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AD 390 612

QTR 31 JAN 68

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OPERATIONAL REPORT

LESSONS
LEARNED

CLASSIFIED BY *Hq 4th Infantry Division*
SUBJECT TO *SECURITY INFORMATION*
SCHEDULE *SECRET*
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED *NO YEAR*
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON *SEC. 31/1974*

31 JAN 68

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

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SECTION 1 (N) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (N) General.

a. During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation MAC ARTHUR. A portion of the period, 1 November through 1 December, was covered in the Combat Operations After Action Report "Battle for DAK TO".

b. Organizational Structure.

(1) Task organization for Operation MAC ARTHUR for the period 1 November through 1 December is contained in the After Action Report "Battle for DAK TO".

(2) Task organization for 2 December 1967 through 31 January 1968 is at inclosure 1.

c. Company E, 58th Infantry (Long Range Patrol), less personnel and equipment, was assigned on 20 December.

d. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at inclosure 2.

e. On 4 January Major General Charles P. Stone assumed command of the division from Major General W. R. Peers. *4th Infantry Div.*

f. Mission.

(1) The general mission of the division at the end of the reporting period was to conduct surveillance and offensive operations and to provide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM's Refugee Resettlement Program and the Revolutionary Development Program.

(2) The specific missions of the 4th Infantry Division are to:

(a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.

(b) Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the highlands into the coastal provinces.

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- (c) Conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations.
- (d) Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.
- (e) Detect and eliminate VIET CONG infrastructure.
- (f) Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.
- (g) Support the Government of VIETNAM's EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program.
- (h) Open, secure and maintain land lines of communication.
- (i) Be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of Camp Strike Forces (formerly Civilian Irregular Defense Group), Regional and Popular Forces, critical signal sites and sector/subsector headquarters within II Corps Tactical Zone.
- (j) Provide to I Field Force, VIETNAM, a battalion size reserve, on order.

2. (1) Intelligence.

a. General¹. With the exception of the TET offensive at the end of the reporting period, enemy activity in PLEIKU and DARLAC Provinces was light. In DARLAC there were several significant contacts with elements of the 33d NVA Regiment. As a result, the 33d withdrew into CAMBODIA and reappeared to attack BAN ME THUOT on 30 January. PLEIKU City was attacked on two occasions with 122mm rockets and there was a sharp increase in mining and anti-aircraft incidents. On 30 January, PLEIKU City was attacked by a combined NVA/VC multi-battalion assault. After the November battle for DAK TO, there were many intense attacks by fire and some limited ground attacks in KONTUM Province. This was done to facilitate the reorganization and resupply of NVA/VC offensive on 30 January.

(1) The division had a total of 328 contacts with enemy forces during the reporting period. Thirty-two of these involved enemy forces of platoon size or larger.

(2) DARLAC Province. During November and early December the 33d NVA Regiment posed a threat to the QUANG NHIEU agricultural development site. This threat was neutralized in a series of contacts made during search and destroy operations conducted by the 2d Brigade between the YA SOUP River and the MEVAL Plantation. The 33d sustained substantial losses, and in December withdrew to the northwest into CAMBODIA. The TRAN PHUC Special

¹The Battle for DAK TO was reported in a separate after action report and is only touched on here when clarity or continuity requires.

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Forces Camp was attacked by an enemy force which employed limited amounts of riot control agents in December, and BAN ME THUOT was attacked by fire on the 4th, 9th, and 17th of January. By this time the 33d Regiment had moved from CAMBODIA to a base camp northwest of the DUC LAP Special Forces Camp and its 2d Battalion began operations against QUANG NHIEU. The 33d NVA Regiment in conjunction with the E-301 VC Battalion launched a coordinated attack against BAN ME THUOT on 30 January.

(3) PLEIKU Province. In December the K-6 Battalion, 32nd NVA Regiment moved south from the DAK TO Battle area through the PLEI TRAP Valley and then east into PLEIKU Province. Concurrently, VC elements, under the control of GIA LAI Provincial Unit 280, intensified harassing activities against villages in the province. The 95B Regiment was located in the area northeast of PLEIKU City and, like the H-15 Battalion, initiated a series of ambushes on Highway 19E. Early in January captured documents and PW's foretold of a large scale enemy offensive in and around PLEIKU City during the TET holiday period. Attacks were to be under the joint direction of the B-3 Front and MR5. In conjunction with local VC, the 408th Sapper Battalion and the H-15 Local Force Battalion, supported by 122mm rocket units, were to conduct the attacks. Specifically stated targets were the airfields, police posts, the radio station, the electric power plant and the bank. Some enemy troops were to infiltrate the city in ARVN uniforms and civilian clothes. Attacking forces, in conjunction with these infiltrated troops, were to rapidly seize the city. Large forces prepositioned around the city on main avenues of approach would prevent US forces from reinforcing or relieving the city. On 20 January, the 200th Artillery Battalion attacked military installations near PLEIKU City with 122mm rockets. This was the third time 122mm rockets had been employed in the PLEIKU area. By the end of January enemy units had begun converging on the city. The 4/95B and 408 Sapper battalions moved down from the north and northeast while the H-15 LF Battalion moved up from the southeast. The TET offensive began early on the morning of 30 January with mortar attacks on New PLEIKU AFB, 3d ARVN Cavalry Headquarters, and Camp Holloway and a 122mm rocket attack on 71st Evacuation Hospital. Following the indirect fire attacks, ground elements, many of which had previously infiltrated the city, launched attacks on selected targets throughout the city. In addition to small arms and automatic weapons, B-40 rockets and satchel charges were widely used in these terrorist assaults. The assaulting elements were forced to withdraw to the southwest on the evening of 30 January, after achieving limited success in the downtown areas during the day. The following day was quiet until 2200 hours when the enemy advanced from the northeast supported by a mortar attack. This assault was driven back with the aid of artillery and gunships. Elements of the H-15 Local Force Battalion, 408th Sapper Battalion, K-28 Sapper Company and local guerrillas were identified in the ground assaults. Elements of the 200th Artillery Battalion were believed to be responsible for the rocket attack.

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(4) (4) KONTUM Province. Heavy attacks by fire and limited ground attacks indicated that major elements of the B-3 Front remained in the DAK TO area after the November battle. The intensive attacks by fire served a dual purpose: first, they kept US attention and troops oriented on the DAK TO area, and secondly, they limited allied movement and gave the NVA greater freedom of movement for resupply and reorganization. On 30 January, an attack (coordinated by the VC headquarters and the B-3 Front) was launched against TANH CANH and KONTUM City. The fighting in these cities was intense and destruction great. Local VC elements and elements of the 174th NVA Regiment attacked TANH CANH while the 24th Regiment, the 304th Main Force Battalion, and local VC operated against US and ARVN forces in KONTUM City.

b. Estimated enemy composition, disposition and strength on 31 January.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
B-3 Front	8530	Tri-Border Area	7 Feb	
1st NVA Div	5230	YB7533	29 Jan	PW
32nd Regt	1600	YB918208	31 Jan	PW
66th Regt	1600	YB880330	26 Jan	PW
95B Regt	300	NE PLEIKU City	31 Jan	AGENT
K101D Bn	400	NW PLEIKU City	8 Dec	DOCUMENTS
24th Regt	500	AR8095	31 Dec	PW
33d Regt	750	AP812934	31 Jan	AGENT
174th Regt	1600	ZB0525	20 Jan	PW
200th Arty Bn	350	ZAO42530	20 Jan	DOCUMENTS
407th Sapper Bn	260	BINH DINH/PKU	5 Jan	DOCUMENTS
408th Sapper Bn	300	AR7997	31 Jan	PW
304th VC Bn	50	AR9637	26 Jan	AGENT
H-15 VC Bn	300	SE BAN ME THUOT	30 Jan	AGENT
E-301 VC Bn	260	NE PLEIKU City	30 Jan	PW

c. Counterintelligence.

(1) The VIET CONG infrastructure continued to direct its largest propaganda effort at EDAP ENANG Refugee Center in an effort to encourage the MONTAGNARD villagers to return to their villages in the jungle, thereby providing the VC and NVA with a source of forced labor and food. The VC threats of attacks and actual attack on innocent villagers during TET have caused many villagers to leave EDAP ENANG. As of 14 January 23 of the 48 villages had left EDAP ENANG. The GVN has been attempting to truck villagers back to EDAP ENANG with minimal success.

d. Significant enemy tactics and techniques.

(1) General. The NVA/VC were far more active this quarter than the preceding quarter and reached their peak of activity during the expected

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TET offensive. The widespread attacks, by ground elements and by fire on cities and military installations during the TET offensive, are indicative of the enemy capability to strike where he desires provided he is prepared to pay the price. NVA/VC forces have effected closer coordination than they did during the preceding quarter. Task forces of NVA and local force VC units were formed at will to undertake large scale operations, as was done in attacks on BAN ME THUOT, KONTUM and PLEIKU at the beginning of TET.

(2) Significant changes in tactics. The first use of a limited number of 75mm pack howitzers against the division was made during the "Battle for DAK TO" in November. Widespread use of the 122mm rocket and the 120mm mortar has been made. There was also a step-up in the use of armor-defeating rockets and the enemy appeared to have no hesitations about attacking as a sniper or in platoon strength. The TET offensive showed a new willingness to stand and fight in large scale engagements. However, these actions may have been based on political reasons and were not considered to be standard NVA tactics. Additionally, there was an upswing in the number of aircraft receiving ground fire. Captured documents indicated that enemy units were instructed to increase anti-aircraft activity.

(3) Recapitulation of enemy battle losses (Includes losses at DAK TO).

(a) Personnel.

	<u>MAC ARTHUR</u>
KIA (Body count)	1,813
NVA/VC (Captured)	71
TOTAL	<u>1,884</u>

(b) Weapons.

Small arms	348
Crew served	<u>106</u>
TOTAL	<u>454</u>

(c) Ammunition.

Small arms rds	18,832
Crew served rds	1,825
Grenades	604
Mines	202

(d) Selected Items of captured equipment.

Explosives (lbs)	235
Documents (inches)	21
Rice (tons)	56
Salt (lbs)	460

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(e) Material destroyed.

Structures 81

Fortifications 1,115

e. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

(1) Enemy capabilities.

(a) The NVA in the Western Highlands is capable of launching attacks of up to multi-regimental size in the CAMBODIAN and LAOTIAN Border areas. These attacks may be conducted in coordination with local VC elements. The enemy is capable of launching attacks further within RVN in battalion or regimental strength. It is believed, however, that a concentration of strength larger than battalion size would be detected and the attack preempted by friendly actions.

(b) The enemy has a 122mm rocket capability which can inflict damage to large targets such as air bases, base camps, and other fixed military installations. Through the use of these rockets the enemy can place a considerable amount of firepower into an area in a relatively short period of time and withdraw from the launch site prior to the arrival of reaction forces. In a prolonged attack, however, the enemy is capable of employing mortars of various calibers up to 120mm in his attacks by indirect fire.

(c) The enemy has demonstrated that he has a limited capability to employ riot control agents against friendly installations. RCA's have been delivered by 82mm mortars, grenades, and possibly thrown by hand. They have been used in conjunction with attacks by mortar fire. Captured documents have shown that the enemy is attempting to increase this capability. Special Forces Camps and small fire support bases are the most vulnerable to a combined RCA/mortar attack because of the limited area they occupy.

(2) Enemy vulnerabilities.

(a) The enemy's logistical system is vulnerable to disruption through friendly ground and air operations. Enemy units operating within RVN rely upon resupply of arms and ammunition from NVN. These supplies are carried over long distances through difficult terrain. They are subject to interdiction by friendly ground and air elements as they move through RVN.

(b) The enemy's need for extensive combat preparations and his inflexibility in the execution of his plans make him vulnerable to pre-emption by spoiling attacks.

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(c) Enemy forces, when massed, are especially vulnerable to combined air, artillery, and ground attacks. This vulnerability increases as an enemy force penetrates deeper into RVN.

(d) The enemy is also vulnerable to the use of chemical defoliants and crop destruction agents. The enemy's need for concealed base areas and the need to produce his own rice to augment foodstuffs procured from the local populace renders him particularly vulnerable to these weapons.

(e) There are several psychological vulnerabilities which can either be exploited as separate targets or used in conjunction with other operations against enemy units. The enemy can be exploited psychologically because of suspected low morale in several units. Lack of proper medical attention and food has brought hardship on the individual soldier thereby weakening his determination to fight.

(e) Enemy probable courses of action.

(a) The enemy is expected to increase the number and intensity of his attacks by indirect fire. PW's have confirmed that the 40th Artillery Regiment has broken out its elements and assigned them as direct support to the infantry regiments, thus providing them with a 122mm rocket capability. The number of probable targets has increased to include installations in and around the cities of PLEIKU, KONTUM, and BAN ME THUOT, the 4th Division Base Camp, Brigade headquarters and Special Forces camps. The NVA can launch multi-battalion size attacks into the interior of the border provinces; these attacks can be coordinated with the local VC forces and guerrillas in the area of attack as demonstrated during the TET offensive. Because of heavy losses during TET, the 24th and the 33d NVA Regiments can be expected to spend two or three months refitting. The enemy will continue to propagandize and terrorize. He will continue mining activities in order to combat the continuing threat of armor deployment during the remainder of the dry season.

(b) The NVA will continue to increase their reinforcement and integration of VC units and to provide them with leadership. This is a goal of NVA operational plans, as revealed in captured documents and confirmed by PW's. Their past losses, and problems in recruiting local South VIETNAMESE sympathetic to the VC cause, have forced the VC to accept the NVA into their ranks. VIET CONG main force and local force battalions are now heavily infused with NVA. Most of their cadre are NVA, as are their fire support units. Recent losses in the VC main force and local force battalions may require some to be disbanded or replaced almost entirely with NVA personnel. The 407th and 408th Sapper Battalions, 304th Main Force Battalion, H-15 Local Force Battalion and 301st Local Force Battalion suffered heavy losses during the TET offensive and will require numerous replacements. These units are not considered an immediate threat.

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3. (U) Operations and Training Activities.

a. OPLAN 41-67 (RETRIEVER) initiated a search and recovery operation along the YA Krong Bolah River to locate a downed UH1 helicopter. The operation was conducted in four phases which included: air reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance and search by indigenous personnel, dragging operations by the 4th Engineer Battalion and final recovery of the helicopter.

b. Operations. The 4th Infantry Division continued Operation MAC ARTHUR which began on 12 October 1967. A chronological summary of significant activities for this quarter is at inclosure 3. Events which took place in the area of operations for the "Battle for DAK TO" during the period 25 October through 1 December are contained in the Combat After Action Report "Battle for DAK TO".

c. Training.

(1) 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment.

(a) The detachment trained 4,429 replacements during the period.

(b) The Combat NCO Leadership School provided instruction to 214 students. Of these, 191 successfully completed the course.

(c) One hundred students successfully completed the Recondo Preparatory Course.

(2) RF/PF Training.

(a) The Combined Mobile Improvement Team/Combined Mobile Training Team program made significant progress in the strengthening of Regional Forces and Popular Forces. As of 20 December, the CMT's had completed the training of 34 Regional Force companies. The six CMT's had trained 65 Popular Force platoons.

(b) Problem areas encountered and corrective action taken.

1. Unit equipment shortages and deficiencies.

Corrective action: Inspections were accomplished to determine shortages and deficiencies. RF/PF units were instructed in correct procedures for requisitioning needed supplies and parts. Results of inspections were taken to proper VIETNAMESE and US advisory headquarters.

2. Village outpost defensive weaknesses.

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Corrective action: RF/PF leaders made inspections of village/outpost defenses in conjunction with the CMIT/CMTT personnel. Weaknesses were determined and the defensive fortification portion of training was spent on correcting the weaknesses.

3. RF/PF leadership identification.

Corrective action: During the entire period that a CMIT/CMTT worked with an RF/PF unit, the leadership of the unit was constantly evaluated. The interest of the officers and NCO's in the training, the manner in which they looked after their men, and their performance in field exercises was noted in detail. Good and poor leaders were identified by name to the proper US advisory headquarters. In order to avoid a breakdown in rapport, this information was treated in a confidential manner.

(c) The excellent progress of the program resulted in an expansion scheduled to begin in February 1968 and continue through December. The increase in training teams will proportionately speed the upgrading of RF/PF units.

(3) New Equipment Training. Evaluation of the Sound Ranging Set, AN/TNS-3 is presently being conducted. This equipment is used to record small arms muzzle blast, and compute, in six to seven minutes, the source of incoming fire.

(4) Training Regulations.

(a) The Pre Recondo training was outlined in a regulation which specified the scope of the instruction and responsibilities for conducting the training.

(b) A regulation was published to outline instruction on anti-vehicular mines.

(c) A regulation was published to govern responsibilities, scope, and procedures for the use of air lift capabilities in South East Asia.

(d) A regulation was published outlining policy, procedure and reporting techniques for combined operations.

d. Air Support.

(1) The following close air support missions were flown in support of Operation MAC ARTHUR, 1 November 1967 - 31 January 1968, including the "Battle for DAK TO".

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TYPE MISSION	REQ	FLOWN	SORTIES	A1 E	B 57	F4 C	F 100	A 37	A4 A6	AC 47	C 130
FAC PP	1085	845	2269	48	27	205	1973	16	0	0	0
FAC Imm	1308	921	1989	227	33	355	1336	16	A4(16) A6(6)	0	0
CSS PP	195	142	147	0	14	13	117	3	0	0	0
CSS Imm	69	42	47	0	1	5	41	0	0	0	0
SPOOKY	95	94	94	0	0	0	0	0	0	93	1
TOTAL	2752	2044	4546	275	75	578	3467	35	22	93	1

(2) Damage Assessment.

TYPE MISSION	EST KBA	BUNK- ERS	SEC EXP	SEC FIRES	A/W POS	RKT POS	MORTAR POS	HUTS
FAC PP	167	102	38	23	7	0	5	16
FAC Imm	577	179	69	14	11	4	13	23
CSS PP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CSS Imm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SPOOKY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	744	281	107	37	18	4	18	39

(3) Damage assessment shown in paragraph 2 is incomplete and does not show the true destructive capability of tactical air. It is estimated that 25% of damage assessment was made by ground exploitation and 75% by visual reconnaissance from the air.

(4) B52 Strikes. The B52's struck known base areas, infiltration routes and strong points. Numerous secondary explosions and destroyed fortifications were found in the target area. There were 399 sorties flown in 55 missions in support of 4th Infantry Division units.

(5) Weather. Weather conditions were not significant in restricting air strikes during the reporting period.

e. Chemical.

(1) Chemical elements continued to support combat operations within the division by employing riot control agents (RCA), supervising the defoliation program, operating and maintaining the division's Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD), rendering technical advice on use of flame munitions, and operating a chemical ASP.

(2) Defoliation. The use of defoliants decreased during the reporting period because of the decline in plant growth during the dry season. Nonavailability of aircraft and high winds also reduced the number of aerial defoliation missions.

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(a) Northeasterly winds prevented several Traildust missions from being flown near the CAMBODIAN Border because the winds might have blown the agent across the border. A total of 141 Traildust sorties were flown in the division area of operations spraying 141,000 gallons of agent ORANGE (see inclosure 4).

(b) Ground based defoliation was negligible because suitable targets (enemy crops, grass, small trees) were in a dormant state during the dry season and not susceptible to growth regulator type herbicides. A total of 1450 gallons of herbicide were utilized on perimeter and roadside defoliation compared to 14,725 gallons during the previous quarter.

(c) An AGAVENCO spray system was received on 22 January but was not tested because aircraft were not available. The system will provide a capability of spraying 200 gallons of mixed agent from a UH-1 aircraft.

(3) RCA Employment.

(a) Bulk Agent. A total of 36,300 pounds of CS-1 powder was dropped using 21 CH-47 sorties. All of the drops were in support of 2d Brigade operations and were designed to restrict enemy use of terrain in the mountainous area northwest of DUC CO (see inclosure 4). Several requests from subordinate units for bulk CS drops were denied because of limited availability of the agent.

(b) E-158 Munitions. A total of 35 E-158 munitions were expended in the area of operations using eight UH-1 sorties. They were employed on known enemy locations in an attempt to flush the enemy into the open where he would be vulnerable to conventional fires. On three occasions, personnel were seen fleeing the area and were taken under fire, resulting in at least seven confirmed kills. Several targets suitable for use of E-158 munitions could not be supported because the munitions were not available.

f. Psychological Warfare.

(1) The CA/PSYOPS evaluation of the indigenous population attitude shows a growing interest in self improvement and protection. There is evidence however that the people do not want to become too closely identified with Free World Forces because of frequent changes in areas of operation. The bulk of the population in the three provinces in the division area of operations are MONTAGNARD. There has been an increase of information being received pertaining to mines and enemy activity in the area. This is particularly true within the TAOR. In KONTUM Province, in response to appeals for information leading to the recovery of an American soldier believed drowned, an entire village responded to the call. The body was found. Another incident of cooperation was in the response received in the recruiting of local MONTAGNARDS to search for a helicopter that went down in the YA KRONG BOLAH, (SE SAN) River in late August. Search attempts were unsuccessful

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at that time due to the swiftness of the river at the height of the monsoon season. Representatives from two villages participated in the search and the helicopter was found on the second day of the operation.

