

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDHH-GC-MH

21 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending  
30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

**S&E DISTRIBUTION**

**SECTION 1 (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES**

**1. (C) General.**

a. On 1 February 1969, the beginning of this reporting period, the 4th Infantry Division initiated Operation DAN QUY: N - HINES.

b. Organizational Structure. Task organization, Operation HINES, 1 February - 30 April 1969, is set forth at Inclosure 1.

c. Key personnel. Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

**d. Mission.**

(1) During the first two and a half months of Operation HINES, the Division's general mission remained essentially the same as in the later stages of Operation MACARTHUR: conduct sustained, coordinated, and combined offensive operations to destroy enemy main and local force units, destroy or neutralize enemy base areas, interdict high-speed infiltration routes, assist in the protection of urban areas, and support pacification efforts and civil programs of the Government of VIETNAM.

(2) In mid-April, after thwarting the North VIETNAMESE Winter-Spring offensive in the Highlands, the 4th Infantry Division intensified its operations in support of the Government of VIETNAM's Pacification and Development Plan of 1969. Divisional units supported operations of provinces and districts by clearing and protecting areas designated for pacification. They intensified their operations against VIEP CONG Infrastructure (VCI), sapper units, and local force units. They assisted in the improvement of VIETNAMESE units, particularly the Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF). While concentrating its efforts on pacification, the Division remained prepared to resume operations against Main Force elements should a new threat emerge.

**e. Concept of Operation.**

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(1) The guidance set forth in Letter of Instruction (LOI) Concept of Operation 4th Infantry Division - 1969, dated 28 December 1968, influenced the Division's operations throughout the reporting period. Concept 69 calls for saturation of likely areas of enemy activity and avenues of approach with screening and reconnaissance forces; combined with rapid, aggressive, and overwhelming commitment of immediately available reaction forces to fix and destroy the enemy. Reaction forces include air cavalry, with their organic anti-aircraft elements; armored and mechanized units; and infantry battalions light and specially trained to conduct rapid airmobile operations.

(2) OPORD 81165 specified that the 1st Brigade would become a mobile force prepared to conduct operations anywhere within the 4th Infantry Division's area of operations or within II Corps Tactical Zone.

(3) Plans for intensified pacification operations call for maneuver battalions to provide an outer shell of security around hamlets and villages in order that the Government of VIETNAM's influence may become firmly established. The plans direct battalions to coordinate closely and continuously with the districts in which they operate and, where feasible, to collect to their command posts with district headquarters. To the extent that the tactical situation permits, maneuver elements are to operate in stabilized areas, becoming familiar with the local populace and gaining their confidence. In anticipation of attempts by VIET CONG local forces to disrupt the pacification effort, the Division's intelligence gathering agencies and maneuver battalions are to maintain continuous surveillance of enemy base areas and avenues of approach. Ambushes, long and short range patrols, and sniper teams, employing night vision devices to the maximum, are to interdict enemy movement. At least fifty percent of operations are to be conducted at night. Divisional units are to react rapidly and with overwhelming force to attacks on villages and hamlets.

## 2. (C) Intelligence.

a. General. In late January a large enemy force, later confirmed to be the 66th NVA Regiment with supporting artillery and engineer units, infiltrated southwestern KONTUM Province in preparation for an offensive. From the region 25 kilometers southwest of FOLEI KLANG two battalions of the 66th plus elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment moved northwest attempting to flank blocking forces deployed by the 4th Infantry Division. In the PLEI TRAP Valley of western KONTUM Province, the NVA expanded their road network. Truck traffic through the PLEI TRAP supported the enemy buildup. Material introduced into the PLEI TRAP included 105mm towed artillery.

In mid-February the enemy commenced extensive reconnaissance efforts against friendly positions and became more overt in his movements. On 23 February, the enemy Spring Campaign began with attacks by fire against

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FLEIKU City, KONTUM City, and US fire support bases. The 24th NVA Regiment, despite its defeat in the CHU PA Mountain complex in early February, attempted to interdict Highway 14 North and harass the PLAI MRONG area. The 66th NVA Regiment infiltrated elements of two battalions to the vicinity of FOLEI KLANG but withdrew after a series of small contacts. Although the enemy failed to take and hold any population center, local units in KONTUM and FLEIKU Provinces achieved some success in limited attacks against undefended villages. Pressed by the 4th Infantry Division's vertical envelopment operations, the enemy began to withdraw, covering his movement with harassing attacks. In late March and early April the bulk of the enemy forces successfully exfiltrated to base areas along the CAMBODIAN Border.

