.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT

October 1950

Crossing the 38th Parallel

As soon as UN leaders digested the allied success, they began to debate the advisability of crossing the 38th Parallel into North Korea. The National Security Council advised President Harry S. Truman against moving north. The council’s position was that the expulsion of the North Koreans from South Korea was a sufficient victory. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed
however, claiming military doctrine demanded that the North Korean Army be destroyed completely to prevent renewed aggression. President Truman, on 11 September, adopted the arguments of his military advisers while heeding the National Security Council’s call to avoid provoking Communist China and the Soviet Union.

Thus, on 27 September, the Joint Chiefs directed General MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel for the purpose of destroying North Korea’s military forces, providing that no Chinese or Soviet forces had entered, or threatened to enter, North Korea. They further decreed that UN troops were not to go into China or the Soviet Union and that only ROK soldiers should operate along these borders. Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, on the twenty-ninth, sent MacArthur a personal message that confirmed his approval for tactical and strategic operations north of the parallel. This message, MacArthur was told, had been personally endorsed by Truman.

MacArthur received a secondary mission to unite all of Korea, if possible, under President Rhee.

The responses to this decision were immediate and strong. On 1 October Premier Chou En-lai warned that China would not tolerate or stand aside if UN forces invaded North Korea. This was a clear threat that China would intervene if that should happen. On the second the Soviet delegate to the United Nations proposed that a cease-fire in Korea be called and that all foreign troops be withdrawn. The following day the Indian delegate expressed his government’s position that UN forces should not cross the 38th Parallel.

General MacArthur, on 1 October, sent a message to the commander in chief of the North Korean forces, demanding that the North Koreans lay down their arms and cease hostilities under UN military supervision so as to avoid further loss of life and destruction of property. The message also called for the release of UN prisoners of war and civilian internees. But North Korea ignored the proposals. MacArthur issued a last chance ultimatum for North Korea to surrender on the ninth. While North Korea did not respond officially, Premier Kim Il Sung rejected it the following day in a radio broadcast. Meanwhile, on the seventh, the UN General Assembly had passed a resolution calling for the unification of Korea and authorizing MacArthur to send troops across the 38th Parallel.

Meanwhile, the North Korean Forces continued to retreat toward the 38th Parallel. Between 3 and 5 October, the 25th Division moved to the Taejon area where elements of the 24th Infantry Division were relieved. The IX Corps command post opened at Taejon on 5 October. The 2d infantry Division assumed responsibility generally for the area west and southwest of Taejon, and the 25th Division for the Taejon area and that south and east of it.

During October the 25th Division was the American organization most actively employed in anti-guerrilla warfare. It had 6,500 square miles of mountainous country in its zone of responsibility. This lay athwart the escape routes from the old Pusan Perimeter of the larger part of the enemy units cut off or bypassed. On occasion, large groups of enemy soldiers were cornered and either destroyed or captured. On 7 October the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, largely as a result of unusually effective artillery fire, killed or wounded about 400 of an enemy force estimated to number approximately 500 men. On another occasion the 3d Battalion of the same regiment captured 549 prisoners in one day.

Few North Korean units showed much inclination to fight. On the other hand, they did not exhibit a disposition to surrender en masse. The 14,676 prisoners captured during the month
of October were the result of aggressive patrolling. Only "diehard" fanatics and guerillas remained.

A rigorous training program was instituted to increase the combat effectiveness of the troops for future missions, and to indoctrinate the replacements, which had begun to arrive.

The Yalu River

With the North Korean capital city secured, the Eighth Army continued its push northward toward the Yalu River, Korea's traditional border with China. The Ch'ongch'on River and its tributaries, the Kuryong and Taeryong Rivers, all flowing from the north, formed the last major water barrier in the western part of North Korea short of the border. At this point in time, the Ch'ongch'on River was the principal terrain feature in the Eighth Army's field of operations, and it largely dictated the army's deployment and tactical maneuvers.

China Intervenes

Late in October, in the mountainous region above P'yongyang, the Eighth Army was poised to cross the Ch'ongch'on River in full force. Morale among the American and allied soldiers was high, for many thought that this river crossing would be the last brief phase of the war. However, nearly one hundred eighty thousand CCF soldiers secretly crossed the Yalu River between 14 October and 1 November. General MacArthur, unaware of the full extent of Communist China's commitment, believed that the attack on 25 October was a token gesture rather than a serious intercession. But, by early November, intelligence officers had amassed undeniable evidence that the Chinese had indeed intervened in strength.

An operational directive from IX Corps on 31 October stated the 25th Division would be relieved in the present area by the 3rd ROK Corps not later than 5 November 1950. The Division was to assemble in a suitable billeting area in the vicinity of Taejon for further movement by rail and motor. Plans for the orientation of the ROK troops and the assembling of the Division were being formulated as the Division moved.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT

November 1950 - Meeting the Reds

At the beginning of November, the Chinese Reds had been hurled into the conflict just as the UN troops were entering the final phase of their drive to the Yalu River. On 8 November, the "Cacti" was in a position near the 38th parallel.

The Communists were being driven from North Korea as the United Nations Forces had swept through Pyonggang, and were rapidly advancing to the Yalu River, the International boundary between Korea and Manchuria. Meanwhile, Chinese Communist Forces were being rushed across the Yalu, and launched a sneak attack against the rapidly advancing "Liberators". A new, fresh army of invaders faced the United Nations Forces.

Again, the "Tropic Lightning" fighters were called upon to stop the invaders. A telephone message on 2 November alerted the division for immediate movement to Kaesong, preparatory to further movement north by organic transportation. As the troops assembled in this area, reports were received of the increased activity of bypassed enemy groups, and the men were employed to sweep and destroy the Red bands threatening the Eighth Army vital supply lines to the north.
An IX Corps order was received on 10 November, directing the movement of the Division to the Sunchon area for an offensive mission; however, the next day the move was delayed by Eighth Army, due to the critical supply situation in the north. The Division was to carry out the mission of mopping up and securing the Kaesong area. The Turkish Infantry Brigade and the 17th ROK Regiment were attached to join in combating the vigorous attacks of the guerilla bands. Well-organized and armed enemy units were met in the Ichon-Pyonggang area.

A telephone call from Eighth Army on 17 November ordered movement without delay to an assembly area north of Pyonggang. The Turkish Brigade was to accompany the Division in the move, which was to be completed in five days.

With the cessation of Chinese attacks on 6 November, Walker and Almond (X Corps Commander) began planning to resume the offensive, both Walker and Almond planned to follow through with major offensives of all their forces beginning on 24 and 27 November, respectively.

In the west, Eighth Army began its offensive north from its positions along the Ch’ongch’on River, some fifty miles north of P’yongyang, on 24 November. Its initial objective was to reestablish contact with any remnant North Korean forces or Chinese volunteer units. The Eighth Army’s IX Corps with the 25th Infantry Division, 2d Infantry Division, and the Turkish Brigade were in the center of the line.
Elements of the United States 1st Corps, presently known as I US Corps, in the Division zone of responsibility, were relieved on 22 November; and "H-hour" for the all-out offensive, "The Yalu, then home! " was announced at 1000 hours on 24 November 1950.

Task Force DOLVIN, an armored spearhead, pushed through the center of the zone, with the 24th and 35th RCT’s on its flanks, over the rough, frozen, and mountainous terrain. The initial attack advanced steadily against only light opposition. Important gains were made along the entire front, but as the attack progressed, enemy resistance stiffened. In order to strengthen the driving force, an infantry battalion was added to Task Force DOLVIN, thus forming the hard-hitting Task Force WILSON. The North Korean "People’s Army" had been defeated, and was being driven back into the river.

The I Corps attacked west and northwest toward Chongju and T’aech’on, while IX Corps (25TH Division) headed north toward Unsan, Onjong, and Huich’on. The ROK II Corps began moving toward the northeast and into the Taebaek Mountains on the Eighth Army’s right flank that separated Eighth Army from X Corps. All advancing units generally received only scattered small-arms fire, and in most instances they moved unopposed toward their objectives.

A few miles from Unsan, elements of the 25th Division discovered thirty U.S. soldiers missing since the 8th Cavalry’s battle with the Chinese weeks before. They had been captured and then released by the Chinese and suffered from wounds and frostbite, but they were alive. By
25 November all units were reporting that they had reached their objectives, although they also reported increasing enemy resistance and even some local counterattacks. However, optimism still prevailed. Eighth Army thus planned to resume its offensive in conjunction with the planned attack of X Corps in the east beginning on 27 November.

In a swift reversal of the fortunes of war, a sudden onslaught by overwhelming numbers of fresh Red Chinese troops, rushed into the conflict from the "Privileged Sanctuary" of Manchuria, beyond the Yalu, and drove back the Eighth Army troops along the entire fifty-mile front in northwestern Korea.

On the night of 25 November the Chinese struck Eighth Army again. Attacks also were pressed against the U.S. 25th Infantry Division to the 2d Division's left, prompting a now-alerted U.S. command to cancel the advance planned for 26 November. Suddenly on the defensive, U.S. soldiers dug in and consolidated their positions while waiting for new Chinese attacks.

Eighth Army's situation was complicated by the fact that the Chinese broke through elements of the ROK II Corps on the army's right wing. They penetrated the ROK front in several places, establishing roadblocks to the rear of ROK units, cutting them off and creating panic. By noon on the 26th, the ROK II Corps front had folded, exposing Eighth Army's entire flank.

Late on the twenty-sixth Chinese forces struck again on the Eighth Army's right flank, with the goal of exploiting the collapse of the ROK II Corps while attempting to flank the entire Eighth Army from the east. The lightly armed Chinese troops quickly overran the positions. The violent attack was pressed without regard to losses. Thousands of assault troops were slain, but enough survived to capture the positions they stormed. Attacking heavily in the east and center sections of the UN line, the Chinese threw five field armies into the fight while sending another against the 24th Division to the west on a holding mission. Attacks against the ROK 1st Division drove that unit back and soon exposed the flanks of both the U.S. 24th and 25th Divisions. Only a rapid readjustment of forces plugged this gap and stabilized the situation by early evening on 27 November.

However, the situation was growing grim. By mid-afternoon on the 28th all U.S. and ROK units were in retreat. Attempts by the 2d Division to hold the line and by the 1st Cavalry Division and Turkish Brigade to restore Eighth Army's right flank were in vain. Two Chinese Armies, the 42d and 38th, were pouring through the broken ROK lines to Eighth Army's east and threatening to envelop the entire force. Walker's only hope was to bring off a fighting withdrawal of his army deep behind the Ch'ongch'on River line, below the gathering Chinese thrust from the east. The 25th yielded ground to protect its exposed right flank, and to elude envelopment by massive Chinese Communist Forces. The military situation was grave but not disastrous.

