

4th Infantry Division  
BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC-MH

21 July 1970

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RGS MACJ3-32 (R2)) (U)

## SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) NAME OF OPERATION: BINH TAY I
2. (C) DATES INCLUSIVE: 5-25 May 1970
3. (C) LOCATION: Base Area 702, CAMBODIA (See Operation Map).
4. (C) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 4th Infantry Division (US).
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Major General Glenn D. Walker, Commanding General, 4th US Infantry Division.
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

### a. Task Organization as of 5 May 1970:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
3-506th Inf (Abn)  
1-14th Inf  
3-8th Inf

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
1-12th Inf  
1-22d Inf  
2-35th Inf

Division Troops  
2-8th Inf (Mech)  
C-75th Inf Rangers  
K-75th Inf Rangers  
7-17th Air Cav  
2-1st Cav  
1-10th Cav

### b. Task Organization change effective 11 May 1970:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
RECEIVE 1-12th Inf

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
RELEASE 1-12th Inf

### c. Task Organization change effective 14 May 1970:

Division Troops  
3-12th Inf RELEASE C/3-12th Inf  
1-10th Cav RECEIVE C/3-12th Inf

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d. Task Organization change effective 16 May 1970:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
RELEASE A/1-14th Inf

Division Troops  
2-8th (Mech) RECEIVE A/1-14th Inf

e. Task Organization change effective 17 May 1970:

Division Troops  
1-10th Cav RECEIVE C/3-12th Inf  
3-12th Inf RECEIVE C/3-12th Inf

f. Task Organization change effective 18 May 1970:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
RECEIVE 3-12th Inf  
RELEASE 1-12th Inf

Division Troops  
RELEASE 3-12th Inf

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
RECEIVE 1-12th Inf

g. Task Organization change effective 19 May 1970:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
RELEASE 3-506th Inf (Abn) to IFFV  
RELEASE B/3-12th Inf (3-12th Inf)  
1-14th Inf RECEIVE B/3-12th Inf

h. Task Organization change effective 21 May 1970:

Division Troops  
RELEASE A/2-1st Cav OPCON 3-506th Inf

i. Task Organization effective 25 May 1970:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
1-14th Inf (-)  
3-8th Inf  
3-12th Inf (B/3-12th RELEASED  
OPCON from 1-14th)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
1-12th Inf  
1-22d Inf  
2-35th Inf

Division Troops  
2-8th Inf (Mech) (A/1-14th Inf)  
1-10th Cav  
2-1st Cav (-)  
K-75th Inf Rangers  
C-75th Inf Rangers (RELEASED OPCON 4th Inf Div)

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery Support

(1) Artillery units initiated moves to support Operation BINH TAY I on 4 May 1970 by positioning in forward areas from which they could be

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inserted with maneuver forces. This gave the additional benefit of reducing the amount of time required to lift the units into selected fire support bases. After the planned occupation of fire bases by the light and medium artillery units, only one battery (B/4-42d Arty) was relocated within the base area. This move was predicated on the decision to increase the troop density in the 1st Brigade AO. With this one exception, all artillery elements remained in positions initially occupied until withdrawal from CAMBODIA. In conjunction with the withdrawal of forces, the 2d Ranger Group (ARVN) inserted two battalions into the old 1st Brigade AO. To support the Ranger operation, elements of the 1st Brigade established two fire support bases to the immediate east of the CAMBODIAN border containing one 105mm howitzer battery and one 155mm howitzer platoon.

(2) Several unique situations developed during BINH TAY I that required additional liaison parties over and above those normally provided by the artillery. The additional parties were provided in a variety of ways.

(a) The SF/CIDG Camp at NEW PLEI DJERENG was furnished an around the clock liaison party for grid clearance purposes ( personnel from HHB, 4th Div Arty and 5-16th Arty).

(b) The 2-1st Cav was furnished a liaison party for fire support of its LOC security mission. (Personnel from HHB, 4th Div Arty and 4-42d Arty).

(c) 52d Artillery Group furnished a liaison party to handle problems of the Group Artillery units (A/1-92 Arty, A/7-15 Arty, 4-60 Arty).

(d) The most important liaison party was provided by personnel of the 52d Artillery at LZ SCOTT. The party performed liaison duties between the 2d ARVN Ranger Group and artillery support provided by 6-29th Artillery reinforced by A/1-92d Artillery. All fires in support of ARVN were processed by this liaison party.

(e) The 52d Artillery Group also provided a permanent liaison party with Division Artillery Tactical Command Post at NEW PLEI DJERENG. This party was necessary and effective in providing assistance on all items concerning elements of the 52d Artillery Group working with the 4th Infantry Division.

(3) The most critical operational problem faced by Division Artillery throughout the entire operation was ammunition resupply. Two problems created initial difficulties: establishment of the temporary ASP and stockage of the ASP was not in accord with recommended stockage objectives. The result was over-stockage of 155mm and eight inch ammunition. A critical shortage of CLV was avoided due to a one day delay of the initial combat assault of the maneuver elements. An added difficulty was prompted by the initial delay in establishing the ASP which prompted the artillery units to rely on their organic transportation to move ammunition from the PLEIKU ASP. This in turn aggravated the shortage of wheeled vehicles. Complicating problems also concerned expenditure guidance (from normal

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expenditures to maximum possible expenditures when the Division withdrew to a cease fire situation once back in VIETNAM) to normal expenditures. Obviously projecting and planning to meet the desired stockage objectives required intensive command staff emphasis. The real limiting factor, then, in determining the ability of Division Artillery to respond to the guidance to make maximum expenditure of the artillery was the ability to retail deliver ammunition from the ASP to the fire bases, and this was in turn totally dependent upon non-divisional helicopter resources. Air delivery of an initial GLV stock might have alleviated initial difficulties and more adequately supported the planned scheme of maneuver.

## b. Air Support

(1) Tac Air support in CAMBODIA began on 5 May 1970 with a total of seventy four fighter sorties. These were controlled by nine Cider FAC's. Initially they flew in excess of six hours each. This compares to a normal flying time of approximately three hours. On 6 May these same FAC's controlled a total of 110 fighter sorties. Realizing that this rate could not be sustained, the Division ALO requested and received an augmentation of aircraft and FAC's from other units in II Corps and I Corps. On 7 May a total of 98 fighter sorties were controlled by thirteen FAC's, while on 8 May, 68 sorties were controlled by twenty FAC's. Total Tactical Air sorties during the period 5 May through 15 May totalled 522 including 464 preplanned and 58 immediate strikes.

(2) In addition to Tac Air, a total of 72 B-52 strikes delivered over a six day period with three sorties per target. Unfortunately, ground exploitation was not conducted immediately after any of the twenty-four strikes. However, a BDA performed by the 7-17th Air Cavalry within an hour following one strike revealed heavy recent activity in the strike area, but no enemy casualties were found. All strikes were targeted against the best intelligence available, and as subsequently noted, several US and ARVN units discovered caches in the target areas.

## c. Aviation Support

### (1) General

The initial and most difficult phase of the operation involved air lifting two infantry brigades and supporting artillery by helicopter from NEW FLEI DJERENG, RVN to objective areas located within CAMBODIA. During the initial insertions, each brigade was allocated approximately sixty lift aircraft, eighteen gunships, and sixteen hooks to accomplish their mission. Aviation assets were provided by the 17th Combat Aviation Group (CAG). The 17th CAG tasked the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) to provide an overall air mission commander and to control all 17th CAG aircraft supporting the Division.

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## (2) Control of Aircraft

Due to the large number of aircraft involved in the operation, control was a major problem. Aircraft supporting the division came from several locations, some as far away as CAM RANH Bay. This situation made it extremely difficult to assemble aircraft at the proper place and time to begin each day's operation. Aircraft were often late due to weather conditions existing at points of departure. Initially aircraft were required to check in with the 52d CAB Mission Control Center (MCC) prior to reporting to the supported units at NEW PLEI DJERENG. The 52d MCC and the Division Army Aviation Element (AAE), both located near PLEIKU, were the controlling elements for aviation support. Close coordination was effected between these elements via radio and land line communications. During the first two days of the operation, aircraft frequently failed to check in with the 52d MCC and confusion prevailed as to what aircraft had actually reported to support the division. Direct contact with the brigade aviation sections was necessary to ascertain what aircraft were on station. This proved to be very time consuming since communications frequently presented a problem. It became apparent that an aircraft forward control element (FCE) was needed at NEW PLEI DJERENG. The division tasked the 52d CAB to provide such an element at NPD with a communications capability. This element was staffed by the 52d LNO and an officer from the Division AAE. On the third day of the operation aircraft were required to check in by radio with both the 52d MCC and the FCE at NPD. Close coordination between these two elements was effected via radio and land line communications. Control problems were considerably reduced after this arrangement began operations.

## (3) Airfield Facilities

NEW PLEI DJERENG airfield was the only facility established in the AO for refueling and rearming of supporting aircraft. The division was augmented with an air traffic control team from the 165th Aviation Group. The team and equipment provided were sufficient, but control of traffic was hampered by the operational environment. The large number of helicopters involved in the initial phase of the operation created a major difficulty for the air traffic controllers. Close coordination between the division and the air traffic control element was a continuous requirement in order that priority of refueling and rearmament could be effectively controlled. Refueling operations were hampered in many instances due to the mixture of aircraft participating in the operation. Excessive delays in refueling and rearming of aircraft were also caused by the severe dusty conditions experienced at NEW PLEI DJERENG. The dust suppressant program was initiated on the first day of the operation, but was continually hampered by aircraft operations during the remainder of the operation. Periodically, Air Force fixed wing cargo aircraft used the airfield at NEW PLEI DJERENG. This created havoc with helicopter operations at the airfield and in most cases helicopter operations had to cease while these aircraft were operating in and out of the airfield.

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## 8. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

a. In order to accurately assess the enemy situation in CAMBODIA, the entire Division G-2 Section, the 4th Military Intelligence Company, and the 374th Radio Research Company directed their research efforts to Base Area 702. The object of this concentrated effort was to produce an analyzed picture of the enemy as soon as possible to allow commanders of maneuver elements time for planning and briefing. In addition to information on file, information was obtained from G2 IFFV and from the 525th Military Intelligence Group. Much of the most current data was from a HOI CHANH interrogation report dated 15 September 1969.

b. It was known that headquarters, NVA B-3 Front had operated from the Tri Border area (CAMBODIA, LAOS, VIETNAM) since 1965. Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA included elements of B-3 Front headquarters and a number of "T" stations (Commo-Liaison) and "Q" stations (Supply). Major NVA combat units rest and refit in the area, but in May 1970 no major combat units were known to be in Base Area 702. It was estimated that a total of 1500-1600 enemy military personnel were in the area at the beginning of BINH TAY I operations. These personnel were expected to avoid contact. However, after operations commenced, the enemy did defend landing zones in particular with ground to air fire. In the north central part of the base area, enemy elements attempted delaying actions while service units withdrew to the northwest. The enemy's replacement system and supply process was interrupted to some extent, and NVA base camps were destroyed as time allowed. The limited duration of division operations did not, however, allow for complete destruction of facilities to the enemy.

c. A document captured by the 4th Infantry Division on 8 May in Base Area 702 showed the enemy had expected operations because of a change in CAMBODIAN governments. The document was a typewritten message from the Rear Service Office of B-3 Front and was dated 17 March 1970. It read:

"According to the information obtained, the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) will be operating in our base area. All the caches and troop locations must be well camouflaged so the enemy does not discover them. If the enemy does find any of these locations we must separate our forces and evacuate the area. Documents must be packed and be ready for evacuation at any time.

The cache areas and troop locations, including dispensaries, must establish a permanent security guard. Patrols must be established in order to know the enemy situation at all times. All locations must be kept secret. Radios will not be played loud. No hunting or fishing will be allowed around area X6 XQ5 or around the TA BOP River. No weapons will be fired in base camp areas.

All cadre and troops must be trained to obey these orders. Don't be captured or allow documents, weapons, or caches to be captured. Do not fight against the enemy. Instead, flee from them."

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d. The following enemy units were identified in Base Area 702:

- (1) Production Cell/Rear Service Section/B-3 Front
- (2) K-5 and K-6 Transportation Battalions
- (3) TA GIAC Production Unit
- (4) 26th Signal Battalion
- (5) GO 5 Dispensary
- (6) 211 Hospital (AKA 84th Hospital)
- (7) 3d Company/D2076 Infiltration Group
- (8) BINH TRAM TRUNG Depot
- (9) BINH TRAM TRUNG Dispensary
- (10) C-15 Transportation Company
- (11) C/3-7th Replacement Battalion

e. Fortifications

(1) YA 627363, 25 bunkers with two feet by three feet openings and two feet OHC built within past 24 hours (7 May 70), two AA sites, many individuals in green uniforms.

(2) YA 629367, 25 bunkers with two feet by three feet openings.

(3) YA 504645, 30 huts, 30 bunkers, 30-40 individuals in area.

(4) YA 494633, 150 structures (ten feet by twenty feet), one mess hall (50'x100'), one structure with six sides, 50' across with 40' high roof, 75 bunkers (ten feet by twenty feet) with no OHC.

(5) YA 519655, 25 huts, one mess hall, ten bunkers.

(6) YA 586407, twelve huts (12'x100'), NVA equipment.

(7) YA 668440, thirty bunkers with two feet by three feet, openings and three feet OHC.

(8) YA 530469, eight structures (ten feet by fifteen feet), eight bunkers, defensive positions in oval shape around structures.

(9) YA 430405, 15 huts (12'x20'), 25 bunkers with two feet OHC, one AA site.



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- (10) YA 714100, 20 huts with trenches connecting them to bunkers.
- (11) YA 471459, 20 huts (15'x18'), 20 bunkers.
- (12) YA 524384, 50 huts, 50 bunkers.
- (13) YA 503432, 18 huts (20'x60'), five huts (15'x20'), five huts (8'x10'), 15 bunkers.
- (14) YA 390518, cam bunkers along river.
- (15) YA 531499, one structure (40'x150'), 35 structures (ten feet by twenty feet) cam with nets, 40 bunkers.
- (16) YA 415495, cam bunkers along river.
- (17) YA 555475, 50 trenches, under ground bunkers, two kitchens, appears abandoned.
- (18) YA 635225, battalion size base area, huts and bunkers.