(2) The division participated in a special TET campaign, which included playing nostalgic music over known NVA locations in the DAK TO area. With the breaking of the TET truce by NVA/VC forces the program was discontinued and the hard sell approach was employed.

(3) Closer coordination was effected with Tac air in order to place timely psyops follow-up on airstrikes. The current policy is to drop National Safe Conduct passes, Rally Instruction and CHIEU HOI appeals following air strikes that have been called in as the result of enemy contact.

(4) A special operation was conducted between 25 and 31 January in the PLEIKU area in preparation for an expected attack on installations in that area. The operation was coordinated with II Corps Psyops Advisor, 937th Engineer Group and LE TRUNG District Headquarters.

(5) A 500 watt loudspeaker was positioned at the 937th Engineer compound, a 250 watt loudspeaker was positioned with an ambush platoon vicinity AR8345 and the A/V Jeepster was positioned at LE TRUNG District Headquarters. The attack did not occur as had been expected: however, the team at the 937th Engineer compound did broadcast immediately after one of the numerous attacks in the PLEIKU area with unknown results.

(6) Over 61 million leaflets, 302 hours of airborne loud-speaker time, 318 hours of ground loudspeaker time and 32 hours of audio/visual time comprised the psyops effort. Themes used emphasized the combined strength of ARVN and Free World Forces and were designed to drive home the point of the hopelessness and futility of effort of NVA/VC forces. Other themes used included the CHIEU HOI Program, medical treatment and loneliness. Toward civilians, the themes were weapon rewards, rewards for information, atrocities of the VC/NVA against the civilians, and support of the GVN.

(7) Several new items of equipment were received. Six cart-ridge tape recorders for use with the 1000 watt loudspeakers were received. Also twenty AM radios were received and distributed to hamlets within the TAOR to provide receivers for the villagers to pick up MONTAGNARD dialect broadcasts from radio BAN ME THUOT. Instructions on the use of the radio were given by the CA team during the distribution phase. The division also procured five TV sets to be used in the TAOR in conjunction with the CA teams. The sets will be employed in the same role as the audio/visual Jeepster.

g. Army Aviation Operations.

(1) Training. Training of all assigned aviators in pilot techniques was continuous. Newly assigned aviators were given standardization

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training, an area orientation ride, jungle survival training, escape and evasion training, and weapons familiarization training prior to being assigned to operational missions. New aviators were then paired with experienced aircraft commanders. Those aviators who displayed required maturity, judgment, pilot proficiency, and who progressed rapidly were selected for training as aircraft commanders. Additionally, periodic standardization rides were given each aviator to insure that high standards of flying proficiency and aircraft operations were maintained. Continual spot checks on flight operations in the unit base of operations provided a basis for stressing safety. Additional stress and guidance was provided unit commanders during the daily battalion staff and commander's briefing. The above mentioned procedures and the continued strong emphasis placed on safety, maintenance, and flight operations culminated with accident free months of December and January.

(2) Operations. Operational totals for the quarter were:

	<u>Company A</u>	<u>Company B</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Hours flown:	6,006	1,434	7,440
No. of passengers:	33,177	1,074	34,251
Tons of cargo:	669	0	669
No. of sorties:	17,936	9,438	27,374

(3) Logistics.

(a) Problem areas during the quarter.

1. A shortage of four OH-23 aircraft existed and reduced the capability to perform some general support missions.
2. T-53 L-13 engine availability remained critical.
3. Items in critical supply and continuing high EDP rate included main rotor blades, main rotor hubs, and tail rotor pitch change links. Armament replacement parts particularly XM-134 parts have been critical items and have caused otherwise flyable gunships to be EDP.

(4) Personnel. A large turnover of personnel, particularly key individuals, occurred during the first week of January. The Company A Commander, the S-3, the S-2, the Airfield Commander, the Assistant Division Aviation Officer, and the Maintenance Officer rotated during this period. Because the replacements for these key individuals were experienced, with several on second tours, the transition period was of short duration and little difficulty was encountered.

4. (C) Logistics.

a. General.

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(1) Detailed reports of the logistical support of tactical operations during Operation MAC ARTHUR for November are contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, "Battle for DAK TO". The remainder of the period is discussed in the following paragraphs.

(2) Air drop of supplies was not conducted during December and January because of a shortage of USAF aircraft in RVN for training missions.

(3) Action was completed on 181 Reports of Survey. Twenty-seven Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved and 552 Combat Loss Reports were processed.

b. Supply and Services.

The following figures represent cumulative support data for support and service activities of the 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion at all locations:

(1) Division Supply Office

Requisitions received	21,263
Requisitions passed	3,395
Requisitions filled	10,978

(2) Class I

Average headcount issues	10,009
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(3) Class III (gallons issued)

JP4	2,968,000
MOGAS	1,211,000
DIESEL	1,565,400
AVGAS	78,125

(4) Baths

Individuals processed	38,197
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(5) Graves Registration

Human remains processed	34
Personal property shipments processed	267

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c. Transportation Service.

(1) During the reporting period a traffic regulating headquarters was established by the Division Transportation Office to control all vehicle convoys in the area of operation. Additionally, a passenger/cargo terminal for C7A aircraft operations was established at Hensel Airfield. Seventeen special missions by fixed wing aircraft were flown in support of tactical units. The C7A division aerial courier lifted 5,338 passengers and 790 short tons of cargo.

(2) The hold baggage section at Camp Enari processed the baggage of 953 personnel.

d. Materiel Readiness.

(1) The Command Maintenance Management Inspections continued with four initial inspections and two reinspections. The program is seventy-five percent complete.

(2) Roadside spot inspections continued, averaging two inspection days weekly. The large backlog of equipment in the maintenance battalion shops forced the inspections to be less frequent than desired.

e. Maintenance Support. Maintenance support for all divisional elements continued to be accomplished through three Forward Support Companies, the Main Support Company and the Aircraft Maintenance Company of the 704th Maintenance Battalion. Provisional emergency support was provided to Task Force Powerhouse (Two infantry battalions and support elements, 173d Airborne Brigade) and the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry.)

f. Medical Service. Medical support was provided by the medical battalion. A summary of medical services is shown below:

	<u>HQ and A Company</u>	<u>B Company</u>	<u>C Company</u>
Patients seen	8,418	4,018	817
Patients admitted	1,124	1,812	441
Patients returned to duty	667	294	63

g. Operation MAC ARTHUR Logistics.

(1) Logistical support was provided forward elements of the division by Forward Support Elements (FSE), from Division Support Command, and by Forward Support Activities (FSA), from PLEIKU Sub Area Command (PKSAC).

(2) The FSE's in operation at BAN BLECH and the Oasis continued to provide support to the 2d Brigade operating in the Oasis and BAN BLECH area. The FSE at BAN BLECH relocated to the MEWAL Plantation and later to BAN ME THUOT East Airfield. A FSE continued to support the 2d Brigade at

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the Oasis with Class I, III, and V, barrier materials, graves registration, bath (showers) and laundry services.

(3) The FSE at BAN ME THUOT Airfield was augmented by six personnel from the 1st Logistical Command as "expeditors". This FSE (augmented) provided Class I, III, and V, graves registration and barrier materials by direct input from the 1st Logistical Command CAM RANH Bay. The FSE continued operations until 24 January. Class V distribution points at BAN ME THUOT was by ALOC through 1st Logistical Command channels.

(4) The main support for Class I, II, III, IV, V was furnished by the 1st Logistical Command FSA at KONTUM for units operating in the area until 16 December. A five man detachment, consisting of two Class I, two graves registration and one Class II and IV personnel from 4th Support and Transportation Battalion augmented the FSA's capability in supporting the 173d Airborne Brigade (-). The detachment remained with the 173d Airborne Brigade (-) at an FSE at PLEI MRONG until the Headquarters and Brigade Supply Operations Center of the Brigade relocated to Camp Enari on 27 and 28 January.

(5) Logistical support continued to be furnished to 1st Brigade units in the DAK TO area by a 1st Logistical Command FSA.

(6) In addition to the logistic support provided by US Army elements, the US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III and V in support of operations, less the "Battle for DAK TO". A detailed report of logistical support by the US Air Force for November is contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, "Battle for DAK TO".

<u>Class III</u>	<u>QTY (gallons)</u>
Fighters	22,280,000
B-52's	42,000,000

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Bombs	6,289	1,932.5
CBU	236	64.4
Napalm	2,273	841
Rockets	370	74

Delivered by Fighters and AC47 (SPOOKY)

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
20mm	238,400	59.6
7.62	206,600	103

Delivered by B-52's

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Bombs	UNK	2,891.5
	16	

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5. (U) Military Civic Action Program.

a. TAOR. The Good Neighbor Program (GNP) continued within the division TAOR. In December, the TAOR was extended from 10 to 12 kilometers from the perimeter of the base camp. The extension increased the number of hamlets in the TAOR from 69 to 85 with a corresponding increase of population to approximately 20,000. The GNP continued to be implemented by 23 Civic Action teams of five to 10 men each, formed from the resources of battalions and separate companies of the division. Beginning in mid-December and continuing through January, VC/NVA harassment and kidnapping of villagers within the TAOR increased. A total of 24 chiefs and 216 villagers were kidnapped, threatened, and released. During the battles around PLEIKU that began on 29 January, the VC forced great numbers of villagers to serve as shields during assaults on LE CHI, PLEI DO LIM, and PLEIKU. The VC directed other villagers to go to PLEIKU, probably to cause congestion and confusion during the attacks there.

b. PLEIKU Province.

(1) The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry conducted civic action in hamlets along Route 19W and in the villages along a new road cut north from EDAP ENANG. The 2d Brigade assumed responsibility for civic action in this zone and in the PLEI MRONG area on 22 December.

(2) 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, conducted civic action in the hamlets along Highway 19E from PLEIKU City to MANG YANG Pass. On 21 November, the squadron S5 element, with APC's, conducted a cattle roundup for a refugee village, netting 16 head of cattle.

(3) 1st Battalion, 69th Armor continued responsibility for conducting the GNP along Highway 14S from the southern edge of the TAOR to the vicinity of PHU NHON District Headquarters. In November, the S5 elements of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor with additional security, carried out a two week active pacification probe into the heart of the "Golden Triangle" (area bounded by Highways 14S and 6C).

(4) Civil Affairs Team 9 of 41st Civil Affairs Company continued support to district officials and sub-sector advisors in conducting civic action activities at the EDAP ENANG Refugee Center. On 24 December, people began to leave in increasing numbers. The reasons for the exodus were:

(a) Inadequate food, water and land, resulting from the failure of the GVN to implement the EDAP ENANG Program fully.

(b) VC propaganda exploiting these failures.

(c) VC attacks and threats.

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c. KONTUM Province. In November, the 1st Brigade moved to KONTUM Province, DAK TO District, and conducted a Good Neighbor Program in hamlets along Highway 512, in KONTUM City and in the DIEN BINH Plantation area (Highway 14N). This program included visits, MEDCAPS, Youth Health Activities, self-help construction, repairs and material assistance to two schools, two orphanages, one leprosarium and the Dr. Smith Hospital. In January, enemy activity increased in the DAK TO area, and villagers were subjected to intensive pressure and grave danger. They continued to provide information and assistance to US Forces.

d. DARLAC Province. Initially, the 2d Brigade conducted extensive civic actions in the BAN BLECH area. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry continued the programs after the departure of the 2d Brigade in December.

e. Nation Building Program.

(1) Psychological Development

(a) Government.

1. To build confidence and competence in GVN leadership, division civic action teams assisted district officials in visiting hamlets within the TAOR by furnishing helicopter transportation and security. Additionally the division sponsored meetings at the Good Neighbor Council House with hamlet chiefs from within the TAOR. At these meetings, district officials heard the individual problems of each village. The hamlet chiefs exchanged ideas and developed priorities for joint action by GVN/US/village teams.

2. The new supplies/logistics system, in which all materials come through VIETNAMESE channels, became effective during the period. Villagers submitted requests for materials to their respective district headquarters. Province and district officials and staffs validated the projects by visiting the requesting hamlets. In this way, GVN officials made more frequent visits to hamlets and became increasingly aware of the conditions in each hamlet. Division CA teams assisted village leaders in preparation of requests for materials, monitored the progress of requisitions through the district and province staffs, and transported materials from district/province warehouses to the hamlets. The logistics system will be a useful practical exercise in responsible government for administrators and villagers alike.

3. On 18 occasions, the attached audio/visual team, together with sector civic action and reaction forces, showed movies and slides and played tapes in villages at night. The team and reaction force remained in the villages overnight.

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(b) Education.

1. The 4th Infantry Division and LE TRUNG District continued to sponsor the health workers training school. During the period, one class of 12 students graduated from the school bringing the total number of graduates to 85. An advanced curriculum to further develop the abilities of selected graduates is being prepared by the faculty.

2. Division Artillery continued to support the Highlands Junior Military Academy with a full time English/Sports instructor. Six cadets and one instructor from the academy spent six weeks visiting junior military academies in the western United States.

3. The Division Support Command and 4th Engineer Battalion arranged for 50 villagers, including four chiefs, to attend the MONTAGNARD Agricultural School.

(2) Development of the standard of living.

(a) Water Supplies. The chief of PLEI NHOA YUT designed, supervised, financed and built nine wells with assistance from the supporting CA team in the form of transportation of materials. Division Support Command hired the well diggers of PLEI NHOA YUT to design wells, train diggers, and supervise construction of wells in other hamlets when requested. The chief of PLEI GAO MONU 1 designed and built an outstanding concrete spillway after having seen a spillway built thru the cooperative effort of a CA team and citizens from another village.

(b) Pig Program. The pig program at EDAP ENANG Refugee Center was a combined GVN-US operation. The CA team serving EDAP ENANG purchased four pigs as demonstration animals in June 1967. The effectiveness of the demonstration led villagers to raise successive shipments of piglets provided by the GVN using American techniques. Initially the pigs were on a combined farm, but as hamlet and family pens were completed the pigs were moved to them so that each hamlet/family could take care of their own pigs. The families made uneven progress in caring for their pigs, and deaths continued to occur among the pigs. The pig program for the TAOR has not achieved the success necessary to convince villagers of the efficiency of US methods. The villagers have returned to letting their pigs run loose.

(c) Health Program. Standardized MEDCAP structures using cooperative construction efforts were completed in 26 hamlets. VC raids destroyed or damaged eight of these. Villagers have rebuilt all but two of the destroyed shelters. The dispensary program included five dispensaries in the TAOR and one in PHU NHON District at AP PHU QUANG. The dispensaries in the TAOR are at various stages of construction. The dispensary at AP PHU QUANG (AR873052) was completed during January.

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(3) Development of Security.

(a) Popular Forces. PLEI BREL DOR PF Platoon operated in the TAOR from 23 to 26 January to secure propaganda/youth teams remaining overnight in villages that had been plagued with VC propaganda. The combined village of PLEI CHI TEH volunteered 34 men to form a PF Platoon to defend the village.

(b) Self Defense. After threats that the village would be burned to the ground if the people did not move back to their old locations, the hamlet chiefs in the village of PLEI CHI TEH decided spontaneously to ask for arms to help US forces to hunt VC, and to help defend their village. The persons who volunteered asked for neither pay nor indemnities if they should be killed or wounded. The hamlet chiefs, LE TRUNG District Chief, and 2d Brigade worked out an agreement. The 2d Brigade Reaction Force trained 21 MONTAGNARDS to work with the force. The chiefs in PLEI CHI TEH also asked for defenses for their combined village. The division provided barbed wire, pickets, sandbags and supervision. The MONTAGNARDS built a five strand fence, a five meter band of tanglefoot, a double apron fence, 10 bunkers, and gate obstacles in 10 days. In the future volunteers from the village will be trained as a PF platoon at a training center.

c. Statistical Summary of Civic Action.

(1) Construction.

Culverts - 2
Footbridges - 1
MEDCAP shelters - 26
Bulletin boards - 10
Playgrounds - 7
Latrines - 1
Wells - 9
Spillways - 5
Road building - 16 kilometers
Pig pens - 3
Dispensaries - 1
Grading - 1010 square feet
Land clearance EDAP ENANG - 12000 acres

(2) Health.

MEDCAPS - 38,072
Insecticide spray operations - 3 villages
Youth Health Program (Daily milk/vitamins) - 34,468
Health workers trained - 12
VETCAPS - 67 head livestock treated

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(3) Services.

Food distribution - 47,613 lbs
Clothing - 7,173 lbs
Lumber - 9,710 bd. ft.
Soap - 3,261 lbs
Construction material (sand) - 61 tons)

(4) Recovered goods returned to GVN.

41,050 lbs rice
7,200 lbs salt

d. Results.

(1) Security.

(a) Forward areas. There are few places outside of the TAOR in which there is reasonable assurance to the civilian population that they will not be the victims of VC terrorism. In spite of this fact, civilians in the DAK TO area have provided information on enemy troop movements, weapons locations and mine locations to 1st Brigade forces.

(b) TAOR.

1. Forces available for security in the TAOR are five reaction platoons, and one exploitation platoon at base camp, two RF companies at DE GROU Outpost (AR939347) and PLEI DO LIM Fort (AR886281), two PF platoons at PLEI BREL DOR (AR896437) and PLEI MOROLN (AR878274) and one PF squad at LA SON (AR845375). The two RF companies operate only in an area of operations southeast of the TAOR that overlaps with 5% of the TAOR. These forces have not succeeded in assuring the civilian population that it will not be terrorized by the VIET CONG.

2. One village of eight hamlets, PLEI CHI TEH (AR843373), had extensive civic action conducted within it. It was sufficiently contented with its situation and confident in its future that it opted to take sides in the conflict and defend itself against the VC.

3. Two hamlets with PF forces suffered repeated VC attacks during the report period. One attack penetrated one hamlet. The PF fought effectively against heavy odds.

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4. ~~Unprotected~~ hamlets had 242 persons kidnapped. 183 of these have not returned. The mood of the villagers in most of the hamlets is that they must cooperate with both sides since they are completely defenseless. Eighteen hamlets expressed interest in defending themselves after getting word about the PLEI CHI TEH defense.

(2) Intelligence. Villagers served by CA teams provided useful assistance on the following recorded occasions:

(a) On 26 December, villagers from PLEI BLO (AR848402) informed 2d Brigade Civic Action personnel of the location of a VC anti-tank mine on Highway 7C.

(b) In the latter part of December, local nationals in KONTUM Province stopped a convoy on Highway 512 and informed them of a mine planted in the road.

(c) On 7 January near DAK TO local nationals turned over 13 mortar fuzes to 1st Brigade elements.

(d) On 16 January at (YA995295) a local national dug up a MLAL mine and turned it in to a division engineer minesweep team.

(e) The villagers from PLEI BLO (AR848402) provided information to 2d Brigade CA personnel as to the location of a mine on Highway 7C on 18 January.

(f) Also on 18 January a 1st Brigade CA team stayed near the village of PLEI PHAM NGOL (AR875300). The villagers did not betray the presence of the CA team. At approximately 2000 hours, the team engaged an estimated 25 armed VC approaching the village killing two and adjusting gunship fire onto the remaining VC. Blood trails were found the next day.

(g) On 20 January on Highway 14N, KONTUM Province, local nationals stopped a US convoy and reported the road was mined and a VC ambush element lay in wait. The road was swept and two enemy mines were located.

(h) On 22 January four villagers from PLEI CHI TEH turned themselves in to the CA team that serves the village and said that they had worked for the VC as gardeners and rice carriers and wanted to sever their connections with the VC.

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(i) On 22 January a CA team interpreter identified a stranger in PLEI CHI TEH as being VC, and turned him in to the CA team. The PW gave information about VC activities in his village.

(j) On 24 January a man in PLEI BIA TEH offered to identify VC in the villages to the east of the TAOR.

(k) On 30 January a VIETNAMESE member of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry CA team reported there were 30 VC in TRA BA 2 (AR768445). Later, those VC participated in the attack on PLEIKU.

(l) On 30 January villagers from DAK MOT KRAM (YA949239) apprehended an NVA who stopped in the village for food. These villagers turned the NVA and his weapon over to a 1st Brigade unit. On 31 January the same villagers caught and turned in a second NVA with his weapon.

(m) On 31 January villagers along Highway 512, near DAK TO, reported the location of an enemy mortar site to the 1st Brigade CP.

(n) On 31 January, a MONTAGNARD turned in 16 people from PLEI GREO (AR852173) who were strangers in his village. They were going to PLEIKU on VC orders. They gave information on a NVA supply route between PLEI ME and CHU GO (west of PHU NHON).

(o) On 31 January one chief and six others from four villages in the northeast portion of the TAOR reported that VC had come to their villages and told them to go to PLEIKU to loot the city. The chiefs and villagers refused in spite of the VC threat to return the next night and burn the village.

e. Summary. The efforts of Civic Action teams have created a favorable psychological climate for local civilians to join the US/GVN side. The advances in health and living conditions the MONTAGNARDS have achieved in cooperation with civic action teams, and the promise of education are strong incentives to join the free world. However, the lack of security in most hamlets forces the civilians to cooperate with both sides, but this also is changing. The recent development in which the citizens of PLEI CHI TEH threw in their lot with the Americans is the first sign of genuine grass roots pacification in the TAOR. PLEI CHI TEH is well fortified and has American advisors in it 24 hours a day. The idea appears to be spreading. If other hamlets decide to combine, fortify, and arm themselves, large portions of the TAOR will become untenable for the VC.