Large enemy forces continue to operate in the Tri-Border area, threatening B2I HET. There, on the night of 3-4 March, the enemy launched the first armor attack in the Central Highlands. Recent intelligence indicates the presence of a new NVA regiment, the 28th, in the Tri-Border area. On 3 February, a PW captured in I Corps revealed that he was a member of the 19th Medical Company, 28th NVA Regiment, and that the regiment was to continue to B-3 Front. On 30 March, the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry captured documents identifying the 4-28, a possible designator for the 28th Regiment. On 25 April, the 1st of the 12th captured additional documents identifying a regiment-sized unit. The participation of a battalion of infantry in the tank attack on B2I HET indicates the presence of additional units in the area.

After five months of relatively light activity in DARLAC Province, Camp Strike Force (CSF) and 4th Infantry Division elements operating southeast of TIEN ATAR (ZVQ21622) captured prisoners and documents identifying battalion-sized infiltration groups moving through northern DARLAC toward PHU YEN and KHANG HOA Provinces. In spite of extensive reconnaissance, allied elements have not yet located the enemy's main body.

(1) KONTUM: The B2I HET Special Forces Camp (YB872256) was the target of intense attacks by fire during February. Elements of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment employed 85mm guns and possibly 105mm howitzers as well as 122mm rockets, mortars, and recoilless rifles. An estimated eight to ten Soviet MT-76 light amphibious tanks participated in the attack on the night of 3-4 March. For unknown reasons, the attack, which included a battalion of infantry, dissipated before enemy and friendly forces could become decisively engaged. Of the two enemy tanks knocked out, one was evacuated by US forces for extraction of technical intelligence. After 4 March, attacks on B2I HET dissipated to minor harassing fire.

In the PLAI TRAP Valley, the K25A and K25B Engineer Battalions constructed roads, fortifications, and weapons positions. Logistical elements, using the road system, attempted to establish a supply base in

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the region 20 to 25 kilometers west-northwest of POLSI KLENG. Elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment infiltrated through the PLEI TRAP road system to shell US fire bases with 105mm howitzers, antiaircraft guns, some as large as 37mm, fired on aircraft flying over the PLEI TRAP. On 2 March, Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry discovered two Soviet 1½ ton GAZ trucks abandoned 30 kilometers northwest of POLSI KLENG. One truck was evacuated. On 10 March, Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry located two 105mm howitzers which had been heavily damaged by artillery and air strikes. Both howitzers, of US manufacture (1942 and 1945), were evacuated. In its Spring Campaign in KONTUM Province, the 40th Artillery Regiment lost nine artillery pieces to allied artillery and air fires.

Elsewhere in KONTUM Province, enemy forces avoided military installations but launched attacks, up to battalion-sized, against lightly defended villages along Highway 14 southeast of BAN TO. Hardest hit was KON HONG (ZB125160), attacked by the 304th Local Force Battalion on 23 and 25 February. In spite of reinforcement by the 1st Battalion, 12th ARVN Regiment and support from gunships and tactical air, the village suffered 52 civilians killed, 36 civilians wounded, five civilians missing, and 132 houses destroyed. KON HONG (ZB125149), DIAI BANH (ZB0919), and TANH CANH (ZB0622) were also attacked during February and March. Mining and ambushes along Highway 14 ten to fifteen kilometers north-northwest of KONTUM City were probably the work of the 304th Local Force Battalion; the 5th Battalion, 24th Regiment; and possibly the K25B Engineer Battalion.

The most successful enemy operation of the reporting period was a sapper attack on the 584th Light Engineer Company at TAN PHU (AR764813). Early on the morning of 21 March, under cover of mortar and rocket fire and a diversionary infantry attack against the adjacent Special Forces Camp, 35 to 40 sappers breached the Engineer perimeter. Employing satchel charges and 8-10 rockets, the sappers destroyed or damaged practically all of the engineers' heavy equipment, including a 80 to 120 ton-per-hour asphalt plant, four 20 ton Euclid dump trucks, three 5 ton dump trucks, a D7 dozer tractor, and two 20 ton truck-mounted cranes. After 15 minutes of destruction the sappers withdrew, apparently with minimal casualties. Only two enemy killed could be confirmed.