The 35th Infantry became entangled in the withdrawal as well. In the days of 27-28 November, the Cacti lost more men than at any other time in Korea. Over 130 lost their lives or were captured.

"The immunity of the 35th Infantry on the night of 25-26 November, and the day of 26 November, from Chinese attack, when it was general elsewhere across the Eighth Army front, seems to have been intentional. Later intelligence disclosed that the 39th and 40th CCf armies were massed in assembly areas near Unsan and that the 35th Infantry was advancing straight toward them. The CCF 66th Army was concentrated just a few miles farther west. The Chinese hit the ROK 1st Division, just to the left of the 35th Infantry, and Task Force Dolvin just to the
right of it, in strength on their first night of their 2nd phase offensive, 25-26 November. They could have done the same against the 35th Infantry, had they wanted. But with their attack forces advancing south of the 35th Infantry on both its left and right flanks and with the 35th having no contact with friendly forces on either flank, the enemy envisioned a perfect trap for the unit as it advanced into the heart of their assembly areas. The regiment then could have been cut off in the heart of enemy-held country and surrounded. Fortunately, the 25th Division CP realized the danger facing the regiment and stopped it on the morning of 26 November."

"Beginning about 3p.m. on 27 November, Chinese assault troops drove in K and L Company outposts. The combat quickly became hand-to-hand in places, especially in K Company. Lieutenant Hinewood, a forward observer with K Company for the mortar company, had a fist fight with a Chinese soldier. Captain Hughes, K Company commander, stayed with his men two hours after being wounded. K Company held its lines against repeated enemy attacks and quickly sealed off one enemy penetration and subsequently restored its own position. An estimated two Chinese Regiments assaulted the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 35th Infantry during the night, withdrawing from the battle only with the coming of dawn. Alter daylight, a great many Chinese dead could be seen in front of the company perimeters. The dead were especially numerous in front of K Company. There were 374 counted enemy dead and an estimated 600 Chinese soldiers killed from the defensive fires and fighting of the 35th during the night. Six Chinese prisoners were captured, all from the 117 Division, 39th Army."
Brig. Gen. George B. Barth later stated that the stand of K Company in hurling back repeated Chinese attacks probably averted a major disaster. The Chinese attacks against it were persistent because that is where the Chinese command intended to open a penetration. More than a division of enemy troops, about 10,000, according to prisoner information, stood ready behind the assault teams to pour through the penetration into the rear of the 35th into the rear of the infantry lines if K Company had broken. This large enemy force subsequently shifted westward and exploited a penetration of the ROK 1st Division lines during the day. Despite the heavy fighting during the night, the casualties of L and K companies were not heavy - a tribute to good leadership, discipline and the professional use of weapons. (Roy E Appleman – Author)

Narrative of Art Buckley – King Co 3rd Bn 35th Infantry Regiment

These dates are significant in that it was our first meeting with the Chinese. We (the 35th Regiment) were on our way to the Yalu River to finish the war when the Chinks stepped in and spoiled the whole thing. I guess that they didn't realize that MacArthur had promised us a Victory parade in Tokyo by Christmas. Oh well!

The Chinese first let their presence be known to us late at night on the 27th of Nov. 1950. They hit our Company (K) with a Battalion sized attack, which lasted till dawn. We kicked their ass (I like to relish the term "kicked their ass" because for the next few weeks they kicked ours). In any case Capt. Hughes was one of the few who were wounded that night (while he was busy earning the DSC).

On the 27th of Nov there were 47 CACTI KIA. These were overwhelmingly from the 1st Bn, mainly Baker Company. It is also interesting to note that there were 5 CACTI Combat Medics KIA that day.

The next day, the 28th, we started to pull back supposedly to straighten up the Division front. It was in the process of pulling back that the Chinese got all over us. They had set up blocking positions every few miles between where we were and the Ch’ongch’on River about 30 or so miles to the south. We basically had to fight our way out of this encirclement. We lost many good soldiers (KIA & MIA) during this battle. The 3rd Bn was the rear guard for the 35th Regiment and the regiment was rearguard for the 25th Division. There was no reserve; all troops were on the line (such as it was).

On the 28th there were 86 KIA. Mostly from the 3rd Bn (47) and of the 3rd Bn KIA’s 20 were from my Company (King Co.). There were quite a few on both days wherein the Company was not designated, but I suspect many (at least on the 28th) were 3rd Bn troops. (End of narrative)

The withdrawal of Eighth Army units was made more difficult by the thousands of fleeing Korean refugees who blocked the roads. In addition, the hordes of refugees gave excellent cover to Chinese and North Korean infiltrators, who often dressed in Korean clothing, went through U.S. checkpoints, and then turned and opened fire on the startled Americans. The tactics repeated those used by the North Koreans during the initial invasion of the South and were often equally effective. As in the summer, Eighth Army orders directed that refugees be diverted from main roads, escorted by South Korean police, and routed around allied defensive lines, although the strictures were often difficult to enforce.

Round-the-clock air attacks in close support of ground troops inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The over-all situation continued to be critical, and I Corps ordered the 25th
Division to occupy defensive positions on the south bank of the Ch’ongch’on River on 30 November.

The battles along the Ch’ongch’on River were a major defeat for the Eighth Army and a mortal blow to the hopes of MacArthur and others for the reunification of Korea by force of arms. Although not closely pursued by the Chinese, Walker decided that his army was in no shape to hold the Sukch’on–Sinch’ang-ni line and ordered a retreat farther south before his forces could be enveloped by fresh Chinese attacks.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT

December 1950 - The Fallback

At the beginning of December 1950, with other units of the 25th Division, the 35th was forced to fall back, first to Ch’ongch’on River then to the high ground south of Pyongyang. It was Heartbreak Highway all over again, this time with a new and more desperate foe.

At this time, Colonel Henry G. Fisher, commanding the Cacti, was evacuated to the hospital for pneumonia. Colonel Fisher had commanded the Regiment while it was in Japan and during the Korean Campaign until this time. It was said he wore himself out completely through indefatigable efforts to keep his command at the peak of efficiency it had displayed all during the war. Lt. Colonel Gerald C. Kelleher, who was to carry the "Cacti" Regiment to many more victories later in the war, succeeded him in command.

The masses of Chinese reinforcements continued to flow from the Manchurian side of the border, which was only fifty to sixty miles from the main battlefront. The United Nations Forces were ordered to withdraw to the south. Successive blocking positions were occupied by the elements of the 25th Division to cover the withdrawal of other UN units, and to prevent the Reds from cutting the route to the rear. Minimum losses were sustained as these retrograde movements were effected.

Delivering positions were occupied along the south side of the 38th Parallel in the vicinity of Kaesong by the units of the Division on 9 December.

A strong defense line was established south of the Imjin River on 14 December. Extensive work was done on an intricate defense system. Multiple defensive measures and material were utilized. Many miles of wire were stretched; mines and flares were placed; fields of fire were laid in. All possible entrances into the zone were covered.

General Walker was an indirect casualty of the Chinese attacks. On the morning of 23 December the Eighth Army commander left Seoul by jeep on an inspection trip. Ten miles north of the capital, his vehicle zoomed north past several U.S. trucks halted on the opposite side of the road. Suddenly, a Korean truck driver pulled out of his lane, heading south, and tried to bypass the trucks. In doing so, he pulled into the northbound lane and collided with Walker’s jeep. The commander was knocked unconscious and later pronounced dead from multiple head injuries.
The man selected to replace General Walker as Eighth Army commander was Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway.

Beginning on 26 December, the CCF struck hard at UN units on the western approaches to Seoul. Supporting attacks occurred as well in the central and eastern parts of the line. The Chinese hit the ROK units hard, and again several units broke. Two out of three regiments of the ROK 2d Division fled the battlefield, leaving their valiant 17th Regiment to fight alone and hold its position for hours despite heavy losses. Ridgway reluctantly ordered a general, but orderly, withdrawal, with units instructed to maintain contact with the enemy during their retreat, rather than simply giving up real estate without inflicting losses on the enemy.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT

January 1951

The defenses along the Imjin River were abandoned because the units on the right flank had crumbled. The Chinese made a strong attack on 1 January 1951, against the 1st ROK Division on the right, and its line was penetrated as a large column hit on an extremely narrow front. Additional columns of hostile soldiers poured through the gap for exploitation of the breakthrough.

Initially, Eighth Army pulled back thirty miles to a defensive line along the Han River to protect Seoul. By 2 January both I and IX Corps had successfully concluded the new withdrawal and, with extensive firepower at their command, their chances of holding the city were good. However, there was a distinct danger that the two corps could be outflanked to the east and forced to defend Seoul with their backs to the sea. Ridgway, unwilling to risk the loss or isolation of so much of his combat power, reluctantly ordered the retreat of both corps to "Line C," just south of the Han. For the third time in the war so far, Seoul was to change hands.

Followed by hordes of refugees hauling their loved ones or a few personal treasures on their backs or on oxcarts, I and IX Corps began withdrawing from Seoul on 3 January. On the whole, the allies accomplished the evacuation of Seoul with minimal casualties.

The withdrawal to Line C was complete. However, even as units were moving into position on this defensive line, plans were being executed to withdraw some thirty-five miles farther south to Line D, running from P’yongt’aek in the west, northwestward through Wonju to Wonpo-ri.

Ridgway assessed the situation and, after the withdrawal from Seoul was completed, ordered the entire Eighth Army to withdraw again to Line D, which was somewhat redrawn to run
straight east from Wonju to Samch’ok instead of northeastward to Wonpo-ri. Beginning on 5 January all five corps of Eighth Army pulled back to this line. Despite its losses, the Eighth Army situation was thus much improved from the last days of November, with better coordination between units and fewer open flanks.

Successive phase lines were occupied to delay the Red’s onslaught as defensive positions were being prepared south of Osan. This line was held, and the Chinese were halted.

A limited objective offensive, launched on 15 January, encountered stiff resistance. Air, armor, and artillery coordinated their fires to kill many thousands of the Communists in their hillside entrenchments. The hard-hitting armored spearheads led the advance to successive objectives as bayonet-wielding infantrymen combed the hills in sub-freezing temperatures, dislodging the enemy from his positions, and forcing him to take refuge on the north side of the Han River.

At daylight on 15 January, the 25th Division sent a strong armored force to the vicinity of Suwon to disrupt enemy concentrations, and to inflict maximum destruction on the enemy. The resistance was neutralized in the vicinity of Osan; the column advanced, bypassing blown bridges and hazards, and entered the outskirts of Suwon, where well-fortified entrenchments were encountered.