## f. Military Installations

- (1) YA 712065, huts, bunkers, two AA positions, two mockups of wooden howitzers, in revetments.
- (2) YA 475558, two classrooms (eight feet by twenty five feet) with 24' long benches, mess hall with two ovens and five tables, firing range, obstacle course.
- (3) YA 565393, 23 huts (fifteen feet by ten feet by eight feet), two classrooms with benches to seat thirty people, one bunker, four two seat latrines, (NFK).
- (4) YA 533486, 23 huts, 75 bunkers, mock up concertina wire, model of jet, 100 practice Chicom grenades, five practice satchel charges, four man size targets.
- (5) YA 481563, 15 huts (fourteen feet by twenty-two feet by six feet) twenty beds per hut, transfusion machine, 500 rolls of gauze, 10,000 pounds of rice.
- (6) YA 516467, three huts (eight feet by twenty feet), two huts (six feet by eight feet), two chicken coops, one small generator, one fluoroscope, miscellaneous surgical and dental tools, Chicom field phone, three SKS rifles.
- (7) YA 565730, 70 huts, 200 men.
- (8) YA 496635, possible company location, five hospitals.

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


Figure One. Staging Areas

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9. (C) MISSION. The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations in CAMBODIA in northern Base Area 702 to locate and destroy enemy resources, installations and command facilities.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION. The 4th Infantry Division initially pre-positioned two infantry brigades in the vicinity of NEW PLEI DJERENG in preparation for multi-battalion combat assaults into the objective area. One battalion was chopped to division control to provide security for Camp Radcliff while one mechanized infantry battalion provided LOC security from LZ OASIS to NEW PLEI DJERENG until its relief by the 2-1st Cavalry. At that time the battalion reverted to division reserve and provided security for the division TAC CP and LSA. Each infantry brigade had one air cavalry troop in direct support.

11. (C) EXECUTION. Receipt of a warning order on the afternoon of 2 May initiated 4th Division plans for subsequent operations in CAMBODIA. Two major brigade sized operations were in progress at the time, and these activities had to be terminated along with the closeout of several Fire Support Bases. By 2000 hours 2 May, the brigades had received their warning order to prepare for operations in Base Area 702.

The following morning, 3 May, the initial redistribution of forces began with the 3-506th Abn Battalion of the 1st Brigade, which was operating in the DAK PAYOU area, airlifting from LZ MATTIE to Camp Radcliff, AN KHE. The 1-22 Inf, 2-35 Inf(-), and 1-12 Inf (-) of the 2d Brigade also began their move into Camp Radcliff. On 4 May, 3-12th Inf, operating in the DAK PAYOU (VC Valley) area, with 1st Brigade elements, reverted to Division control and returned to Camp Radcliff to conduct base camp security operations. In addition, the 1st Brigade TAC CP airlifted to NEW PLEI DJERENG, while the remaining elements of its CP group and the 3-506 Abn Battalion convoyed overland to Camp Holloway near PLEIKU. The 1-14 Inf moved overland and closed into LZ MEREDITH, and then prepared to continue the overland move the next day to NEW PLEI DJERENG where it would begin its combat assault. The 3-8 Inf remained at Camp Radcliff and continued preparations for the operation.

The final redistribution of forces continued through 6 May with 2d Brigade elements occupying LZ MEREDITH, LZ JACKSON HOLE, and LZ OASIS. (See Figure One). The 3-8 Inf of the 1st Brigade convoyed overland on 5 May from Camp Radcliff and closed LZ MEREDITH and prepared to combat air assault on 6 May.

All aircraft on 5 May, D-Day, were dedicated to the single lift of one battalion at a time. This involved the use of some sixty lift ships to move the 3-506 Abn Infantry battalion to the first objective area, in the vicinity of YA 452535. At 0915 hours the battalion commander reported his lift was airborne and on the way. Events were soon to prove that the primary LZ was too hot. The first aircraft approaching the landing zone received heavy enemy fire from well concealed .51 caliber machineguns.

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Obviously, air strikes used to "prep" the LZ had not totally cleared enemy forces from the area. Because of time distance factors and fuel problems it was decided to abort the lift and return the 3-506 Abn to NEW PLEI DJERENG, rather than to attempt a landing at an alternate LZ. When the flight returned the helicopters landed on the airstrip. This became the first serious problem of the operation, making it impossible to bring in C-130 aircraft with needed POL. The possibility that all three scheduled combat assaults would be completed that day was eliminated.

In spite of the congestion on the airstrip, difficulties in aircraft control, dust, and the inadequate number of refuel/rearm points, three major attempts were made on 5 May to insert the 3-506 Abn. LZ's finally used by the battalion were in the vicinity of YA 413537 and YA 415545. No enemy resistance was met at either location.

The 1-14 Inf met the same stubborn resistance as the 3-506 Abn had, and they were also turned back from their planned insertion point. In addition, an alternate landing zone proved to be too hot, so this battalion was not able to put any troops in the operational area until 6 May.

By the end of D-Day then, only one battalion with its supporting elements was operational in CAMBODIA. In retrospect, the original concept of the operation called for the battalions to be moved to the objective area in minimum time in a single airlift (a new experience for many commanders). Because there was so little time to position all elements forward for multiple assaults, the short time span made it impossible to make allowances for any imperfections in execution.

On 6 May the 1st Brigade continued to insert its forces into the CAMBODIAN AO. Enemy fire severely hampered the insertion of the 3-8th Infantry, and airstrikes were unable to suppress the enemy fire. After finding the enemy fire too heavy, the battalion commander directed the ships to an alternate LZ at YA 482649. However, after the insertion of only sixty men, one aircraft was shot down in the LZ. Another try at inserting troops was made, and resulted in two more aircraft badly damaged. Finally a dustoff attempting to extract the wounded was driven off by heavy enemy fire. As the day ended the 3-8 Inf had only sixty men on the ground, and had suffered one KIA and two WIA. The 1-14 Inf had done somewhat better, and was able to insert about 75% of its forces into an LZ at YA 430591. Light enemy activity with elements of the 3-506 Abn completed the days activities. The 1st Brigade completed the movement of its maneuver elements on 7 May without further incident. The brigade had used only twelve aircraft for the final moves, and the balance of the helicopters, forty-eight, were dedicated to completing moves of the 2d Brigade. New fire bases were established by the 1-12, 1-22, and 2-35 Inf battalions at YA 598445, YA 519472, and YA 600400. (See Figure Two).

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



Figure Two. Operational Area

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Figure Three. Base Area 702

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Coincident with the movement of the infantry, artillery units were positioned in forward areas from which they could be inserted with the maneuver elements. This significantly reduced the amount of time required to lift the units into selected fire support bases. All light artillery units were positioned in Base Area 702 during the period 5-7 May. Medium and heavy artillery were positioned along Highway 19W and Highway 509, and also to provide fire support in the area of the LOC to NEW FLEI DJERENG, which was the LSA and major staging area. With only one exception, all artillery units remained in positions initially occupied until withdrawal from CAMBODIA. (See Figure Three).

Significantly, ground and air operations conducted against enemy forces in CAMBODIA were moderate to light actions. These contacts resulted in some 212 enemy KIA with approximately 55% resulting from infantry contacts and 14% credited to the air cavalry.

Several significant cache discoveries were made during the course of operations; the first on 9 May. Elements of the 3-506 Abn discovered, after a brief exchange of fire, a huge rice cache estimated to contain over 500 tons of rice, much of which was destroyed by the battalion.

By 11 May, the 1-14th Infantry had penetrated into a hospital complex containing a variety of medical equipment. Two companies of the 3-8th Infantry located another medical facility containing some twenty beds and other medical items.

The following day, 12 May, C Company, 3-506 Abn Inf, in the vicinity of YA 484550, found the largest cache of the operation. Numerous crew served and individual weapons were found along with large amounts of assorted ammunition.

Because of other contingency missions, 2d Brigade elements on 12 May, with the exception of the 1-12th Inf, began preparing to disengage and return to RVN in the vicinity of Camp Radcliff, RVN. The 1-12th Inf had chopped to 1st Brigade control on 11 May because of a decision made to increase the troop density in its AO. This decision was based upon the number of enemy contacts and cache discoveries made in its area of operations.

By 13 May the 2d Brigade had airlifted its remaining two battalions, the 1-22 Inf and the 2-35 Inf, from Base Area 702 and returned to Camp Radcliff for a brief standdown. Enemy activity remained light for the duration of the operation in the base area.

On 15 May instructions were given to the 1st Brigade to prepare for further deployment back to RVN. Since the cache area, originally developed by the 3-506 Abn, had not been fully exploited, plans were made for the ARVN 2d Ranger Group to deploy two battalions into that immediate area to

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continue operations and exploitation. That same day, the 1-12 Inf was airlifted from multiple pickup zones to NEW PLEI DJERENG, where it remained overnight awaiting transportation so that on 16 May it could move over land to Camp Radcliff. In addition, both the 3-8th Inf and the 3-506th Abn began closing out operations at their respective fire bases. Finally on 16 May all 1st Brigade elements were extracted from CAMBODIA and returned to RVN.

Because of the continuing ARVN operations in Base Area 702, both the 3-8th Inf and the 3-506 Abn established fire bases adjacent to the CAMBODIAN border in the PLEI TRAP Valley from which they conducted local search and destroy operations. The 1-14 Inf conducted local security at NEW PLEI DJERENG as well as local clearing operations.

Even though the BINH TAY I operation was to continue through 25 May, the major tactical effort was complete with the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade units on 16 May 1970.

## 12. (C) RESULTS.

### a. Summary of personnel and equipment losses:

US KIA	43
US WIA	118
NVA KIA	212
NVA CIA	7

### Weapons and Equipment

CB Weapons	20
SA weapons	859
Rice CIA	591 Tons
Structures Destroyed	2,157
Ammunition	10,797 Rounds SA
	717 Rounds Mortar
	141 Rounds RR
	612 Grenades
	224 Rounds B-40



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	CIA	CIB
<b>b. Casualty Causes</b>		
Friendly Missiles (Ground Contact, Friendly Initiated)	9	18
Ground Contact (Enemy Initiated)	20	45
Ground Contact at an LD	1	9
Bomber Attack	2	6
Ground to Air Fire	6	8
Non-Battle Casualties	5	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>118</b>
<b>Enemy Casualties</b>	<b>516</b>	
<b>Air Casualty</b>	<b>30</b>	
<b>TAC Air/B-52</b>	<b>48</b>	
<b>C-75 Bomber</b>	<b>16</b>	
<b>Ground Contact</b>	<b>118</b>	
<b>Artillery</b>	<b>102</b>	
<b>Total</b>	<b>712</b>	

13. (C) ~~MAINTENANCE~~

a. General

Logistical support of the combat units was accomplished through the combined efforts of the DISCOM Forward Support Element (FSE), the 45th General Support Group Logistical Support Activity, and the 186th Ordnance Battalion Forward Support Unit (FSU). The FSE was composed of elements organic to the Division Support Command. The large scope of this operation necessitated the use of additional logistical support. This support was requested by the Division from the 45th General Support Group at FLEBU, and the 186th Ordnance Battalion was tasked to establish a Forward Ammunition Supply Point at NEW FLEI DUMHUC.

b. Supply and Services

(1) General: The Division Support Command provided the maintenance support, medical support, transportation, and graves registration for the Division. Units deployed with the basic load of Class I and V. Initial

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stockage of Class IV at the LSA was provided by DISCOM. The 45th General Support Group also augmented the 4th Supply and Transport Battalion in meeting the Division transportation requirements. Class V was provided by the PSU (184th Ordnance Battalion). The extension of the Main Supply Route (MSR) to cover the division new area of operations necessitated the pre-positioning of supplies and establishment of stockage objectives at NEW PLEI DJERENG.

(2) Supplies

(a) Class I. A rations, C rations, LRP rations and sundry packs used to provide Class I support to division troops during the operation. The stockage level for packaged rations was five days. Issue of A rations was based on a head count of 6,000 from 5-16 May and 3,500 from 17-26 May (See Appendix 1 to Annex B for issued items).

(b) Class III. POL support consisted of JP4, 70,000 gallon capacity with thirteen refuel points; diesel, 20,000 gallon capacity; MOGAS, 10,000 gallon capacity; and AVGAS, 2,000 gallon capacity. There were ten line items of packaged petroleum products stocked by the LSA at NEW PLEI DJERENG. The original plan called for one JP4 refuel point to be established on the south side of the runway on the west end of the airfield. As a result of the serious dust problem that developed early on 5 May 1970, the point was split with five 10,000 gallon bags and six nozzles being installed on the east end of the airfield and two 10,000 gallon bags feeding five nozzles and one 5,000 gallon tanker feeding two nozzles for a total of seven points on the west end of the airfield. To insure adequate supply of JP4 to commence the operation, ten 5,000 gallon tankers arrived at NEW PLEI DJERENG on 4 May. Additional tankers were programmed in on 5 May to bring the on hand quantity up to the required level. On two different occasions JP4 was flown in via C-130 bladder bird when the on hand quantity reached a dangerously low level, but at no time during the operation did the LSA run out of JP4.

(c) Class IV. See Appendix 2 to Annex B for issued items.

(d) Class V. The initial stockage objective of Class V at NEW PLEI DJERENG was based on a three day intensive combat rate. This was later reduced to a two day intensive combat rate because of the increase in the 45th General Support Group resupply capability. There were 1098.4 short tons of munitions issued by the forward ASP at NEW PLEI DJERENG from 5 May through 27 May 1970. During the phase out of this operation, 563.4 short tons of these munitions were backhauled to the ASP at PLEIKU. (See Appendix 3 to Annex B).

c. Services

(1) Maintenance: Maintenance support was provided by C and D Companies, 704th Maintenance Battalion. C Company operated at NEW PLEI DJERENG, D

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Company operated at PLEIKU. The 62d Light Maintenance Company of the 45th General Support Group assumed the maintenance support of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry effective 15 May. This greatly reduced the operational load of D Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion.