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6. (U) Personnel.

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

(1)	Beginning of period	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized:		1,090	185	16,565	17,840
Organic					
Attached		<u>44</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1,013</u>	<u>1,060</u>
TOTAL		1,134	188	17,578	18,900
Assigned:		1,075	153	16,990	18,218
Organic					
Attached		<u>44</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>991</u>	<u>1,038</u>
TOTAL		1,119	156	17,981	19,256
(2)	Close of period				
Authorized:		1,070	185	16,126	17,381
Organic					
Attached		<u>44</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1,016</u>	<u>1,063</u>
TOTAL		1,114	188	17,142	18,444
Assigned:		1,161	168	16,736	18,065
Organic					
Attached		<u>44</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>961</u>	<u>1,008</u>
TOTAL		1,205	171	17,697	19,073

b. Replacements: A total of 368 officer and 3,982 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period division losses were 276 officers and 3,554 enlisted personnel. Some 263 emergency leaves were processed during the period.

c. Morale and Personnel Services.

(1) Decorations awarded.

Distinguished Service Cross	1
Silver Star	90
Distinguished Flying Cross	31
Legion of Merit	6
Soldier's Medal	14
Bronze Star w/V Device	382
Bronze Star (Service)	402
Air Medal w/V Device	93
Air Medal (Service)	1432
ACM w/V Device	335

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ACM (Service) 1,088
Purple Heart 912

(2) Combat Badges.

Combat Infantryman Badge 3,395
Combat Medical Badge 236
Aircraft Crewman Badge 60

d. Promotions. A total of 5,418 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

e. Reenlistments. 179 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was: first term RA reenlistments 54, AUS reenlistments 43, nine RA extensions and no AUS extensions.

f. Postal.

- (1) Money order sales. \$4,843,131.52
- (2) Postal and parcel post fees. \$123,406.50
- (3) Incoming mail. 22,607 sacks - 2,407 pouches
Daily average. 246 sacks - 27 pouches
- (4) Outgoing mail. 8,243 sacks - 1,874 pouches
Daily average. 90 sacks - 20 pouches
- (5) Number of mail days. 92

g. Special Services.

- (1) The division was visited by the Bob Hope Show. There was an attendance of 8,000.
- (2) R&R quotas received were 3,935 out-of-country and 691 in-country.
- (3) A total of 72 movies were circulated within the division.

h. Chaplain Activities.

<u>DENOMINATION</u>	<u>NO. OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Roman Catholic	852	29,189
Protestant	1,175	44,814
Jewish	14	173
Memorial Services	67	

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i. Maintenance of discipline, law and order.

(1) A total of 572 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's office during the period.

(2) Military Justice:

- (a) General Court-Martial 7
- (b) Special Court-Martial 65
- (c) Summary Court-Martial 53

j. Health.

(1) The health conditions of the division during the quarter remained at a satisfactory level.

(2) Malaria continued to be the most serious health problem in the division. A higher incidence of malaria was anticipated because of the dry weather; however, there was a steady decline in the overall incidence. This decline is attributed to the publication and strict enforcement of the division regulation concerning malaria prevention which was published in October.

(3) Injuries not a result of hostile action declined during the period. The injuries that did occur were mostly sprained ankles and minor lacerations. The decline is attributed to the dry season and the absence of slippery conditions. The addition of paved roads and graveled sidewalks is expected to improve conditions during the rainy season.

7. Artillery.

a. General. The units of Division Artillery participated in the following activities during the quarter:

- (1) Operation MAC ARTHUR.
- (2) The Battle for DAK TO (After Action Report submitted).
- (3) Base Camp Defense.
- (4) Base Camp Development.

b. Intelligence.

- (1) Enemy use of indirect fire.

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(a) On 15 November the firebase at DAK TO received 55 rounds of high explosive fire. Crater analysis and check of the area indicated that 75mm pack howitzers were used.

(b) A new indirect fire tactic was introduced in this area by the NVA using a device of some type to give a muzzle flash at one location to draw counter battery fire while actually launching an attack by indirect fire from another direction. This was the first known use of this deceptive tactic in this area.

(c) The use of 120mm mortars in the Central Highlands by the NVA was confirmed during this period.

(2) Base camp defense.

(a) Visual reconnaissance of the TAOR was flown with one or more aircraft each morning at first light and each evening prior to darkness, weather permitting.

(b) Patrol activity continued throughout the TAOR. Five to six moving patrols and two stationary patrols were employed on a daily basis.

(c) One reaction platoon was committed to defense of a new life hamlet in the 2d Brigade sector of the TAOR. Defensive barbed wire was placed around the village and 81mm mortars were emplaced in the village.

(3) Survey.

(a) Battalion survey sections conducted position area surveys to furnish control and direction to the firing batteries and the radar section.

(b) The Division Artillery Survey section continued to furnish the battalion survey sections with survey control points. The significant operations of the survey section were fourth order surveys from Artillery Hill to KONTUM, Artillery Hill to PLEI DJERENG, and Camp Enari to DUC CO.

(c) Survey section of Division Artillery, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery and 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery surveyed-in fifteen interlocking observation posts at selected positions in the DAK TO area. These manned OP's provided flash bases for high burst registrations and excellent surveillance of enemy rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle firing sites. The observation posts proved their value by detecting 42 enemy firing positions.

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(4) Metro.

(a) Three electronic meteorological sections were employed in the area of operations; one from Division Artillery, one from the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (52d Artillery Group) and one from the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (52d Artillery Group).

(b) The Division Artillery section operated for a total of 1104 hours and was non-operational for 33 hours for parts during the period. A total of 368 flights were made. The section transmitted 237 NATO and computer type messages.

(c) Due to the widely separated areas of operations and the variance of weather conditions within a 60-72 kilometer radius, a pilot balloon observation (PEBAL) metro team was sent to AO Wainwright in the BAN BLECH area. This team made visual flights daily for a seven line NATO met and a five line computer met.

(5) Radar.

(a) The Division Artillery AN/TPS-25 radar was located in Base Camp for the period and conducted ground surveillance of the TAOR. The radar made numerous contacts during the period and was also used to provide surveillance of fires in the TAOR. The AN/TPS-25 radar was operational 1117 hours and non-operational 23 hours for mechanical failure or awaiting parts during the period.

(b) An AN/MPQ-10 counterbattery radar supplements the Base Camp defense effort. This radar was operational during the entire reporting period. The AN/MPQ-10 radar was used to observe 80 artillery registrations.

(c) Division Artillery received an AN/PPS-5 Ground Surveillance Radar in January. This radar provides a back-up for the AN/TSP-25 radar. The radar set was also used in conjunction with patrols and reaction force operations thereby adding depth to the Base Camp observation.

(d) Four AN/MPQ-4A countermortar radars were employed in the area of operations. One from the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, one from the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, one from the 237th Radar Detachment and one from the 52d Artillery Group. The radar from the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery was also operational in this area during November and December. These radars provided a very effective means of conducting registrations and provided excellent countermortar surveillance. During the period the radars conducted 73 high burst registrations, located 61 enemy mortar positions, seven possible rocket positions and nine possible recoilless rifle locations. On one occasion in the DAK TO area the AN/MPQ-4A radar

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detected the first incoming round and gave the alarm before the round impacted. The countermortar radar has been utilized extensively and successfully in the DAK TO area. The radars operated an average of 20 hours daily with a minimum of down time.

(6) Aerial Observers. Division Artillery provided aerial observers for the visual reconnaissance and surveillance program, artillery VR's, registrations, and contact missions. The aerial observers flew 325 missions logging 810 hours of flight time during the period.

(7) Searchlight. Battery B, 29th Artillery (searchlight) provided eleven 23 inch xenon searchlights to support operations. All searchlights were operational during the period except for 25 hours. Six of the lights were employed in support of the Base Camp defense following prepared schedules rotated on a nightly basis.

c. Operations, Training and Safety.

(1) Operations.

(a) For organic and supporting artillery operations during the period 25 October to 1 December see Combat After Action Report, "Battle for DAK TO".

(b) MAC ARTHUR. 12 October 1967 - continuing.

1. Concept of operations. The concept of artillery employment was to provide direct support artillery to the maneuver elements; to utilize medium and heavy artillery in reinforcing and general support missions; utilize artillery automatic weapons for convoy and fire-base/base camp security; and provide artillery coverage of the border areas, especially USSF/CSF camps near the border.

2. Execution.

a. To provide direct support to the maneuver elements, the initial artillery employment in November was the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (-) in direct support of the 1st Brigade; the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery in direct support of 2d Brigade; and the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (-) in direct support of Task Force 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. The 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and the 52d Artillery Group (-) units were employed in general support and reinforcing roles.

b. As the threat in the DAK TO area increased, artillery shifted to the 1st Brigade area. During the month of November the general artillery employment was as follows: The 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105 T) was in direct support of the 2d Brigade in northern DARIAC Province. Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155 SP) provided reinforcing fires. Task Force 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry in western PLEIKU

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Province was supported by the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (-) (155 SP) of the 52d Artillery Group. The 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105 T) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at DAK TO. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery provided reinforcing fires in the area of operations. Batteries A, B and D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and the remainder of the 52d Artillery Group provided general support and general support reinforcing fires to the division with the emphasis on support at DAK TO. The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery provided direct support fires for the 173d Airborne Brigade, also at DAK TO.

c. With the conclusion of the "Battle for DAK TO" and in reaction to increased enemy activity in the PLEIKU area during the latter portion of December and early part of January, a shift of forces was effected to provide coverage of PLEIKU and the area to the west and northwest as well as continued operations in the DAK TO area. The 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105 T) provided direct support fires to the 1st Brigade at DAK TO. The 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (-) (105 T) provided direct support fires for the 2d Brigade in the central MAC ARTHUR AO. Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105 T) continued to provide direct support fires for Task Force 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. Battery A, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105 SP) was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, and Battery B, 3d Battalion 6th Artillery (105 SP) was in direct support of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. Battery B, 7th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175 SP) was positioned at SOVI DOI with a mission of general support and coverage of Highway 19 East. This released two 155mm towed batteries for deployment in areas which necessitated an airlift capability for a medium battery. The 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and the remainder of the 52d Artillery Group provided general support and general support reinforcing fires to the division. The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (-) (105 T) continued to provide direct support artillery fires for the 173d Airborne Brigade (-) which operated in conjunction with the 4th Infantry Division.

d. Whenever possible and practicable, mutually supporting firebases were established and were particularly successful in countermortar programs and massing artillery fires.

e. The artillery made better use of intelligence targets this quarter as a result of more efficient dissemination of current intelligence information. Intelligence targets were attacked rapidly with large volumes of fire. Follow-up intelligence indicated that these fires inflicted damage on enemy equipment and personnel and materially decreased morale.

f. Division Artillery units established an observation post at each firebase or battery position for surveillance of the surrounding area. This proved very effective in sighting enemy firing locations as evidenced by the 42 visual sightings. On 27 January, 122mm

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rockets were observed firing at PLEIKU from the west. Artillery fire was placed on the location and a later sweep of the area produced two NVA bodies in the rocket pits killed by artillery. The OP's were also used as an O1 O2 base to conduct high burst registrations for artillery units in the area.

g. Battery D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) and the 2d Platoon, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) continued to provide automatic weapons support to the division. During the daylight hours the M-42 "Duster" and the M-55 "Quad 50's" were utilized for convoy security and highway strong points. During the hours of darkness they were used for firebase security. On the night of 3 and 4 November the firebase of Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) and Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) received a mortar attack followed by a ground attack. The dusters and quad 50's were employed along with direct fire from the 155mm and 8" howitzers to thwart the attack. A sweep of the area produced 25 NVA KIA and one NVAC.

(2) Training.

(a) Scheduled training as required by 4th Infantry Division Regulation 350-6 was continued. In addition to this program a minimum of 15 hours per week was included to encompass MOS refresher training, safety during firing, and rules of engagement. The battalions further expanded their MOS refresher training to include MOS's other than those directly connected with the delivery of fire. Cross training continued to be emphasized in the units.

(b) The program of forward observer training for non-artillery personnel was continued. The instruction was both conference and practical exercise, stressing the method of calling for fire, adjustment of fire, safety in firing, and rules of engagement.

(c) Classes were conducted for battery executive officers, fire direction officers, and forward observers designed as a refresher on basic fundamentals, and safety procedures required in this area of operations.

(d) Students were sent to the Fire Direction Officer training course at PLEIKU and the Forward Observer training course at AN KHE, conducted by IFFV Artillery. Five officers attended each course.

(e) The Division Artillery continued to support the 4th Division Training Detachment NCO classes with shoots on a bi-weekly basis and as requested.

(f) The Division Artillery inspection/instruction team was reorganized to improve performance by "instructing while inspecting". The team visited six batteries in January.

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(g) The 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery conducted section training and fire direction training for the Special Forces CSF element at PLEI ME on 20-22 December, and conducted training for the DUC CO Special Forces weapons NCO (US) and artillery officer (ARVN) in January.

(h) The 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery made liaison, inspection and instruction visits to the Special Forces camps at DAK PEK and DAK SEANG.

(3) Safety. Division Artillery published and distributed a new safety SOP during the quarter. Safety was also stressed on each visit to the units and in each of the schools conducted. There were nine firing incidents during the period.

(4) Ammunition expenditures.

6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105 T)	78,925
4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105 T)	44,931
3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105 T)	66,199
3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105 SP)	20,483
2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (105 T)	18,676
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155 SP)	36,615
5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (8" SP)	9,711
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155 T)	32,404
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (8" SP)	10,740
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm)	13,724
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (175mm)	6,450
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm)	1,680
Base Camp (105 T)	1,627
Base Camp (155 SP)	1,572

RECAPITULATION

105mm	155mm	8"	175mm
230,841	70,591	20,451	23,620

(5) Army Aviation.

(a) Aircraft status.

1. Disposition of aircraft.

a. OH-23G. nine authorized, assigned and on hand.

b. UH-1C. two authorized and attached to 4th

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2. One assigned aircraft was totally destroyed on 18 November due to enemy action.

3. One aircraft was placed TDY to 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery on 30 January.

(b) Operations.

1. During the period, artillery units in the DAK TO area, and at BAN BLECH during November, were supported with an average of two aircraft and crews. When the BAN BLECH operation moved to Oasis, one aircraft continued support from Base Camp. The remainder of the aircraft were on a mission basis at Base Camp.

2. Summary of aircraft utilization.

- a. Hours flown 1702
- b. Passengers carried: 4122
- c. Cargo carried. 2730 lbs
- d. Missions flown. 1959
- e. Sorties flown. 4421

d. Logistics.

(1) Basic loads of artillery ammunition.

(a) For operation MACARTHUR the basic loads of artillery ammunition remained the same as developed from experience gained during past operations. Basic load figures are the same as listed in previous Operational Reports - Lessons Learned.

(b) Basic loads were originally developed to insure adequate stock of ammunition at battery positions and the Battalion ammunition trains area to meet the demands of providing support of maneuver units during periods of heavy, prolonged contact. Battery position stockage levels represent the maximum to be stored at the position. Amounts were reduced when battery positions were too small to safely accommodate a large number of rounds, when a move was imminent, or when the number of rounds being expended daily did not justify stocking a large amount of ammunition. Amounts were increased when the situation required. Ammunition not stocked in the battery positions was held at the battalion ammunition trains area and earmarked for the batteries. The stockage at the battalion ammunition trains area insured adequate ammunition resupply to the batteries.

(2) FSE stockage levels of artillery ammunition.

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(a) DISCOM operated an FSE at Oasis. The following were the stockage levels:

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>FSE TOTAL</u>
105mm howitzer	3000 rds
155mm howitzer	750 rds

(b) Artillery units operating in the DAK TO area drew needed ammunition from the 1st Logistical Command FSA at DAK TO. The class V stockage level maintained by the FSA fluctuated with the volume of fires and number of units operating in the DAK TO area.

(3) Available supply rate of artillery ammunition. The following ASR's were in effect during the reporting period (105mm HE only):

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ASR</u>	<u>FIRE</u>	<u>TACTICAL SAVINGS</u>
24 1800 Oct - 09 1800 Nov	36	32.8	3.2
09 1900 Nov - 24 1800 Nov	81	62.2	18.8
24 1800 Nov - 09 1800 Dec	46.4	46.7	-0.3
09 1800 Dec - 24 1800 Dec	36	38.3	-2.3
24 1800 Dec - 09 1800 Jan	39	23.5	15.5
09 1800 Jan - 24 1800 Jan	36	18.3	17.7

Because of the heavy expenditure of ammunition at DAK TO the ASR for these periods were increased. Figures are rounds per tube per day.

(4) The average percentage of howitzers deadlined by month was:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>M101A1</u>	<u>M109</u>	<u>M110</u>
November	0.37%	15.3%	17.5%
December	2.5%	18.1%	30%
January	3.2%	22.2%	56.4%

(5) The average percentage of vehicles of all types deadlined by month was:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AVERAGE % DEADLINED</u>
November	2.3%
December	8.0%
January	12.0%

8. (U) Engineer.

a. General. The 4th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed toward support of tactical operations and base development at Camp Enari.

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Companies A, B, and C were in direct support of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades respectively. Company D at Camp Enari was in general support of the division. Company E (Bridge) supported the division with tactical bridging and construction. Headquarters and Headquarters Company with its heavy equipment, water purification units, flame APC's and tanks provided backup for the line companies and remained in a general support role for the division. A composite "Rome Plow" clearing task force was organized from all companies to include tracked security vehicles. This was in addition to the land clearing platoon attached to the 937th Engineer Group which continued operations in the division area of operations, performing clearing missions in accordance with priorities established by the division.

b. Intelligence.

(1) The enemy stepped up mining activity after a lull of approximately two and a half months during the preceding quarter. In contrast to his previous tactics of localizing his mining to a fairly short stretch (four to five kilometers) of unpaved road on Route 19W, he spread out his mining operations and began to mine other sections of the road not heretofore attacked. There were 130 mining incidents reported during the period, fairly well scattered over the area of operations so as to preclude daily sweeps of isolated areas where he habitually operated. Within the division's area of operations there were approximately 300 kilometers of major roads being used, which precluded daily sweeps of all routes to be traversed on any given day. Accordingly, there was a sharp increase in the number of damaged vehicles in spite of the fact that when sweeps were held, the minesweep team was usually successful in finding mines when they were present. There were some notable exceptions, where security vehicles for minesweep teams detonated mines as they followed the sweep teams. Investigation revealed that these areas had been thoroughly swept and there was therefore some indication that either the mines were being buried deeper or a type of non-metallic mine was being used. Overall, the enemy used more imagination in his mining techniques, and thus took a greater toll in damaged US vehicles and equipment.

(2) Aerial reconnaissance was somewhat restricted during the period for lack of adequate helicopter support. Ground reconnaissance was also limited due to heavy commitments by units which otherwise would be called on to provide ground security during engineer reconnaissance missions. Ground and aerial reconnaissance were performed on Routes 14N and 512. Aerial reconnaissance was flown over routes 19W, 19E, 509, 14B, 511 and 19A.

c. Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Operations.

(a) Headquarters and Headquarters Company provided normal administrative and equipment support to the battalion. The tank dozers

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in each of the line companies were consolidated into a provisional platoon with the flame APC's, and the composite organization provided the battalion a great measure of flexibility in operating its own Rome Plow team since it was relatively independent of the infantry units for security. Once coordination was effected with the brigade in whose area the clearing operations were to take place, the clearing team could proceed without being totally dependent on the brigade for its security. Throughout the period the water purification units of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, consisting of five 1500 gal/hr units and five 600 gal/hr skid mounted units, were utilized at 100% capacity with only occasional rests for units and personnel between moves. Once again the 600 gal/hr skid mounted units proved to be an invaluable asset to the division in supplying small isolated units with water, thus precluding the many hook sorties that would have otherwise been required.

(b) Company A provided direct support to the 1st Brigade and spent the majority of the reporting period in the vicinity of DAK TO after the deployment of the brigade to AO Spaatz in preparation for the "Battle for DAK TO". During the heavy fighting in this area in November and December, the infantry battalions were constantly on the move from one battalion fire base to another. These frequent moves into areas of dense jungle, inaccessible to items of heavy engineer equipment, called for extensive use of chain saws and demolitions. On several occasions reinforced platoons from Company A cleared infantry battalion fire bases capable of accommodating a battery of 105mm howitzers, the heavy mortars and the security element for the fire base in a matter of a day's time. Within two to three days the fire base would be enlarged to accept a battery of 155mm howitzers and additional elements of the battalion. After that, there were helicopter pads to be cut, enlarged and improved; trees creating masks for the artillery had to be eliminated; and bunkers and wire obstacles had to be emplaced as the fire base expanded. Whenever airlift was available, D6B tractors were transported into the firebases by CH54 skycranes to assist in the construction.