On the 15th of January the 35th Regiment of 25th U.S. Division passed through 29th Brigade and drove northwards to contact and harass the enemy, and to ascertain his strength and
intentions. This force remained out, operating forward of the 29th Brigade (English) for several days.

On 20 January 1951, General Ridgway, Eighth Army commander, issued a directive designed to convert his current reconnaissance operations into a deliberate counterattack. Since the enemy situation was still unclear, the action, code-named Operation Thunderbolt, was designed to discover enemy dispositions and intentions with a show of force. The operation had the additional objective of dislodging any enemy forces south of the Han River, the major estuary running southeast from the Yellow Sea through Seoul and beyond. The projected attacks did not represent a full-scale offensive. Phase lines—lines drawn on maps with specific reporting and crossing instructions—would be used to control tightly the advance of the I and IX Corps. The units were to avoid becoming heavily engaged. To accomplish this, each corps would commit only a single U.S. division and ROK regiment. This use of terrain-based phase lines and of limited advances with large forces in reserve was to become the standard procedure for UN offensive operations for the rest of the war.

The 35th RCT was given the mission of taking the town of Suwon. During this time, the Reds were far from idle, and US soldiers on the line rarely passed a night without being awakened to repel a counter-attack or enemy raid. One such raid occurred on a company of the "Cacti" attached to Task Force Eyewitness.

"I couldn’t sleep," recalled Sergeant Robert Gonzales, a mortar section chief from San Francisco. "While the guard was changing, I heard a lot of small arms and mortar fire just ahead of our position.

The man in the forward observation post was shouting into the phone that the Chinese were attacking. The company position was being overrun by screaming Reds. Then mortar fire was called for and Sergeant Gonzales and his men went into action. But before the mortars started firing, the section was hit on the right flank by Chinese riflemen. Corporal Donald L. Meissner, of Kansas City, Kansas, immediately placed his light machine gun in plain view of the Reds and opened fire.

Corporal Daniel Montage of New Mexico put another machine gun into action just behind Meissner and the Reds were caught in withering cross-fire. ‘Boy, were we mowin’ ‘em down," declared Meissner. "They kept coming toward the bush where I was and Montage kept knocking ‘em down." The Red attempt to destroy the mortar section had failed.

On the twenty-sixth, Suwon, north of Osan, with its large airfield complex, was recaptured. Close air support sorties supported the advance, damaging enemy lines of communications and pounding points of resistance. As part of the I Corps attack, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division advanced against stiff enemy resistance in high ground south of Seoul.

Contact was maintained with the enemy while the United Nations reinforced their troops and strengthened their defensive positions. Reconnaissance in force was employed to inflict destruction on the Chinese Reds.

The first, or western, phase of Operation Thunderbolt lasted from 25 to 31 January. As January neared its end, Chinese resistance began gradually to increase, indicating that the main enemy line had almost been reached. By the end of January a new defensive line had been established from the Han River, running just south of Wonju to Samch’ok on the eastern coast.
As January neared its end, Chinese resistance began gradually to increase, indicating that the main enemy line had almost been reached. On the twenty-ninth Ridgway converted THUNDERBOLT into a full-scale offensive. The I and IX Corps continued a steady, if slow, advance to the Han River against increasingly more vigorous enemy defenses. As part of the I Corps attack, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division advanced against stiff enemy resistance in high ground south of Seoul.

On 9 February the enemy defense opposite I and IX Corps gave way. Soon UN units in the west were racing northward. The U.S. 25th Infantry Division retook Inch'on and Kimpo Airfield as elements of I Corps closed on the south bank of the Han opposite Seoul. Inchon Harbor and Kimpo Air Base, their capture culminating the attack, were secured on 10 February 1951. A total of 18,223 prisoners of war had been taken by elements of the 25th Division up to this date.
On 10 February the 35th Infantry reached the south shores of the Han. The Chinese shifted their pressure to the center of the peninsula as the "Tropic Lightning" force was driving them back across the half-frozen Han River into Seoul.

On the night of 11-12 February the enemy struck with five Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) armies and two North Korean corps, totaling approximately 135,000 soldiers. The main effort was against X Corps' ROK divisions north of Hoengsong. UN forces in the center of the peninsula were soon in a general withdrawal to the south, giving up most of the terrain recently regained. Despite an attempt to form a solid defensive line, Hoengsong itself was abandoned on 13 February.

On 15 February, the Division was ordered to the vicinity of Kumyangjang where they relieved the 1st Cavalry Division, and also drove the Reds back across the Han in this sector.

By the eighteenth the Communist offensive was spent, and enemy forces began withdrawing to the north rather than attempting to hold what they had taken. Such tactics would become the familiar way that the Communists would indicate the end of their offensives. Heavy casualties and the need for resupply and reorganization frequently forced the Chinese to break direct contact and pull back. UN firepower was simply too strong.

By 28 February all units had finally eliminated all enemy forces south of the Han River. Nevertheless, many enemy units escaped by withdrawing north under cover of inclement weather.

The month of February 1951 had seen the tide of battle turn again, and brings into ascendancy the fortunes of the United Nations. Constant pressure had been maintained against the enemy all during the month, and by the end of February, the 35th Regiment was firmly entrenched on the south bank of the Han River.

March 1951

The "Cacti" now waited for the order to cross the river and begin the assault north. The temperature at this time averaged 15 degrees below zero. Following mop-up operations south of the Han, the 25th Division was to take part in Eighth Army's Operation RIPPER, crossing the Han and engaging the enemy in his delaying action.

The new operation, code-named RIPPER, was to continue the advance twenty to thirty miles northward to a new line, Idaho. Line Idaho was in an arc with its apex just south of the 38th Parallel. The major objectives of RIPPER included the recapture of Seoul and of the towns of Hongch'on, fifty miles west of Seoul, and Ch'unch'on, fifteen miles farther to the north.

On 7 March, following one of the largest UN artillery bombardments of the war the 35th Infantry started to cross the Han River. On the left, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division quickly crossed the Han and established a bridgehead. Operation RIPPER was on. The "Cacti" pushed across the river inflicting many casualties, retaking the key city of Yong Dong Po.

General Bradley's three regiments reached line Albany between the 11th and 13th. The 35th Infantry, first to reach the phase line, cleared a narrow zone on the east side of the Pukhan River, the first objective of Operation Ripper. On the west side the 24th Infantry and 27th Infantry occupied heights in the Yebong Mountain mass within two to three miles of the Seoul-Ch'unch'on road and on line with the northern outskirts of Seoul to the west.
By the middle of March, after participating in driving the Reds from Seoul, Inchon, and Kimpo airfield, the Regiment was driving northward again up the Han River toward the 38th Parallel.

Following the recapture of Seoul, Communist forces retreated northward, conducting skillful delaying actions that utilized the rugged, muddy terrain to maximum advantage. During the evening of the 13th General Ridgway ordered the next phase of the RIPPER advance to begin the following morning. On the west, the 25th Division was to advance toward a segment of line Buffalo bulging four miles above the Seoul-Ch’unch’on road in a zone confined to the west side of the Pukhan River.

Against the continued advance, according to estimates prepared by the army G2 as the initial RIPPER phase concluded, the Chinese delaying forces backing away from the 25th Division were expected to join their parent units in defenses in the next good system of high ground to the north located generally on an east-west line through Hongch’on.

On 15 March the 25th Division at the right of the I Corps zone moved easily through the ground west of the Pukhan. By dark on the 15th, the 24th Infantry and 27th Infantry reached the Seoul-Ch’unch’on road at the left and center of the division zone while the attached Turkish brigade, having taken over a zone bordering the Pukhan at the far right, moved about two miles above the road adjacent to the newly won positions of the 24th Division.
As a first step in the attempt to block and attack the North Korean I Corps, Ridgway on 21 March ordered his own I Corps to move forward to line Cairo, which he extended southwestward across General Milburn’s (I Corp Commander) zone through Uijongbu to the vicinity of Haengju on the Han. At points generally along this line six to ten miles north of line Lincoln, Milburn’s patrols had made some contact with the North Korean I Corps west of Uijongbu and the Chinese 26th Army to the east. Milburn was to occupy line Cairo on 22 March, a day ahead of the airborne landing at Munsan-ni, and wait for Ridgway’s further order to continue north.

The three divisions of the I Corps started toward line Cairo at 0800 on 22 March. The ROK 1st Division, advancing astride Route 1 in the west, overcame very light resistance and had troops on the phase line by noon. The 3d Division astride Route 3 in the center and the 25th Division on the right also met sporadic opposition but moved slowly and ended the day considerably short of the line. The objective was to reach to the Imjin River, designated Line Benton, where a link-up was planned with elements of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (RCT), which are to be parachuted near the town of Munsan-ni.

On the I Corps right, the 25th Division on 23 and 24 March had run into a large number of minefields and small but well entrenched enemy groups employing small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire. At nightfall on the 24th General Bradley’s forces held positions almost due west of Uijongbu in the 3d Division’s zone at corps center.

Withdrawal seemed to be the Chinese intention. The withdrawal of the Chinese delaying forces was confirmed on the 26th when the 3d Division and the 25th Division as well moved forward against little or no opposition. Moving through spotty resistance, the 25th Division on the right had kept pace with the 3d Division, and by nightfall on 28 March both were on or above line Aspen.

Riper Concluded

Late on 26 March, as it became obvious that the Chinese were backing away from the 3d and 25th Divisions, General Ridgway then ordered the I and IX Corps to continue to line Benton.

Even with RIPPER in its final stages, Ridgway’s staff was planning a new operation. Code-named COURAGEOUS, it was designed to trap large Chinese and North Korean forces in the area between the Han and Imjin Rivers north of Seoul, opposite I Corps.
35th INFANTRY REGIMENT

April 1951

As March 1951 drew to a close Eighth Army units were nearing the 38th Parallel. However, with indications that the Chinese and North Koreans were massing forces for a spring offensive, Ridgway decided to move even farther north to secure more defensible positions.

The new advance was divided into two sub-operations code-named RUGGED and DAUNTLESS. The first, Operation RUGGED, was designed to secure a new line, Kansas, just north of the 38th Parallel. The 35th Infantry would continue her assault against determined enemy opposition from positions approximately 18 miles north of Seoul.

The Enemy Situation

Whether the expected enemy offensive would occur before all RUGGED and DAUNTLESS objectives could be taken was difficult for the Eighth Army intelligence staff to estimate. Some evidence came from recently taken prisoners who gave dates between 1 and 15 April for the start of the next Chinese offensive.
The Advance to Line Kansas

To maintain, and in some areas regain, contact with enemy forces, Ridgway allowed each corps to start toward line Kansas as it completed preparations. The RUGGED advance, as a result, staggered to a full start between 2 and 5 April.