(2) Medical Services: C Company, 4th Medical Battalion provided medical support for all units operating out of NEW PLEI DJERENG. Medevac support was provided by the 283d and 498th Air Ambulance Companies.

(3) Graves Registration: The 4th Supply and Transport Battalion established a remains collection point at NEW PLEI DJERENG. Operational problems with the reefer unit necessitated the expeditious movement of remains to PLEIKU where they were processed by the 573d Field Service Company at PLEIKU. A Graves Registration representative from the 4th Supply and Transport Battalion was collocated with the 573d Field Service Company at PLEIKU. There were fifty nine human remains processed by the 573d Field Service Company during this operation.

(4) Bath Services: The 4th Supply and Transport Battalion provided bath services with the use of four mobile shower units.

## (5) Transportation

(a) The initial movement of the Division from AN KHE to NEW PLEI DJERENG required the total transportation assets of the 4th Supply and Transport Battalion. It was necessary to request additional transportation support from the 8th Transportation Group. After completion of the deployment of the Division to NEW PLEI DJERENG, regular convoys were run between NEW PLEI DJERENG and PLEIKU by the 8th Transportation Group. QL19E was initially secured from PLEIKU to NEW PLEI DJERENG by the 2-8th Infantry (Mech); the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry assumed security of the road on 5 May.

(b) The initial land transportation resources were the limiting and controlling factors that determined the rate of build-up in the forward area. The rate of redeployment to the division base camp from the forward area at the end of BINH TAY I was also determined by the amount of wheeled vehicles available. Last minute changes in plans (the cancellation of the planned movement by C-130 to NEW PLEI DJERENG at the beginning of the operation and the inability to forecast the actual schedule for extraction at the end of the operation) resulted in additional, unprogrammed shortages in vehicle requirements. The availability of wreckers at both terminals of the road movement became the determining factor controlling the efficiency of the artillery moves.

(6) Laundry: Laundry support was given the Division by the Camp Schmidt contract laundry. A total of 1,309 individual bundles and 44,561 bulk laundry pieces were laundered for division personnel during this operation.

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(7) Administrative and Personnel Support: Approximately 500 division troops were provided billets, messing and office space in the PLEIKU area by the 45th General Support Group and other 1st Logistical Command units. In addition, motor pool and maintenance shops were provided for division units.

d. In addition to the normal combat service support mission, the Commanding Officer, DISCOM, was given the mission of coordinating security for NEW PLEI DJERENG as well as running the base camp. Considering that the support requirement alone was a monumental task, the addition of the installation coordinator provided a host of complex problems. Selected significant experiences will be found in lessons learned.

## 14. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

### a. General

Psychological operations in support of Operation BINH TAY I were initially geared toward the exploitation of HOI CHANHS, supply and weapons caches, and significant victories. When the number of enemy personnel in the area proved to be limited, enough to lessen the possibility of HOI CHANHS and major tactical victories, propaganda efforts were shifted toward the exploitation of discovered supply and weapons caches. Leaflets were also developed to inform the civilian populace of the purpose of the operation and to tell them how to protect themselves. A total of 4,320,000 leaflets were dropped in Base Area 702 during the conduct of the operation. 180,000 of these leaflets were directed at the civilian population.

### b. Leaflet drops (See Annex C)

(1) During the period 7-11 May 1970 more than three million leaflets were dropped in CAMBODIA. They were JUSPAO leaflets and were a standard surrender/PM mix. CHIEU HOI leaflets could not be used because there was no CHIEU HOI Program in CAMBODIA.

(2) Leaflet operations were also conducted in VIETNAM in the 4th Division area of operations. Leaflets were developed by A Company, 8th PSYOP Battalion, NHA TRANG and targeted against communist forces in RVN.

(3) The following special leaflets and tapes targeted against the enemy and the civilian populace were developed by B Company, 8th PSYOP Battalion in PLEIKU:

(a) 8-B-142-70 leaflet and tape message directed toward JARAI MONTAGNARDS living in CAMBODIA. A total of two hours aerial loudspeaker time was conducted on 12 and 13 May.

(b) Three special leaflets (8-B-141-70, 8-B-143-70, and 8-B-144-70)

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were developed and employed against enemy troops in CAMBODIA to exploit the fact that they were no longer safe in CAMBODIAN sanctuaries. US and ARVN forces were now in CAMBODIA and would remain so there was no choice except surrender.

(e). A rice denial leaflet (8-B-148-70) was developed and disseminated to exploit the capture of more than 500 tons of enemy rice by ARVN and US elements.

## c. Loudspeaker Utilization

A PSYOP loudspeaker team was available at the division forward FSB at NEW PLEI DJERENG for immediate deployment to CAMBODIA. The team, from B Company, 8th PSYOP Battalion, was equipped with a 250 watt back pack loudspeaker system for use in ground operations and also a 1,000 watt loudspeaker for use in ground operations and also a 1,000 watt loudspeaker for use in aerial speaker operations. The team was not deployed into CAMBODIA due to the non-availability of aircraft and a lack of targets or enemy concentrations requiring immediate priority reaction.

## 15. (c) ENGINEER SUPPORT.

a. The 20th Engineer Battalion was in general support of the 4th Infantry Division throughout the operation. The battalion provided one company, and one 1500 GPH water point for the division at LZ OASIS. This company was also given the mission of maintaining Highway 19W from the junction of Highway 19 and Highway 14 to vicinity DUC CO. In addition the company constructed rear and refuel facilities and placed peneprime for dust control at DUC CO.

b. One platoon of the 299th Engineer Battalion was attached to the 3-506th Inf Battalion (Abn) throughout the operation. The platoon provided direct combat support to the battalion by cutting landing zones, clearing fields of fire, and constructing field fortifications.

c. The 4th Engineer Battalion (-) moved from Camp Radcliff to the BINH TAY AO with one line company placed in direct support of each brigade, while one company was placed in GS of the division with the mission of maintaining Route 14B and constructing the division logistics base. The bridge company relocated to PLEIKU where it remained at Engineer Hill and supported the division with heavy equipment, tactical bridging and mine sweeping while maintaining the capability to provide float bridging. The battalion administrative elements remained at Camp Radcliff.

d. On the morning of 4 May 1970 the 4th Engineer Battalion headquarters deployed with the 4th Infantry Division elements to the vicinity of PLEIKU. By 1800 hours on 4 May, the battalion headquarters (forward) was established at Engineer Hill, PLEIKU, RVN. Subsequently, on 11 May the 4th Engineer Battalion Headquarters deployed with the division headquarters to NEW PLEI

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DJERENG. The 4th Engineer Battalion (-), subsequently returned to Camp Radcliff on 16 May with the division headquarters, thus terminating tactical support activities in CAMBODIA.

(1) Company B, minus one platoon, and Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion provided direct combat engineer support to each maneuver battalion within the brigades, while the company headquarters remained with the brigade headquarters. 1/A/299th Engineer Battalion provided the third engineer platoon for support of the 1st Brigade's three maneuver battalions. Primary tasks included clearing landing zones, constructing field fortifications and clearing mines and booby traps. Landing zone clearance was accomplished through employment of rappelling teams, using chainsaws and explosives, followed by the Case 450 airmobile dozer on battalion fire bases. Each platoon deployed, and returned with the infantry battalion to which it provided direct engineer support. Similarly, the company headquarters remained and moved with the brigade headquarters. Company C returned with the 2d Brigade headquarters and maneuver elements on 15 May 1970. Company B returned with the 1st Brigade elements on 26 May 1970 with the exception of one squad which remained to close NEW PLEI DJERENG. This task was completed on 29 May 1970, and then the squad returned to Camp Radcliff.

(2) On 3 May 1970, Company D, 4th Engineer Battalion, minus one platoon, was placed in general support of the division, with the exception of one squad which was placed in direct support of the 2-8th Infantry Battalion (Mech) under division control. The company headquarters with one platoon moved to LZ PANZER. This company, supplemented with D-7 dozers and graders from Company E, was given the task of maintaining Route 14B from the junction of 14B and 19W to PLEI DJERENG. The remaining platoon moved to PLEI DJERENG and assisted Company E in dust control operations, while constructing field fortifications for the division logistics area. The company completed its mission and returned to Camp Radcliff on 15 May 1970.

(3) Company E, 4th Engineer Battalion began moving elements from Camp Radcliff on 3 May 1970. The entire company minus certain items of engineer equipment had displaced to Engineer Hill by 5 May 1970.

One combat engineer vehicle (CEV) with blade was placed in direct support of the 2-8th Infantry Battalion (Mech). The other two CEV's with mine roller attachments were placed in general support of the division and given the mission of conducting daily minesweeps on QL-19W and Route 14B to PLEI DJERENG. Two armored vehicle launchers (AVL) and three armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLB) were provided to support the operation. One AVL and two AVLB's were stationed at NEW PLEI DJERENG in reserve and to facilitate movement of the route security forces. The bridge platoon with two sets of M4T6 float bridging were based on Engineer Hill on 5 May 1970. The platoon was held at Engineer Hill until 14 May 1970, in an alert status for a possible bridge mission. With the cancellation of the bridge mission, the platoon returned the bridge to Camp Radcliff and its trucks were

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dispatched to NEW PLEI DJERENG with the mission of transporting elements of the 1-12th Infantry from NEW PLEI DJERENG to Camp Radcliff. This mission was completed by 16 May 1970. By 17 May the bridge platoon and its equipment had closed Camp Radcliff.

(4) The heavy equipment platoon departed Camp Radcliff on 5 May and closed the same day at Engineer Hill. Due to the lack of ten ton tractors and trailers, four days were required to shuttle the D-7 dozers and graders to Company D to support the road maintenance effort on QL-14B, while two asphalt distributors and the water distributor along with two D-7 dozers were placed at NEW PLEI DJERENG for the construction of helicopter pads, refuel points and for dust suppression. The majority of the heavy equipment platoon remained in support of the operation until 23 May 1970 when it returned to Camp Radcliff. The remaining elements stayed at NEW PLEI DJERENG with Company B until the conclusion of the operation on 26 May 1970.

e. Company B, 20th Engineer Battalion assumed the mission of maintaining QL-19W from QL-14 to DUC CO on 4 May 1970. In addition, on 6 May 1970, the company constructed FOL berms, a rear point and an ammunition supply point at DUC CO. On 16 May 1970 the company took over the maintenance of Route 14B from Company D, 4th Engineer Battalion. B Company continued to maintain both QL-19W and Route 14B until 29 May 1970, when it returned to Engineer Hill.

f. Planning: The planning time for the operation was short, however adequate plans were made and executed for the necessary direct engineer support for the maneuver elements.

g. Dust Control: The problem of dust control was underestimated, initially resulting in the acute dust problem at NEW PLEI DJERENG, which made the peneprime operation extremely important. Due to heavy air and road traffic, penepriming operations could only be accomplished during darkness. The limited equipment available to the division engineers, coupled with the lack of adequate peneprime stock, hampered the ability to cope with the problem.

h. During the latter part of the operation, rains seriously hampered overlaid supply efforts. The route selected for an MSR was constructed of the local basaltic soil, the surface of which rapidly turned into a soupy mud under the combination of rain and heavy vehicular traffic. There was no adequate rock source nor fill material available with which the road base could be upgraded. Had the operation continued with no change in the weather, resupply operations by road would have been drastically reduced.

i. The CEV with expendable mine rollers proved extremely valuable for this operation. By using two mine rollers, one at either end of the MSR, the engineers were able to clear the entire MSR within an hour during dry weather. With the advent of heavy rains, however, the efficiency of the

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mine roller was greatly reduced due to mud collecting in the road wheels. This condition was alleviated somewhat, by proceeding at a slower speed. However, the mud caused excessive wear on the bearings of the mine roller itself.

## 16. (C) SIGNAL SUPPORT.

### a. General

Signal planning for Operation BINH TAY I commenced on the evening of 2 May 1970. Knowing the objective area, the signal staff identified key communications center locations and relay points. Profiles were prepared and a letter of instruction was written to the 124th Signal Battalion outlining communications requirements.

b. With the identification of PLEIKU as the initial location of the division command post and NEW PLEI DJERENG as the operating base for at least one brigade, Dragon Mountain was determined to be needed for a relay site. On 3 May, a coordination visit to PLEIKU was necessary to fix the exact location of the command post. The signal officer had recommended Engineer Hill as the ideal location for the command post. Several reasons for this selection were:

- (1) Adequate cable pairs to the dial central office were readily available to satisfy telephone requirements.
- (2) VHF communications were possible from Camp Radcliff to Engineer Hill.
- (3) Adequate real estate was available for the deployment of communications vans.
- (4) The old engineer group headquarters building was vacant.

This recommendation was not accepted, and a decision was made to locate near II Corps headquarters.

c. After the selection of the command post location was made, it was necessary to coordinate telephone service through the 1878th Communications Squadron (Air Force) which operates the PLEIKU Telephone System. The non-availability of unused cable pairs presented the first serious communications problem. This was solved by the availability of a fifty pair cable belonging to the 43d Signal Battalion, which had been installed as back up for the PLEIKU Communications Center. It was virtually free with only seven pairs in use. Phone requirements were passed to the communications squadron and installation began on 5 May.

d. The division signal battalion deployed on 4 May to PLEIKU. Although RATT and FM voice communications were quickly established, VHF installation took more time. Local keying lines had to be run, relays had to be placed



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on Dragon Mountain and the brigades had to get in place before communications could be satisfactorily installed. By doctrine the signal battalion installs its own local wire. This was done for the local switchboard and keying lines, but other keying lines and the dial telephones, which formed an important part of the system were installed by another unit. Considering that this unit had never supported an infantry division before, the cooperation of the unit was excellent. Communications delays in PLEIKU could be attributed to several factors. These were:

- (1) The decision to locate in the MACV compound.
- (2) The dependence on a unit which was unfamiliar with the division modus operandi.
- (3) The inexperience of personnel within the division signal battalion who had never been to the field with the division.
- (4) The location of the VHF terminal at NEW PLEI DJERENG in an area removed from the brigade headquarters.

e. On 6 May, the signal staff was alerted of a possible move forward of the division command post to NEW PLEI DJERENG. Since communications were beginning to stabilize, this required new planning and a need for additional equipment to support the new concept of operation. The signal estimate was three days needed to establish communications at a satisfactory level. This date was met but not without complications. Command post wire lines were disrupted by engineer and track vehicles, which caused numerous delays and disrupted communications between the 2d Brigade, DISCOM and the division command post.

f. Modification made to the TOE of the division signal battalion, over the past three and one half years, to handle garrison type operations, seriously hindered the communications operations of the division. Mobility had been reduced, thus introducing delays in installations. The DISCOM headquarters was lacking in communications support because no platoon was available to meet its needs.

g. Inexperience on the part of signal personnel contributed to communications delays. Never before had the battalion been tasked to deploy with the division command post, and many technical deficiencies were uncovered which have since been corrected.

h. The 2d Brigade used radio set AN/GRC-163 to talk with two of its battalions. This equipment was new, but due to the industriousness of the brigade signal officer, it provided the commander with telephone communications to his battalions in CAMBODIA. This marked the first time this equipment was used in the division between a brigade and its subordinate battalions.