(c) Company B provided direct support to the 2d Brigade. Operations of the 2d Brigade were characterized by its battalions being widely dispersed and usually located at great distances from the division's base camp. Consequently, the company commander experienced greater problems of command and control and so the ability of the parent company and the battalion to provide backup support to these units on a timely basis was limited. Therefore the platoons adopted a "do it yourself" attitude. Using the men, materials and equipment available, corduroy roads and fords were constructed instead of tactical bridges; handtools and explosives were employed when heavy equipment would be late in arriving; and local materials and expedient methods were used when other means were not available. Within the 2d Brigade, squad-sized engineer elements habitually accompanied infantry company operations. This was possible because the 2d Brigade

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operated in terrain where the demands on the engineer platoon were lighter for clearing vegetation from fire bases. The engineer squads supported the infantry companies by clearing helicopter landing areas for resupply and medevac at the companies' night location, assisting infantry in stream crossings, destroying bunkers and tunnels which they encountered, and also doing their share of the fighting when a contact was made.

(d) Company C continued support to the 3d Brigade Task Force with combat engineer support in the area of operations and with the construction of the brigade base camp. Engineer support in the TAOR averaged four line squads daily and work consisted mainly of clearing landing zones, destroying enemy fortification, constructing defensive positions, mine clearing, and providing technical assistance in construction of field fortifications. Engineer support for base camp included prefabrication and construction of tent kits, construction of helipads and helicopter maintenance facilities, maintenance and operation of water supply points, penneprime distribution, road construction, and drainage.

(e) Company D was engaged in continuing construction of the division base camp, but had numerous combat support missions during this period. Significant were: 37 mine sweeps on Route 19W; support of the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division with one engineer platoon 25 miles south of BAN BLECH for one month, providing one engineer squad to reinforce Company A at DAK TO with chain saws to clear fire bases; "Operation Chubby", a platoon reinforced with heavy equipment which supported the 173d Airborne Brigade Task Force at PLEI MRONG for one week in January; and overall supervision of the Rome Flow land clearing team. The construction effort within the division base camp was primarily directed toward completing the east perimeter extension which expanded the area of the base camp by twenty percent. This area was cleared by dozers, seven rows of new wire placed and seven rows of old wire removed. Forty-five bunkers, four observation tower bunkers, seven billets, three orderly rooms, one headquarters, one mess hall, six showers, and six latrines were constructed in this area. Seven perimeter towers were moved to new locations and dropped in predug positions by Chinook helicopters. Throughout the base camp, the following construction projects were completed: Snack Bar, EM Club, NCO Club, two PASOE buildings for Special Services, 24 billets for the 4th Engineer Battalion, over 30 quonset dayroom buildings, DTOC overhead protection, and other smaller projects.

(f) Company E provided general support to the division by installing and retrieving bridges. An eleven float M4T6 bridge was installed across the DAK POKO River on Route 512 (YB953238) opening Route 512 for class 60 traffic to BEN HET. This bridge was removed in late December when a Bailey bridge was installed across the river by the 70th Engineer Battalion. On 26 October 1967, a five ponton M4T6 raft was constructed for use across the KRONG POKO River on Route 511 to ferry vehicles and equipment

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to the POLEI KLENG Special Forces Camp where a C-130 airfield was under construction. This raft was operated by Company E until 13 January when it was removed as a result of the water level becoming too low to permit continuous operation. On 2 January a 38'-4" M4T6 dry span bridge was installed for access to the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry fire base south of BAN BLECH. This bridge was removed on 13 January and remained with the infantry battalion until its return to base camp on 23 January. The AVLB platoon provided tactical bridging to the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, and one bridge and launcher remained with the 299th Engineer Battalion at KONTUM where it could respond to requirements on Highway 14N in case a bridge was destroyed by enemy action. The AVLB on operations with Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry launched its bridge 14 times. The other AVLB's remained at Camp Enari in general support and at various times were used by the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry and the 2d Brigade. A major effort undertaken by Company E was the dust control of Camp Enari using penepime and bunker oil. A simple but effective facility was constructed for unloading, opening, and transforming the penepime into distributors, using a minimum of mechanical equipment. Over 9200 barrels of penepime, mixed with JP-4 or diesel with a 1/4 ratio to enhance penetration, was spread. Over 863,000 square meters were covered with multiple passes during this period primarily on heliports, hover lanes and helicopter revetments for the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry and 4th Aviation Battalion. 80,000 gallons of bunker oil was distributed on roads and parking lots within the base camp. Company E was given the mission in early January to recover bodies and equipment from a helicopter which had crashed in the YA KRONG BOLAH River southwest of KONTUM on 26 August. The mission was completed on 14 January with the recovery of the radio equipment from the helicopter. The bodies of the missing crew members and passengers were not found.

(2) Training. Training of units in the area of operations was conducted mainly at the squad level because each engineer squad provided combat support for an infantry company. Each man was cross trained in the use of demolitions. Also training was conducted in the techniques of hasty river crossing so that the engineers could assist the supported infantry companies over water obstacles. Squad leaders conducted discussions with their squads on the mandatory subjects.

(3) Chemical. The Battalion Chemical NCO provided direct chemical support to Company D, 4th Engineer Battalion from 21 November to 3 December, during an operation involving clearing a mine field at Freedom Village (BQ045289), approximately 25 miles south of BAN BLECH. One M-106 sprayer-duster, two insecticide pump sprayers, and 100 gallons of agent blue herbicide were used during the operation. The chemical mission was to dry the heavy foliage to allow removal of the mine field. Within seven hours all leaf-bearing vegetation had begun to turn black; within 24 hours all leaves began to fall and in 48-72 hours stem type vegetation showed effects of chemical poisoning. The use of chemicals was effective in affording visibility to clear the mine fields that had been overgrown by heavy foliage.

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d. Logistics.

- (1) Experience has shown that the ASR for C-4 is insufficient.
- (2) Considerable problems have been experienced in receiving pumps for water purification sets which are apparently available only in substitutable items in some sizes and not available at all in others.
- (3) The experience in the lead time for replacement bucket loaders is excessive. During the quarter, three that had been on order nine months or longer were finally received, but during the same period two were lost, one to a mine and one to a mortar round.
- (4) Excessive lead times were also experienced on 5-ton dump trucks, bridge trucks and 250 CFM air compressors.
- (5) Repair parts support for the armored vehicle launched bridges can only be termed as non-existent.

f. Engineer.

- (1) Reorganization to infantry.
 - (a) Name of operation: Operation TET.
 - (b) Dates of operation: 25-26 January and 30 January to present.
 - (c) Location: PLEIKU City.
 - (d) Task Force: 4th Engineer Battalion (-); consisting of Company D; Company E (-); platoon, Company A; armored platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company; and Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.
 - (e) Supporting Forces: Artillery Liaison Officer and forward observer from 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery, and 37th ARVN Artillery Battalion.
 - (f) Intelligence:
 1. Reconnaissance: Upon notification on 25 January alerting two companies from the 4th Engineer Battalion to perform infantry combat missions, an aerial reconnaissance was performed to the three probable blocking positions stated in the warning order.
 2. Enemy Intelligence: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and the II Corps advisor provided initial intelligence

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of the enemy situation in PLEIKU City. PLEIKU Sector provided intelligence reports throughout the operation.

3. POW: Three POW's captured by Company E, 4th Engineer Battalion at approximately 301830 January 1968 during a sweep operation were interrogated. Two were NVA from two separate sapper teams consisting of 30 men each. These teams had a suicide mission to destroy portions of PLEIKU. The POW's were armed with AK-47's, hand grenades, and carried blasting caps.

(g) Mission: Perform infantry combat missions as the division reserve.

(h) Concept of Operation: To organize a task force comprised of two companies of engineers and a platoon of armored vehicles with a control headquarters to undertake and carry out infantry combat missions. Method of deployment could either be overland or by air. Missions were to vary from blocking force, clearing operations, or reinforcing roles.

(i) Execution:

1. 25-26 January: When alerted on 251045 January 1968 to organize two companies to perform infantry combat mission for deployment to one of three possible blocking positions in the division area in view of the enemy activity prior to TET holidays, a task force was immediately formed for deployment. The Rome Plow clearing team to include the organic armored vehicles was notified to return to base camp so that the tanks and personnel could be used for this operation. To increase the fire power, 12 caliber .50 machine guns were hand receipted from infantry battalions to supplement the six M-60 machine guns on hand. Overhead cover consisting of heavy timber and salvaged M8A1 matting for bunkers was loaded. Triple basic loads, three bales of concertina wire, two water trailers, C-rations for three meals, 24,000 sandbags, two grenades per man and pyrotechnics were loaded on organic trucks. Heavy engineer equipment included a D-7E dozer with a bull blade on a tractor-trailer. The entire task force was prepared for deployment at 1630 hours, 25 January. Pending notification to move to an area and assume a specific mission, review classes were conducted on the evening of 25 January for all officers and NCO's on the use and maintenance of the starlight scope, dust-off procedures, artillery adjustment, and the caliber .50 machine gun. During the morning of 26 January, equipment and personnel were inspected and training was conducted on crew served weapons. The afternoon was spent on range firing of M-16's, M79's, M60's and the caliber .50 machine gun. Stand down instructions were received at 261530 January 1968.

2. 30 January to present: The unit was again alerted at 300930 January 1968. The same equipment and personnel were prepared for movement by vehicular convoy at 1130 hours. Instead, at 1500

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hours, the unit assaulted by air to PLEIKU with three sorties of eight slicks and one hook. Company D and the command section were the first sortie; the remainder of Company D and the platoon from Company A were the second sortie; and Company E was the third sortie. A perimeter was immediately formed around the LZ. After linking up with Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and coordinating with the Mike Force Commander, the sweep began. Contact was made within the first city block and the force taken under enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned and the sweep continued. The task force closed on the Chinese school house (AR761465) at dusk, and established a perimeter and CP. At 2100 hours the battalion's organic armor, which had been sent overland, linked up with the air-lifted force. Three POW's were evacuated to the PLEIKU Sector Headquarters for interrogation. There were no significant actions throughout the night, although sporadic fire was received. A sweep of the area started on the morning of 31 January with two skirmish lines and the company of tanks. Results of the sweep were: 21 enemy KIA (body count) and five AK-47's and numerous grenades captured. The companies continued sweeping to the north with negative results. The CP was relocated to ZA236464 at 311330 January 1968 at the 37th ARVN Artillery compound. An OP was established at ZA234460 with two starlight scopes; one platoon was sent to reinforce Artillery Hill (ZA228532); and a platoon each of tanks and infantry provided security at the power plant (AR767236). At 1930 hours the OP reported VC in the vicinity of ZA2246 coming toward PLEIKU City. Spooky and gunships were employed and artillery called in. A sweep of the village adjacent to the battalion area was conducted on 1 February with tanks and a platoon of engineers resulting in 10 detainees being evacuated to PLEIKU Sector. Concurrently another platoon searched out a large building in the immediate area, suspected of having VC holed up inside, but with negative findings. ARVN swept the area where Spooky and gunships had fired and found blood soaked clothing, some bandages, clips of ammunition, a compass and map, but no bodies. On 011500 February 1968 orders were received to sweep the village of PLEI NHOL (AR772417) on return to base camp. The village was swept with negative results. The task force returned to base camp 011800 February 1968.

(j) Results: Enemy losses - 21 KIA, five AK-47's, 10 detainees, three POW's, bag with wallet and uniforms, and miscellaneous grenades and ammunition.

(k) Administrative Matters: Medics and med-evacuation procedures were superior. Resupply was accomplished by land convoys from base camp, and included a hot noon meal served on 1 February.

(2) Organic land-clearing team: In November a Rome Flow clearing team composed of four organic dozers from Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Companies D and E augmented by a contact maintenance team, fuel truck, air compressor and associated support vehicles and personnel was organized to assist in the clearing of Highway 14 north of KONTUM

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after NVA forces had ambushed a convoy on that route. The clearing team was secured by the organic 4th Engineer M48A3 tank dozers (blades removed) and flame APC's, thus making it a nearly self sufficient unit. Moving into an area requiring relatively heavy clearing, the team cleared a five kilometer length of road, 100 meters on either side, and returned to base camp eight days later, when the Rome Plow clearing team of the 937th Group neared linkup. Although working within sight of the fighting and air strikes on the surrounding hill, and securing itself at night along the road with two additional tracks from the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry the team had no enemy contact. In January the team was reconstituted and cleared a new north-south pioneer road for approximately 11 kilometers from Route 19W to 509. Work was also begun on a lateral east-west pioneer road in the same area.

9. (U) Signal.

a. Plans.

(1) A request for an improved bunker complex for Dragon Mountain was submitted and approved. Construction on the complex was begun in late December and is still in progress.

(2) A pole line between Signal Hill and Dragon Mountain is programed to support two 100 pair cables. It is planned to relocate two of the AN/MRC-69s on Signal Hill to Dragon Mountain. Tactical circuits will be demodulated at Dragon Mountain and extended into Base Camp via the 100 pair cable. This arrangement will release radio relay equipment making it available for deployment elsewhere within the TAOR as required.

(3) The installation of the Dial Telephone Exchange Facility is programed pending arrival of the equipment in country and construction of the building to house the facility.

(4) AFRS continued to be broadcast by the battalion at Dragon Mountain and initiated broadcast at DAK TO on 6 December. Detachment 3, AFVN, has begun testing of their broadcasts from the new AFRS Radio Station at Camp Enari on 560 kilocycles. Tests conducted to date have proven very successful and once a few minor difficulties are corrected they will assume full time responsibility for this function.

(5) Detachment 12, 518th Signal Company, USASTRATCOM-PAC established a 45 channel microwave system between Camp Enari and PLEIKU. The local end terminal is located on Signal Hill. This system is programed to replace several of the AN/GRC-50 systems presently being operated by the 278th system. One 12 channel system has been replaced to date. The system will provide both DCA and Army Area Circuitry, which increases the number of channels and quality of the circuits for the 4th Infantry Division.

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b. Operations.

(1) VHF Operations.

(a) The number of tactical VHF systems in use expanded significantly in the period prior to the "Battle for DAK TO". This expanded service continued after the battle until the redeployment of units from DAK TO.

(b) VHF carrier equipment (AN/TGC-7) service formerly located adjacent to the FAMOUS switchboard and operated by the 278th Signal Company was discontinued on 1 December when the 124th Signal Battalion assumed operational responsibilities with its organic equipment located on Signal Hill.

(2) AM Radio Operations.

(a) The signal battalion continued to operate NCS for Division Command Net #3 and a station in the IFFV RATT and SSB Nets.

(b) AN/VSC-2, SSB, RATT communications were used extensively throughout the area of operations. The communications proved very satisfactory and nets from Base Camp to the following units were established:

1. 173d Abn Bde (DAK TO)
2. 1st Bde, 1st Air Cav Div (KONTUM and DAK TO)
3. 1-12 Cav, 1st Air Cav Div (DAK TO)
4. TF Powerhouse (KONTUM)
5. 1-22 Inf (MEWAL Plantation)
6. 1-22 Inf (BAN ME THUOT)

(c) In mid-December, AFRS was extended to the DAK TO area for rebroadcasting to the troops via tactical VHF system. Rebroadcasting was accomplished by an AN/GRC-26D. The rebroadcast station is presently still in operation and is scheduled to continue operations until the new AFRS station is fully operational.

(d) AN/GRC-46's were provided on several occasions to the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry and 1st Battalion, 69th Armor in order for these units to maintain RATT communications with Division Main because of maintenance difficulties encountered with their organic equipment.

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(3) FM Radio Operations.

(a) The battalion continued to operate Division Command Net #1, DTOC remotes, and Dragon Mountain retransmission station. An additional retransmission station was provided the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry during their operations in the southern portion of the area of operations.

(b) FM radio sets for NCS continued in operation for the UHF and HF Tollhouse, Division Intelligence, and G2 Air nets.

(c) FM retransmission stations were also provided on Dragon Mountain for two Dustoff nets and the Division Transportation Office.

(4) Communication Center Operations.

(a) At present the following teletype circuits are in operation:

1. two circuits to I FFORCE V (Typhoon)
2. one circuit to PLEIKU (access to world wide systems)
3. one circuit to 1st Bde (Formal Forward)
4. one circuit to 2d Bde (Fortify Forward)
5. one circuit to 3d Bde (Flexible Forward)

(b) One circuit from DTOC to I FFORCE V is provided and operated by the signal battalion.

(c) Channelization is provided over tactical VHF systems to the 374th RRC for teletype circuits to the 1st and 2d Brigades.

(5) Wire Operations:

(a) The Camp Enari underground cable project was completed on 19 November.

(b) The Signal Hill Main Dial Facility (MDF) was completed on 20 November which provides for all circuits entering Base Camp to be routed to the FAMOUS MDF and subsequently to the subscribers via the underground cable system.

(c) A pole line between Dragon Mountain and Signal Hill has been installed. Future use is for installation of 12 Spiral/4 cables and one 100 pair cable.

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(d) On 11 January the SB-611 patch panel located on Signal Hill was replaced by a SB-675 patch panel. This equipment will provide for more efficient operation at the Base Camp in addition to releasing a vital item of communication equipment for employment elsewhere within the area of operations.

(6) A public address system was furnished for the following functions:

- (a) 10 December - 50th Anniversary Ceremony
- (b) 26 December - Bob Hope Show (Project Holly)
- (c) 4 January - 4th Infantry Division Change of Command Ceremony.

c. Training of signal personnel.

(1) A program has been initiated to provide personnel each month to attend the AN/TRG-24 school operated by the 43d Signal Battalion at PLEIKU to insure a continuous supply of MOS qualified personnel.

(2) Maximum number of personnel are receiving cross-training to provide a balance of qualified personnel throughout the battalion and to supplement MOS areas which reflect a shortage.

10. (U) Information Activities

a. The action during November at DAK TO created the greatest news interest of any event that the division has been involved in since its arrival in VIETNAM. During November, 138 news media representatives from throughout the Free World visited the division, principally to cover the "Battle for DAK TO." During the remainder of the period 29 news media representatives visited the division.

b. In November a quonset hut, with a capacity of 16 persons, was completed on base camp to house visiting newsmen.

c. The number of home town news releases submitted monthly rose from 270 in November to 1101 in January 1968. Also in January a manual for the preparation of home town news releases was locally produced and distributed to the field.

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d. In early January a provisional public information detachment consisting of one officer and two information specialists was constituted from the Information Office resources and attached to the 2d Brigade.

e. According to USARV Information Office figures the division rose from last among infantry divisions in number of inches of copy printed in the Army Reporter for the month of November, to first in the same category for the month of December. Figures are not yet available for January.

f. On 7 December the Commanding General, MG W. R. Peers, traveled to SAIGON where he conducted a press conference which was video-taped at the SAIGON studios of AFTRS. He summarized 4th Infantry Division combat and civic action activities in the Central Highlands during 1967. The press conference was attended by approximately twenty news media representatives. A kinescope recording of the conference was made and shown on the PLEIKU AFVN TV station.

g. There were 13 editions of the IVY LEAF published during the quarter, one of which was the Golden Anniversary issue on 10 December which was expanded from the normal eight pages to 12. Three editions were published during the "Battle for DAK TO". Daily telephone calls to Tokyo and the Tokyo based editor's monitoring of the wire services enabled division readers to follow the battle on an almost current basis.

h. By the end of January the division chapter of the 4th Infantry Division Association had over 4,200 members. The division chapter sponsored a memorial dedicated to the Ivy Division on its Golden Anniversary on 10 December.

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SECTION 2 (U) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. (U) General. Many of the observations in the form of lessons learned for the quarterly period were submitted in the After Action Report, "Battle for DAK TO". Additional lessons learned are submitted herein.

2. (U) Personnel.

Augmentation of the Finance Section

Item: Augmentation of the Infantry Division Finance Section.

Discussion: The present TOE 12-37E authorizes 82 EM to operate a mechanized finance office for a division strength of 16,500. This is inadequate for two reasons: (1) manual preparation and computation of vouchers is necessary in RVN and (2) increased division strength which the finance office services (up to 19,000). There is under consideration an MTOE which will authorize 102 EM, but this will still be inadequate for the above reasons.

Observation: There is an urgent need for augmentation to a total of 124 EM to provide adequate finance support under the manual system to the increased strength of an Infantry Division. The recognized augmentation should include requisitioning authority for finance personnel pending authorization by an adequate MTOE.

3. (U) Intelligence.

Enemy Use of Riot Control Agents

Item: Employment of Riot Control Agents.

Discussion: The Special Forces Camp at TRANG PHUC (ZVO25266) in DARLAC Province was mortared on 28 December. Investigation by a technical intelligence field agent revealed that out of the 30-50 rounds that impacted within the camp's perimeter at least 11 of the rounds contained a riot control agent. Examination of fragments by the combined US/RVNAF Material Exploitation Center revealed that they had been prepared by partially hollowing out the explosive filler and inserting a chemical agent. Laboratory tests of the agent showed it to contain CS, TNT, and a compound similar to CN. CS was the predominant component of the mixture.

Observation: The enemy has placed an increased emphasis on the use of chemical agents. Captured documents have shown that he is attempting to obtain an additional chemical capability. It is probable that additional attacks with chemical agents will be employed in the future most likely in conjunction with mortar assaults.

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75mm Pack Howitzer

Item: Employment of 75mm Pack Howitzer.

Discussion: The enemy has been suspected of using 75mm pack howitzers in the DAK TO area since the middle of November. The first evidence that the weapon was being used was on 15 November when a company commander heard a sound different from that of a mortar or recoilless rifle. Interrogation of two PW's confirmed the presence of four to six of these weapons in the DAK TO area. During the TET offensive at YB973149, the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found two 75mm pack howitzer rounds and a 75mm shell casing.