In organizing the RUGGED operation, General Ridgway had widened the I Corps zone eastward to pass control of the 24th Division, which had been operating on the IX Corps left, to General Milburn’s I Corp. While Milburn’s forces along the Imjin stood fast, the 25th and 24th Divisions in the eastern half of the I Corps zone attacked north on either side of Route 3 on the morning of 3 April. West of Route 3, the 27th Infantry and 35th Infantry of the 25th Division advanced toward high ground rising between a lateral stretch of the Yongp’yong River and the Hant’an River farther north.

Pushing scattered 26th Army forces out of position by fire and occasionally by assault, and turning back a few light counterattacks, the 25th Division took the heights overlooking the Hant’an River on 5 April.

MacArthur Replaced

During Operation RUGGED turbulence at the higher American command levels led to significant leadership changes in the Far East Command and the Eighth Army. On 10 April, as the result of a disagreement over strategy, President Truman relieved General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, U.S. Far East Command, replacing him with General Ridgway. Four days later, Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, in turn, replaced Ridgway as Eighth Army commander. This action created a political firestorm in the United States, but its impact on battlefield operations, other than the change at the highest levels of command, was minimal.

Operation DAUNTLESS

The second, Operation DAUNTLESS, would see the UN forces continue twenty miles farther to the north. Ridgway intended DAUNTLESS to threaten the enemy logistical hub located in a region nicknamed the Iron Triangle, northwest of Kumhwa, a crossroads town twenty miles north of Line Kansas. With the objective only of menacing the triangle, not of investing it, the two corps were to attack in succession to Line Utah and then to Line Wyoming. Wyoming would then be transformed into a heavily defended outpost line. When the Communists opened their next offensive, the forces along Wyoming were to conduct a fighting withdrawal south to Line Kansas, while causing the maximum amount of casualties and disruption to the enemy. The main defensive battle would then be fought along Kansas.

General Ridgway set an opening date for the DAUNTLESS advance late on 9 April after all but the X and ROK III Corps had reached line Kansas. The I and IX Corps forces were to start toward the Iron Triangle on the 11th. Line Utah, the initial objective line, arched eleven miles above Line Kansas. The opening phase would be primarily a I Corps operation involving attacks by the 3d, 25th, and 24th Divisions.

On the west flank of the DAUNTLESS attack, at approximately I Corps center, the 3d Division reached line Utah on 14 April. In the right half of the corps zone, delaying forces of the 26th and 40th Armies had been more reluctant to give way before the 25th and 24th Divisions advancing toward Ch’orwon and Kumhwa. The 25th Division spent four days crossing the Hant’an River and getting a foothold in the Pogae-San heights, a series of steep north-south ridges between Routes 33 and 3, and needed two days more to cover half the ten-mile
distance between the Kansas and Utah lines. East of Route 3, the 24th Division attacking through the Kwangdok-san ridges shouldering the Yongp'yong River gained scarcely a mile in three days.

But by 17 April resistance weakened in both division zones. On the following day, in the 25th Division zone, a battalion of the 35th Infantry, two companies of the 89th Tank Battalion, and an artillery battery moved through the upper Hant'an River valley within five miles of Ch'orwon before receiving fire. Impeded by rugged ground, heavy rains, and somewhat stiffer resistance beginning on 19 April, the two divisions were on line Utah on the 20th except at the left of the 25th Division, where enemy delaying forces held up the attached Turkish brigade along Route 33.

The I Corps' final DAUNTLESS objectives lay in the zones of the 25th and 24th Divisions stretching north of line Utah to Ch'orwon and Kumhwa at the base of the Iron Triangle. Immediately west, the 24th Division did not test the opposition below Kumhwa, but deliberately stood fast in the Kwangdok-san ridges to allow the neighboring ROK 6th Division to come abreast. In the Pogae-san heights, the 25th Division attacked toward Ch'orwon but made no substantial progress after receiving increasing artillery fire during the day and becoming involved in hard fights right at the Utah line, especially in the zone of the Turkish brigade along Route 33.

Neither corps developed evidence of enemy offensive preparations during the day. Below the Iron Triangle, the resistance that began to stiffen on 19 April had been expected to grow progressively heavier as I Corps forces moved above the Utah line. On the Imjin front, daylight patrols working above the river again found only a scattering of Chinese. General Milburn concluded in an evening wrap-up report to General Van Fleet that the "enemy attitude remains defensive."

Perhaps the most dramatic- certainly the most visible- evidence of enemy activity to appear as Eighth Army forces closed on the Kansas and Utah lines were billows of smoke rising at numerous points ahead of them. By mid-April, belts of smoke up to ten miles deep lay before much of the I, IX, and X Corps fronts. Air observers confirmed that enemy troops, some in groups of fifty to five hundred, were setting fire to grasslands and brush. Some observers reported that smoke generators also were being used. Fires doused by rain showers were rekindled. Maritime air that frequently stagnated over the battlefront, added sea haze and moisture to the smoke and produced smog. On a number of days-varying from sector to sector rain, haze, fog, smog, and particularly smoke hampered ground and air observation, the delivery of air strikes, and the adjustment of artillery fire.

Though the smoke was intended to shield daylight troop movements, there was not much evidence that enemy forces were moving toward the front. Two captives taken by the 24th and 25th Divisions were from different regiments of the 81st Division, which belonged to the 27th Army of the IX Army Group. One of the latter told his captors that his unit would be committed
to offensive operations after the 27th Army finished relieving the 26th. By 20 April these prisoners and the sprinkling of Chinese discovered above the Imjin were the only indications that fresh forces might have moved forward under the smoke.

More evidence appeared on the 22d as the I and IX Corps continued their DAUNTLESS advance toward line Wyoming. The progress of the attack resembled that on the previous day, IX Corps forces making easy moves of two to three miles, the two I Corps divisions being limited to shorter gains by heavier resistance. In the 25th Division zone on the west flank of the advance, six Chinese who blundered into the hands of the Turkish brigade along Route 33 during the afternoon were members of a survey party from the 2d Motorized Artillery Division. The division's guns, according to the officer in charge, were being positioned to support an attack scheduled to start after dark.

**Chinese Spring Offensive**

Aerial reconnaissance after daybreak on the 22d reported a general forward displacement of enemy formations from rear assemblies northwest of the I Corps and north of both the I and IX Corps, also extensive troop movements, both north and south, on the roads above Yanggu and Inje east of the Hwach'on Reservoir. Though air strikes punished the moving troops, air observers reported the southward march of enemy groups with increasing frequency during the day. On the basis of the sightings west of the Hwach'on Reservoir, it appeared that the enemy forces approaching the I Corps would mass evenly across the corps front while those moving toward the IX Corps would concentrate on the front of the ROK 6th Division.

Civilians entering I Corps lines from the northwest confirmed the enemy approach from that direction, and through the day British 29th Brigade forces along the Imjin observed enemy patrols investigating the north bank of the river for crossing sites. The 3d Division meanwhile found evidence that the III Army Group was included in the forward displacement when a patrol operating north along Route 33 above the division's right flank picked up a member of the 34th Division, which belonged to the group's 12th Army.

At 1700, 25th Division air observers reported a long column of trucks, some towing artillery pieces, moving down Route 33 toward the Turks. Aircraft and artillery attacked the trucks until they dispersed off the road into wooded areas. By 1800 enemy foot troops were seen on Route 33 marching south in close column and just before dark were observed occupying foxholes along the sides of the road. Ten batteries of artillery kept the road and the suspected enemy artillery positions under fire.

In the Pogae-san ridges below Ch'orwon, the 2d Motorized Artillery Division prepared the way for infantry attacks on the 25th Division with a three-hour bombardment, dropping most of its fire on the Turkish brigade along Route 33. On the east wing of the III Army Group, the 179th Division, 60th Army, attacked behind the fire about midnight, its bulk hitting the Turks, some forces spilling over against the 24th Infantry at division center. The latter bent back the left of the 24th's line while the forces attacking the Turkish position penetrated at several points and so intermingled themselves that artillery units supporting the brigade were forced to stop firing lest they hit Turks as well as Chinese. Further fragmented by persistent attacks through the night, the Turkish position by morning consisted mainly of surrounded or partially surrounded company perimeters, and Chinese penetrating between the Turks and the curled-back left flank of the 24th Infantry moved almost two miles behind the division's front. Ahead of the 27th Infantry on the division's right, enemy forces (apparently the westernmost forces of the 27th Army) massed and began their approach at first light, but heavy defensive fire
shattered the formation within half an hour, and the Chinese attempted no further attack on the regiment.

Near dawn General Bradley ordered the 24th and 27th Infantry Regiments to withdraw two miles and instructed the Turkish brigade to leave the line and reorganize south of the Hant’an River. The 35th Infantry came out of reserve to take over the Turkish sector. The Turks fought their way off the front during the morning and, except for one company that had been virtually wiped out, assembled below the Hant’an in better condition than Bradley had expected. The Chinese followed neither the Turks nor the two regiments, and the division sector quieted as Bradley developed his new line.

Along the eastern portion of the I Corps line, the 25th Division, whose front had quieted after daylight on the 23d, was on line Kansas by midafternoon. The 35th and 24th Infantry Regiments reoccupied the division’s former positions on the ridges between the Hant’an and Yongp’yon rivers while the 27th Infantry and Turkish brigade assembled immediately behind the Yongp’yon.

Though unable to operate at top capacity, the Fifth Air Force alone flew some three hundred forty close support sorties on the 23d, a number that almost equaled the highest flown during a single day so far in the war, and the 1st Marine Air Wing flew over a hundred fifty missions.
The bulk of the air strikes supported the I Corps as General Milburn pulled the 24th and 25th Divisions and the rightmost forces of the 3d Division back to line Kansas. He judged that the Fifth Air Force and Marine attacks, in combination with artillery fire, had been instrumental in preventing Chinese forces from following his withdrawal closely.

Chinese following the withdrawal of the 24th and 25th Divisions finally reestablished contact with small, groping attacks near midnight on the 23rd. The midnight exploratory probes in the eastern half of the corps sector developed into stout but not overpowering daytime assaults by three divisions against the 24th Infantry on the right of the 25th Division and on the entire front of the 24th Division. The 179th Division seized Hill 664, the highest ground in the 24th Infantry sector, but failed in daylong attacks to dislodge the regiment and two reinforcing battalions of the 27th Infantry from a new line established in the foothills of the high feature.