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## 17. (C) INFORMATION.

a. The information office took the following steps to provide adequate internal press coverage and support of civilian correspondents in the field. The 21st and 14th Public Information Detachments were attached to the 1st and 2d Brigades respectively and given the additional task of press support at NEW PLEI DJERENG and if need be, in CAMBODIA. The PID's were augmented by the division information office with two personnel and a vehicle.

b. The division information officer, along with a driver and one other officer, established a forward information office at the Press Camp at Camp Schmidt in PLEIKU. The Press Camp was equipped to house and feed as well as lend other support to correspondents which alleviated the burden on the 4th Division. At the Press Camp, the division information officer, or his representative, briefed all correspondents before they went to the field and arranged transportation forward.

c. Official announcement of the operation was made by the MACV Information Office at 1500 hours on 5 May, and by 1700 hours there were thirteen civilian correspondents representing all the major news services at the PLEIKU Press Camp. These people were housed, fed, and jointly briefed by the 4th Division IO and the II Corps ARVN IO that evening. By the following day the number of correspondents both civilian and military, had increased to approximately thirty-five, which taxed the facilities of both the Press Camp and the 4th Division to the limit. The scarcity of aircraft and the influx of correspondents caused the information office operations to slow down, but the majority of correspondents were able to get out and obtain stories. No serious complaints were received by the press.

d. By the end of the operation, fifty-five correspondents had checked in with the 4th Division Information Office at PLEIKU and had gone forward. This figure does not include 4th Division writers and photographers and other Army and Marine pictorial teams which covered the action for Department of Defense use. All coverage of the operation was favorable. After the first three days, very little press interest was shown. There were two major reasons for this, first the start of new operations by other units in CAMBODIA, and the lessening of the news value of the BINH TAY I operation.

e. At the end of the operation, the public information detachments stayed with and deployed with their respective brigades and the information office element at PLEIKU returned to Camp Radcliff. The division information office returned to base camp with the PLEIKU element.

## 18. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS.

Operation BINH TAY I resulted in not only a very successful effort conducted against a dedicated enemy, but an extensive logistical and air movement deployment never before attempted by the 4th Infantry Division.

Using US Air Force airlift, overland convoys, and helicopter air assaults and extractions, two brigades and their supporting elements conducted an operation in a foreign country about which very little was known. The

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valuable experiences gained by commanders both tactically and logistically in CAMBODIA will be well remembered.

In terms of logistics, the operation in CAMBODIA demanded the utmost in support and preparation. Without it, obviously the units would have been unable to meet the expectations placed upon them. When the lines of communication are extended into an unknown area, these LOC's are not functional if they are not supported and improved upon. It is realized that there is always a great dependence upon aviation support which in turn is subject to a great number of variables. However, all units should plan to be self-sustaining for at least three days in the field with Class I, V and a limited amount of Class III. A case in point was the intense heat and scarcity of water to be found in the SE SAN Base Area.

The logistical resupply of the ground units must be as carefully planned as the tactical plan. If it is not, then the ground unit simply must wait for the supplies to "catch up"--quite certainly a poor solution.

This is true also of aviation support. The assets must be judiciously allocated to support the committed unit as well as the next assaulting unit. Control of aircraft must remain at the user level.

The single lift concept (simultaneous insertion of all battalion maneuver elements plus the direct support artillery battery) was used by the division for the first time in CAMBODIA. This concept becomes very difficult to control if the LZ's are hot. This concept should be used when intelligence indicates the likelihood of hot LZ's is small, when flight time is relatively short, and when the established refuel system is adequate.

Flexibility in planning while "on the move" and an organization structured and trained in quick reaction movement is essential to the successful accomplishment of the mission. Artillery must be able to move quickly, shoot accurately and provide the command and control required. These capabilities have been exercised and developed during the past months in support of brigade and battalion operations. They were used in the same manner during operations in CAMBODIA, except on a much larger scale. Because the methods employed remained unchanged, the artillerymen executing the plans were not required to change their normal operating methods.

The establishment of an AN/GRC-163 multi-channel radio-telephone communication system from brigade to battalion headquarters greatly enhanced the command and control of combat elements during the operation. This system provided relatively secure voice communications and substantially reduced the traffic on command radio nets.

In the area of intelligence it was noted that the recovery of collated information in one day's time emphasized a weakness in the Army system of Combat Intelligence. Information on Base Area 702 had been collected by military intelligence agencies over a number of years. However, when the

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information was needed quickly, there was no single packet of Base Area 702 information on file, nor one point where all the information was stored for rapid readout.

Whether a successful operation is measured in terms of number of enemy killed or captured, enemy equipment found or efforts expended logistically over a great distance, the results achieved in all categories point to victory on the battlefield in CAMBODIA for the 4th Infantry Division during Operation BINH TAY I.

19. (C) OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED.

a. Artillery

(1) The relatively drastic changes in expenditure guidance (from normal expenditures to maximum possible expenditures when the division was ordered to withdraw to a cease fire situation in VIETNAM to normal expenditures) complicate the problem of projecting and planning to meet the desired stockage objectives.

(2) The limiting factor in determining the ability of division artillery to respond to insuring maximum expenditure of artillery is the ability to retail deliver ammunition from a temporary ASP to the fire bases.

(3) Liaison teams can be formed from any qualified resources available. Additional liaison teams will normally be required whenever any battalion sized unit is working in close coordination with the division.

(4) Ammunition expenditures are greatly dependent upon transportation resources. Ammunition resupply requires intensive staff management and continuous attention. Air delivery of an initial stock may alleviate initial problems, and support the scheme of maneuver.

(5) When an installation as large as NEW PLEI DJERENG is established, at least a battalion liaison team should be tasked to perform the fire support coordination functions. The liaison team should be the team from the battalion that provides security for maneuver forces.

b. Aviation

(1) In large airmobile operations involving more than one brigade, the supporting aviation unit should provide a full time liaison officer whose sole responsibility is to ensure that proper coordination is effected between the supporting aviation units and supported units.

(2) UH-1H aircraft should use different helipads than the CH-47/CH-54 when large quantities of supplies are to be moved. When UH-1H and CH-47/CH-54 use the same pad, the UH-1H cause delays and reduce the efficiency of the heavier helicopters.

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(3) Improvements to airfields that are necessary to eliminate safety hazards should be accomplished prior to initiation of an operation. This is particularly true of any dust suppressant effort.

(4) Mixing of helicopter and fixed wing operations at a small airfield complex is unsatisfactory in conducting large tactical operations.

(5) Every available means must be used to closely control large airmobile operations, especially when aircraft assets are provided by several aviation units operating from different locations.

(6) It is very difficult to start daily operations on time when aircraft must come from many locations. Units must have alternate plans to productively utilize those aircraft that do arrive on schedule.

(7) The division army aviation element should have an element as far forward as practical to assist in controlling large airmobile operations.

(8) Although the FAC's assigned to the division are able to control a vastly increased number of sorties for a few days, the number of flying hours can reach a critical safety factor and augmentation is required.

(9) Where a large number of aircraft are involved in an operation, control problems can be greatly reduced by using more than one facility or airfield for refueling and rearming of aircraft. A reduction in aircraft density is the greatest advantage to be derived from this arrangement.

## c. Intelligence

Maps must be inventoried at battalion level on a regular basis. Prior to going on an operation, map loads should be checked to insure maps are included in accompanying supplies.

## d. Logistics

When deploying the major portions of the division, operational capabilities will be determined by the availability of non-divisional transportation resources.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
EVERT R HOUSE  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



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ANNEX A (Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I) to  
4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

## 1. (U) TERRAIN ANALYSIS

a. Purpose: To analyze MACV Base Area 702.

b. Mission: To enter Base Area 702 and to seize and destroy or evacuate all enemy supplies found in the area, and to destroy any enemy forces found in the area. Time available ten to fifteen days. Advance into CAMBODIA will be no farther than the western boundary of Base Area 702.

## 2. (C) GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

a. Climatic conditions: See Appendix 1, this annex.

b. Terrain

(1) Relief and drainage systems. Base Area 702 is bordered on the west by the TONLE SAN River, on the southeast by the SE SAN River, and on the north west by the SONG TAPOA River which flows into the TONLE SAN. The TONLE SAN varies in width from 75 meters to 400 meters, while both the SE SAN and SONG TAPOA vary from 50 to 100 meters in width. River depth varies with the monsoon season, but the rivers are navigable for shallow draft vessels all year long. Rapids are found in the southern portions of the rivers. Possible fords are at YA 610254, YA 522354, YA 441409, and YA 483360 along the TONLE SAN and SE SAN. River banks along the TONLE SAN and SE SAN are generally gradual with some areas of sparse vegetation. Numerous jungle streams flow from the high ground in the center of the area into the TONLE SAN or SE SAN Rivers. These streams generally have steep banks, are narrow in width, two feet to six feet in depth and with dense vegetation along the banks. Along the TONLE SAN River there are two areas of swamp 20% underwater. Centers of these swampy areas are YA 4244 and YA 4056. The first is a strip four kilometers wide while the second is eight kilometers wide. Relief in Base Area 702 ranges from a high point of 671 meters in the north at YA 5051 to a high point of 378 meters in the south at YA 6344. The terrain in the northern portion of the base area is mountainous with ridge lines running generally north to south. Relief in this area averages ten meters. In the southern parts of the base area the terrain is moderately rolling with areas of flatlands. Relief here averages forty meters.

(2) Vegetation. In the northern parts of the base area, the vegetation is multi-canopied jungle with dense underbrush. Stream banks are densely over grown and the entire area is primarily jungle. To the south and east the jungle is single canopy with clearings and grass lands. To the west are swamp areas of scrub underbrush. Along the eastern portions of the area are numerous fields, and rice paddies are located in the southwestern corner. See Appendix 2, Fields, this annex.

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ANNEX A (Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I) to  
4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

(3) Manmade features

(a) Roads and trails (omitted)

(b) Bridges. Bridges are located at the following locations:

1. YA 488354, 50 meters long, ten meters wide, constructed of logs, capable of truck traffic.
2. YA 561794, 20 meters long, ten meters wide.
3. YA 549315, 30 meters long, ten meters wide.
4. YA 457676, foot bridge, bamboo construction.
5. YA 506682, five meters wide, 40 meters long.
6. YA 433509, four meters wide, ten meters long.
7. YA 374617, four meters wide, 75 meters long, constructed of wood.

(c) Villages. Villages are located at the following locations:

1. PLEI TANG, YA 584349
2. PLEI KTANG, YA 645245
3. PLEI BI YA, YA 657407
4. KOAN SANG, YA 584272
5. PLEI PHI, YA 645335
6. UNK, YA 390150
7. UNK, YA 580408

(d) Military Installations and Fortifications. See Appendix 3, this Annex.

(4) Additional Characteristics - Population: People of two ethnic backgrounds live in Base Area 702, CAMBODIANS and MONTAGNARDS. Since the recent change in government in CAMBODIA, the majority of CAMBODIANS have withdrawn from the base area into an area west of the TONLE SAN River. The MONTAGNARDS in the area work for, but do not necessarily support the NVA.



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ANNEX A (Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I) to  
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## 3. (C) MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

### a. Tactical Aspects

#### (1) Observation and Fire

(a) Weather conditions. Good ground and air observation is present until the monsoons begin, then air observation is not possible and ground observation is very limited.

(b) Relief. In the northern parts of the base area, the mountainous terrain limits observation and fields of fire. In the flatlands along the TONLE SAN and SE SAN Rivers and in the southern portion of the area, observation and fields of fire are less limited. Dependent upon vegetation, indirect fire weapons are effective throughout the area.

(c) Vegetation. The dense vegetation in the northern portion of the area severely limits observation and fields of fire. Maximum range for both is limited to ten meters or less in many areas. Use of grenades and M-79 fire is limited because of the possibility of "bounce-backs", due to the thick underbrush. The triple canopy may provide some protection from light indirect fire weapons. In the south and along the rivers, the grass lands present few limitations on observation or fields of fire. Scrub brush in some locations limits observation and fire, but all areas are unlimited in the use of indirect fire and grenades.

(d) Manmade features. Well camouflaged bunkers that are hard to detect and destroy are plentiful in the base area.

#### (2) Concealment and Cover

(a) Relief. The mountainous areas afford a great deal of cover and concealment from both air and ground observation. The rolling terrain in the south offers limited cover and concealment.

(b) Vegetation. The dense jungles and thick underbrush offer excellent cover and concealment. Enemy use of camouflage further enhances the natural cover and concealment. To the south the open grass lands and swamps offer little cover, and concealment is dependent upon grass height. In the shrub brush and single canopy jungle both cover and concealment are again excellent.

#### (3) Obstacles

(a) Relief. Movement by foot troops in the mountainous areas is limited and necessitates a slow pace. Vehicle traffic in this area is impossible. In the south tall grasses slowed foot movement while the

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ANNEX A (Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I) to  
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single canopy jungle limited use of vehicles to roads.

(b) Drainage. The TONLE SAN and SE SAN Rivers present obstacles to vehicle traffic making bridging necessary. The swamps in the western part of the base area also limit both foot and vehicle movement.

(c) Manmade features. Punji stakes and huts are placed on possible LZ's to limit air mobile operations.