Observation: The enemy has been in possession of these weapons since the Indo-China war, but has made only limited use of them. Even though this weapon is difficult to transport and an ammunition resupply problem does exist, he has used it effectively. Wider use of this weapon can be expected in the future, particularly in the CAMBODIAN/LAOTIAN Border area.

4. (U) Operations.

Engineer Support

Item: Utilization of Bulldozers.

Discussion: Due to the enemy's widespread capability for launching indirect fire attacks, the construction of forward fire support bases with raw manpower rendered base personnel and equipment vulnerable for an unacceptably long period.

Observation: Bulldozers were able to dig trenches six to eight feet deep in minutes. A bulldozer under the direction of the advance party can complete preliminary clearing and excavation with minimum exposure to enemy fires and thus reduce considerably the period of vulnerability for the main body.

Counterfire Techniques

Item: Analysis of enemy weapons attacks.

Discussion: The enemy has employed 60mm and 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, 122mm rockets, B-40 rockets and possibly 75mm howitzers against friendly bases. Post strike analysis revealed that with few exceptions the enemy emplaced his weapons at almost maximum range.

Observation: The initial counter battery effort should be concentrated at the maximum range of the weapon system detected after direction is obtained, either from a single ray flash report or crater analysis. After range is obtained through the use of observers or radar, necessary adjustments can be made. Should no target information be available, counterfires should be directed in accordance with a previously planned counterbattery program.

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Artillery Intelligence

Item: Dissemination of intelligence information.

Discussion: Intelligence information gathered by aerial personnel detection, red haze, agent reports, and other intelligence gathering sources, is only of value as artillery targets if disseminated promptly through artillery channels. Intelligence of a specific enemy location is valueless if not timely, as the enemy forces concerned are normally small and constantly moving.

Observation: An aggressive program of intelligence gathering and dissemination at all levels should be stressed to bring timely and effective fire upon targets produced through intelligence.

Searchlights

Item: Use of searchlights.

Discussion: The presence of large, organized enemy units within the area of operations which were capable of ground probes of defensive perimeters and close-range mortar attacks required the maximum utilization of surveillance devices during the hours of darkness.

Observation: Searchlights located with M-42 "Dusters" complemented the H&I fires and assisted in the location of targets around the perimeter. Searchlights, using infrared, scanned the area prior to using the M-42. After the M-42 fires, the searchlights flashed visible light on the entire area to determine damages and to allow subsequent firing, if needed. Using the searchlights during the hours of darkness to continuously scan the entire perimeter of a battery forward fire base with infrared light increased the security of the fire base and provided searchlight support for small unit operations within range of these fire bases.

Priority of Fires

Item: Priority of fires.

Discussion: Recently battalion fire support bases received mortar attacks while a coordinated ground attack was directed against a subordinate element. Such a coordinated attack is designed to prevent massing of countermortar fires and reaction elements. Countermortar fire planning must take this type of coordinated attack into account. Additionally mortar attacks may be a warning of an impending attack.

Observation: The term "Priority of fires to units in contact" should be replaced or tempered with the knowledge that a coordinated attack is a likely occurrence. Fire priorities should be assigned with due consideration for the vulnerability of fixed positions to ground and mortar attack.

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Medevac

Item: Dustoff Requests

Discussion: Requests for Dustoff of injured personnel have been received which caused evacuation from insecure landing zones and in some instances at night, when such evacuation could have been delayed until the dangers inherent in a hot LZ or a night evacuation could have been avoided. Urgent requests for evacuation should be verified, and if an urgent need for evacuation does not exist, the evacuation should be delayed to avoid unnecessary exposure of Dustoff personnel and choppers.

Observation: Unnecessary exposure of Dustoff helicopters should be avoided by careful screening of medevac needs when a hot LZ or night evacuation is involved.

B-52 Strikes

Item: B-52 strikes in support of Tactical Operations.

Discussion: Delays to requested or planned B-52 strikes of up to 72 hours can be expected because of immediate requirements in other parts of VIETNAM. B-52 strike targeting can assist the tactical plan of maneuver but the timing and proximity should not dictate delays or withdrawals to meet required safety factors.

Observation: Tactical planning in the use of B-52 strikes must take into consideration possible delays in planned strikes. Care should be exercised in decisions to postpone or delay operations to await such strikes.

Combat Engineer

Item: Divisional Engineer Battalion reorganization for combat.

Discussion: When employed as infantry in the VIETNAM environment, reorganization of the Engineer Battalion in the manner described by current field manuals did not prove practical and required extensive tailoring to the local situation. Since the companies in direct support of committed brigades cannot be pulled back for such a mission, the battalion can normally field only a line company, bridge company and perhaps a provisional platoon from other elements of the battalion in the base camp, with a control element from battalion headquarters.

Observation: That a detailed SOP be prepared by divisional engineer battalions for reorganization for combat, taking into account the local situation with careful attention being devoted to the following:

(a) Availability of additional crew served automatic weapons - the bridge company has none by TOE and it is normal for a number of automatic

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weapons from the other companies to be committed to base camp perimeter defense.

(b) Much of the communications capability may be tied up in base camp defense. SOI's must be prepared covering associated units. If the rear element of the battalion remains operational it is wise for either it or the deploying element to switch to the alternate frequency to eliminate administrative traffic during a combat situation.

(c) Alternate plans must be made to take care of the eventuality of either overland deployment or deployment by air. Loading plans should also be prepared indicating requirement for trucks or aircraft.

(d) Definite lists of items to be carried on the individual soldier and a list of special items such as extra batteries, flares, claymores, etc., must be prepared and checked periodically to insure rapid response and nothing is left behind. Again two lists should be made, one for overland deployment and another for deployment by air. In the latter case it is wise also to prepare a list of "first resupply" items and insure that these items are on hand.

(e) Augmentation personnel. An artillery liaison officer is required. Additional medics may be required. A mortar section is desirable if available.

(f) An officer should be designated to effect liaison with the CP of the major unit to which attached for combat operations.

(g) A supply of maps for all areas where the battalion may be employed should be maintained.

(h) Scheduled training in infantry tactics and techniques must be provided all personnel in the plan.

Mining Incidents

Item: Harassment and interdiction fires to prevent mining of LLOC's.

Discussion: The increase of mining incidents throughout the area of operations necessitated a corresponding expansion of the H&I program to cover unsecured land routes during the hours of darkness. Use of HE rounds for this purpose left craters in road surfaces and deposited fragments which damaged the tires of wheeled traffic and impeded the effectiveness of mine sweeps.

Observation: The employment of white phosphorous for harassing fires resulted in a significant reduction of mining incidents in western PLEIKU Province without the disadvantages caused by HE munitions.

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Cordon and Search Operations

Item: Timing of Cordon and Search Operations.

Discussion: Interrogation reports have revealed that VC/NVA entering villages for the purpose of rice collection and propaganda lectures enter and conduct their activities in the early evening and do not stay overnight. Thus a cordon set up just prior to daylight frequently yields nothing.

Observation: Cordons should be emplaced as soon after EENT as possible. Patterns must not be established. Re-entering a village several hours after a cordon and search operation can obtain effective results. Cavalry raids by mechanized vehicles can also be effective.

Ambushes

Item: Ambush of lone vehicles.

Discussion: VC/NVA forces operating in western PLEIKU Province area tend to ignore armored vehicle convoys and allow them to pass unmolested. Experience has shown, however, that an armored vehicle traveling alone is frequently the target of harrassing small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 rocket fire.

Observation: Wheeled vehicles should move only in convoys, and tracked vehicles should always be at least in pairs in insecure areas.

Bait for Ambushes

Item: Use of discovered rice caches as bait for ambushes.

Discussion: Recently several sizeable rice caches have been discovered. While working to evacuate these caches, units have been fired upon.

Observation: Once a rice cache has been discovered, it may be bypassed, leaving a stay behind force to act as an ambush. Evacuation of the rice can be postponed until it has first served as bait for the ambush.

5. () Logistics.

Replacement of Armored Vehicles

Item: Lack of replacement tanks and personnel carriers.

Discussion: Increased losses of tanks, M48A3, and ACAV's, M113A1 to enemy antitank weapons have not been rapidly replaced. Replacement times of up to one month have seriously affected the combat power of the armor battalion and two cavalry squadrons. Additionally, a structural failing in the integral fuel tanks of the ACAV vehicle results in leaking fuel tanks after 2,000 to 2,500 miles and adds to an already critical situation.

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Observation: Failure to rapidly replace tanks and personnel carriers results in a serious drop in the combat power of armor units. The problem of the M113A1 fuel tanks will remain critical until the fuel cell MWO kit becomes available in the supply stream.

Tank and APC Track

Item: High usage of tank and APC track.

Discussion: High mileage is being accumulated rapidly on tanks and personnel carriers. Track is becoming an item of critical supply because of the high mileage and because significant amounts of track have been destroyed by enemy mines. Present stocks of track are not adequate to meet the increased demands.

Observation: There is an increased demand for track which is greater than the present supply. The arrival of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry has added to the demand for track. The rate of supply for track should be increased.

Sling Equipment

Item: Sling equipment clevises.

Discussion: The nut and bolt used with sling equipment clevises is easily lost since either or both can be separated from the clevis. It was found that spot welding the bolt to a chain, itself in turn welded to the clevis, eliminated the loss of the bolt. The nut was spot welded to the clevis, eliminating the problem completely.

Observation: A field fix consisting of spot welding the nut and bolt to the clevis eliminates their loss.

Forward DX Facility

Item: Resupply of clothing and other TA 50-901 items.

Discussion: When TA 50-901 clothing and equipment becomes unserviceable, it is necessary to effect a direct exchange for like items with unit supply personnel. The former requirement of having each man personally conduct the exchange in base camp proved far too costly in terms of man hours. All clothing and TA 50-901 equipment was consolidated by the unit S4, and a mobile issue facility was established. Periodically, this facility traveled to the unit's forward fire bases and afforded all personnel the opportunity to DX unserviceable clothing with minimum time lost.

Observation: Every effort should be made to continue the flow of supplies from rear to front to conserve available man-hours of combat units.

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Overhead Cover

Item: Pre-fabricated overhead cover for FSB's.

Discussion: During the "Battle for DAK TO" one of the infantry battalions moved into a new FSB where little timber existed for overhead cover. Pre-fabricated bunker kits were designed using lumber sizes already available and assembly drawings were prepared and reproduced in multiple copies. The kits were packaged into two bundles and banded. On one bundle a sandbag was fastened which contained nails and a copy of the assembly drawing. The kits were then ready for airlift to the new FSB.

Observation: When a battalion moves into a FSB where natural material for overhead cover is not available and the possibility of enemy mortar and rocket attack is imminent, the use of prefabricated bunker kits is worth the expenditure in materials and airlift time to enable the unit to get under cover in the minimum amount of time.

Helicopter Revetments

Item: Expedient helicopter revetments.

Discussion: On several occasions when a brigade or battalion was operating at great distances from the base camp, it was desirable to retain the helicopters at the forward location in order to save time. This practice necessitated the construction of some type of expedient revetments. Since there was always an abundance of empty peneprime drums available at the base camp, these were trucked to the new location (44 bbls to a bridge truck). The lids of the barrels were removed by exploding a circular piece of det cord beneath the rim of the empty barrels. The drums could then be aligned, filled with earth using a scoop loader and sandbags placed on top to the desired height. Fifty barrels were used for each UH-1 helicopter revetment.

Observation: Expedient revetments constructed as above provide quick, satisfactory protection for helicopters in forward areas and are superior to earth berms, which create a dust problem.

Forward Water Supply

Item: 600 GPH water purification unit - FSN 4610-902-3106, Md1 VN 500.

Discussion: These units are simple, require a two man crew, and when mounted in the bed of a 1½ ton trailer along with a supply of chemicals, the approximate 5000lb load can be easily transported along with the crew by CH-47. Experience has shown that an average battalion fire base requires from two to three hook loads of water per day, or about 18 hook loads per week.

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When an operating cost of \$750/hr for the CH-47 is used, and an average time of one hour per sortie, the cost of transporting water to a fire base amounts to \$13,500 per week, compared to the one time cost of \$4,150 for the 600 GPH unit.

Observation: Experience has shown the value of the 600 GPH water purification unit and it should be authorized to the divisional combat engineer battalion in VIETNAM on the basis of two units for each three infantry or armor battalions supported, considering that some units will not always have a source of water near by.

Palletized Ammunition

Item: Palletized ammunition for sling loads.

Discussion: Palletized ammunition received at ASP's is broken down for issue to units. Often the units sling load the ammunition to fire support bases. The ammunition on pallets as received by the ASP is ideal for sling loading operations.

Observation: ASP's should retain some palletized ammunition on hand for sling loading. This would save time because ASP personnel would not have to break down the pallet loads and rigging crews would have an easier job in preparing the ammunition for sling loading.

Sling Equipment

Item: Return of sling equipment during combat assaults.

Discussion: During the "Battle for DAK TO", a serious problem encountered was the quantity of sling gear used to hook equipment and supplies forward that was not returned to base camp. The result was an acute drain on rigging material assets.

Observation: The failure to return sling equipment has occurred frequently during aerial delivery operations within the division and has resulted in a critical demand for these items. Sling equipment must be returned to load points to insure that future air lifts of supplies can be supported.

POL Bladders

Item: Use of POL Bladders.

Discussion: Recent use of steel 500 gallon POL pods has produced leaks caused by the jolting and stressing that the pods received while being transported to the field by truck. By substituting collapsible bladders, this difficulty was eliminated.

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Observation: Collapsible bladders are more acceptable for transporting POL to the field by truck as they are not damaged by the stresses encountered when moving over rough terrain.

6. (U) Chemical.

RCA Employment

Item: Bulk CS-1 Delivery.

Discussion: Rigging 80 pound drums of CS-1 for airdrop with composition C-4 inside the drum as the explosive results in excessive burning of the agent and is very time consuming. Use of one 15 second delay detonator results in an unacceptably high malfunction rate.

Observation: By wrapping the outside of each drum with eight wraps of detonating cord (four wraps above the bottom reinforcing band and four above the top band) and running each end of the det cord to one of two 15 second delay detonators secured to the top of the drum with steel straps and screws, flash and malfunction rate is kept to a minimum and rigging time is reduced to ten minutes per drum for two experienced men. The det cord is taped to prevent its being torn off by branches as it falls through the jungle canopy. Maximum aircraft altitude for effective bursts is 2300 feet above terrain. There is not a minimum altitude as the drums will burst even after impacting with the ground. Until the XM920E2 fuze and burster becomes available, drums should be rigged as described above for delivery of bulk CS-1.

APD Missions

Item: Conduct of APD missions.

Discussion: Prior to 4 December, two gunships and one UH-1 (slick) were employed for APD missions. During the mission, the copilot of the slick which carries the APD was required to devote his attention to plotting the ship's position and readings on a map, leaving only the pilot in control of the ship. If the pilot were incapacitated by enemy ground fire, the copilot could not react in time at that speed and altitude (100 knots at treetop level) to regain control. It is believed that this may have been a contributing factor in the crash and loss of a ship, crew, and APD set on 4 December. A chase ship was subsequently employed on all APD missions. The APD ship's position and readings are now recorded in the chase ship so that both the pilot and copilot of the APD ship can maintain control.

Observation: The employment of a chase ship in APD missions adds to the safe operation of the aircraft and produces more accurate data.

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~Maintenance of APDsItem: Maintenance of APD's.

Discussion: Maintenance of the APD is an increasing problem because of wear and tear on the set and a lack of spare parts. The sets now in use are the original experimental models which require frequent disassembly for cleaning and other maintenance. This, combined with daily mounting and dismounting in helicopters, has caused wear on fittings, cables, and other critical components. The lack of spare parts at organizational and depot maintenance facilities has caused an increase in the downtime of the APD. A new and improved APD has been developed; however, there is no information on the availability of these sets.

Observation: That the production and issue of the new APD's be expedited, and that in the interim, spare parts for existing APD's be made available.

APD Search PatternsItem: APD search pattern in mountainous terrain.

Discussion: The most accurate data on APD missions is obtained when the missions are flown at tree top level and in contour with the terrain. A parallel, crosswind pattern flown from downwind to upwind works well over level or rolling terrain. However, this type pattern is difficult in mountainous terrain.

Observation: In mountainous areas an irregular search pattern is easier to fly and can be just as effective if the aircraft pilot is aware of factors which may affect the APD readings and adjusts his search pattern to allow for them. Factors to be considered are exhaust fumes from the APD aircraft or accompanying aircraft and variable winds in mountainous areas. The irregular search pattern may correspond to flying from the top of hills down draws and ravines, regaining altitude, and then flying down other sides of the high ground until adequate coverage is attained. This method is more time consuming than a regular pattern but is considered safer and just as reliable.

7. (U) Civic Action.

Village InteractionItem: Village to village Civic Action.

Discussion: One village chief designed, supervised, financed and built nine wells for his village. The brigade S5 suggested that he lend his well diggers as technical advisors to other villagers who did not know how to dig wells or who were afraid of going so far into the ground. Division G5 catalyzed the program by compensating the well diggers.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (HQS CSFOR-65) for
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Observation: By praising, paying, and spreading the influence of specially skilled civilians, the civic action team can build pride in accomplishment. The acceptability and complete transfer of knowledge of a new technique are assured when one MONTAGNARD tells another MONTAGNARD.

GVN Distribution of Civic Action Materials

Item: GVN distribution of Civic Action materials.

Discussion: The apathetic attitude of local GVN officials toward MONTAGNARD affairs and village conditions has limited provincial/district progress in gaining MONTAGNARD support for the GVN. The newly instituted GVN logistics system provides district/province officials with a practical exercise in responsible government by giving them a chance to do something for the people and by requiring them to visit local hamlets to evaluate RD Projects. Similarly, local hamlet chiefs learn to use the constituted GVN institutions to obtain materials. Civic Action Personnel monitor the disposition of the village requests, through district and province, and arrange for the transportation of bulk materials.

Observation: To achieve the goal of placing the district/province government effort at the service of the people, the GVN Civic Action logistics system must be made to work. Civic Action personnel should monitor the logistics program, but always as a behind-the-scenes force.

Civic Action Teams

Item: Manning of Civic Action Teams.

Discussion: The key problem in mounting a civic action program is personnel. Only one person is authorized in infantry battalions for civic action and psyops. None are authorized for other battalions. Personnel to man civic action teams must therefore come from other resources. Two possibilities exist for furnishing personnel - either rotate the duty among a roster of people, or assign a few specific people full time civic action duties. The latter solution has proved to be markedly superior. Full time civic action personnel get to know the people and to be known and trusted by them. This is a prerequisite to cooperation between the CA teams and the civilians. Cooperation on useful work and games provides the bond of shared experiences that later pays off in information about the enemy.

Observation: CA teams are most effective when composed of personnel assigned the duty on a full time basis.

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Village Self Defense

Item: Spontaneous commitment to self defense.

Discussion: Pacification is achieved when the people are sufficiently contented with their lot and their prospects for the future that they cleave to their situation and reject by force proposals for revolutionary change. In one group of hamlets in the division TAOR, civic action and psychological guidance has led to a spontaneous decision to take sides in the VIETNAMESE war. The hamlet chiefs made this decision over a period of time involving several discussions between the chiefs, and interpreter, and a brigade S5. The US personnel answered questions and clarified problems, but did not offer a solution or attempt to structure the discussion.

Observation: The essential ingredient in pacification is that it represent the considered consensus of the people. Officials guiding pacification should address themselves to the basic prerequisites to pacification - security, improved living conditions, and opportunity for the people's children - and allow the decision to be made spontaneously.

MONTAGNARD Bill of Rights

Item: Advertising the MONTAGNARD Bill of Rights.

Discussion: The GVN policy is to afford MONTAGNARDS certain rights with respect to land ownership, education, maintenance of language, customs and courts and access to government careers. Provincial implementation of this policy negates the GVN objectives, because provincial officials, fearful of the MONTAGNARD numerical superiority and legendary ferocity, seek to keep the MONTAGNARDS in a weak, ignorant, and divided state. A sense of participation in their country and a feeling of hope for the future is essential to enlist MONTAGNARD support for the war. (Decree 0033/67 and 0034/67) Translation of the MONTAGNARD Bill of Rights into the local dialect, with symbolic illustrations keyed to the paragraphs of the decrees, proved to be fairly effective. The civic action team interpreter read and explained the Bill of Rights, pointing out the paragraphs and pictures as he went. Later, literate or semi-literate members of the village explained the document to others using the pictures, and some words, as memory aids.

Observation: Civic Action teams must, in some cases, take the initiative in publicizing the policies of the VIETNAMESE Government.

Civic Action - Audio Visual Team

Item: Use of joint Civic Action - Audio Visual teams.

Discussion: Civic Action MEDCAP teams have at times experienced low turn-outs of villages during visits because the villagers are working in the

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fields or are at the city market. The Audio/Visual teams visiting the same village at night have a very large turnout.

Observation: The combined use of MEDCAP teams and the audio visual team making joint visits during the evenings have been highly successful. Villagers have returned from the fields and market and taken advantage of the medical assistance while being entertained by the audio visual unit.

8. (U) Information.

Civilian Correspondents

Item: Civilian correspondents.

Discussion: Whenever a battle takes on major proportions, the civilian press corps will rush to the scene. This situation creates several unique and difficult situations, as was the case in the "Battle for DAK TO". On one particular day during the battle there were 58 civilian news people, both male and female, in the area.