Well before daylight on the 25th General Milburn became convinced that the I Corps would have to give up the Kansas line. As suspected, the North Korean I Corps was joining the offensive, although its initial move ended abruptly when its 8th Division attempted to cross the Imjin over the railroad bridge near Munsan-ni and was blown back with high losses from artillery fire and air attacks.

In the eastern half of the corps sector, the remainder of the Chinese 29th Division, the 179th Division, and the 81st Division opened and steadily intensified attacks on the 25th Division between dusk and midnight. Simultaneous with frontal assaults on the 35th Infantry at the left, forces of the 29th Division apparently coming out of the adjacent sector of the 7th Infantry to the west drew close enough to place fire on the regimental command post and supporting artillery units. On the right, Chinese penetrated and scattered the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry. Unable to restore the position, General Bradley pulled the 24th Infantry and 27th Infantry onto a new line about a mile to the south but gained no respite as the Chinese followed closely.

Because of this danger on his exposed right flank, the continuing and effective heavy pressure on the 25th Division, and the threat of a major enemy penetration through the wide gap between the ROK 1st Division and 3d Division, General Milburn at 0500 on the 25th ordered a withdrawal to line Delta, which, as set out in previously prepared corps plans, lay
four to twelve miles, west to east, below line Kansas. He instructed the 24th and 25th Divisions to begin their withdrawals at 0800.

With the Yongp'yong River at its back, the 25th Division faced a canalized withdrawal over two bridges in the southeastern corner of its sector, one on Route 3, the other at Yongp'yong town two miles to the west. Earlier, after the Chinese had captured Hill 664 three miles directly north of the Route 3 crossing, General Bradley had set the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, in a blocking position above the bridge. For the withdrawal he ordered all of the 27th Infantry to cover both river crossings while first the 24th Infantry and then the 35th Infantry pulled back, the 24th using the Route 3 bridge, the 35th using the crossing at Yongp'yong town. To cover the withdrawing 27th Infantry, Bradley deployed his attached Turkish brigade astride Route 3 five miles below the Yongp'yong River. Despite the difficulty of withdrawing while heavily engaged, Bradley's forces succeeded in breaking contact with small losses. By early evening the 27th Infantry and 35th Infantry were deployed on line Delta, left to right, with the Turkish brigade and 24th Infantry assembled close behind the line.

General Milburn intended to make no stubborn or prolonged defense of line Delta. He considered it only a phase line to be occupied briefly in the I Corps' withdrawal to line Golden. Milburn ordered the next withdrawal at midmorning on the 26th after attacks opened during the night by the North Korean I Corps and XIX Army Group made inroads along the western portion of his Delta front.

Enemy forces reaching the I Corps phase line after dark on the 26th attacked in each division sector except that of the 24th on the corps right. On the front of the 25th Division, Chinese concentrated an assault between two companies of the 27th Infantry, some reaching as far as a mile behind the line before regimental reserves contained them. A radar-directed bomb strike brought down at the point of penetration and ground fire delivered under light provided by a flare ship eliminated the enemy force.

At 0600 on the 27th, the 24th Division passed to IX Corps control, as had been directed by General Van Fleet, and what had been the boundary between the 24th and 25th Divisions became the new corps boundary. Shortly afterward, General Milburn ordered his remaining forces to withdraw to the next phase line, which would be the last occupied by the I Corps before it moved onto line Golden.

On the I Corps right, the two line regiments of the 25th Division had some difficulty in getting off the first phase line. The 27th Infantry ran into enemy groups that had got behind the regiment during the night, and Chinese closely following the 35th Infantry took that regiment under assault when it set up a covering position to help the 27th Infantry disengage. It was well into the afternoon before the two regiments could break away. General Bradley deployed the same two regiments on the second phase line. In preparation for further withdrawal, Bradley set the Turkish brigade in a covering position midway between the phase line and line Golden and assembled the 24th Infantry behind the Golden fortifications.

As I Corps forces began their withdrawal to line Golden at midmorning on the 28th, enemy patrols investigating the positions of the 25th Division around noon were the only enemy actions the division had during the day. Milburn attached the 65th Infantry, 3d Division, to the 25th Division so that General Bradley, using the 65th and his own reserve, the 24th Infantry, could man the eastern sector of the Golden line while the remainder of his division was withdrawing.
As deployed for the defense of Seoul by evening of the 28th, the I Corps had six regiments on line. With adequate reserves, fortified defenses, and a narrower front that allowed heavier concentrations of artillery fire, the corps was in a position far stronger than any it had occupied since the beginning of the enemy offensive.

An enemy attack appeared to be in the offing during the day of the 29th when patrols and air observers reported a large enemy buildup on the front of the 25th Division, but heavy artillery fire and air attacks delivered after dark broke up the enemy force. Division patrols searching the enemy concentration area after daylight on the 30th found an estimated one thousand enemy dead. Across the corps front, patrols moving as much as six miles above line Golden on the 30th made only minor contacts.

With the coming of the Chinese spring offensive, the 35th RCT had moved back to Line Golden, five miles north of Seoul where it was to hold at all cost. Here bloody fighting took place but the "Cacti" held. During the fight, a company from the "Cacti" put into practice some tricks they had learned with cold steel. They leaped from their foxholes during a Red attack and met the Chinese halfway. Sergeant First Class Clifford Cameron of Yakima, Washington, led the frontal counter-assault, and platoons led by Lt. Leo Whitman of Manhattan, Kansas, and Silver Star winner Lt. William Toomey of Maiden, Massachusetts, struck from the flanks.

In dropping back to No Name line, an extension of Line Golden, Eighth Army forces since 22 April had given up about thirty-five miles of territory in the I and IX Corps sectors and about twenty miles in the sectors of the X and ROK III Corps.

Among U.S. Army divisions, casualties suffered between 22 and 29 April totaled 314 killed and 1,600 wounded. In both number and rate, these losses were scarcely more than half the casualties suffered among the divisions engaged for a comparable period of time during the Chinese offensive opened in late November.

Among a variety of estimates, an Eighth Army headquarters report for the eight-day period from evening of the 22nd to the evening of the 30th listed 13,349 known enemy dead, 23,829 estimated enemy dead, and 246 taken captive. This report included information obtained daily from U.S. and allied ground units only. At UNC headquarters in Tokyo, the estimate was that enemy forces suffered between 75,000 and 80,000 killed and wounded, 50,000 of these in the Seoul sector. Other estimates listed 71,712 enemy casualties on the I Corps front and 8,009 in the IX Corps sector. Although none of the estimates was certifiable, enemy losses were unquestionably huge.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT

May - June 1951

On 30 April, fearing a new Communist effort to take Seoul, General Van Fleet started shifting forces westward, shoring up the area around the capital. He also fortified the line as much as possible. Fortifications were to include log and sandbag bunkers, multiple bands of barbed wire with antipersonnel mines interspersed, and 55-gallon drums of napalm mixed with gasoline set out in front of defensive positions and rigged for detonation from the bunkers. Notwithstanding the high enemy losses in the previous offensive, General Van Fleet cautioned on 1 May that the enemy had the men to attack again "as hard as before or harder." While Eighth Army units improved their positions over the next week, the front was quiet, with little contact between opposing forces.
On 9 May UN forces made limited attacks north, while intensifying preparations for yet another major offensive slated to begin on the twelfth. But on the eleventh, intelligence indicated that the enemy was once again ready to renew his own offensive, and all UN attack planning was halted.

The Chinese Communists' renewed offensive began on 16 May.

On 18 May, after Chinese had reached P'ungam-ni, then the deepest point of enemy penetration, General Ridgway suggested that General Van Fleet attempt to relieve the pressure on his forces in the east by attacking in the west to threaten enemy lines of communication in the Iron Triangle.

On the western front, enemy attacks had forced back some patrol base and outpost units and had tested the main line in both the I Corps and IX Corps sectors, but these attacks had been isolated affairs, not coordinated actions in a concerted holding operation.

Judging enemy forces in the east central area to be clearly overextended after he reconnoitered the front on 19 May, Ridgway enlarged his concept to take advantage of their vulnerability and ordered Van Fleet to attack across the entire front.

Van Fleet's plan called for the I Corps, IX Corps, and part of the 1st Marine Division at the left of the X Corps to advance on 20 May toward the Munsan ni-Ch'unch' on segment of line Topeka. Once the Topeka segment was occupied, strikes to start encircling the Chinese forces that had attacked in the east were to be made toward the Iron Triangle. One up Route 3 to secure a road center in the Yongp'yong River valley some twenty miles above Uijongbu, another up Route 17 beyond Ch'unch'on to seize the complex of road junctions at the west end of the Hwach'on Reservoir.2

**Counterattack**

With the objective of reaching the main bodies of enemy forces, including reserves, before they could organize for defensive action, General Milburn had made speed the keynote of the counterattacks opened by the I Corps on 20 May. In setting his three divisions on courses for line Topeka some fifteen miles above his Seoul defenses, Milburn aimed the ROK 1st Division toward Munsan-ni, the 1st Cavalry Division north through Uijongbu and up Route 33, and the 25th Division north along Route 3 toward the road hub in the Yongp'yong River valley.

On 20 May the 2nd Battalion was attacking dug in enemy positions north of Seoul when a platoon of Company E hit heavy resistance, killing the platoon leader and sergeant. Sergeant First Class Donald R. Moyer took command of the platoon and led it in the attack against the enemy.

Sergeant First Class Donald R. Moyer, RA16263096, United States Army, assistant platoon leader, Company E," 35th Infantry Regiment, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, in action against an armed enemy of the United Nations near Seoul, Korea, on 20 May 1951.

On 20 May the 2nd Battalion was attacking dug in enemy positions north of Seoul when a platoon of Company E hit heavy resistance, killing the platoon leader and sergeant. Sergeant First Class Donald R. Moyer took command of the platoon and led it in the attack against the enemy.

Sergeant Moyer's platoon was committed to attack and secure commanding terrain stubbornly defended by a numerically superior hostile force emplaced in well-fortified positions. Advancing up the rocky hill, the leading elements came under intense automatic weapons, small arms, and grenade fire, wounding the platoon leader and platoon sergeant.
Sergeant Moyer, realizing the success of the mission was imperiled, rushed to the head of the faltering column, assumed command and urged the men forward. Inspired by Sergeant Moyer’s unflinching courage, the troops responded magnificently. Enemy fire increased in volume and intensity and the fanatical foe showered the platoon with grenades. Undaunted, the valiant group forged ahead, and as they neared the top of the hill, the enemy hurled grenades into their midst. Sergeant Moyer, fully aware of the odds against him, unhesitatingly threw himself on the grenade, absorbing the full blast of the explosion with his body. Although mortally wounded in this fearless display of valor, Sergeant Moyer’s intrepid act saved several of his comrades from death or serious injury, and his inspirational leadership and consummate devotion to duty, contributed significantly to the subsequent seizure of the enemy stronghold and reflect lasting glory on himself and the noble traditions of the military service.