## (4) Key Terrain Features:

(a) Hill 637 (YA 5059). This hill controls observation over the northeastern portion of the base area. Dense jungles and steep slopes make this an extremely difficult area of operation.

(b) Hill 609 (YA 5152). This hill controls the center of Base Area 702. Observation of the CAMBODIA-VIETNAM border is possible as is observation of the low lands to the south. Operations in this area are hindered by the jungle and mountain slopes.

## (5) Avenues of Approach

(a) Ground approach is limited to two areas: Highway 509 and Highway 19.

(b) There are numerous LZ's for airmobile operations throughout the base area.

## (6) Combat Service Support Aspects

Logistics. All logistical support must be provided by helicopters.

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Appendix 1 (Climatic Conditions) to ANNEX A (Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

## 1. (C) General

a. The transition from the northeast monsoon season to the southwest monsoon, which began in March is completed in May. The air of the southwest monsoon originates in part as a warm, dry, stable air mass over Australia and merges with tropical air as it moves northward over the Indian Ocean. During passages over warm tropical waters, the air mass is rapidly modified by the addition of heat and moisture. It arrives over the area as a very moist, unstable tropical air mass which produces extensive convective clouds, heavy rainshowers and thunderstorms over most of the area, especially on the windward side of the mountain slopes. During the southwest monsoon, the lift (air blowing up the side of a mountain) provided by these mountains augments the process of convective instability (unstable air implies rainshowers/thunderstorms) to produce much cloudiness and heavy rainshower activity on the westward windward slopes as a direct result of topography.

b. Small changes in location can cause large changes in the observed weather. Surges do occur in the southwest monsoon which causes an increase in the recorded surface winds. Wind gusts to twenty knots are common and gusts will occasionally exceed thirty knots. Large local variation in wind direction and speed will occur in more mountainous terrain, due to the channeling effect of valleys and ridges.

## 2. (C) Precipitation

a. May is a wet season month. Rainfall increases everywhere and is primarily afternoon and evening rainshowers and thunderstorms. The principle factor influencing the amounts of precipitation is exposure to the moist wind flow. Higher elevations receive more precipitation.

b. Precipitation can be expected ten to fifteen days per month for the following totals:

(1) Monthly mean	9"
(2) Monthly maximum	20"
(3) Monthly minimum	2.8"
(4) 24 Hour Maximum	4"

## 3. (C) Cloudiness

a. Cloud amounts continue to increase in May. Convective clouds with bases 3,000' form during the day, late morning and afternoon ceilings are

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Appendix 1 (Climatic Conditions) to ANNEX A ( Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

common. During May, skies are cloudy 65% of the time and the table below describes the type of cloudiness that makes up the total.

<u>TIME (Local)</u>	<u>CONDITIONS</u>	<u>MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS/MONTH</u>
0700	(No ceilings below 10,000 feet and visibility greater than five miles)	11
1000	"	10
1300	"	5
1600	"	7
1900	"	15
All Hours	(Days total cloud cover less than 30%-no ceiling)	5
All Hours	(Days total cloud cover forms a ceiling at some time during the day)	23

b. Generally, ceilings will be 3,000 feet above ground level except during surges and afternoon rainshowers/thunderstorms.

#### 4. (C) Visibility

No significant improvement in the visibility occurs in May. Although the smoke and haze is decreasing, the increase in convective cloudiness decreases the slant range visibility for aircraft and rainshowers/thunderstorms will lower the visibility one to three miles in local areas. Occurrence of fog is decreasing with an average of one fog day per month.

#### 5. (C) Thunderstorms

a. A thunderstorm day is defined as a day on which thunder is heard at the location. Precipitation does not have to occur. The statement "an average of one to two thunderstorm days" means that any specific location in that area averages one to two days per month with thunderstorms. The area in concern has twelve thunderstorm days per month during May. The duration of individual thunderstorms is one hour, however, continuous thunderstorm activity at any station often lasts longer than one hour due to development of additional thunderstorm cells. Typical thunderstorm weather observations are as follows: 1000 scattered, 2000 broken, visibility two miles in thunderstorms (implies heavy rain), winds variable at fifteen gusts to thirty-five knots.

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Appendix 1 (Climatic Conditions) to ANNEX A (Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

b. In more severe thunderstorm gusts can be as high as fifty knots. Generally, hail does not reach the surface from tropical thunderstorms, but can be found above and near the freezing level which is at 14,000 feet during May. Tornadoes occur rarely with tropical thunderstorms and do not pose a serious threat in VIETNAM.

## 6. (G) Temperatures

Temperatures for the monthly averages indicate cooler weather due to gradual increases in the amount of cloudiness during the month.

Extreme maximum	100 (F°)
Mean maximum	90
Mean minimum	70
Extreme minimum	62

## 7. (G) Relative Humidity

a. The mean relative humidity for all hours of every day is 88%. A diurnal cycle does occur where the morning relative humidities often exceed 95% with the lowest humidity (70-75%) occurring in the afternoon.

<u>WINDS</u>	<u>DIRECTION</u>	<u>SPEED</u>	<u>SPEED (SURGE)</u>
Surface	SW	8	25 knots
2000 feet (Above Mean Sea Level)	SW	8	20-25 knots
5000 feet	W	10	20-30 knots
10,000 feet	WSW	7	no data
20,000 feet	S	5	no data

b. During surges, wind directions and speeds will vary considerably due to the channeling effect of mountain ridges and valleys. Occasionally, winds warnings will be issued for high gusts and turbulence.

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Appendix 2 (Platons) to ARMM 4 (Analysis of Area of Operations for BISH TAF I) to 6th Infantry Division BISH TAF I After Action Report (I)

## PLATONS

## REGIMENTALS

TA 400599  
TA 425605  
TA 427607  
TA 435600  
TA 440598  
TA 445593  
TA 452597  
TA 461599  
TA 471583  
TA 472579  
TA 473586  
TA 477583  
TA 481561  
TA 488562  
TA 490562  
TA 501555  
TA 506553  
TA 505558  
TA 509560  
TA 513559  
TA 519561  
TA 512558  
TA 517553  
TA 519552  
TA 525569  
TA 531562  
TA 542557  
TA 543560  
TA 548560  
TA 612231  
TA 555550  
TA 559561  
TA 509647  
TA 531504  
TA 525622  
TA 520491  
TA 541481  
TA 533680  
TA 526475  
TA 538471  
TA 550470  
TA 561476

TA 570471  
TA 572640  
TA 565640  
TA 555498  
TA 591431  
TA 610642  
TA 618646  
TA 620649  
TA 621641  
TA 601371  
TA 601376  
TA 653368  
TA 660281  
TA 660286  
TA 618258  
TA 618258  
TA 612262  
TA 601270  
TA 591289  
TA 605233  
TA 590320  
TA 548317  
TA 550320  
TA 570376  
TA 561390  
TA 470413  
TA 423616  
TA 425620  
TA 509647  
TA 423600  
TA 506682  
TA 511672  
TA 548718

# C. A. T. - 1

Appendix B (Military Installations and Pertinent Areas to COMSEC & Cryptologic  
of Area of Operations for USMC 7th Div and Infantry Regiment 21st Div  
After Action Report - 1)

<p><b>AS PMS:</b></p> <p>TA 43007  TA 43010  TA 43011  TA 612360  TA 570571 (Fire zone)  TA 570572  TA 58105  TA 600672  TA 580045  TA 600055  TA 5361  TA 600007  TA 570570</p> <p><b>TRAINING AREAS:</b></p> <p>TA 507344</p> <p><b>STORAGE AREAS:</b></p> <p>TA 635007  TA 612062 (Rico)  TA 670560 (Arms)  TA 500720</p> <p><b>ENGINE POINTS:</b></p> <p>TA 507341  TA 557070  TA 617057  TA 670600  TA 600561  TA 600562  TA 650770</p> <p><b>T STATIONS:</b></p> <p>TA 5509 (T-25)  TA 5777 (T-6)  TA 5000 (T-7)  TA 6700 (A-2)  TA 600000 (A-1)  TA 581000 (T-3)  TA 5900 (T-20)</p> <p><b>RE PMS:</b></p> <p>TA 620007  TA 551712  TA 600005  TA 657005  TA 510557  TA 510502</p>	<p><b>OP 1</b> TA 500000  TA 600001</p> <p><b>OP 2</b> TA 612371  TA 581305  TA 600002  TA 581305  TA 600007  TA 677300  TA 657300  TA 600391  TA 600030  TA 600003</p>
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Appendix 3 (Military Installations and Fortifications) to ANNEX A (Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

## CAMP SITES:

### COORDINATES

YA 561546		YA 575574
YA 561566		YA 594501
YA 564566		YA 612371
YA 575375		YA 617516
YA 454645		YA 618511
YA 473583		YA 624672
YA 478683		YA 600642
YA 485560		YA 601531
YA 490630		YA 576612
YA 503553		YA 695508
YA 505683		YA 609526
YA 506646		YA 582543
YA 531478		YA 625605
YA 532696		YA 582625
YA 5448		YA 684517
YA 625295	CHI PLA	YA 677518
YA 694257		YA 685546
YA 625447		
YA 514367		AA PSN: YA 560535
YA 515546		YA 442595
YA 466605		YA 438560
YA 545322		YA 532547
YA 415355		YA 533548
YA 551330		YA 544544
YA 450420		YA 446528
YA 555224		YA 476519
YA 5456		YA 533501
YA 420555		YA 536502
YA 591319		YA 521492
YA 427235		YA 516498
YA 550600		YA 531490
YA 635482		YA 539479
YA 660365		YA 556460
YA 575325		YA 554474
YA 553646		YA 576474
YA 584273	KNOLL SANG	YA 530438
YA 454685		YA 607533
YA 475555	TA LAV	YA 620488
YA 555475		YA 625487 (four psns)
YA 425599		YA 638366
		YA 690451
		YA 639483
		YA 635482 (two psns)
		YA 635485

## FOX HOLES:

YA 425687  
YA 559468  
YA 572571



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ANNEX B (Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2d Brigades and Supporting Units) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDE-S3

3 May 1970

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: 4th Infantry Division Field Standing Operating Procedure for use in the Central Highland, RVN (FOUO).

2. Purpose: To provide guidance and information concerning logistical support for all units participating in operation order 16-70.

3. General: This letter provides for supply, maintenance and service support for all units participating in order 16-70.

4. Supply Support: The 45th General Support Group will establish and operate a logistical support activity (LSA) at New Plei Djereng.

a. Class I: The LSA will provide supply point distribution. Units will provide the Class I supply point a seven day forecast for operational rations.

(1) LRP rations will be programmed and stocked for one meal per day for forward maneuver elements, but must still be requested by using unit.

(2) MCI's: A three day supply will be stocked for all supported units.

(3) A rations will be available for units subsisting at New Plei Djereng.

(4) Sundry Packs will be issued with the rations on the basis of one pack per 100 men per day.

(5) Batteries will also be issued with the rations on a two-two-three cycle.

(6) Emergency requirements will be filled as required.

b. Class II: Clothing and equipment will be available on a direct exchange basis at the 88th S&S Bn Class II point in the logistical center, Pleiku. Items not available through the 88th S&S Bn will be obtained by unit PBO's

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from DSupO at Camp Radcliff. Paperware and plasticware will be issued through the Class I supply point at New Plei Djereng.

c. Class III: The LSA of the 45th General Support Group will operate a Class III supply point for JP4, DF2, MOGAS, AVGAS and common packaged products.

(1) Stockage of bulk fuel:

(a) JP-4 - 50,000 gal

(b) DF-2 - 20,000 gal

(c) MOGAS - 10,000 gal

(d) AVGAS - 1,500 gal

(2) Packaged products to include heat tablets, will be available as follows:

(a) OE - 10

(b) OE - 30 or 9250

(c) OE - 50

(d) 7808

(e) GAA

(f) LAD 2

(g) Solvent

(3) Bottle gas will be on direct exchange basis at the 88th S & S Bn in Pleiku.

d. Class IV: Initial stockage of class IV items will be accomplished as follows.

(1) 4th S & T Bn

(a) Sand bags 200,000

(b) Six foot pickets 6,000

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SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units.

- (c) Three foot pickets 4,000
- (d) Bar wire 200 rolls
- (e) C - wire 3,000 coils
- (1) LSA - Stockage Objective
- (a) Sand bags 150,000
- (b) Six foot pickets 3,000
- (c) Three foot pickets 2,000
- (d) B - wire 100 rolls
- (e) C - wire 1,500 coils

Timbers and other required Class IV items will be made available through the LSA upon request.

e. Class V - Ammunition resupply will be through a Field Storage Unit (FSU) at New Plei Djereng. This FSU is an extension of ASP 341 located at Pleiku. The DAO will have a representative at the FSU and ASP 341 to monitor issues to Division units. Request for issue and turn in will be effected on DA Form 581 in accordance with tab D to App 3 to Annex G to 4th Division Field SOP.

f. Class VI: Post exchange is not available and sundry packs will be issued. See para a above.

g. Class VII: Major end items will be requisitioned and issued through PBG's at Camp Radcliff.

h. Class VIII: Medical resupply will be effected through DMSO, 4th Med Bn, at New Plei Djereng. Emergency resupply through any dust off aircraft.

i. Class IX: Repair parts supply will be furnished through C and D Companies, 704th Maint Bn for 2nd and 1st Brigades units respectively. Back up supply support to 704th Maint Bn will be through the 62nd Maint Bn, Pleiku, on a fill or kill basis.

5. Maintenance: Direct Support Maintenance will be provided by D Company, 704th Maint Bn for 1st Brigade units and by C Company, 704th Maint Bn for

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SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units

2nd Brigade units. (Support not covered by the above will be published on 6 May 70 and involved units advised). Equipment not repairable will be retrograded through the supporting maintenance unit to US Army Depot, Qui Nhon.