The problems that immediately arose were those of transportation and shelter. Initially the press had to get from MACV Press Center in PLEIKU to DAK TO. Once there, the problem became more acute since the majority wanted to go "where the action was". As in all periods of heavy contact, the helicopters were most needed for military uses. This problem was solved by coordinating with the Division Aviation Officer for the use of a helicopter on a priority basis during the morning hours, and on a "when available" basis in the afternoon. The rationale behind this schedule was that most of the press arrived in the morning or stayed overnight and wanted to go out in the morning. Shelter for the press was a problem in that there was only space for 10 to 15 people in the forward area. This problem was solved by initially advising the correspondents of the limited space, dispatching them to other units in the area, and making it convenient for them to return to the Press Center at night and go out early the next day should they decide to return.

Another problem was that of obtaining factual and up-to-date information concerning all actions of the day for the newsmen. Since each of them could not cover every contact a daily briefing was presented to the newsmen by a member of the G-3 section. To give added impetus to the briefing, a high ranking officer was available to answer questions and explain the action of the day. This particular technique, while not new, helped prevent rumor and inaccurate reporting.

The final problem and perhaps the most difficult to correct was that of keeping the military personnel advised of the rights of civilian correspondents and getting them to cooperate fully with the press. MACV regulations, augmented by USARV and Division regulations, spell out what

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the press can and what it cannot do. This problem arises from the rapid turnover of personnel and the length of time that usually elapses between battles. This situation was remedied by briefing commanders on the spot when possible.

Observation: During any major contact, many civilian correspondents will arrive in the area. These people will need both transportation and shelter. PIO should work very closely with the Division Aviation Officer to arrange this transportation. The press should be advised of the space available, and every effort should be made to provide space with other units and the MACV Press Center. Newsmen should be given a daily factual and up-to-date briefing. Military personnel should be aware of the rights and privileges of the newsmen and cooperate with them to the best of their ability. The Division Field SOP should, in the information annex, summarize the rights, privileges and limits placed on the press.

Part II: Recommendations.

Appropriate recommendations are contained in the lessons learned and the Combat Operations After Action Report for "The Battle for DAK TO".

5 Inclosures
as

Charles P. Stone
CHARLES P. STONE
Major General, USA
Commanding

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DISTRIBUTION:

1 - ACSFOR - DA	1 - CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
1 - OCMH - DA	1 - CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
4 - USCDC	1 - CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
2 - USCONARC	1 - CO, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
1 - CINCUSARPAC	1 - CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
1 - COMUSMACV	1 - CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
1 - DCG, USARV	1 - CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
2 - COST ANAL STUDY GP, USARV	1 - CO, 4th Avn Bn
6 - CG, I FFORCE V	1 - CO, 4th Engr Bn
1 - CG, ROK V	1 - CO, 124th Sig Bn
1 - Comdt, Armed Forces Staff College	1 - CO, 4th Med Bn
1 - Comdt, Army War College	1 - CO, 4th S&T Bn
1 - Comdt, C & GS	1 - CO, 704th Maint Bn
1 - Comdt, Armor Sch	1 - ACofS, G1
1 - Comdt, Arty Sch	1 - ACofS, G2
1 - Comdt, Avn Sch	1 - ACofS, G3
1 - Comdt, Chemical Center & School	1 - ACofS, G4
1 - Comdt, Engr Sch	1 - ACofS, G5
2 - Comdt, Inf Sch	1 - Comdt, 4th Div Repl Tng Det
1 - Comdt, Sig Sch	1 - Chemical Officer
1 - Comdt, USMA	1 - TACP (ALO), 4th Inf Div
1 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div	10 - CO, 29th Mil Hist Det
1 - CG, Ft Polk, La	1 - AG File
1 - CG, Americal Div	
1 - CG, ROK Capital Div	
1 - CG, 9th ROK Inf Div	
1 - CG, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)	
1 - CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	
1 - CG, 196th Lt Inf Bde	
1 - DSA, II Corps	
1 - SA, 24th STZ	
1 - CO, CDC, CBR Agency	
1 - CO, 52d Arty Gp	
1 - CO, 937th Engr Gp	
1 - CO, 52d Avn Bn	
1 - CO, 29th Engr Bn	
1 - CO, 5th USSF Gp	
1 - CO, Co B, 5th USSF	
2 - CO, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div	
2 - CO, 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div	
2 - CO, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div	
2 - CO, Div Arty	
2 - CO, DISCOM	
1 - CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav	
1 - CO, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav	
1 - CO, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav	
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor	
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 8th Inf	
1 - CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf	

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

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1. (U) For organizational structure for the period 25 October through 1 December see Combat After Action Report, the "Battle for DAK TO".

2. (C) Task organization for the remainder of the quarter, 2 December through 31 January, is shown below.

a. Task organization as of 2 December was:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
1-12 Inf (-)
B/1-69 Armor (-) (OPCON)
Plat, 2-1 Cav (OPCON)
6-29 Arty (DS)
Co A (-), 4th Engr Bn (DS)
TACP

173d Abn Bde (-)

1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
4-503 Inf
2 Co's, 1-12 Inf
Plat, B/1-69 Armor (OPCON)
Trp E, 17th Cav
23 MF Co (OPCON)
3-319 Arty (-)
173d Engr Co (-)
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty (-) (DS)
Co B (-), 4th Engr Bn (DS)
TACP

TF 22

2-8 Inf (Mech)
1-10 Cav (-) (OPCON)
3-6 Arty (-) (DS)
2 Plat, 4th Engr Bn (DS)
TACP

1-69 Armor (-)

A/3-6 Arty (DS)

2-1 Cav (-)

Div Arty

5-16 Arty

Div Troops

1-12 Cav
Btry, 2-19 Arty
7-17th Cav (-) (GS)

DISCOM

b. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 13-37-67 DTG 071642Z Dec 67 Effective 11 Dec 67.

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

delete: 4-39 Inf

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c. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 14-37-67, DTG 111546Z
Dec 67.

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

add: 2-8 Inf (eff 11 Dec)
1-10 Cav (eff 11 Dec)
1-12 Inf (eff 11 Dec)

delete: 1-22 Inf

Div Troops

delete: 1-12 Cav (eff 9 Dec)
add: 1-22 Inf

d. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 15-37-67 DTG 130730Z
Dec 67.

173d Abn Bde (-) departs 4th Inf Div AO eff 14 Dec

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

add: 1-503 Inf (eff 140700 Dec)
2-503 Inf (eff 140700 Dec)

e. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 20-37-67 DTG 250735Z
Dec 67.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

delete: 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf

TF Powerhouse

add: 1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf

f. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 24-37-67 DTG 111000H
Jan 68.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
B/1-69 Armor
B/2-1 Cav
6-29 Arty (DS)
Co A (-) 4th Engr Bn (DS)
TACP

7-17th Air Cav (-)

Div Arty

5-16 Arty

Div Troops

DISCOM

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf
1-10 Cav

TF Powerhouse

1-503 Inf
2-503 Inf
3-319 Arty (-)
TACP

TF 1-22

C/4-42 Arty (DS)
TACP

1-69 Armor (-)
A/3-6 Arty (DS)

2-1 Cav

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g. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 30-37-67 DTG 220300Z Jan 68.

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

add: 2-503 Inf (eff 20 Jan 68)
1-22 Inf (eff 22 Jan 68)

h. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 31-37-67 DTG 241200Z Jan 68.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

add: 1-12 Inf (eff 25 Jan)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

delete: 1-12 Inf (eff 25 Jan)

i. Task organization as of 31 January 1968.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
1-12 Inf
3-12 Inf
B/1-69 Armor
Co A (-) 4th Engr Bn (DS)
TACP

Div Troops

7-17 Cav (-) (GS)

DISCOM

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (Mech)
1-22 Inf
1-10 Cav
2-503 Inf
Co B (-), 4th Engr Bn
TACP

1-69th Armor (-)

2-1 Cav (-)

Div Arty

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Key Personnel

Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period.

Division Headquarters.

Stone, Charles P.	MG	CG, 4th Inf Div
Connor, Robert E.	BG	ADC-A
Hickman, Don R.	BG	ADC-B
Sniffin, Charles R.	COL	Chief of Staff
Birch, Harold B.	LTC	AC of S, G1
Smith, John A.	LTC	AC of S, G2
Petro, Peter P.	LTC	AC of S, G3
Tombaugh, William W.	LTC	AC of S, G4
Apt, Robert	LTC	AC of S, G5
Thomason, David A.	LTC	AG
Singer, Lawrence R.	LTC	Div Surg
Seaman, Robert W.	LTC	IG
Holeman, John S.	LTC	PMO
LaBarbera, Albert	LTC	Fin Off
Sheehan, Joseph F.	LTC	Chap
Young, Harold G.	LTC	Cml Off
Kington, Donald M.	MAJ	IO

1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Johnson, Richard H.	COL	CO
McBride, Thomas E.	LTC	XO
Stiner, Carl W.	MAJ	S3

2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Hodges, Warren D.	COL	CO
Story, Robert P.	LTC	XO
Foss, John W.	MAJ	S3

3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Wear, George E.	COL	CO
Bentz, Harold F.	LTC	Deputy CO
Kunze, Melton H.	LTC	XO
Doyle, William P.	MAJ	S3

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Division Artillery

McAlister, Robert C.	COL	CO
Dewhirst, Sam T.	LTC	XO
Godwin, Bobby J.	MAJ	S3

Division Support Command

Blewett, Rex R.	COL	CO
Hyatt, Frederic D.	MAJ	XO
Haltiner, Robert G.	MAJ	S3

Battalions

Madison, John H.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 8th Inf
Edgerton, John P.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf
Malone, Danridge	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
Schneider, George J.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
Hendrix, Jamie R.	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
Ball, George	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
Junk, William P.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
Taylor, William W.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
Livsey, William J.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
Heiden, Charles K.	LTC	CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav
Graham, Charles P.	LTC	CO, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav
Grant, William D.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
Kenny, Donald E.	LTC	CO, 6th Bn, 29th Arty
Dickerson, Roy L.	LTC	CO, 4th Bn, 42d Arty
Bobzien, Gerald B.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 9th Arty
Evans, Henry C.	LTC	CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty
Mierswa, Myles H.	LTC	CO, 4th Avn Bn
Lee, Emmett C. Jr.	LTC	CO, 4th Engr Bn
Spitz, William M.	LTC	CO, 124th Sig Bn
Anderson, Kirby V.	MAJ	CO, 4th Med Bn

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DeVillle, David A.	LTC	CO, 4th S&T Bn
Rice, Marvin E.	LTC	CO, 704th Maint Bn

Separate Companies and Detachments

Batchelder, Michael J.	CPT	CO, HHC, 4th Inf Div
Kneuluehl, Richard	CPT	CO, 4th Admin Co
Hazelwood, Robert R.	CPT	CO, 4th MP Co
Peffer, William D.	CPT	CO, 4th MI Det
Cutler, Francis E.	MAJ	CO, 29th Mil Hist Det

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

OPERATION MAC ARTHUR

This summary does not include activities connected with the "Battle for DAK TO" during the period 1 November to 1 December. See After Action Report, "The Battle for DAK TO".

1 November. Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry in a sweep of the 31 October contact area at AQ820429, found 19 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, five rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition and three NVA bodies. At AQ854472 Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found seven SKS rifles and one machine gun. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry captured one individual with pack and knife at ZAD02364.

2 November. Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found 28 NVA packs at AQ820429 and at AQ870425 Company A took two individuals under fire, resulting in one NVA KIA and one NVA captured.

3 November. At 2155 hours at AQ813375 the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry fire support base received mortar and SA fire, resulting in 17 US WIA and two trucks damaged. Simultaneously at AQ912447 the firebase of Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was mortared and at 2213 hours the perimeter was probed from 3 sides. By 2255 hours the attack had become so intense that the unit had to lower their tubes of the howitzers to direct fire angles to keep their perimeter intact. The attack lasted until 0130 hours 4 November. A dawn sweep resulted in 24 NVA bodies and one NVA POW. Friendly losses from the encounter were 1 US KIA and 18 US WIA. A 4th Aviation Battalion gunship flying in support of the contact crashed and burned at AQ914448.

4 November. At AQ899444 the gunship downed on 3 November was found with all four crewmen dead. At YA890444 a minesweeping team found 12 anti-personnel mines.

5 November.

6 November.

7 November.

8 November.

9 November.

10 November.

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11 November. At 1710 hours at AQ875413 a 4th Aviation Battalion gunship received ground fire and force landed, wounding two US.

12 November. At 1029 hours at AQ815215 the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry killed one VC. At YA944290 an APC from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine wounding three US.

13 November. At 1630 hours at YA955349 Company A 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found a bunker complex and received SA and 25-30 rounds of mortar fire, resulting in one US KIA and three US WIA.

14 November. At 1004 hours at AQ872378 Company C 1st Battalion 12th Infantry exchanged fire with two NVA resulting in one NVA KIA one US WIA. At AQ862358 one platoon of Company D killed two NVA. At 2225 hours the 1st Battalion 12th Infantry FSB received 30-40 rounds of mortar fire from the southwest, resulting in one US KIA and five US WIA.

15 November. At 1331 hours at AQ894395 Company A 1st Battalion 22d Infantry killed one NVA.

16 November. At 1530 hours Company C 2d Battalion 8th Infantry received AW fire, resulting in three US WIA.

17 November. At AQ850415 Company C 1st Battalion 22d Infantry made contact with a force of unknown size. The contact continued until 1710 hours, resulting in three US KIA 11 US WIA and six NVA KIA. At 2150 hours at YA942255 an ambush patrol of the 2d Battalion 8th Infantry killed two VC.

18 November. At 1618 hours Company C 1st Battalion 22d Infantry killed one NVA. At 2025 hours at AQ888281 a patrol from Company B 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry exchanged fire with a force of unknown size, resulting in five US WIA.

19 November. At 0850 hours at AQ850416 Company D 1st Battalion 22d Infantry found a bunker complex with 70 bunkers and five graves with five NVA bodies. At 1645 hours at AQ847410 Company A 1st Battalion 22d Infantry found four NVA bodies and captured two NVA.

20 November. At 1230 hours at YA967323 one platoon of Company A 2d Battalion 8th Infantry received SA fire resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. At 2120 hours at YA964435 Troop A 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry received SA and mortar fire resulting in six US WIA. The unit returned fire, killing one NVA.

21 November.

22 November. At 0945 hours at YB975153 in the area of the 20 November contact, Company A 2d Battalion 8th Infantry found seven NVA bodies.

23 November. At 1015 hours at ZA180335 Troop D 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry made contact with a force of unknown size resulting in two US WIA and one $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck destroyed.

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24 November. At 1251 hours at YA896353 Company A 2d Battalion 8th Infantry made contact with a force of unknown size resulting in two US KIA, two US WIA and six NVA KIA. At 1405 hours at YA884350 Company B 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry exchanged fire with a force of unknown size, resulting in one US WIA. At the same time at ZA014398 Company C, 2d Battalion 8th Infantry exchanged fire with a force of unknown size, resulting in one US WIA.

25 November. At 1235 hours at YA896305 a UH-1H aircraft from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received AW fire resulting in one US WIA and the wounding of an ARVN interpreter. At 1430 hours at ZA043398 Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry killed one VMC and captured six VMC. At 1444 hours at YA981350 Hawkeye Team H4B killed one VMC. At 1612 hours at AQ 831462 Company A, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry found four NVA bodies in graves.

26 November. Company B 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found four NVA bodies in the area of the 24 November contact.

27 November. At AQ814483 Company C, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry found one NVA body in a grave.

28 November. At 1240 hours an OH-23 from 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry crashed at YA982355. The pilot died in the crash and the crew chief received a broken arm. At 1620 hours at AR765063 two US personnel from the 1st Battalion 69th Armor were wounded when they tripped a booby-trapped grenade.

29 November. At 0854 hours at AQ798492 Company C, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry found six NVA bodies in graves and one more at 1530 hours at AQ 762496. At 1940 hours the 2d Battalion 42d ARVN Regiment had two personnel wounded at ZA134410.

30 November. Hawkeye Team 4A killed one VMC at YA962307.

1 December. At 1345 hours at YB953607 a CIDG company made contact with an estimated NVA company resulting in two US WIA and nine NVA KIA. At 1415 hours at ZB244503 the first platoon of Company C, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry killed one NVA.

2 December. From 0059 hours to 0125 hours and from 0310 hours to 0325 hours the 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry FSB received ten mortar rounds from the west-southwest resulting in one US WIA. At 1350 hours Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry found three NVA bodies at YB873313. At 1520 hours Company A 1st Battalion 8th Infantry found an NVA body, estimated to have been three days old at YB838115. At 1630 hours at YB653550 a CIDG company made contact with a platoon size force, resulting in one CIDG WIA.

3 December. At 0330 hours Company B, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry found one partially covered NVA body in a hole at YB814088 and shortly afterwards the company found a regimental size base camp enclosing the area YB813091, YB810087, YB813085, and YB816088. The camp consisted of 86

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bunkers and 12 mess areas. At 1128 hours, Companies A and D, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry received two rounds of friendly artillery in the vicinity of Hill 943, resulting in seven US WIA. At 1615 hours, Company B found another complex in the vicinity of YB797084, consisting of 100 bunkers and positions. They also found 30 B-40 rocket cases, six graves and two NVA bodies estimated to have been 24 hours old. At 1730 hours at YB955138, Company A, 3d Battalion 8th Infantry reported one US KIA and 11 US WIA as the result of a grenade which exploded on a soldier's web gear.

4 December. At 0710 hours, a 173d Airborne Brigade mine sweep team found ten mines along Highway 502 from YB928255 to YB937254. At 1000 hours at YB925258, a 173d Airborne Brigade 5-ton truck hit a mine, resulting in two US WIA. At 0730 hours, Company B, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry uncovered the remaining four graves found on 3 December and found three more NVA bodies. At 0815 hours, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion 8th Infantry found seven NVA bodies, estimated to have been killed one week earlier by artillery. At 0900 hours at BR330460, a convoy was ambushed by an estimated VC platoon. The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry reacted and killed 13 VC and captured one. One US was killed and one wounded as a result of the action. At 1200 hours at YB827171, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry found one NVA body, estimated to have been one week old. At 1440 hours at YB785104, Company D, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry made contact with two or three individuals in a bunker, resulting in one US WIA. At 1545 hours at YB772-055, a helicopter mounting an APD crashed from unknown reasons and burned, resulting in three US KIA, one WIA, and one MIA. At 1550 hours at YB850-217, a grenade on a soldier's web gear exploded as Companies C and D, 1st Battalion 8th Infantry linked up, killing two and wounding nine.

5 December. At 0829 hours at YB785104, Company D, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry found six bunkers with overhead cover, estimated three to four weeks old. Inside the bunkers, the company found two M-60 machine guns, 18 cases of 7.62mm linked ammunition, five unknown type rifles, one B-40 rocket launcher, 35 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition, claymores, and mines.

6 December. At 1400 hours at BR225522, an engineer work party had a man injured when a dud mortar round exploded while the party was burning off an area in the vicinity of strong point #10. At 1640 hours at YB961273, eight Montagnards surrendered to LRRP 3A. At 1205 hours at ZA104496, the Aero Rifle Platoon of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry made contact with an estimated VC squad, resulting in three VC KIA, one VMCC, and two carbines captured. At 1700 hours at ZB133135, a helicopter from the 52d Aviation Group crashed from undetermined reasons, resulting in one ARVN KIA and one ARVN WIA.

7 December. Two companies of the 3d Battalion 12th Infantry proceeded to the wreckage site of the APD downed on 4 December and extracted the four KIA's. At 0931 hours at AQ783220, Company C, 4th Battalion 39th Infantry made contact with an estimated four or five VC, resulting in one US WIA and one VC KIA. Three troops of the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry conducted a cordon-and-search operation around the village at BQ080439, resulting in seven Hoi Chanh's.

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8 December. At 0800 hours at YB787145 Company B 1st Battalion 8th Infantry found three bodies in graves. One grave had a star and wreath on top of the mound. The bodies were dressed in green uniforms and estimated to be three to four weeks old. While checking the graves the unit heard a bugle to the west. At 1145 hours at AQ785223 Company C 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry fired at two VC wearing khaki uniforms with packs. One US was wounded by shrapnel from one of the unit's own M-79 grenades.

9 December. At 0945 hours at YB793213 LRRP HLC sighted seven NVA and took them under fire killing two. At 1100 hours at AR814515 the 22d ARVN Battalion killed one VC and captured another. At 1430 hours at ZA075512 an OH-23 received fire from an estimated 15 AW positions wounding the crew chief. At 1755 hours at YB940132 five men from Company D 3d Battalion 8th Infantry were injured by a mortar round which fell short near their position. The 1st Squadron 12th Cavalry departed AO Spaatz and returned to the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM).