Milburn’s forces had gained ground rapidly; especially the ROK 1st Division, which entered Munsan-ni at midmorning on the 21st, and all three divisions were on or near the Topeka line by evening of the 23d. But the attack had amounted to a futile chase as the North Korean I Corps and 63d Army backed away far faster than the I Corps advanced. Tank and tank-infantry forces probing well to the front of the main body of the 25th Division consistently failed to make solid contact and raised doubt that the Yongp’yong River valley road hub more than ten miles ahead of the division could be taken in time to block enemy movements through it.

General Milburn attempted to hurry the I Corps with orders for a top-speed move to line Kansas. Driving up Route 3 ahead of the general advance, the 89th Heavy Tank Battalion and a battalion of the 27th Infantry blocked the road hub on 25 May, and all three of Milburn’s divisions reached the Kansas line on the 27th.

Since it was obvious by the 27th that most major Chinese units, mangled as they were, had escaped entrapment, General Van Fleet laid out Operation PILEDIVER to extend the reach of the counterattack. In the west, the I Corps was to seize line Wyoming to cut enemy lines of communication at the base of the Iron Triangle. The weight of the western attack was to be in the zone of the I Corps. General Milburn was to seize the Ch’orwon-Kumhwa area.

During this time, intensive training was being conducted by the 35th. The command of the "Cacti" changed hands for the second time during the Korean War when Colonel Thomas W. Woodyard replaced Colonel Gerald C. Killecher, 3 June 1951.

**Operation Piledriver**

For advancing the I Corps right to line Wyoming, General Milburn on 28 May laid out an attack by three divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division moving along the west side of Route 33 to occupy the segment of the line slanting southwest of Ch’orwon to the Imjin River, the 3d Division advancing on the Route 33 axis to take the Ch’orwon base of the Iron Triangle, and the 25th Division attacking astride Route 3 to seize the triangle’s eastern base at Kumhwa.

While Milburn organized full-blown attacks to start on 3 June in the I Corps zone, forces edging above line Kansas in preliminary advances encountered stiff opposition. As General Ridgway had predicted, the Chinese were determined to hold the Iron Triangle and adjacent ground as long as possible. Then drenching rains during the last two days of May began to turn roads into boggy tracks and, along with low clouds and fog, limited close air support and both air and ground observation. Two clear days followed, but as the full attacks got under way on 3 June rainstorms returned to hamper operations through the 5th.
Aided by the bad weather, Chinese delaying forces fighting doggedly from dug-in regimental positions, arranged in depth, held the advance to a crawl through 8 June, then finally gave way under the pressure and began a phased withdrawal, moving north in what air observers estimated as battalion-size groups. Against declining resistance and in drier weather, the assault divisions occupied their line Wyoming objectives between 9 and 11 June. Tank-infantry patrols were sent up each side of the Iron Triangle on 13 June to investigate P'yonggang at its apex. The patrols met no resistance en route and found P'yonggang deserted. The Chinese defenders of the triangle had taken up positions in commanding ground northeast and northwest of the town. Rimmed on the north by Chinese and on the south by the I and IX Corps, the coveted road complex in the Iron Triangle area now lay largely unusable in no-man's-land.

Although the 25th Division was holding its assigned sector, the task was no easy one. During the first part of June the 25th had pushed forward of Line Wyoming, on the high ground overlooking Kumhwa from the west. Here they took up positions until 21 June, when it moved into the I US Corps reserve near Uijongbu, where it was ordered to prepare plans for offensive operations in the Corps area. Here, the 35th Cacti prepared a secondary defensive line and conducted training and rear area security missions.
The first armistice conference was convened and operations continued but at a diminished pace. Emphasis was placed on the preparation of defensive positions along Lines Kansas and Wyoming.

As directed by General Van Fleet, line Kansas was being organized as the main line of resistance with defensive positions arranged in depth and elaborately fortified. Forces deployed on the looping Wyoming line were developing hasty field fortifications from which to delay and blunt the force of enemy attacks before withdrawing to assigned main line positions. To deepen the defense further, patrol bases were being established ahead of the Kansas-Wyoming front on terrain features dominating logical enemy approach routes. To prevent enemy agents reconnoitering Eighth Army defenses from mingling with local farm folk, the battle area was being cleared of Korean civilians from five miles behind line Kansas northward to the line of patrol bases.

On 23 June the Soviet ambassador to the UN called for cease-fire negotiations. As the real possibility of negotiations loomed, Eighth Army forces continued to improve their positions, building strong-points and conducting active patrolling. Since April the enemy had suffered more than 200,000 casualties and heavy losses in equipment, drastically impairing his ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT
July-Dec 1951

On 2 July the Chinese and North Koreans finally agreed to cease-fire negotiations. The parties agreed on the choice of Kaesong, a village north of the front line in the eastern sector, as the site for the talks, and the meetings formally began in early July. The negotiations marked the end to major offensives conducted by both sides. However, both the talks and the fighting would continue for two long years, with the war characterized by small-scale infantry battles to gain control of hilltops and other tactically critical pieces of terrain. Despite peace talks, the war was not yet over.

On 15 July 1951, the "Cacti" returned to Line Wyoming, southwest of Chorwon at the corner of the ‘Iron Triangle." Emphasis was placed on construction and improvement of defensive positions while extensive reconnaissance operations were conducted to the front of the line. The friendly patrols employed the method of moving in close and placing artillery and mortar fire on the enemy then pulling back.

One such patrol from Love Company left the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) and was ambushed. Five men returned to the line that night. The following morning fourteen more men found their way back to the safety of the MLR and their unit. A patrol from Item Company the next day found two more men who had been ambushed the night before. Seven days later, Love Outpost observed a wounded man out in front of their position, and on investigating, found it to be one of their buddies from
the ambushed patrol eight days previous. The Regiment was relieved in their sector on the line by the Eighth Cavalry on 31 July 1951.

August 1951

At the beginning of August, the "Cacti" Regiment was located south and east of the town of Pyongyang, often referred to in the press as the northern apex of the Red "Iron Triangle" Kumhwa—Chorwon—Pyongyang. Also in early August, the Regiment completed the occupation of its assembly areas south and west of Kumhwa, conducted training in basic military subjects and reconnoitered blocking and defensive positions in the zone.

Planning for "Operation HUNT" was also initiated and largely completed during the month. It was to be part of a deep combat and reconnaissance patrol directed by I Corps. The Division objective, Area Hunt, was Hill 472, north of the Kumhwa-Pyonggang road. Task Force WOODYARD, the 35th Infantry Cacti, less one battalion, but plus attachments, was to seize objectives Hunt and Fox Hill 419.

September 1951

At the beginning of September 1951, the 35th Infantry Regiment had been in action in Korea for 416 days and had suffered numerous battle casualties. The "Cacti" continuously conducted aggressive combat and reconnaissance patrols.

One morning Company "I" was positioned on Hill 682 and Company "L" on Hill 717. At about four o’clock in the morning, the two companies were subjected to an intense barrage of enemy mortar and artillery, and immediately following that came a large number of enemy infantrymen making an assault on the hilltop position.

Private Billie G. Kanell of Company I received the MOH posthumously when on 7 September 1951 a large Chinese force attacked his position. Delivering accurate fire Private Kanell caused significant casualties in the attacking force. Love and Item Companies fought back with all they had. For hours the battle waged with the fanatic Communists coming out of the black night in screaming waves. Against hopeless odds, the men of Item and Love Companies continued to hold their positions until ammunition ran dangerously low. Then they were ordered back. They fought their way through miles of Communist held territory, back to friendly lines. It was in this action that Private Billie G. Kanell was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for giving his life so others might live. His citation read as follows:

"Private Billie G. Kanell, RA17317531, Infantry, United States Army, a member of Company I, 35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and outstanding courage above and beyond the call of duty in action against the enemy near Pyonggang, Korea, on 7 September 1951.

A numerically superior hostile force had launched a fanatical assault against friendly positions supported by mortar and artillery fire, when Private Kanell stood in his emplacement exposed to enemy operation and action and delivered accurate fire into the ranks of the assailants. An enemy grenade was hurled into his emplacement and Private Kanell threw himself upon the grenade, absorbing the blast with his body to protect two of his comrades.
from serious injury and possible death. A few seconds later, another grenade was thrown into the emplacement and, although seriously wounded by the first missile, he summoned his waning strength to roll toward the second grenade and use his body as a shield to again protect his comrades. He was mortally wounded as a result of his heroic actions."

In mid-July the Tropic Lightning returned to the front line in its previous positions in the Ch’orwon-Kumhwa area.

**October 1951**

The 35th Infantry Regiment occupied a sector on the 25th Infantry Division right flank on Line Wyoming, with all units of the Regiment on line. During this time, the action consisted of patrols, raids and task infantry operations. On 4 October, a platoon from Company "K," supported by a platoon of tanks from Company "C," 89th Tank Battalion, and a platoon from Battery "C," 21st AAA Battalion, advanced more than 800 yards forward of the MLR to seize high ground in the vicinity of Kumgong-ni, Korea. A brief fire fight took place, and fifteen minutes later, twenty enemy lay dead where the team had engaged them. Three enemy soldiers saw their last action of the war when they were taken prisoner on the same mission.

Then, on 22 October, elements of the 27th Wolfhound Regiment were brought into the line enabling the "Cacti" to pull out one battalion, for a much-needed rest. The remainder of the Regiment was relieved of its responsibilities of the line on 29 October and moved to an assembly area in the center of the Division sector, where a training program was started and a much needed rest enjoyed.

**November 1951**

The rest period continued until 7 November, when the 35th Infantry Regiment was again on line for its fourth month in a stable defensive position.

Along with patrolling and the running of task forces, training was carried on to sustain combat proficiency and an aggressive spirit in face of the rapid personnel turnover and the threat of defensive-mindedness. The reserve units of the "Cacti" were held ready to mop up the encircled enemy in the area.

Progress of the cease-fire talks at Panmunjom, indicated the imminent delineation of a buffer zone based on the line of contact between friendly and enemy forces. On Eighth Army and Corps orders, the Division Commander initiated an intensified patrol program.

**December 1951**

Aggressive patrolling and task force operations continued, and again inflicted many casualties on the enemy. On 14 December 1951, the 35th Infantry Regiment was directed to move one company to IX Corps Headquarters to relieve elements of the 2nd United States Infantry Division, providing security for IX Corps Command Post. The remainder of the "Cacti" went into reserve with the 25th Infantry Division. Training was carried on, stressing offensive action and heightening the level of combat proficiency of the "Cacti."