## 6. Services:

a. Medical support is provided by C Company, 4th Medical Battalion, for all units. Six (6) dust off aircraft will be positioned for area coverage with two at Pleiku, two at Plei Djereng and two circling near objective area. C Company, 4th Medical Battalion will operate a clearing company with an underground treatment facility at Plei Djereng. Evacuation will be through the 71st Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku, in accordance with current SOP.

b. Graves Registration: The 4th S & T Bn will establish and operate a GRREG collection point at Plei Djereng. Backup support will be provided by 88th S & S Bn, Pleiku.

c. Bath: Two portables eight head shower units will be operated at Plei Djereng. Support will be on an area basis with schedules coordinated with supported units.

d. Laundry: Laundry service will be provided by the commercial contract laundry at Camp Schmidt, Pleiku. Three day service will be available.

## e. Transportation

(1) Requirements exceeding unit capability will be passed to DTO office at Camp Schmidt, Pleiku.

(2) Air transportation between Camp Radcliff and Plei Djereng will be established for mail replacements and high priority cargo. DTO will publish schedule as soon as it is confirmed.

## 7. Task Organization Forward:

DET, HQ DISCOM (Plei Djereng) - four officers four EM

DET, HQ DISCOM (Pleiku) - three officers three EM

DET, A Co, 4th S & T Bn (Plei Djereng) - eight EM

DET, HQ 704th Maint Bn (Plei Djereng) - two officers five EM

C Co (-) 704th Maint Bn (Plei Djereng) - three officers 83 EM

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D Co (-) 704th Maint Bn (Flei Djereng) - five officers 70 EM

DET, E Co 704th Maint Bn (Holloway) - two officers eight EM

C Co (-), 4th Med Bn - five officers 42 EM

8. DISCOM will coordinate all logistical services from its forward command post at Flei Djereng. Queries concerning combat service support should be addressed to the DISCOM S3, DTO or DAO as appropriate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ James C. Mullett  
/t/ JAMES C. MULLETT  
Captain, Armor  
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

Special

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GORDON S. AXELSON  
MAJ, INF

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Appendix I (Bottom) to Annex B (Letter of Instructions (LOI) logistical Support for 1st and 2d Brigades and Supporting Units) to 4th Infantry Division BIRN TAF I After Action Report (O)

The following rations were issued to division units and attachments during Operation BIRN TAF I:

	Qty Issued (5-16 May)	Qty Issued (17-26 May)	Total
A rations	19,690	12,900	32,590
C rations	98,690	13,520	112,210
LMP rations	18,205	11,969	30,174
Sentry Rations	390	96	486

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Appendix 2 (Class IV Supplies) to ANNEX B (Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2d Brigades and Supporting Units) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>
Barbed Wire	432 rolls
Concertina	1,232 rolls
Fence Post Eight Foot	4,321 ea
Fence Post Six Foot	1,944 ea
Fence Post Three Foot	1,916 ea
Sandbags	167,200 ea
PSP	630 pcs
Culvert 60"	600 pcs
Lumber Four by Four	19,782 BF
Lumber Four by Twelve	14,576 BF
Lumber Eight by Eight	6,390 BF
Lumber Assorted Sizes	5,254 BF
Nails 60D	550 lbs
Nails 20D	950 lbs

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Appendix 3 (Ammunition Stockage Objectives) to ANNEX B (Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

The ammunition stockage objectives listed in Tab A, this appendix were utilized during BINH TAY I. The recommended S/O column was utilized during the two brigade phase of the operation. This S/O was established based on the intensive combat rates listed in USARPAC Reg 710-15 with few deviations, and the Commanding Officer, 184th Ordnance Battalion in conjunction with the DAO agreed to these figures and shipped ammunition from QUI NHON.

The final stockage objective column was utilized during the one brigade portion of BINH TAY I and was arrived at based on the sustaining combat rates indicated in USARPAC Reg 710-15. This S/O was established by the BAO and agreed to by G-4 and DIVARTY. The S/O in effect was never used as a management tool, since actual stockage in most cases was much higher and transportation assets were not available to reduce, nor was it considered urgent to do so. The termination date of the operation occurred prior to attrition bringing the O/H figures in line with the S/O.

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TAB A (Ammunition Stockage Objective for N&W PLEI DJERENG) to Appendix 3 (Ammunition Stockage Objectives) to ANNEX B (Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

	<u>DODIC</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>RECOM S/O</u>	<u>FINAL S/O</u>
1.	A068	5.56mm Tracer	28,800	2,200
2.	A071	5.56mm Ball	132,000	20,000
3.	A130	7.62mm Ball 5/Clip	5,040	0
4.	A131	7.62mm Lkd	160,000	10,000
5.	A165	Mini Gun	216,000	10,000
6.	A557	50 Cal Lkd	252,000	5,000
7.	A574	50 Cal Spotter	800	0
8.	B534	40mm APERS	2,592	250
9.	B535	40mm WSP	880	440
10.	B536	40mm WSC	880	440
11.	B567	40mm CS	192	0
12.	B568	40mm HE	9,120	1,320
13.	B470	40mm Lkd	8,000	1,000
14.	G226	81mm Illum	900	180
15.	G256	81mm HE	2,860	720
16.	G276	81mm WP	316	72
17.	G705	4.2" HE	2,132	408
18.	G706	4.2" Illum	468	68
19.	G715	4.2" WP	400	0
20.	G266	90mm HE	748	0
21.	D505	155mm Illum	232	40
22.	D506	155mm HC	196	8

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	<u>DDIC</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>RECOM S/O</u>	<u>FINAL S/O</u>
23.	D540	155mm Prop Chg GB	300	90
24.	D541	155mm Prop Chg AB	1,000	432
25.	D544	155mm HE	1,200	488
26.	D547	155mm Green Smk	44	0
27.	D549	155mm Red Smk	30	0
28.	D551	155mm Yellow	30	0
29.	D550	155mm WP	136	32
30.	D561	155mm ICM	68	16
31.	G881	Frag Gren	3,000	400
32.	G900	Gren Inc	60	0
33.	G911	Gren Offensive	1,200	560
34.	G924	Gren CS	1,000	0
35.	G940	Gren Smk (Green)	1,200	90
36.	G945	Gren Smk (Yellow)	1,396	180
37.	G950	Gren Smk (Red)	900	80
38.	G955	Gren Smk (Violet)	1,000	140
39.	G963	Gren C/S	520	0
40.	H555	66mm LAW	840	30
41.	H490	2.75" Rkt (#10)	4,000	200
42.	H534	2.75" Rkt (#17)	1,000	100
43.	K143	Claymore w/acc	2,044	188
44.	L306	RSC	972	0
45.	L307	WSC	972	80
46.	L310	GSP	972	0
47.	L311	RSP	972	0
48.	L312	WSP	1,944	200

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	<u>DODIG</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>RECOM S/O</u>	<u>FINAL S/O</u>
49.	L314	GSC	972	0
50.	L340	Sig Smk White	240	0
51.	L342	Sig Smk Red	240	0
52.	L341	Sig Smk Green	240	0
53.	L343	Sig Smk Yellow	240	0
54.	L473	A/C Flares	200	0
55.	L495	Trip Flare	4,000	300
56.	M023	C-4	10,000	362
57.	M032	TNT #1	4,000	160
58.	M039	#40 Cratering	90	5
59.	M130	Elec Blasting Caps	2,000	0
60.	M131	Non Electric	4,000	0
61.	M420	#15 S/C	120	5
62.	M421	#40 S/C	80	5
63.	M028	Bangalores	90	8
64.	M456	Det Cord	144,000	3,000
65.	M591	M11 Dynamite	10,000	0
66.	M670	Time Fuze	18,000	600
67.	M766	Fuze Lighter	600	104
68.	M248	Fuze MTSQ	158	100
69.	M276	Fuze MTSQ	70	0
70.	M278	Fuze MTSQ	252	200
71.	M335	Fuze PD	5,026	2,280
72.	M331	Fuze PD	172	10
73.	M412	Fuze Prox	206	70
74.	M477	Fuze Prox	85	35
75.	M523	Primer Perc	2,554	240
76.	M525	Primer Perc	1,916	240

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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	<u>DDIC</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>DRAWN</u>
23.	D541	155mm Prop Chg WB	1400
24.	D544	155mm HE	654
25.	D548	155mm HC	100
26.	D550	155mm WP	112
27.	D561	155mm ICM	24
28.	D675	8" Prop Chg M1	50
29.	D676	8" Prop Chg M2	128
30.	D680	8" HE	162
31.	D684	8" ICM	48
32.	G881	Gren Frag	660
33.	G940	Gren Hd Smk (Green)	96
34.	G945	Gren Hd Smk (Yellow)	688
35.	G955	Gren Hd Smk (Violet)	432
36.	H490	2.75 Rkt (#10)	324
37.	H459	2.75 Fleshette	192
38.	H534	2.75 Rkt (#17)	235
39.	H555	66mm Rkt (LAW)	15
40.	L312	WSP	1148
41.	L473	A/C Flare	96
42.	L495	Trip Flare	864
43.	K143	Claymore w/acc	144
44.	K145	Claymore w/o acc	108
45.	M026	Bangalores	149
46.	M131	N/Electric Blast Cap	5000
47.	M420	#15 S/C	12



ANNEX C (Leaflet Drops) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

1. Leaflet Number: 2767

Front:

DO YOU KNOW THE TRUTH?

To the VC/NVA Cadre and Soldiers.  
What is happening to the talks in Paris between Hanoi and the U.S. now?  
What is the truth about it?

Back:

Why have you been forbidden to listen to the Free World radio broadcasts? You need to know the truth about the Paris talks, because the outcome determines your own fate. In order to help you to know the truth about the Paris talks, we offer you the schedule of radio news broadcasts from the Free World. You can tear this schedule off and keep it for your own use.

VOA

Meter Bands	Time
19-25031-263	0630 hours
16-19-25	1230 hours
263-29-25-31	1900 hours
19-25-31-263	0730 hours
19-25-31-263	2100 hours
25-31-19-263	2200 hours
19-25-31-190-263	2400 hours

BBC

Meter Bands	Time
12	1930-2000 hours
14	1930-2000 hours
17	1930-2000 hours
19	1930-2000 hours
25	1930-2000 hours
31	1930-2000 hours
42	1930-2000 hours

2. Leaflet Number: 2547

Side One: To All Soldiers Who Came Into the South from the North

You learned day by day as you moved into the South that your leaders were not telling you the truth. You are the cream of the nation's youth. Your hands and your minds should not be used to destroy but to rebuild your country after 20 years of war. It will be tragic if you are killed. The Vietnamese people have strong hands and excellent minds. Your hands and the weapons in them are only being used to kill. Think what do your sacrifices do but help the Communist destroy the country?

Side Two:

If the Communist doctrine is ideal then why do the South Vietnamese and indeed many Vietnamese in the North oppose it? If this war will last 20 years or more, as Ho Chi Minh said it would, what does the future promise for your country and your people? Do you think you will live that long? If the Communist doctrine brings happiness to the people, why doesn't the government of the North allow a free and open economy as the South does? No, they use force to invade the South with their "liberation" program. If you think about the answers to these questions, you will know the truth.

3. Leaflet Number: T-23

Side One: Soldiers in the North Vietnamese Army:

Why do you continue to fight in the South? Your leaders have proclaimed that you are winning, that you are only in the South as reinforcements for the victory which is near. If that is true, why has your Uncle Ho often stated that the war will last ten or 20 years?

What is the truth, then? The truth is that the NLF is losing all over the south. The people do not trust the NLF and therefore do not support them. The Liberation Army is seriously short of manpower--that is why you infiltrated into the South.

Now that you are in the South you will see the truth. Look for the chance to escape from the NVA ranks. The South Vietnamese will welcome you with open arms.

Side Two: Instructions From Liberation Army Headquarters:

Here is an excerpt from instructions sent out by NLF Headquarters: In January 1966 the number of deserters increased dramatically. The deserters included both soldiers and administrative members. This high desertion rate has created many serious problems such as the following: a shortage of manpower; the defeat of the Be A Soldier Campaign; a loss of combat spirit; many soldiers desert to return home, and many rally to the GVN.

The following instructions is given: local governments must develop a plan and take positive action to prevent desertion.

4. Leaflet Number: 74

The people of South VN do not want to be ruled by the Lao Dong Party. Although the Party is using force to try to take over South VN, the South people are determined to resist Party Control. They know what life under the Party means in the North. They want to live in freedom in the South.

In the South

\*There is freedom of movement and no "letters of introduction".

\*There is plenty of food, cloth, and consumer goods for all. There is no rationing.

\*There are no compulsory political meetings. Everyone's free time is his own.

\*There are no "three postponements", "three readies", "three responsibilities". One leads his own life.

\*The South is open to the rest of the world, the South people have free access to news and information from the outside world. The northern people are not allowed to have free access to the world outside. How many people in the north know what is going on in China since last year where political unrest, large scale purge, mass slaughter have been triggered by Mao Tse-Tung's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"?

\*People are not suspicious of each other, do not spy on each other.

\*All religions are encouraged and protected.

\*People can sell all that they raise or make.

\*Peasants and handicraft workers are free and independent. There are no cooperatives and required deliveries.

\*Workers are protected by trade unions. There are no norms, no emulation campaigns, no movements to have "one man does two men's work" as in the North.

THE SOUTH IS FREE, THE NORTH IS NOT  
THE SOUTH FIGHTS TO PROTECT ITS FREEDOM

5. Leaflet Number: 76T

WHY IS THERE WAR?

Other people do not want to be controlled by the Communists. The people of South Vietnam resist the control of the Party. The Government of South Vietnam has asked the United States and other countries to help defend the country against Lao Dong aggression. There were no Americans fighting in South Vietnam when the Party started sending large numbers of North Vietnamese troops south. Because the Party sent large numbers of troops south, many Americans had to come to help the GVN.

Because your leaders are not satisfied just to rule North Vietnam, you are being sent to a senseless death in the South. Thousands have died already and many thousands more will die to satisfy the aggressive ambitions of the Party leaders unless they will stop their aggression. This is the era in which such aggression is doomed to failure.

Side Two: Everything you do to help the Party make war, makes the war last longer, makes you suffer longer and more. This is the Party's war, not your war. Seek the first opportunity to give up to your brothers in South Vietnam.



6. Leaflet Number: 8A-252-70

Side One: SOLDIERS AND CADRES OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST

Taking over the political dispute in Cambodia, the Communist leaders of Hanoi have created a political adventure by ordering you to attack and sabotage the neutrality of this small country.