10 December. At 1025 hours at YB829297 Company B 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry made contact with a platoon size force resulting in one US KIA, one NVA KIA and one AK-47 captured. At 1105 hours at AQ855865 a Lambretta hit a M1A1 mine reinforced with an estimated 8-10 pounds of explosives, resulting in 10 VN KIA and two VN WIA. At 1202 hours at YB918-718 Company D 1st Battalion 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated squad size force, resulting in two NVA KIA one NVA PW and 37 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition captured. At 1513 hours Company B 3d Battalion 12th Infantry received eight 60mm mortar rounds and SA fire from several directions. The action, which took place at YB773107 resulted in seven US WIA and three US MIA. At 1530 hours at YB832297 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry found 55 bunkers with overhead cover and two NVA bodies in graves, estimated to be one day old.

11 December. The 1st Battalion 12th Infantry conducted an overland movement to Plei Mrong at ZAl17675 and came under the operational control of the 2d Brigade. At 1010 hours at BR209525 a Montagnard stopped an engineer convoy of the 173d Airborne Brigade and told them that a mine had been emplaced in the road. The Montagnard identified the site and a CHICOM AT mine was extracted. At 1255 hours at YB771105 two companies of the 3d Battalion 12th Infantry conducted an attack on Hill 890. At 1325 hours the companies began receiving heavy SA fire and an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds. Air and artillery support were called in and the contact was broken at 1342 hours. Results of the contact were four US WIA including the company commander of B Company who remained in command and two NVA KIA. At 1410 hours the 4th Battalion 39th Infantry completed airlift from East Ban Me Thuot airfield and came under the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division. At 1510 hours at YV860725 Company D 1st Battalion 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA platoon resulting in one US WIA, four NVA KIA and four NVAC. At 1845 hours the 1st Battalion 22d Infantry came under the operational control of the 2d Brigade and assumed responsibility for Task Force Wainwright.

12 December. At 0830 hours at ZA200095 an element from the 1st Battalion

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69th Armor received one round of sniper fire while conducting a cordon-and-search operation resulting in one US WIA. At 1616 hours at YA985295 an APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry received a rocket round, resulting in two US WIA. At 1635 hours at BR187517 a 5000 gallon tanker overturned on Highway 19E seriously injuring two US. At 1730 hours Company B, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry recovered one US body reported as MIA on 10 December. The 7th ARVN Battalion conducted an overland move to Kontum for further disposition.

13 December. At 1040 hours at YB772106 Company C, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry found the other two US bodies reported as MIA from the 10 December contact. At 1130 hours at YB772109 the company received sniper fire resulting in one US WIA. At 1447 hours at the same location the company again received sniper fire, resulting in one US KIA. At 1820 hours at YA940331 an APC working with Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine, resulting in three US WIA. At 1845 hours at ZB004217 50-60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire landed within the perimeter of the 4th Infantry Division's Forward TAC, resulting in three US KIA, 11 US WIA, and one VN WIA. Countermortar fire was initiated. At 1947 hours Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry reported one of their officers killed by an HE round, believed to have been part of the counter-mortar program being conducted at that time.

14 December. At 0655 hours at YB864119 a B-52 strike resulted in one US KIA and two US WIA from Company B, 1st Battalion 8th Infantry. At 1740 hours Troop A, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry spotted five NVA and killed one. At 1805 hours at YB766113 Company C, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry heard five mortar rounds fired from Hill 865. The rounds landed 300 meters east of B and C Companies night location. While counter-mortar fire was being conducted a short round with VT fuze exploded at the FSB wounding 11 US 4th Battalion (abn) 503d Infantry departed AO Spaatz for BEN HIEP and further disposition. At 1740 hours A Troop, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry spotted five NVA and killed one.

15 December. D Troop, 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry found a cache containing seven M1A1 mines, 11 60mm rounds, eight boxes of TNT, 21 81mm rounds, eight claymores, 15 grenades and four 75mm rocket rounds. At ZA075539 two troops and an APD of the 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry conducted a CA and searched the village at that location. They received SA fire from the village during the search. Results of the operation were three NVA KIA, one NVA body found, 10 suspects detained and 22 82mm rounds captured.

16 December. At AR805211 Company A, 1st Battalion 69th Armor had five men injured when a grenade exploded for unknown reasons. At ZA078169 LRRP 2D made contact with an unknown size VMC force, results were one VMC KIA, one VMCC, and one VMC WIA. At AQ915467 a patrol from A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry observed two individuals wearing fatigue jackets and loin cloths who evaded when they saw the patrol. The CIDG elements working with the patrol fired, resulting in two VMCC WIA. At 1147 hours at YB862118, Company C, 1st Battalion 8th Infantry spotted one NVA in uniform and called in artillery, suspecting that there was a sizeable enemy force in the area. At 1158 hours at the battalion FSB while the support

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mission was being fired, a 105mm round exploded within the perimeter resulting in 10 US WIA. Cause of the incident was determined to have been an individual who threw an expended canister in front of the howitzer tube while the tube was firing. At YB935188 a UH-1H from the 52d Aviation Group crashed for unknown reasons, resulting in three US KIA and seven US WIA. At ZA013330 the Reconnaissance Platoon 2d Battalion 8th Infantry received 10-20 rounds SA fire and one B-40 rocket round from an estimated 5-10 enemy, resulting in one US WIA.

17 December. In the vicinity of ZA1216 D Troop 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry found a large base camp area. Fires were still warm. At AR815713 B Troop 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry captured one VC with carbine and pack. At AQ818443 Company C, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry found one NVA body in a grave estimated at being two weeks old. The company found another NVA body at AQ828437. At ZA061139 LRRP 2C made contact with one VC, resulting in one VC WIA. At ZA069545 Troop A 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry killed one VC. LRRP 4H observed an individual moving across an open field and shot and wounded him. When they moved out to capture the individual the patrol received SA fire from all directions. The patrol was extracted.

18 December. At AQ914446 one US was killed by a fragment from an 8" round that had been direct fired at a range of 400-500 meters. At YB977363 a 4th Aviation helicopter received 10-12 rounds of SA fire and set down, unable to fly. The ship was extracted. At YB795102 Company C, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry found a massive bunker complex. At YB922064 Troop A, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry fired on two NVA, killing one. At ZA054694 a CIDG Company took three individuals under fire, resulting in one NVA KIA, one VMC KIA, and one AK-47 captured. At YA973940 an APC working with Company C, 2d Battalion 8th Infantry was narrowly missed by a B-40 rocket round. One US was wounded when the round fragmented on a nearby tree. At YB946-397 two US were wounded when an aircraft from Troop D 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry received 15-20 rounds of SA ground fire.

19 December. At ZA139306 an APC from Troop B 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry hit a mine, resulting in two US WIA and the APC destroyed. At AQ834355 LRRP 4C observed seven NVA, killed one and captured a carbine. At YB772313 Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry exchanged fire with one NVA, resulting in one US WIA. At ZA147312 an ARVN 2 1/2 ton truck hit a mine, resulting in two ARVN WIA and the truck destroyed. At ZA098611 a CIDG company found two NVA bodies and miscellaneous weapons and equipment.

20 December. At BR053353 Troop A 2d Squadron 1st Cavalry spotted two armed VC, pursued them with a tracker team and killed one VC and captured both weapons at BR032346. At ZB016094 the command and control ship of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry with the Battalion CO and Sergeant Major aboard crashed and burned, resulting in two US KIA, four US WIA, and two US MIA.

21 December. At YB818246 the artillery base of Company A, 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received 20-30 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire. Air and artillery support was called in and two secondary explosions were observed. At YB788111 the artillery firebase secured by Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received nine rounds of 60mm and one of 82mm mortar fire.

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22 December. At AR877173 Company A 1st Battalion 69th Armor detained one individual who claimed to be a VC barber. An MI team was sent to the village, resulting in four confessed VC.

23 December. At BR013275 LRRP 4A made contact with four NVA, killing two.

24 December. At YB803104 the Reconnaissance Platoon 3d Battalion 12th Infantry observed 10 NVA and took them under fire, resulting in three NVA KIA. At YB796104 Company C, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry ambushed two NVA, killing one. At YB793106 one platoon from Company C made contact with three NVA and killed one. The platoon then received AW fire from Hill 900, resulting in the death of the platoon leader one US WIA and one US MIA.

25 December.

26 December. At YB793108 Company C 3d Battalion 12th Infantry received sniper fire from two or three individuals, resulting in one US WIA. At AR970110 Troop B, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry killed one VC with pack and weapon. At YB799110 Companies C and D 3d Battalion 12th Infantry received sniper fire and five mortar rounds, resulting in three US KIA eight US WIA and eight NVA KIA. At AR977223 Troop A, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry killed three VC. At ZA100298 an APC from Troop A 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry received one B-40 rocket round, resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA.

27 December. At YB793103 Company D 3d Battalion 12th Infantry found two graves with two NVA bodies in each grave estimated to be four or five days old. At AR985256 LRRP 4C killed two VMC. At AR955365 the Division Exploitation Platoon received SA fire from a village and observed one individual running from the village. Results one VC KIA. The 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry moved to KONTUM and came under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

28 December. At AR973173 the Aero Rifle Platoon 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry made contact with an estimated platoon size force. One US was killed, three US WIA, and one NVA KIA. From 1009 hours to 1439 hours at AR999738 gunships and airstrikes were employed against a force of 30-40 NVA resulting in five NVA KIA. At AR985755 Troop A 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry killed one NVA.

29 December. At BR089704 three RF were wounded by a booby trap.

30 December. At ZA125594 Company D 1st Battalion 12th Infantry made contact with a force of unknown size resulting in one VMC KIA. At AR940-841 Company C, 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry detained 14 individuals believed to be a VC propaganda committee. At AR989687 Troop B 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry made contact with a force of unknown size, killing one NVA. At AR943839 three members of Company B 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry stepped on punji stakes. At AR904444 Troop A 2d Squadron 1st Cavalry observed and engaged eight or nine VC resulting in one VC KIA and one RF WIA.

31 December. At ZA113514 a CIDG company made contact with an unknown size force, resulting in one VMC KIA and two VMC PW's.

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In the vicinity of YB8124 a Phantom F4C received SA fire and the aircraft crashed at YB883262. The pilots ejected and were rescued. At AR979708 Troop B, 17th Squadron 17th Cavalry found a bunker with six B-40 rockets, two 82mm rounds, three anti-personnel mines and 2100 rounds MG ammunition. At ZA099509 Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry received sniper fire, resulting in one US WIA.

1 January. At ZB138350 Company B 3d Battalion 12th Infantry found wreckage of a helicopter that crashed on 31 December 1967 resulting in three US KIA and one US WIA. At ZB139359 a CH-47 set a load of 105mm ammo on an anti-personnel mine resulting in one US WIA and two ARVN WIA. At ZA096501 Company A, 2d Battalion 8th Infantry found two NVA bodies in graves, one estimated two or three weeks old one estimated several days old.

2 January. At ZB173479 Company D 3d Battalion 12th Infantry found four NVA graves with bodies, killed by artillery approximately three days before. Also found one NVA body on the ground and one SKS rifle. At AQ918442 a 2½ ton truck hit a mine resulting in one US WIA.

3 January. At ZB187478 one individual from Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was wounded by an 81mm mortar round which fell short. At YA998123 LRRP H2C made contact with 10 NVA. Artillery and gunships were employed, resulting in two NVA KIA. The 7th ARVN Airborne Battalion and Task Force Headquarters departed TAN CANH and closed overland move to KONTUM for further redistribution.

4 January. At AR963698 Troop A 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry observed three NVA and killed one. One US was wounded. At AR965702 elements from Troop D, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry were preparing an LZ when they received SA fire. Three US WIA. At YA910451 an APC from Troop A 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received a rocket or rifle grenade resulting in two US WIA. At YA997467 LRRP 2H reported being surrounded by a company size force. Artillery and gunships were employed resulting in six NVA KIA and one US WIA. In the vicinity of AQ8479 a FAC observed a 100-man force moving east. Three airstrikes were called in. Special Forces provided elements to search the area. They made contact and additional airstrikes were called in. Results were one NVA KIA two AK-50's and one AK-47 captured.

5 January. At YB902156 Company D 1st Battalion 8th Infantry found one NVA body in a grave. The 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion made contact at ZB147477 with an estimated two platoons. Results were three ARVN KIA and eight ARVN WIA. Troop D 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry made contact at AR 960697 with an unknown size force resulting in two NVA KIA and one US WIA. At 1455 hours at AR966697 Troop D made another contact which lasted until 1835 hours.

6 January. At AR964696 Troop D 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry found three VC KIA, one VC PW (WIA) and one French submachine gun. At AR946485 a 937th Engineer Group 2½ ton truck hit a mine resulting in one US KIA.

7 January. At YB886151 Company D 1st Battalion 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated 10 NVA resulting in one US KIA and four US WIA.

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At ZB206522 a RVN Ranger Battalion made contact with an unknown size force, resulting in six VC KIA and one VC PW. At AR907652 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry had two men injured by an anti-personnel mine. At YB887155 an artillery round exploded near Company B as it was moving up to link up with Company D, resulting in one US KIA and five US WIA.

8 January. During the night at ZB126507 the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry heard an explosion. At 0700 hours a VR was flown over the area of the explosion and the wreckage of a USAF F4C aircraft was found. At YA958288 a 3/4 ton truck from 20th Engineer hit a pressure type mine, resulting in two US WIA. At YA960289 an APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was hit with B-40 rockets and SA fire, resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. At ZB206522 a helicopter sitting on the LZ blew down a tree, which was being cut, with its rotor wash. The tree fell on the rotor blade, which then struck a soldier and killed him. A second tree being cut was also blown over, wounding four ground troops. At AR946614 an individual from Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry tripped a booby trapped grenade and was wounded.

9 January. From 0128 to 0215 hours at AR835485 the 815th Engineer received mortar and SA fire. The perimeter was penetrated in some places and the enemy employed satchel charges, resulting in one US KIA and two US WIA. At AR978743 Company A, 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received three grenades, SA fire, and sporadic sniper fire, resulting in two US WIA. At AR954684 the command and control helicopter of the 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry killed one NVA. At AR958702 Company B, 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry called in an airstrike. One NVA fled from the strike towards the company's position and was killed. At YB885110 an aircraft from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received ground fire and crash landed at YB956k15 with negative casualties.

10 January. From 0204 to 0235 hours at AR788888 (KONTUM Airfield), the enemy breached the perimeter and conducted a raid on the airfield with B-40 rockets, SA fire and satchel charges. There were seven US KIA, 21 US WIA, seven UH-1H destroyed, eight UH-1H damaged, eight trucks damaged and five NVA KIA. At 0215 hours at AR790895 Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry observed 11 individuals and took them under fire, resulting in four VC KIA. At ZAO49489 a man from LRRP 2E lost his foot when he stepped on a mine. At BRO26746 a man from Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry stepped on a log beside which was a grenade attached to a tree by a string, resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. At YB918260 a tree cutting detail from Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery received sniper fire 200 meters northwest of FSB 13. One US was wounded.

11 January. At YB932066 Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received heavy ground fire. Two airstrikes were called in, both of which produced large secondary explosions. The aero rifle platoon was inserted and made contact with an estimated NVA company, well dug in with overhead cover. More airstrikes were called in, results of the contact: 14 NVA KIA and two US WIA. At ZAO15516 Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, resulting in one US KIA, one VMC KIA and one NVA KIA.

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LRRP 1A was inserted at ZB126507 to investigate the crash of AR 14C on 8 January. Area was thoroughly searched with findings of metal no larger than two inches square. There was no trace of the pilots. At BR088-708 Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry killed one VC. At AR948-641 Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found a printing press inside a small hut.

12 January. The new 1st Battalion 8th Infantry FSB received 20-22 75mm recoilless rifle rounds from the east northeast. Seven US were wounded. At AR967419 LRRP H4C was following two individuals on a trail when a third threw a grenade from their rear resulting in one US WIA. The 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry airlifted to the new FSB at YB911121. The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry airlifted to ZA058437 and ZA010344.

13 January. At ZA096518 a CSF company with the Reconnaissance Platoon from the 1st Battalion 12th Infantry while pursuing an enemy squad, made contact with an estimated company size force resulting in two VC KIA, one LMG, one AK-47 and one US M-79 captured and one CSF WIA. Companies B and C, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry airlifted to YB885290 and began construction of a new FSB, northeast of BEN HET.

14 January. At YB880270 a mine sweep team working on Highway 512 made contact with an estimated company size force. The enemy initiated the attack by firing a rocket into the lead tank followed by SA AW more rockets and possibly recoilless rifle fire resulting in three US WIA and one CSF WIA. At AR838393 a 3/4 ton truck from the 2d Brigade hit an unknown type mine. Nine US were wounded and the truck heavily damaged. At YB923-063 Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found three bodies in two graves, estimated dead for several days. At YB880273 Company A, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry killed one NVA. At YB855265 Troop A 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry engaged an unknown size force and killed two NVA.

15 January. Early in the morning at ZB151085 two minesweep teams were ambushed with B-40 rockets, AW and SA fire. Gunships and airstrikes were employed. Three US KIA, 15 WIA, one tank destroyed, one tank and four APC's damaged, and 21 NVA KIA and five NVAC. Later in the vicinity of BR 156516-168527 a convoy on Highway 19E was ambushed with B-40 rockets, AW and SA fire. The 2d Squadron 1st Cavalry reacted to the contact resulting in 16 US WIA, five 5000 gallon tankers destroyed, 12 NVA KIA and one NVAC. At ZB147076 an aircraft from Troop A 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry was shot down west of the first ambush site resulting in three US WIA. At ZB186111 a 52d Aviation aircraft crashed with a load of 81mm mortar ammunition. The rounds exploded killing one and wounding four. One US was MIA and the aircraft was destroyed.

16 January. At YB816173 LRRP 1A made contact with an unknown size force, killing one NVA. A PRC-25 radio and one M-16 were left behind in the extraction. At YB870253 a Troop B 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry aircraft was shot down with negative casualties, and at YB788235 another Troop B aircraft went down for unknown reasons wounding two US. At YB986290 an explosion occurred at the patrol base of Company B 3d Battalion 12th Infantry while canisters were being burned resulting in six US WIA. At YA942434 an APC from Troop A 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry was hit with rocket and SA fire. One US was wounded when the .50 caliber machine gun on the APC

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exploded. At AN035185 the Division Exploitation Platoon made contact with an unknown size force, resulting in two VC KIA and one US WIA. Company D, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry conducted a combat assault to ZAO30625 and began construction on a new FSB.

17 January. At ZAO07275 LRRP H4A killed two VMC. At ZU123762 Company B, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated squad size force, resulting in one US KIA and four US WIA. Company D, 1st Battalion 8th Infantry conducted a combat assault to YB839223 and began construction of a new FSB. The 1st Battalion 12th Infantry began operations out of the new FSB.

18 January. At BR165616 a tank from the 2d Squadron 1st Cavalry hit a mine resulting in one US WIA. Another US was wounded when the VTR sent to recover the disabled tank also hit a mine. The 1st Battalion 8th Infantry conducted an airlift to the new FSB. At YB854269 a scout ship from the 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry received heavy AW fire. An airstrike was called in and Troop A inspected the strike area finding seven NVA KIA. The 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry conducted an airlift to the new FSB at ZA107683.

19 January. At YB876296 Company B 3d Battalion 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA battalion which employed SA, AW and mortar fire. When the company attempted to withdraw they were cut off from the rear. Company C attempted to link up. At 1520 hours the enemy broke contact. One US KIA, 26 US WIA and five US MIA. In the late afternoon the 1st Battalion 8th Infantry FSB received 15 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire from the southwest, resulting in two US WIA. The 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry (-) conducted an airlift to the new FSB at ZA110685.

20 January. At YB876294 Companies A and C 3d Battalion 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA battalion resulting in 26 US WIA, five US MIA, and 21 NVA KIA. At YB875257 (BEN HET) FSB received SA, AW, mortar and rocket fire followed by a ground attack resulting in two US WIA, 14 NVA KIA. The 2d Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry came under the operational control of the 2d Brigade and conducted an airlift to the new FSB at ZAO30627. Companies B and C, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry conducted an airlift to the new FSB at YB858540. At ZB155055 a bridge manned by Troop A, 2d Squadron 1st Cavalry received 10-15 rounds of mortar fire and rocket, AW and SA fire. One US WIA, one RF WIA and one tank damaged. The BEN HET FSB received repeated 82mm mortar attacks throughout the afternoon and evening hours, resulting in three US WIA. At 1430 hours at ZA042530 Troop A, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry aircraft observed six NVA on a trail and killed two. The aero rifle platoon was inserted. At 1555 hours an aircraft was shot down in that location with negative casualties. At 1610 hours the ground element made contact with an estimated platoon or company. The contact was broken at 1746 hours with three NVA KIA.

21 January. West of the 3d Battalion 12th Infantry's FSB Company A made contact with an unknown size force and killed two NVA. At BR131544 a 1/4 ton truck from Battery B, 4th Battalion 60th Artillery hit a mine resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. LRRP 4B was fired on by three enemy

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at YA935754 the patrol returned the fire killing two VC Tank Force Wainwright with the 1st Battalion 22d Infantry and with CSF elements conducted an airlift to east of the BAN ME THUOT airfield and DUC LAP for further redistribution.