Lt. Colonel S. B. Baker Jr. took over as commander of the Regiment from Colonel Thomas W. Woodyard on 28 December 1951. During the year, the 35th Infantry Regiment had participated in both offensive and defensive type actions, inflicting many casualties and heavy damage on
the enemy. The hopes of the men were high and the future at Panmunjom looked bright, even though the war was not at an end.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT

Jan-Dec 1952

In January 1952, the bulk of the forces of the "Cacti" Regiment maintained a reserve assembly area in the vicinity of Hwachon, Korea, in readiness to occupy any of several specified positions on the IX Corps sector for offensive or defensive action. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion provided security for a coal power-tungsten area around Sanglong as an Eighth Army mission, while Company "A" was assigned the mission of providing security for IX Corps Headquarters near Chunchon.

Colonel John D. Cone assumed command of the "Cacti" on 12 January 1952, from Lt. Colonel S. B. Baker Jr. At this time, the training program was accelerated under close supervision, with the most practical types of instruction and problems in order to prepare and maintain the high combat efficiency of the command, and at the same time to maintain high morale. Nor was this training confined to company or battalion. On 24 January, the 35th Infantry Regiment officially opened its "Battle School." The "Battle School" and the training program continued throughout February.

In the latter part of February the 25th Division relieved the US 7th Infantry Division on Line Minnesota in the zone of responsibility of X Corps, and assumed its mission of defense in its assigned sector. Operations against the enemy consisted primarily of raids, reconnaissance patrols, and ambushes, with the mission of maintaining contact, detecting any forward movement of the enemy’s positions and capturing prisoners.

March 1952

The Regiment moved in position on the Minnesota Line in the famous "Punch Bowl" at the beginning of March. Patrols were organized with the mission of delaying attempted enemy probes and giving the warning to the Main Line of Resistance in the event of enemy activity.

On 12 March, after days of heavy enemy artillery fire, an estimated enemy company attacked positions held by Company "I." Fierce artillery, mortar, small arms, and automatic weapons fire forced the attacking enemy to withdraw after a thirty-minute struggle and fifteen enemy dead. Four days later, all units of the Regiment were placed on line. Because of the size of the sector, Company "E" of the 27th Infantry Regiment was operationally attached. During March, the deep mud became a trying problem to fighting units. As early Spring temperatures rose, and the ground thawed, roads became axle deep, making movement within the Regimental sector and throughout adjoining passes almost impossible. April brought another serious problem with the increase in temperatures.

April 1952

Yet a day did not go by in which some American soldier did not risk his life for his comrades on some nameless Korean hillside. This was particularly true for those soldiers assigned to the outpost line, a string of strong-points several thousand yards to the front of the UN's main battle positions.
The typical outpost consisted of a number of bunkers and interconnecting trenches ringed with barbed wire and mines perched precariously on the top of a barren, rocky hill. As the UN's most forward positions, the outposts acted as patrol bases and early warning stations. They also served as fortified outworks that controlled key terrain features overlooking UN lines. As such, they represented the UN's first line of defense and were accorded great importance by UN and Communist commanders alike. Not surprisingly, the outposts were the scenes of some of the most vicious fighting of the war. While most of these actions were on a small scale, some of the biggest battles of 1952 revolved around efforts either to establish, defend, or retake these outposts.

It was the night of 3 April 1952; the area was Hill 1243, Kach Il-Bong, the highest peak in the region north of the Punch Bowl. Joined to this high mass by a low saddle is No-Name Hill. The night was clear and cool. The sun set that evening at 1852. The moon, which had reached its first quarter on 2 April, rose at 2153 hours. Sunrise, on 4 April, was at 0611, over three hours after the moon had set. There was fairly deep snow on the slopes and in the draw. A patrol led by 2nd Lt. John A. Chandler, platoon leader, 3rd Platoon, Company "A" of the "Cacti," crossed the MLR at 2100 hours at the point of contact between Company "C" and Company "I." The objective was one of the sites of enemy construction on No-Name Hill. If his decision was correct, he would find his objective point close to the top, if not, the added elevation would allow him a view of the terrain to check his position.

When the patrol reached the crest of the finger, Lt. Chandler led them up the slope, through old communication trenches, and close to abandoned bunkers, but found no sign of the enemy. It seemed strange to be so close to the enemy positions and yet find nothing to indicate that anyone else was in the immediate vicinity. By this time, the only communication with the MLR was by radio; the wire for the sound power had been used up. The patrol used one of the SCR 300 radios to report that it was on the objective at 0025 hours, and that there was no evidence of the enemy. The patrol had now been out three and one half hours.

When Lt. Chandler’s report that he had reached the objective and had made no contact was relayed to the battalion CP, Colonel Walker told Lt. Chandler to continue his original mission, "get a prisoner if you can, if nor, shoot ‘em up. Decide upon the route you are going to take to make contact, move forward about 100 yards, then report again."

Again Lt. Chandler and his men moved out to make contact with the enemy. As they approached the top of the ridge, they stopped and listened to the sounds coming down from the position above them. Apparently the North Koreans had just moved into bunkers and trenches on the forward slope of the hill, close under the crest, and were taking a late meal. The patrol could hear their laughing and talking and what sounded like the click of chopsticks.

From the patrol’s location below the crest, it was not possible to see that the enemy had constructed a communication trench around the forward edge of the finger, which the patrol was climbing. There was a large bunker on the rear wall of the trench, slightly to the left of the patrol’s route of approach. Lt. Chandler formed the patrol in two lines across the front of the position before moving up on it.

When they had covered about twenty-five yards toward the enemy position, PFC Van D. Randon, carrying a BAR on the right flank of the assault squad, muttered to PFC Charles Baugher walking behind him. "There’s a wire right in front of you, be careful." Baugher placed his left foot on a booby-trapped concussion grenade. He was thrown to the ground, and landed on his right side. The rest of the patrol was not much later in hitting the ground. In the immediate silence, Baugher felt for his foot, and found it to be unhurt except for a lack of
sensation. The rest of the patrol lay quietly, waiting for the enemy to come out of the bunkers to see what had tripped the grenade. Nothing happened. The sounds of laughing, talking and eating continued. After a few minutes wait to make sure that no notice was to be taken of the noise, the assault squad moved up to the edge of the communication trench.

As Lt. Chandler and Corporal Kim Bae were getting into the trench, a North Korean came out of the big bunker on their left. They climbed out of the trench again before they were noticed, but when the enemy saw them on the edge, he spoke a few words in gutteral Korean. Kim Bae answered in Korean, but apparently the enemy was not convinced of the identity of the new arrivals. He had unslung his "burp" gun from his shoulder as he first spoke. Now he managed to get off about three rounds before he was killed by either carbine fire from the assault squad or a grenade thrown by Kim. No one there knew who or what had killed him.

Six men came streaming out to find what had happened. The first five were killed by fire from the carbines and BAR’s of the assault squad. The sixth man ducked back into the bunker to escape the fire. After a couple of grenades had been thrown in after him, there was yelling and screaming from inside, but no more enemy came out of that bunker. However, from the other bunkers on either side of the patrol, the defenders came into the trench in an attempt to drive out the assault squad. But the BAR men on the flanks, Randon and Harris, killed them or drove them back into the bunkers where they remained until after the patrol had started its withdrawal. The squad managed to hold off all who attempted to close with them from the immediate vicinity of the position.

Corporal Dabonne and Private First Class Lang Walters, the radio operators, were wounded very early in the action and their radios put out of commission by concussion grenades. Both men were wounded in the head and Walters also received some fragments in the legs. Neither were seriously injured and both were able to walk back to the MLR when the patrol withdrew. There were two other casualties, both in the support squad. Corporal Korschbaum had part of his right foot blown off and was further wounded in both legs, apparently by a grenade. PFC Emment Hancock, the AR man on the left flank, was wounded in the body by grenade fragments. Since Kirschbaum was unable to walk, it was necessary to make a litter out of jackets and sticks in order to carry him back to the rally point in the draw. Hancock, like the two radiomen, was able to keep up with the rest of the patrol. It was not until 0930 hours that all members of the patrol had returned to the MLR. The patrol had been out for more than twelve hours. The objective of raiding the enemy’s positions had been, for the most part, successfully accomplished. The night’s action caused ten friendly casualties, but the patrol inflicted at least the same number of probable killed in action on the enemy.

The patrol was saved from further casualties by the effective placement of many rounds of artillery on known enemy positions.

May 1952

On 6 May, the "Cacti" moved from the Minnesota Line to the Kansas Line to prepare positions and conduct training. In addition, the Regiment had the mission of counterattacking to stop penetrations of the MLR. The third battalion remained in the "Punch Bowl" in the event of a breakthrough in that area.

June and July 1952

The absence of grand offensives and sweeping movements notwithstanding, service at the front was just as dangerous in 1952 as it had been during the more fluid stages of the war. By
June Communist guns were hurling over 6,800 shells a day at UN positions. During particularly hotly contested actions, Communist gunners occasionally fired as many as 24,000 rounds a day. UN artillerists repaid the compliment five, ten, and sometimes even twenty-fold, and still not a day went by when Communist and UN soldiers did not clash somewhere along the front line.

An intensified training program was conducted by the "Cacti" during the first few weeks of June; prior to its relief of the 27th Infantry Regiment on Line Minnesota. One company a day from each battalion engaged in formal training, while the remainder of the battalion continued practical training in field fortifications on line Kansas.

Then on 15 June 1952, the 35th Infantry Regiment relieved the 27th "Wolf-hounds" from their responsibility of the line. All through the remainder of the month, the Cacti" conducted raids on enemy positions in the hope of capturing prisoners of war in order to identify units in contact.

The most successful of these occurred on the night of 28-29 June when a patrol from Company "I" departed the MLR at 2100 hours for known enemy positions. As the patrol reached its objective, they could hear the enemy soldiers moving about in the nearby trenches. When the patrol got close enough, they overran the enemy, killing three and capturing one enemy prisoner. Actions of this nature were common throughout the 35th Infantry Regiment for the remainder of June and through the entire month of July, with very little other action taking place.

August 1952

As the month of August 1952 began, the "Cacti" was still in position on Line Minnesota on the western sector of the 25th Infantry Division. Patrol action and raids continued in the regimental sector until 27 August, when the 14th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel John R. Wright, began relieving elements of the 35th Infantry Regiment. The Regiment returned to the reserve area.