This is serious breakthrough of the international agreement of the defense and protection of Cambodia's neutrality.

Side Two:

The Free World Forces must stop the dark plot of yours. The Free World Forces have cooperated with the ARVN forces to strike all the sanctuaries which are located inside Cambodia. There will not be any safe place for you to rest, resettle or resupply for you and other units in the South.

Immediately stop your illegal aggression. Drop your weapons down and rally to the Free World Forces or the ARVN's.

7. Leaflet Number: 8A-251-70

Side One: SOLDIERS AND CADRE OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST

To stop the warlike activities of the communist who broke into the neutral country of Cambodia, the ARVN and Allied Forces are opening the operations throughout the boundary in order to exterminate the safety bases of yours and will destroy all of you who are using weapons to oppress the neighbor countries. There will not be any safe place for you in either Vietnam or Cambodia.

Side Two:

Be smart and rally to the ARVN and American Forces to live in freedom and happiness in the South.

8. Leaflet Number: 8B-142-70

Now, the US and ARVN are earnestly appealing to all of you, do not be afraid of the soldiers. Stay in your villages and show a white flag. They will not harm you. They come to help cast out the VC who steal your rice, cattle, and hide in your villages. So if you see US/ARVN soldiers, you may report these soldiers so that they can protect your things and yourself.

9. Leaflet Number: 8B-141-70

Side One: The only way you can save your life is to surrender.

Side Two: To Communist Troops in Cambodia:

You have just come under attack by the battle-hardened troops of the

ARVN and the Allies. Your illegal sanctuaries are being overrun; your headquarters are being captured. Your units are disorganized and now have no place to hide. There is no way you can escape that will bring you closer to your home and loved ones. Your only hope of ever seeing them again is to surrender to the ARVN and Allied Forces. You must make your decision quickly, for the time of the Communist aggression grows short. Surrender now, or die a useless death.

10. Leaflet Number: 8B-143-70

Side One: Where can you hide now?

Side Two: Communist Soldiers in Cambodia

The ARVN and US Forces have launched massive attacks against your base areas in Cambodia. Now, the whole situation is changed. There is nowhere you can hide. You can retreat for a while, but you must stop somewhere. Then you will be caught.

If you are smart, you will quickly surrender to the ARVN and Allied Forces in your area. There is no sense in dying uselessly in a cause you know is lost.

11. Leaflet Number: 8B-144-70

Side One: You Have Been Cut Off

Side Two: Communist Soldiers in Cambodia

The ARVN and Allied Forces have launched large attacks against your base areas in Cambodia. The result has been to cut you off from your means of reinforcement and resupply. Now your unit will wither, like leaves on a branch when the branch is cut from the tree. If you wish to escape a useless death in a hopeless cause you have but one choice: Surrender to the ARVN and Allied units in your area. That is your only hope.

12. Leaflet Number: 8B-148-70

Side One: NVA in Cambodia and South Vietnam

The ARVN 40th Regiment and the US 4th Division have swept into Cambodia and have captured more than 500 tons of your rice. They will certainly find more. What will you eat now? Surrender to them. You will be given food and good treatment.

Side Two: NVA in Cambodia and South Vietnam

Are you hungry? Do you have enough rice to eat? Do not expect to receive as much rice in the future as you are now allotted. ARVN and Allied Forces have invaded your sanctuaries in Cambodia and have captured over 500 tons of your rice. And they will certainly find more.

Your situation grows worse with every day. If you are in South Vietnam you can rally to the GVN. If you are in Cambodia, your only hope of returning alive to your family is to surrender to the ARVN or Allied Forces. You will receive food and good treatment.

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ANNEX D (OPORD 16-70 (BINH TAY I) (U)) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I  
After Action Report (U)

OPORD 16-70 (BINH TAY-1) (U)

Reference: Map, CAMBODIA, and VIETNAM, 1:50,000, sheets 6437 II & III,  
6436 I & IV, 6537 III, 6536 IV.

Task Organization:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
1-14 Inf	1-22 Inf	D/7-17 Air Cav(OPCON)
3-506 Abn	2-35 Inf	2-1 Cav
		1-10 Cav
		3-12 Inf
		G/75 Inf
		K/75 Inf
		7-17 Air Cav

## 1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A, Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Current Sitrep.

(2) 22d ARVN Div conducts search and destroy operations with six battalions in southern BA 702 during the period 5-12 May 70.

## 2. (C) MISSION:

Effective 5 May 1970, 4th Inf Div conducts search and destroy operations in northern BA 702.

## 3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation. Annex B, Operation Overlay.

(1) Maneuver. 4th Inf Div in coordination with 22d ARVN Div deploys to vicinity New Fiei Djereng and conducts combat assault with two brigades of three battalions each into BA 702 to destroy enemy resources, installations, and command facilities.

(2) Fires. Annex C, Fire Support.

Group 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

# CONFIDENTIAL

OPORD 16-70 (BINH TAY-1) (U)

b. 1st Bde:

(1) Deploy to Pleiku Province 4 and 5 May 70 in accordance with Annex K, Deployment Schedule.

(2) On 5 May 70, conduct combat assault with three battalions into assigned AO.

(3) Priority of objective areas: A, B, C, D, and E.

c. 2d Bde:

(1) Deploy to Pleiku Province 5 and 6 May 70 in accordance with Annex K, Deployment Schedule.

(2) On 6 May 70, conduct combat assault with three battalions into assigned AO.

(3) Priority of objective areas: RED, WHITE, BLUE and GOLD.

d. 3-12 Inf:

(1) GHOP from 1st Bde to Division Control effective 040800H May 70.

(2) Release OPCON one rifle company to 1-10 Cav effective 040800H May 70.

(3) Effective 4 May 70, provide one rifle company to IDC Camp Radcliff for Golf Course security between 1700 and 0700 hours daily.

(4) Maintain ready reaction capability with one platoon prepared to deploy in fifteen minutes, one company in one hour, and battalion minus in three hours.

(5) Conduct operations vicinity Camp Radcliff as directed.

e. 2-8 Mech:

(1) Secure LOC from Oasis to New Plei Djereng until relieved by 2-1 Cav. Have road open for traffic by 0730 hours on 5 and 6 May 70.

(2) Receive OPCON D/7-17 Air Cav effective 050700H May 70.

(3) Upon relief by 2-1 Cav, revert to Division Reserve vicinity New Plei Djereng.

(4) Secure brigade CP's and LSA vicinity New Plei Djereng as directed by CO, DISCOM.

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OPORD 16-70 (BINH TAY-1) (U)

- f. 1-10 Cav:
  - (1) Continue present mission.
  - (2) Receive OPCON one rifle company 3-12 Inf effective 040800H May 70.
- g. 2-1 Cav: Assume responsibility for LOC security from 2-8 Mech on order.
- h. 7-17 Air Cav:
  - (1) CHOP D/7-17 Air Cav to 2-8 Mech effective 050700H May 70.
  - (2) Place one air cav troop in direct support of each brigade. Squadron minus remains under Division Control.
- i. C/75 Rangers:
  - (1) Deploy to Pleiku Province on 7 May 70.
  - (2) Be prepared to insert up to 50 percent of deployable teams on 8 May 70.
- j. K/75 Rangers: Conduct operations in areas to be designated (initially in Binh Dinh Province).
- k. Coordinating Instructions:
  - (1) Operations in BA 702 will be conducted so as to destroy all enemy facilities in AOs by 20 May 1970.
  - (2) DIRLAUTH and directed ALCON.
  - (3) CO, DISCOM Installation Coordinator New Plei Djereng.
  - (4) DAVNO coordinate PZ control at Camp Holloway, LZ Meredith, and New Plei Djereng.
  - (5) Priority of movement on Hiway 19E, 19W, and 14S to units moving to Plei Djereng/Pleiku, then to empties returning to CR for additional troop/equipment lift.
- 4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT
  - Annex E, Service Support.
- 5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. Signal. Annex H, Communications/Electronics.

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OPORD 16-70 (BINH TAY-1) (U)

b. Command. Division Forward CP Pleiku.

Acknowledge

WALKER  
MG

OFFICIAL:


/s/Prillaman  
/t/PRILLAMAN  
G3

Annexes: A -- Intelligence (TBP)  
B -- Operation Overlay (LIMIDIS)  
C -- Fire Support (TBP)  
D -- Engineer (TBP)  
E -- Service Support (TBP)  
F -- Aviation Support (Omitted)  
G -- Civil Affairs (TBP)  
H -- Communications/Electronics (TBP)  
K -- Deployment Schedule

## DISTRIBUTION:

IFFV	2	K/75 Inf	1	G-3	5
BSA II Corps	2	7-17 Air Cav	1	G-4	1
SA 22d ARVN Div	2	DIVARTY	1	G-5	1
1st Bde	1	DISCOM	1	ADE	1
2d Bde	1	4th Engr	1	ADSO	1
2-8 Mech	1	4th Avn	1	ADAVNO	1
2-1 Cav	1	124th Sig	1	FSCE	1
1-10 Cav	1	4th MP	1	BTO	1
3-12 Inf	1	G-1	1	DPC	1
G/75 Inf	1	G-2	1		

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GORDON S. AXELSON  
MAJ, INF

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Appendix 1 (Annex K Deployment Schedule) to ANNEX D (OPORD 16-70 (BINH TAY I)  
(U) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report

- 4 MAY 70: 1st Bn 1st Bde: OL to Holloway, trks return CPR.  
2d Bn 1st Bde: OL to Meredith, trks RON.
- 5 MAY 70: 1st Bn 1st Bde: CA fr Holloway to obj area (PZ 0830)  
2d Bn 1st Bde: OL fr Meredith to NPD (SP 0730), trks return CPR.  
CA fr NPD to obj area (PZ appr 1130).  
3d Bn 1st Bde: OL fr CPR to Meredith (SP 0700).  
CA fr Meredith to obj area (PZ appr 1330).  
1st Bn 2d Bde: AL fr CPR to NPD  
2d Bn 2d Bde: OL fr CPR to Meredith
- 6 MAY 70: 1st Bn 2d Bde: CA fr NPD to obj area (PZ 0830).  
2d Bn 2d Bde: CA fr Meredith to obj area (PZ 0915).  
3d Bn 2d Bde: OL fr CPR to Meredith (SP 0700).  
CA fr Meredith to obj area.

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MAJ, INF



# CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX E (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

OPLAN 19-70 (U)

Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1: 50,000, sheets 6636I and II, 6737 III and IV, 6637 I and II, 6737 III and IV.

## Task Organization:

1st BDE	2d BDE	Div Trps
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-12 Inf	1-22 Inf	1-10 Cav
1-14 Inf	2-35 Inf	K/75 Rgr

## 1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A, Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Current sitrep.

(2) II ARVN Corps terminates OPERATION BINH TAY 1.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) 2-1 Cav (-) and C/75 Rgr revert to OPCON IFFV upon termination of 2-8 Mech mission vicinity Pleiku City.

(2) One rifle company 1-14 Inf reverts to OPCON 1st Bde upon termination of 2-8 Mech vicinity Pleiku City.

d. Assumptions.

(1) OPERATION BINH TAY 1 will terminate on or about 25 May 70.

(2) 4th Inf Div will retain OPCON 2-1 Cav (-) until closeout of support base at NEW PLEI DJERENG.

(3) 4th Inf Div will lose responsibility for securing Hwy 19W concurrent with loss of OPCON 2-1 Cav (-).

(4) 2-8 Mech will be available for employment in Binh Dinh Province upon return of 2d ARVN Ranger Group.

GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

# CONFIDENTIAL

OPLAN 19-70 (U)

2. (C) MISSION: On order, 4th Inf Div continues present mission, withdraws forces from Pleiku Province, initiates combat operations against 95B NVA Regt, and prepares for future operations against VC Gia Lai Provincial Unit.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) Maneuver. 1st Bde extracts maneuver battalions from BINH TAY 1 AO, covers closeout of support base at NEW PLEI DJERENG, standdowns for four days at Camp Radcliff, and initiates operations against 95B NVA Regt. 2d Bde continues operations against C2 Co, 407th NVA Sapper Bn and unidentified enemy forces operating northwest of An Khe. 4th Engr Bn and 2-8 Mech (after standdown at Camp Radcliff) initiate upgrade of Route 508 and HILL 666 in preparation for future operations against VC Gia Lai Provincial Unit. K/75 Rgr develops ground intelligence for future targeting against VC Gia Lai Provincial Unit.

(2) Fires. Annex C, Fire Support.

b. 1st Bde:

(1) Continue current mission. On order, release OPCON C/75 Rgr to IFFV, cover closeout of support base at New Plei Djereng, and redeploy to Camp Radcliff for four day standdown.

(2) On order, initiate operations with three infantry battalions against 95B NVA Regt. AO as follows: From BR 030492 E along line two km S of QL 19 to BR 266440 SE to BR 500200S to BR 500070 W to BR 060070 N to BR 060100 W to BR 000100 N along DAK AYUNH River to BR 030442 N to start.

(3) On order, receive OPCON one rifle company 1-14 Inf from 2-8 Mech.

c. 2d Bde:

(1) Continue current mission. On order, constrict current operation to area west of a line parallel to and two km west of Route 508.

(2) Be prepared to react to K/75 Rgr intelligence and to assume responsibility for K/75Rgr AO.

d. 2-8 Mech:

(1) Continue current mission. On order, release OPCON one rifle company 1-14 Inf and redeploy to Camp Radcliff for four-day standdown.

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OPLAN 19-70 (U)

(2) On order, initiate operations to secure engineer work parties upgrading Route 508 and constructing forward operating base on HILL 666. AO as follows: From BR 482532 NW along line parallel to and two km W of Route 508 to BR 352672 N to BR 350730 SE to BR 540690 SE to BR 570600 SW to start.

e. 2-1 Cav (-): Continue current mission. On order, revert to OPCON IFFV.

f. 1-10 Cav: Continue current mission.

g. 4th Engr: Continue current mission. On order, resume upgrade of Route 508 and construction of forward operating base on HILL 666.

h. K/75 Bgr: Continue current mission. On order, give priority of effort to gathering information on current operations of VC Gia Lai Provincial Unit in AO as follows: From BR 050680 E to BR 176680 E along province boundary to BR 218688 NE to BR 320870 W to BR 179870 S along province boundary to BR 185840 W to BR 050840 S to start.

1. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Effective for planning on receipt and execution as OPOD 19-70 on order.

(2) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT: Annex E, Service Support.

5. (G) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal. Annex H, Communications - Electronics.

b. Command. Div CP remains Camp Radcliff.

Acknowledge

WALKER  
MG

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Adams  
/t/ PRILLAMAN  
G3


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OPLAN 19-70 (U)

Annexes: A - Intelligence  
B - Operation Overlay (omitted)  
C - Fire Support  
D - Engineer  
E - Service Support  
F - Aviation Support (omitted)  
G - Civil Affairs  
H - Communications - Electronics

IFFV	2	K/75 Bgr	1
IFFV ARTY	1	DIVARTY	5
DSA II Corps	1	DISCOM	1
PSA Binh Dinh	1	4th Engr	1
17th CAG	1	4th AVN	1
52d Arty Gp	1	124th Sig	1
173d Abn Bde	1	G1	1
52d Avn Bn	1	G2	5
CMB	1	G3	5
1st Bde	2	G4	1
2d Bde	2	FSCE	1
2-1 Cav (-)	1	ADG	1
1-10 Cav	1	DSO	1
29th MBD	1	DTO	1
ALO	1	G5	1

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Appendix 1 (Annex A Intelligence) to ANNEX E (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 19-70 (U)

Reference: Maps, Series L607 Vietnam, Edition 1, 1:50,000  
Sheets 6636 I Chu Rpan  
6636 II Phu Thien  
6636 III Phu Nhon  
6636 IV Pleiku  
6736 III Plei Djama  
6736 IV An Tuc  
6737 III Quang An Tuc  
6637 IV Kontum  
6637 III Plei Neh  
6637 II Binh Dinh Dak Quon  
6637 I Kon Mahal

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: HOTEL

## 1. (C) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. The Gia Lai Provincial Committee is the probable control headquarters for a recent series of village attacks, abductions, and sapper attacks in Pleiku Province and western Binh Dinh Province. The Provincial Committee has also impressed a number of Montagnard families into producing food and punji stakes for use by NVA and VC/VMG units.

b. The 95B NVA Regt has the mission of interdicting Hwy 19 between An Khe and Pleiku and disrupting GVN pacification efforts. Presently the K2 Bn reinforced with the X18 Engineer Co, H15 LF Bn, and Regimental Support Companies has been active west of the Mang Giang Pass attacking hamlets and conducting stand-off attacks on US convoys and strong points. East of the Mang Giang Pass other Regimental Support Companies and the X17 Engineer Company have conducted extensive road mining plus aborted sapper activity. Morale is high due to reports US 4th Inf Div has departed Pleiku Province.

c. See Current INTSUM.

## 2. (G) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Essential Elements of Information. Where are company size elements of NVA 95B Regt? Where is the Regt CP of 95B Regt? Where are weapons, ammunition, and food caches of the Gia Lai Provincial Unit located?

b. Other Intelligence Requirements. Where will 95B Regt withdraw to when pressured by US elements? Where are the training centers of Gia Lai Province and what type of training is conducted? What trails and modes of transportation are used to move supplies? Where does Gia Lai Province obtain medical supplies?

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## 3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS

### a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units.

#### (1) 1st Bde report as obtained:

- (a) Enemy contacts.
- (b) New trail networks.
- (c) Food cache sights.
- (d) Location of enemy command posts.

#### (2) Co K, 75th Inf report as obtained:

- (a) Enemy contacts.
- (b) Location of enemy command posts.
- (c) Details on caches found.
- (d) Details on trails found.

#### (3) 1st/10th Cav report as obtained:

- (a) Movement of enemy units into present AO.
- (b) Ground to air fire.
- (c) Location of freshly cultivated areas.

#### (4) 4th Avn Bn report as obtained:

- (a) Ground to air fire.
- (b) LZ information.

### b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent and Cooperating Units.

II CTE is requested to provide information on 95B Regt from captured documents, PW's, and Hoi Chanhs.

## 4. (C) MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL

- a. See Division SOP.
- b. Detainees should be considered long-time VC/VMC and should be expected to attempt to escape.
- c. The capture of signal documents should be reported immediately for timely evacuation and evaluation.

## 5. (U) DOCUMENTS AND/OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED

See Division SOP

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## 6. (C) COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

- a. See Division SOP
- b. Gia Lai Provincial Unit controls sapper units and they can be expected to conduct Reconnaissance of friendly positions for sapper targets.
- c. See Appendix i.

## 7. (C) REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

- a. Reports: See Division SOP
- b. Distribution: Same as OPLAN 19-70

## 8. (U) MISCELLANEOUS

None

- Appendices:
- 1 - Zone 6 Guerillas
  - 2a - Trail Overlay, Gia Lai (LIMIDIS)
  - 2b - Trail Overlay, 95B Regt (LIMIDIS)
  - 3a - Hard Target Overlay, Gia Lai (LIMIDIS)
  - 3b - Hard Target Overlay, 95B Regt (LIMIDIS)
  - 4a - Probably Enemy Locations, Gia Lai (LIMIDIS)
  - 4b - Probably Enemy Locations, 95B Regt (LIMIDIS)
  - 5 - Light and Weather Data (To Be Published)

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Appendix 2 (ANNEX C (Fire Support)) to ANNEX E (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

ANNEX C (Fire Support) to OPLAN 19-70

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) OPLAN 19-70.

(2) Seventh Air Force supports the 4th Inf Div with tactical air and AC 119 Shadow aircraft.

(3) Artillery Support. 52d Artillery Group; GS PWMAF

2. (C) MISSION: Artillery and other fire delivery elements support 4th Inf Div elements in ops directed against 95B, Gia Lai Prov HQ, and 407th Sapper Bn, and support engineer ops along Hwy 508.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation. OPLAN 19-70

b. Air Support.

(1) Allocations. 7th AF provides two sorties tactical air daily against preplanned targets. Sorties for immediate missions allocated by 21st TASS on the basis of fighter availability.

(2) Miscellaneous. Air requests per SOP.

c. Artillery Support.

(1) FA

(a) General. Division Artillery continues current mission of providing light, medium, and heavy artillery fire support to Division operations. Upon termination BINH TAY I, artillery units displace to support future operations in Division AO.

(b) Organization for Combat.

1. 6-29 Arty

a. DS. 1st Bde

b. Release elements 1-92 Arty to control of 52d Arty Gp upon closure of 1-92 Arty elements at NEW PLEI DJERENG.

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c. Select and report positions for one plt 155mm How (Towed) in new 1st Bde AO. Probably mission of plt, GSR 6-29 Arty.

2. 4-42 Arty

DS, 2d Bde

3. 5-16 Arty

a. GS

b. Provide DS to 1-10 Cav with a minimum of one 155mm btry.

c. Provide DS to 2-8 Inf (Mech) with one 155mm btry (-).  
On order increase arty DS to 2-8 Inf (Mech) to one 155mm btry.

d. Provide one 155mm plt (3 tubes) GSR to 4-42 Arty.

(c) Miscellaneous. App 1, Arty Fire Supt TBP as applicable.

(2) ADA. Per SOP.

d. Chemical Support. Div Chemical spts with non-persistent and persistent CS upon request.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Air advisories.

(a) Air advisories continue to be posted in current AO's without change.

(b) In new 1st Bde AO air advisories for Pleiku Province to be posted with BLACKHAWK ADVISORY.

(c) All other air advisories in new 1st Bde AO to be posted with TOLLHOUSE AND TUC.

(2) Political clearances obtained through Div FSCE.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Annex E (Service Support)

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal. Annex H (Communications - Electronics).

b. Command.

(1) FSCE - Div CP

(2) Div Arty CP - Camp Radcliff

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Appendix 3 (Annex D Engineer) to ANNEX E (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

Annex D Engineer to OPLAN 19-70 (U)

REFERENCE: Same as basic PLAN.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See basic PLAN.

## 1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A, Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces. 937th Engr Gp continues to maintain QL-19W and 14B.

2. (C) MISSION. 4th Engr Bn and 937th Engr Gp continue present missions, support withdrawal of 4th Inf Div from Pleiku Province and 4th Engr Bn supports 4th Inf Div Combat Operations against NVA/VC, constructs forward operating base on Hill 666, and upgrades Rte 508.

## 3. (C) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. 4th Engr Bn supports 1st Bde in extraction from Binh Tay 1 AO, closeout of support base at New Plei Djereng, operations against 95B NVA Regt, and continues to support 2nd Bde operations. 4th Engr Bn constructs Brigade sized forward operating base on Hill 666 and upgrades Rte 508 to sustain division loads.

b. 4th Engineer Bn.

(1) Continue present mission.

(2) On order, clear firebase on Hill 666 and improve to Bde sized forward operating base, concurrent with upgrade of Rte 506 to sustain division load.

(3) Support each bde with one combat engr Co (-).

(4) Be prepared to provide additional support as necessary.

c. Coordinating Instructions. Request for engr support from Bde Engr to Div Engr.

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4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT. Annex E, Service Support.
5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. Signal. Annex H, Communications - Electronics.
  - b. Command

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ATTENTION: [illegible]  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JATM-40000

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Appendix 4 (Annex E Logistics) to ANNEX E (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

Annex E (Logistics) to OPLAN 19-70 (U)

1. (C) GENERAL

a. This annex provides for Combat Service Support for the 4th Infantry Division and attached units in support of OPLAN 19-70.

b. Assumptions

(1) Operation Binh Tay 1 will terminate on or about 25 May 70.

(2) 1st Bde elements will stand down for approximately 4 days at Camp Radcliff.

(3) 4th Engineer Bn and 2/8th Inf will standdown at Camp Radcliff.

(4) Proposed operations mentioned in Basic OPLAN 19-70 will be initiated.

(5) 45th GP will close LSA at New Plei Djereng on order.

c. DISCOM: Be prepared to support standdown requirements of the 1st Bde, 4th Engr Bn and 2/8th Inf upon request.

2. (C) MATERIAL AND SERVICES

a. 2/1 Cav - no change.

b. 1/10th Cav - no change.

c. 4th Engr - no change.

d. 2/8th Inf - All supply and services will be from permanent facilities at Camp Radcliff upon relief of present mission.

e. 1st Bde

(1) All supply and services will be from permanent facilities at Camp Radcliff.

(2) Transportation: Movement of troops and supplies from New Plei Djereng (TBA). Submit requirements to DTO.

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1. [Illegible]

2. [Illegible]

3. [Illegible]

4. [Illegible]

5. [Illegible]

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Appendix 5 (Annex G Civic Action/PSYOPS) to ANNEX E (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to  
4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

ANNEX G (Civic Action/PSYOPS) to OPLAN 19-70 (U)

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Current Intsum.
- (2) Annex A, Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Basic Plan.
- (2) B Co, 8th PSYOP Bn.
- (3) "C" Flt, 9th SOS.

2. (C) MISSION: Conduct CA/PSYOP in support of OPLAN 19-70.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Civic Action: Civil Affairs teams will continue to operate in the Camp Radcliff TAOR in accordance with OPORD 41-70.

(2) PSYOPS: Conduct PSYOP against the enemy stressing Chieu Hoi theme - Malaria treatment available through Chieu Hoi Program. Employ ground loudspeaker teams as the situation warrants. Exploit all events such as ralliers, tactical victories and enemy losses as such occur.

b. 1st Bde:

- (1) One loudspeaker team attached.
- (2) Continue present CA/PSYOP mission as directed by OPORD 41-70.

c. 2d Bde:

- (1) One loudspeaker team attached.
- (2) Continue present CA/PSYOP mission as directed by OPORD 41-70.

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## d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Obtain adequate supply of malaria theme leaflets from Office of ACoFS, G5.
- (2) Maintain close liaison with intelligence sections to insure timely exploitation of Hoi Chanh, PW, and PSYOP targets of opportunity.
- (3) Observe PSYOP policy guidance as outlined in JUSPAO and MACV directives.
- (4) Use of PW in PSYOP will be in accordance with MACV Directive 525-207, dtd 15 October 1969.

## 4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

### a. Reports.

(1) Daily PSYOP SITREP to this HQ ATTN: PSYOP Officer, ACoFS, G5 to include:

(a) Targets: Leaflets or Loudspeaker, Number of Leaflets Dropped, Loudspeaker time.

(b) Ralliers: Name, rank, NVA, VC, VMC, unit, target, time picked up, place, and unit receiving rallier. Was he exploited and by what media.

(c) VC/NVA PSYOP Activities: Where, when, target, time, media, audience and theme. Report US efforts at counter propaganda if enemy employs PSYOP.

(2) Negative reports required.

b. Logistics: See Basic Plan.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan.


ACKNOWLEDGE:

WALKER  
MG

OFFICIAL:

/s/Holland  
/t/HOLLAND  
G5

"A TRUE COPY"

  
GORDON S. AXELSON  
MAJ, INF

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Appendix 6 (Annex H Communications - Electronics) to ANNEX E (OPLAN 19-70 (U))  
to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

ANNEX H (Communications - Electronics) to OPLAN 19-70 (U)

1. (U) SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A Intelligence.
- b. Friendly Forces. Para 1 b OPLAN 19-70.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. Para 1 c OPLAN 19-70.
- d. Assumptions. Para 1 d OPLAN 19-70.

2. (U) MISSION:

Install, operate and maintain the division communications system to major elements of the command.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation:

(1) 2/1 Cav (-)

(a) Be prepared to release RTT personnel and equipment to 54th Sig Bn when unit reverts to OPCON IFFV.

(b) Be prepared to release VHF personnel and equipment to 124th Sig Bn when unit reverts to OPCON IFFV.

(2) 124th Sig Bn

(a) Continues present communications support to 1st Brigade, 2/8 Inf, 2/1 Cav and DIV TAC CP.

(b) Be prepared to deactivate communications systems in support of 1st Brigade, 2/1 Cav, 2/8 Inf and TAC CP and return personnel and equipment to Camp Radcliff for standdown.

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