22 January. At ZA124570 a CSF company killed one NVA At YA969544 Company D, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, resulting in three US WIA At YB894123 Troop B 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry received ground fire from a large hole in the ground gunships and airstrikes were called in seven NVA were killed At 1450 hours at ZA071503 Company C 2d Battalion 8th Infantry found a large enemy camp and shortly afterwards made contact with an unknown size force resulting in five US WIA and four NVA KIA. Later in the same vicinity Troop A 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry observed and killed five more NVA and at 1743 hours one aircraft was shot down, resulting in one US KIA and two US WIA When Company C secured the aircraft another fire fight broke out during which the pilot was wounded. Later in the evening another 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry aircraft was shot down at ZA103455 resulting in two US WIA

23 January. At ZA177335 a 4th Engineer 2½ ton truck following a minesweep team hit a mine, resulting in two US WIA Companies A and C 3d Battalion 12th Infantry made contact in the same area as the 20 January contact. The contact in which the enemy employed SA AW and mortar fire, resulted in five NVA KIA Beginning at 1620 hours the FSB was subjected to a mortar and SA fire attack which continued until 1727 hours Fires started by the mortar spread to the 81mm and 4 2" ammo dumps resulting in seven US KIA and 24 US WIA The 2d Battalion 8th Infantry conducted a sweep of the 22 January contact area Enemy losses including those inflicted by the 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry were determined to be as follows: 12 NVA bodies one NVA PW (WIA) one light machine gun one AK-47 one bolt action rifle one B-40 rocket launcher 20 82mm rounds one Chicom radio and miscellaneous equipment and ammunition

24 January

25 January. At 1035 hours the 2d Squadron 1st Cavalry reacted to the ambush of a convoy on Highway 19E at BRO92552 The enemy force estimated to be platoon size employed rockets and SA fire from both sides of the highway. Results were three US KIA two US WIA one Vietnamese WIA one VC KIA one 2½ ton truck and one tractor and trailer damaged At AR815362 a Troop B, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry aircraft crashed for unknown reasons resulting in one US KIA and three US WIA

26 January At 0247 hours Camp Holloway came under mortar and ground attack from the southeast Mortars artillery and tanks were employed by the defense and action ceased at 0337 hours Results: 29 aircraft damaged 18 US WIA one enemy KIA and one enemy POW WIA The PW identified the enemy unit as the 407th Sapper Battalion. The following equipment was captured: one AK-47 and one B-40 rocket launcher At ZA107493 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn) 503d Infantry killed one VC and captured another. At YB823238 Troop A, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry killed one NVA At 0920 hours Company D, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry started receiving SA and machine gun

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fire. Artillery and air were employed. Contact was sporadic until 1625 hours. Results were four US KIA, 10 US WIA, 17 NVA KIA, 10 AK-47's CIA, two SKS, one 60mm mortar, one light machine gun and one medium machine gun captured. The 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion coordinating with the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry started an attack from the north at 1030 hours and at 1158 hours started receiving SA and mortar fire. The contact, broken at 1342 hours, resulted in 10 ARVN KIA, 30 ARVN WIA, one US WIA (gunship crewman). The gunship received fire while covering a dustoff, resulting in one confirmed NVA KIA.

27 January. The BEN HET FSB was mortared, killing three CSF and wounding seven. The aero-rifle platoon was inserted at ZA235198, where Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry had received ground fire, and three VC were killed in the ensuing contact. Two individuals were detained. At YB876294 Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found two US bodies listed as MIA from the 26 January contact. Earlier the company had found two NVA bodies in the same area which had been prepped with CS and artillery fire. The 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion continued to make contact in the area of the 26 January contact. Shortly after noon at YB884313 the ARVN's fought with an estimated company, killing 30 NVA (including those killed on 26 January) and suffering eight WIA and two MIA. They also found seven ARVN bodies killed the previous day. Later that night the ARVN FSB was attacked by a multi-battalion force, supported by AW and rocket fire. One ARVN was killed and five were wounded. At YB812169 Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found two NVA bodies estimated dead for two weeks. They also found the PRC-25 radio and M-16 left by IRRP 1A on 16 January. At YB907176 a man in Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry tripped a booby-trapped CHICOM anti-personnel mine resulting in four US WIA. At 0003 hours the MACV Compound at PLEIKU received a rocket and mortar attack and sporadic SA fire from east of Artillery Hill. Results were one US KIA and one US WIA. Two buildings were damaged. Firing ceased between 0030 and 0100 hours. Artillery fired on suspected rocket positions.

28 January. At YB876293 Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received one round indirect fire, resulting in one US KIA and five US WIA. At YB874296 Company C assaulted the top of a hill from which they had received SA fire. One NVA was killed and eight US WIA. The company made its night location there and at 1928 hours received 22 rounds of mortar fire, and four more rounds at 1935 hours. Two US were wounded. At YB832175 Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found seven NVA bodies in graves. At YB835215 a six-man patrol from Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received SA fire. Air and artillery were called in on the positions and the rest of the company linkup with the patrol and secured the position. The contact resulted in one US KIA and three US MIA. At ZA079498 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an estimated squad, one US KIA and one US WIA. At ZA112507 Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry ambushed seven VC and killed one. At ZA071525 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry encountered five VC and killed one. Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry made contact with an unknown size force and received AW fire, resulting in one US WIA. In a contact that continued throughout the day, the 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion at YB871309 after receiving sporadic fire throughout the morning, engaged an estimated reinforced platoon. The enemy put up heavy resistance and were in entrenched

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positions, so the company which had remained at the FSB at YB867316 linked up with the rest of the battalion. The enemy fled at 1530 hours. At 1600 hours the battalion began to receive SA AW and mortar fire from the saddle between their position and the FSB where an estimated company had moved in during the earlier contact. The battalions assaulted with two companies and contact was broken at 1700 hours. Results were nine ARVN KIA 57 ARVN WIA, seven US WIA, 25 NVA KIA 10 AK-47's CIA one RPG CIA, 300 rounds of 81mm and 82mm mortar CIA.

29 January. Two individuals from the 1st Battalion 8th Infantry listed as MIA on 28 January returned to the FSB and stated that the third MIA was dead. At YA954348 IRRP 4B made contact with four individuals. three fled and the fourth was killed by his own grenade when it fell short. At YB874295 Company C 3d Battalion 12th Infantry found the graves of three US previously listed as MIA Troop A 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry made contact with an unknown size force at YA958352 and one VC was killed.

30 January. At AR794907 a Headquarters aircraft 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry engaged an estimated squad killing three VC The 3d Battalion 12th Infantry FSB received eight rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire resulting in one US WIA. At ZAI62520 Company C 2d Battalion 8th Infantry found two NVA bodies at a rocket position destroyed by artillery. At ZAI22498 a Company C 2d Battalion 8th Infantry ambush killed one VC. At 0830 hours a large group of armed demonstrators was reported at AQ870984. The 1st Battalion 69th Armor reacted and received heavy AW and SA fire when they reached the area. Fire was returned and airstrikes were called in. At 1130 hours a FAC observed a large group in the open in the vicinity of AQ9095 and adjusted airstrikes on the enemy. The 1st Battalion 69th Armor swept the area finding eight VC KIA 13 VC and 16 SA weapons were captured. One civilian was KIA one PF and four civilians WIA. At AR 805915 Company B 1st Battalion 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated squad size force and killed one NVA. Throughout the day the populace from several villages were herded by the VC and forced to walk towards PLEIKU. US units intercepted these groups at which time the VC fled. At 0331 hours at ZB054217, near TAN CANH the 3d Battalion 42d ARVN engaged an estimated NVA platoon that attacked them from the east with SA and AW fire. The contact continued until 0600 hours. At 0700 hours TAN CANH was attacked by an estimated reinforced company. At 0930 hours two tanks from the 1st Battalion 69th Armor at DAK TO linked up the ARVN elements and soon after received hits by B-40 rocket fire. At 1030 hours two more tanks linked up on the west side of the village and at 1142 hours the ARVN with the tanks began sweeping the village from west to east. The fighting continued for more than five hours with the enemy being pushed to the east side of the village. At 1710 hours one of the last pockets of resistance was cleared out and the contact ceased. The village came under mortar attack later in the evening. Results were 39 NVA KIA one NVAC one Russian MG, two B-40 rockets four AK-50's one AK-47 15 ARVN WIA and two US WIA. Beginning at 0015 hours KONTUM City the airstrip and the Special Forces Camp came under general attack. During the early morning hours the enemy occupied three strong points. Within the city the 2d Squadron 1st Cavalry and 4th Aviation provided the initial reaction force. In the afternoon the 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry with one company 1st Battalion 22d

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Infantry OPCON assaulted and began clearing operations. Another company, also OPCON to the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry provided bridge security at AR770875. The strong points were seized from the enemy but street fighting continued until dark. From 1800 to 2400 hours KONTUM repelled 18 ground attacks from the north, east, and west. Results of the day's fighting were 210 NVA KIA, two PW, seven ARVN KIA, 55 ARVN WIA, seven US KIA and 17 US WIA. In PLEIKU, the 37th ARVN Artillery Battalion, the 3d ARVN Cavalry and New PLEIKU came under indirect fire attack during the first three hours after midnight. At 0305 hours Camp Holloway was attacked by an estimated reinforced company employing SA, AW and mortar fire. The enemy was unable to penetrate the perimeter but 13 UH-1H helicopters were damaged, eight of them heavily. The contact was broken at 1240 hours. The RF/PF compound, the artillery compound and the II Corps PW compound received pre-dawn mortar attacks. During the morning hours the enemy occupied several strong points inside the city. Tanks from the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and two companies from the 4th Engineer Battalion were sent as a reaction force to the city and were made OPCON to II Corps. Street fighting continued throughout the day, and the southern portion of the city was extensively damaged by fire. US and ARVN losses were eight KIA and 47 WIA. The enemy lost 138 KIA and two PW's.

31 January. At YB894273 an engineer minesweep team received SA, B-40 rocket and 75mm recoilless rifle fire from north of Highway 512. Five US were wounded. The DAK TO FSB received 82mm mortar fire from northeast resulting in two US WIA. At YB875315 Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received 82mm mortar fire from the west northwest with two US WIA. At YB838223 the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB received 25 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire from the southwest with two US WIA. At YB968168 the Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB received 150 rounds of mortar fire and 15-25 rounds of rocket fire resulting in nine US WIA. At ZA147511 Company D, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry exchanged fire with an unknown size force, one US KIA and three US WIA. Later at ZA149509 the company found a 122mm rocket launcher complete with component parts. At BR230498 a westbound convoy received mortar and SA fire from north of Highway 19E. One US was killed and three were wounded. At AR 788866 the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry engaged two NVA and killed one. At AR785915 Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found four NVA bodies killed the preceding evening when 15-20 NVA approached the company's night location. At ZA239878 Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry exchanged fire with an unknown size force resulting in five NVA KIA. At AR773884 Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry exchanged fire with an unknown size force near the Buddhist temple in KONTUM resulting in 17 NVA KIA. At AR772878 the Reconnaissance Platoon and Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with an unknown size force resulting in 30 NVA KIA and one US WIA. The CSF Company working with the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry killed 20 NVA in scattered incidents throughout the day. At AR 890257 an RF/PF element killed four NVA and nine VMC. At 0330 hours an estimated 300 man enemy force attacked and penetrated the perimeter of ARVN Artillery in KONTUM. Two groups of the enemy separated from the main body and attacked the province chief's house and 24th STZ Headquarters. They were taken under fire by gunships and began to withdraw to KONTUM City at 0435 hours. The force began to break up into small groups and at 0830

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hours most of the city was under enemy control. At noon elements of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry began a sweep through the city during which five US were wounded and 56 enemy killed. During the early evening hours the MACV Compound, KONTUM Sub-sector Headquarters, the B-24 Special Forces Camp and the ARVN Artillery position came under mortar and SA attack. Shortly before midnight the Special Forces Camp repulsed a heavy ground probe, during which three US were wounded, two CSF killed and three CSF wounded. At PLEIKU the engineer night location received SA fire at 0125 hours. During the subsequent contact three PW's were captured. At 1135 hours at AR765473 the engineers made contact with a force at the PLEIKU school house. 21 NVA were killed and three PW's captured. Wrap-up for the 20-31 January ARVN operations in PLEIKU Province: 147 enemy killed, 74 captured, 74 weapons captured, nine ARVN KIA, 37 ARVN WIA and 41 civilian KIA.

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CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

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1. () Defoliation Data

a. The following Traildust missions were flown by Air Force C-123's during the period 1 November - 31 January.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
3 Nov	4	4000	ORANGE	YA7044-YA7027
5 Nov	4	4000	ORANGE	YV8896-YV8879
6 Nov	4	4000	ORANGE	YV8876-YV8696
8 Nov	3	3000	ORANGE	YA7244-YA7227
15 Nov	4	4000	ORANGE	YA6943-YA6926
17 Nov	3	3000	ORANGE	YA9300-YV9383
18 Nov	4	4000	ORANGE	ZA0258-YA6926
20 Nov	3	3000	ORANGE	YA9408-YV9491
21 Nov	3	3000	ORANGE	YA7144-YA7127
26 Nov	3	3000	ORANGE	YV9196-YV9176
29 Nov	3	3000	ORANGE	YV9396-YV9379
4 Dec	3	3000	ORANGE	YA7043-YA7027
7 Dec	3	3000	ORANGE	YA7044-YA7027
8 Dec	3	3000	ORANGE	YV9298-YV9281
9 Dec	3	3000	ORANGE	YA7344-YA7327
10 Dec	3	3000	ORANGE	YV9198-YV9181
12 Dec	3	3000	ORANGE	YA7344-YA7327
19 Dec	2	2000	ORANGE	YA7026-YA7622-YA8013
26 Dec	3	3000	ORANGE	YB7812-YB8720
27 Dec	3	3000	ORANGE	BR0943-BR0928
29 Dec	3	3000	ORANGE	YB7912-YB8820
30 Dec	6	6000	ORANGE	YB7911-YB8819

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
8 Jan	3	3000	ORANGE	YB7912-YB882
11 Jan	3	3000	ORANGE	YA9408-YV9491
11 Jan	3	3000	ORANGE	YB7812-YB8720
14 Jan	3	3000	ORANGE	YV9395-YB8720-YB8507
16 Jan	6	6000	ORANGE	YA8802-YV9097-YV9085
18 Jan	6	6000	ORANGE	YV9398-YV9383
18 Jan	6	6000	ORANGE	YB7812-YB8720
22 Jan	8	8000	ORANGE	YA9408-YV9491
24 Jan	8	8000	ORANGE	YA9101-YV9183
26 Jan	8	8000	ORANGE	YV9396-YA9301-YA8408
27 Jan	4	4000	ORANGE	YV9396-YA9401-YA8508

b. No crop destruction missions were flown in the division area of operations during the period.

c. The only perimeter defoliated during the quarter was that of Camp Enari where the decontamination platoon sprayed 1200 gallons of BLUE mixed with 2400 gallons of water using a 600 gallon truck mounted apparatus.

d. Roadside defoliation was conducted as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>
3 Nov	Hwy 7b	BR0002-BR0102	Truck	50	ORANGE
4 Nov	Hwy 512	YB8625, YB8827 and YB8927	Truck	200	ORANGE

2. (1) RCA Employment

a. Bulk CS-1 agent was delivered by CH-47 helicopter during the period 1 November - 31 January as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>POUNDS CS-1</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
1 Nov	1	1600	YA823130-YA817130
7 Nov	1	1600	YA824135-YA819146
9 Nov	1	1600	YA782326-YA819146
11 Nov	1	1600	YA834095-YA834115

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>POUNDS CS-1</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
11 Nov	1	1600	YA793336-YA798332
20 Nov	1	1600	YA805336
21 Nov	1	1600	YA731345-YA732338
26 Nov	1	1600	ZV235525
29 Nov	1	1600	YA801347-YA810344
1 Dec	2	1600	YA824322-YA832322
			YA828305-YA835305
1 Dec	1	1600	YA995213-ZA001227
3 Dec	1	2080	YA937528-YA942524
4 Dec	1	1840	YA741358-YA747352
5 Dec	1	1780	YA732387-YA738381
9 Jan	1	1920	YA907695
11 Jan	1	1920	YA894685
26 Jan	1	1920	YA761321-YA762313
28 Jan	1	1920	YA913633-YA917633
29 Jan	1	1600	YA739318-YA739310
29 Jan	1	1920	YA757332-YA757324

b. E-158 Canister Clusters were delivered by UH-1 aircraft as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>MUNITIONS</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
1 Nov	1	4	YA735310
4 Nov	1	4	YA899142-YA819146
18 Nov	1	4	YA807331-YA811329
9 Dec	1	2	YA827366
9 Dec	1	2	ZA030528
30 Dec	1	8	YA795785
16 Jan	1	3	BR150510
22 Jan	1	8	ZA8814

3. (●) Employment of 4.2" Mortar CS Rounds

a. Ten 4.2" mortar CS rounds were expended by the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry on 15 January. Target area was a ridge covered with heavy eight to 12 foot second growth brush with intermittent clearings. At TOT (0900 hours) winds were calm and temperature was 60° Fahrenheit. Temperature gradient was inversion. The air observer adjusting the mortar stated that the rounds had no recognizable burst but rather a slow dispersion of CS smoke. On impact, a puff of smoke appeared and then spewed out over the area and settled in a three minute period. The impact area, 150 meters in diameter, was completely covered by CS agent. The smoke continued to hang in the area for ten minutes after TOT and CS could still be detected in the area 20 minutes later when ground troops assaulted the area.

b. On 27 January elements of the 1st Brigade fired 200 4.2" mortar CS rounds into an area along a ridge from YB871295 - 875295 - 874297. The CS preparation was overlapped by 300 rounds of HE fire. The CS was delivered in a 15 minute time period. The target area was triple canopy jungle covering

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an extensive bunker and tunnel complex which had been engaged on two previous occasions by company size units. Temperature gradient was neutral changing to lapse after firing of HE rounds. Bursting height of munitions was 100 feet above terrain. Burning time of munitions was 30-40 seconds. The entire target area was covered with a dense CS smoke. The agent dispersed on the sunny side of the ridge rose immediately to a cool air level at about 500 feet and then was carried by the winds. The effect on the ground from these rounds was estimated to be negligible. The agent dispersed on the shady side of the ridge rose from the ground to the canopy and remained there until dissipated by HE rounds landing in the immediate area. Immediate ground exploitation was planned but was postponed due to tactical considerations. Ground assault was finally made 24 hours after TOT but no evidence of either success or failure of the CS attack from a tactical standpoint was determined.

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ABBREVIATIONS

List of abbreviations used in text (Local, common usage, standard Army).

AA	Anti-Aircraft
AO	Area of Operations
APC	Airborne Personnel Detector
ARVN	Army Republic of VIETNAM
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASR	Available Supply Rate
AVLB	Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
AW	Automatic Weapon
CA	Civic Action
CA	Combat Assault
CAS	Close Air Support
C&C	Command and Control
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CI	Counterintelligence
CMIT	Combined Mobile Instruction Team
CMTT	Combined Mobile Training Team
CP	Command Post
CS	Tear Gas
CSF	Camp Strike Force(formerly Civilian Irregular Defense Group)
CSS	Combat Sky Spot
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DS	Direct Support
DTOC	Division Tactical Operations Center
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FO	Forward Observer

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FRAGO	FRAG Order
FSA	Forward Support Area
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSE	Forward Supply Element
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GRREG	Graves Registration
GS	General Support
GSR	General Support Reinforcing
Gun, Gunship	Armed UH-1 Helicopters
GVN	Government of VIETNAM
Hawkeye Team	Four Man Hunter - Killer Team
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction
Headhunter	O-1E Aircraft Used for Visual Reconnaissance
Hook	CH-47 "Chinook" Helicopter
I FFORCEV	I Field Force, VIETNAM
INRHA	Injuries Not the Result of Hostile Action
IPW	Interrogation Prisoner of War Team
IRHA	Injuries the Result of Hostile Action
Jackson Hole	Brigade CP Area at LE THANH, YA898315
JUSPAO	Joint US Public Affairs Office
KBA	Killed by Air
KIA	Killed in Action
LF	Local Force
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, Recondo Patrol
LLOC	Land Line of Communications
LZ	Landing Zone
MACV	Military Assistance Command, VIETNAM
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program

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MF	Main Force
MI	Military Intelligence
MIA	Missing in Action
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
MSR	Main Supply Route
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NVA	North VIETNAMESE Army
NVAC	North VIETNAMESE Army Captive
Oasis	Brigade CP Area at ZALLO275
OPCON	Operational Control
OPORD	Operation Order
POLWAR	Political Warfare (ARVN)
POW, PW	Prisoner of War
PP	Preplanned
PZ	Pick-up Zone
RCA	Riot Control Agent
RD	Revolutionary Development
RL	Rocket Launcher
RVN	Republic of VIETNAM
S&D	Search and Destroy
Slick	UH-1 Helicopter Used Primarily for Air Lift
SP	Self Propelled
Spooky	Air Force Minigun Armed AC-47 Flareship
TAC	Tactical
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARV	United States Army, VIETNAM

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USSF	United States Special Forces
VC	Viet Cong
VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VETCAP	Veterinary Civic Action Program
VMC	Viet MONTAGNARD Cong
VMCC	Viet MONTAGNARD Cong Captive
VR	Visual Reconnaissance
VT	Variable Time
VTR	Vehicle, Tank Recovery
WIA	Wounded in Action

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