September-December 1952

The order to move came and, on 10 September, the 35th Infantry Regiment began moving to the Korean Communications Zone area. On 17 September, the command of the "Cacti" changed hands. Colonel Autrey J. Maroun replaced Colonel John D. Cone as the commander of the 35th Infantry Regiment. The Regiment was now under K COM Z control, on Koje-Do Island near the southern tip of Korea, where it was to remain until called back into action in November 1952. The assignment on Koje-Do and Cheju-Do in October 1952, was guarding prisoners of war.

At Cheju-Do, 1 October 1952, the commander of the POW Camp 3A had given the order for all prisoners of war to take down flags that had been raised in celebration of a Korean National Holiday. When the prisoners refused to obey the order, elements of the 1st Battalion were called in to enforce the order. About three weeks later, the POW's refused to obey an order to cease close order drill. A company of the 3rd Battalion was called in to enforce the order.

On 22 October 1952, the 25th Division moved to the vicinity of Kapyong. Operational Control passed from the X US Corps to the Eighth US Army, and the Division assumed the mission of Army Reserve.
During October and November 1952, the Division conducted an intensive training program. In November 1952, the Division occupied the Han Tan-Chon Valley sector of Line Missouri. This sector was flanked by Kumhwa on the east and Chorwon on the west. Operational control of the division passed to the IX US Corps. Operations conducted during the defense of its assigned sector consisted of aggressive patrolling, construction of new bunkers, and the improvement of existing defenses.

During November, the "Cacti" received orders to move to Chipo-Ri and reverted to control of its parent unit, the 25th Infantry Division.

As temperatures dropped so too did the pace of combat. Still, shelling, sniping, and raiding remained habitual features of life at the front, as did patrol and guard duty, so that even the quietest of days usually posed some peril. For most frontline soldiers, home was a "hootchie," the name soldiers gave to the log and earth bunkers that were the mainstay of UN defenses in Korea.

Built for the most part into the sides of hills, the typical hootchie housed from two to seven men. Each bunker was usually equipped with a single automatic weapon, which could be fired at the enemy through aboveground firing ports. Inside, candles and lamps shed their pale light on the straw-matted floors and pinup-bedecked walls of the cramped, five-by-eight-foot areas that comprised a hootchie's living quarters. Oil, charcoal, or wood stoves provided heat, bunk beds made of logs and telephone wire offered respite, and boxes of extra ammunition and hand grenades gave comfort to the men for whom these humble abodes were home. However Spartan, the hootchie provided welcome shelter from the daily storms of bomb, bullet, rain, and snow that raged outside.

35th INFANTRY REGIMENT

January 1953, the "Cacti" were occupied improving and defending positions of Line Missouri. On 4 January, the support group of Company "I" a combat patrol approximately 75 yards behind its assault group, was fired on from the rear and flanked by an estimated platoon-size enemy force. Immediately, the assault group joined its support group and assisted them in causing the enemy to withdraw. Enemy casualties in the 15-minute firefight were unknown, while the friendly patrol suffered two wounded.

Three days later, personnel of Company "G," situated on Combat Outpost TOM, received an enemy mortar barrage while changing guards, trapping several in vulnerable positions and wounding one man. Master Sergeant Ussery M. Henry of Roanoke, Alabama, realizing the wounded man’s plight, stalked into the barrage area and carried the wounded man to a protective fighting bunker. Master Sergeant Henry was awarded the Silver Star for his outstanding gallantry in action.

30 January, the "Cacti" was relieved from its position on the Missouri Line and moved to Chik-Ton to begin training. An intensive program consumed February and March, reaching its climax in April with principles of offensive combat in addition to previous specialist schooling for communications and drivers.

On 31 January 1953, the Division assembled in the vicinity of Yongp-Yong, and assumed the mission of IX Corps reserve. It continued in this role until 5 May 1953. The state of training attained during this period is best described in the words of General Jenkins, IX Corps
Commander, in his last report to the Army Commander as the Division departed his command, "Today the 25th Division is like a razor’s edge!"

April 1953

25 April 1953, Colonel Emil P. Escbenburg formally assumed command of the Regiment succeeding Colonel Autry J. Maroun, who moved to G3 at X Corps Headquarters.

May 1953

On 5 May 1953, the Division assumed the responsibility of guarding the approaches to Seoul. It occupied the Main Battle Position in the vicinity of Munsan-Ni and Chang-Dan. Operational Control again passed to I Corps.

During early May, the "Cacti" assumed responsibilities in the Munsan-ni area, overlooking the Panmunjom corridor, immediately instituting a policy of aggressive patrolling. Famous sites such as Bunker Hill, Hedy and Dagmar were occupied by the "Cacti" in this area.

On 28 May, First Outpost KATE began receiving a barrage of mixed mortar and artillery fire. Machine guns took up the pace. In just a matter of 15 minutes, friendly artillery, mortar and machine guns and tank fire completed the task of silencing three weapons. Then, seven minutes after a green parachute flare and small arms fire hit in the vicinity of Outpost 2, it was bludgeoned with machine gun and mortar fire, with bugles sounding in the background. Under friendly artillery illumination, an estimated force of two enemy companies advanced on Outpost 2 at 2215 hours. Friendly artillery and thirty-one mortars saturated enemy positions. In thirty minutes, small arms, automatic weapons, and flame throwers forced the enemy to break contact and withdraw with an estimated enemy loss of sixty (60) killed and seventy-five (75) wounded. Company "G" suffered two wounded.

June 1953

During June, the policy of aggressive and extensive patrolling continued. Men of the crack 35th Infantry demonstrated courage and heroism in the forceful patrolling actions. Four received Silver Stars and sixteen were awarded Bronze Stars for Valor. Seventy-nine meritorious awards were also given.

A prisoner of war agreement, the main stumbling block to a truce, was signed on 8 June 1953. On 17 June President Syngman Rhee released 27,000 anti-Red prisoners of war, and hopes for a truce were again low.

July 1953

On the night of 1 July, Master Sergeant James E. Roberts of Liveoaks, Florida, led a patrol to reconnoiter an advanced area toward outpost MARILYN. All communication ceased with enemy contact when the radioman was mortally wounded. Sergeant Roberts led aggressive fire in answer to a second enemy assault, at the same time firing a red flare for assistance. Three enemy became visible at close quarters; one jumped him, but a nearby private fired and killed the aggressor. The sergeant seized an enemy weapon, turned it upon the remaining pair, and killed both them both.

Meanwhile, a nearby friendly patrol and an alert patrol at the MLR rushed to aid the group. One group came in on a personnel carrier. Two patrol leaders, Lt. Lemcke and Lt. O'Donnel, met at
the battle scene, assisted wounded onto the personnel carrier and organized a screen for wounded. Moving under fire, Master Sergeant Sienicki and Lt. Lemcke were wounded. With sheer guts, Sergeant Sienicki carried the wounded officer to safety, while Lt. O'Donnel bore a wounded and dead soldier back to the MLR.

Total friendly casualties, 2 killed and 10 wounded. Corporal Paul Bals and Corporal LeRoy Webb received Silver Stars for gallantry in action. Master Sergeant Roberts was awarded the Silver Star for his leadership and gallantry in action. Similar persistent defense activity continued until 7 July 1953, when the "Cacti" units, along with the rest of the 25th Division, were temporarily relieved of their combat mission, moved into I Corps reserve, and preceded to Camp Casey at Tongduchon-Ni for rehabilitation and training.

13 July 1953, was a gala occasion for the 35th Infantry Regiment. The Regiment’s 37th birthday anniversary was celebrated. Military and athletic events heralded the occasion. Carnival-style concessions were set up with all proceeds going to the memorial fund to commemorate those "Cacti" who made the supreme sacrifice during the Regiment’s last combat mission. Seven Silver Stars and ten Bronze Stars were presented that day.

Following the celebration, the Regiment continued to conduct a vigorous training program, emphasizing small unit tactics, maximum utilization of supporting fires, coordinated team operations, and vigorous assault tactics. Company "L" was assigned a special mission at Seoul, assuming security of all bridges, tunnels, railroads and control points for eleven days.

The Cacti Regiment moved into a new sector near Yon-Chun, Korea. On 27 July 1953, the armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjon with hostilities to cease at 2200 hours of the same day.

An eerie silence fell across the front. The Korean War was over.
Late in July, "25th Infantry Division (Tropic Lightning)" became official, although it was used unofficially since December 1942. For the first time in Army history, a division was allowed to use a parenthetical designation besides its regular numerical designation.

Post-War Duty

In the middle of August, the 25th Division relieved the 7th Infantry Division in the Taegwang-Ni sector of the Imjin-Gang Valley.

The Division embarked on an intensive salvage operation to clear out the "Demilitarized Zone", which was designated at the signing of the armistice on 27 July 1953. These operations were completed by 13 September.

On 21 September, a vigorous training program for the non-commissioned officers of the 35th Regiment was initiated in the form of the Cacti Leadership School. The five-week school trained approximately fifty men per class, with special emphasis in the following subjects: patrolling, squad tactics, tank and infantry tactics, mines and demolition, field fortifications, map reading and command leadership.

Within the framework of training and education, the opening of the Cacti College, on 5 October 1953, marked the beginning of instruction cycles designed to raise the educational level and effectiveness of many men of the unit. Basic and intermediate levels of education took precedence in accordance with army priorities with an initial class of 98 men graduating after four weeks instruction and through achievement tests. On 11 November, off-duty classes, featuring six different subjects, began with 333 enrolled.

Colonel Charles H. Chase accepted the Regiment from Colonel Emil P. Eschenburg on 14 October, when the latter was transferred to the I Corps General Staff.

In line with the multifold and intensified training programs, special emphasis was laid on all mortar sections and tank platoons starting the third week of November. This program was integrated in a range of instruction topics and cycles including chemical, biological and radiological warfare, vehicle driving, and officer and non-commissioned officer seminars. By the year's end, all mortar and recoilless rifle sections had fired specially prepared training missions, while small arms familiarization firing had been conducted through the Regiment.

At times, the men of the 35th were driven back, but they were never beaten. From the desperate days before the Pusan perimeter to the present, the 35th Infantry Regiment has proved to the Communist enemies that the "Cacti Regiment" has thorns that are to be reckoned with.

The 35th Infantry Regiment had compiled a distinguished record as one of the best regiments in the Eighth Army, serving in all ten campaigns of the Korean War, receiving a Presidential Unit Citation and three Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citations.

In 1954 the 25th Infantry Division returned to its birthplace at Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii. As the Army's strategic reserve for the Pacific, the Tropic Lightning Division began a full-scale training program to prepare it for any contingency. Jungle training and counter-guerrilla operations were emphasized.