(2) PLEIKU: Activity in PLEIKU Province remained moderate throughout the reporting period. The 24th NVA Regiment operated in northern PLEIKU Province while sapper, local force, and artillery units continued to operate in their traditional areas. The only coordinated offensive effort was the spring phase of the Winter-Spring Offensive, initiated on 23 February.

After defending its caches on CHU PA Mountain (YA9537) in January and early February, the 24th NVA Regiment exfiltrated across the YA KONG BOLAH River to regroup in the southern PLEI TRAP Valley. After receiving supplies and replacements, the regiment, less its 5th Battalion, moved east

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across northern PLEIKU Province into positions east and west of Highway 14. The 5th Battalion infiltrated northward into KONTRUM Province.

On 24 February, the 24th Regiment sprang two abortive ambushes on Highway 14 between PLEIKU and KONTRUM. Elements of the 3d ARVN Cavalry dispersed the ambushers, killing 63. The 24th Regiment remained in the vicinity of CHU PHONG Mountain (AR7764), attempting to interdict Highway 14. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, sent into the CHU PHONG to destroy the 24th, met a well-disciplined, aggressive enemy who initiated numerous sharp fire fights at close range, employing small arms, RPG-2, and RPG-7 rocket launchers. After heavy fire fights on 6 and 7 March, the enemy's aggressiveness waned. The 2d of the 35th's persistent combing of the CHU PHONG revealed extensive cave complexes, containing a probable regimental CP and hospital and a chamber large enough to accommodate a battalion. In late March or early April, the 24th Regiment, decimated and deprived of its supplies, apparently exfiltrated back to the southern PLEI TRAP.

VIET CONG local forces in the area west of PLEIKU City between Highway 509 and 19 West were ineffectual, limiting their activity to harassing small arms and RPG-2 fire. The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, screening the border west of PLEIKU, hampered the local VIET CONG's operations by capturing 43 tons of rice.

Elements of the K31 Artillery Battalion harassed allied installations in the PLEIKU City-Camp Xanri area with mortar and rocket attacks. Except for a concentrated effort on 23 February, the attacks were light and sporadic. The enemy's only employment of tube artillery in PLEIKU Province was in the DUC CO area, where 55 and 105mm CHICOM artillery fired a total of 79 rounds at LZ VERA (YAB34178) and the Special Forces Camp (YK240247). It appears that this was a diversionary effort precipitated for the purpose of drawing friendly forces out of the POLLET KLANG area.

(3) BINH DINH (April 15-30): During the first two weeks of the 4th Infantry Division's operations in BINH DINH Province, enemy activity was light. Elements of the 4th Battalion, 95B Regiment conducted harassing attacks along Highway 19 between the MANG YANG Pass (AR2252) and AN KHE. The 5th Battalion, 95B Regiment probably located in the vicinity of the DAK PAYOU Valley, performed supply missions for the regiment. The 18th NVA Regiment operated out of Base Area 226 (ER7463) to interdict Highway 19 and the POL pipeline east of AN KHE.

(4) DARLAC (February 1-24, April 19-30): In February, while the 4th Infantry Division continued operations in DARLAC, enemy activity was light. Enemy elements located in the region were battalion-sized or smaller. They confined their activity to small skirmishes and standoff attacks. The K-34 Artillery Battalion, with security provided by the K-39 Infantry Battalion, launched several mortar and rocket attacks against BAN MA THUOT. The 401st Local Force Battalion apparently operated in the vicinity of

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the KUAL Plantation (AP8623). The 301st Local Force Battalion avoided contact. It was believed to be guiding infiltration groups across DARLAC.

In April, CSF from TIEU ATAR made contact with infiltrating NVA forces. A task force of the 4th Infantry Division, inserted to block the infiltration routes, made moderate contact with infiltration groups which attempted to avoid decisive combat. Captured documents and prisoners mentioned Infiltration Groups 1062, 1063, and 1064; and the 12th and 19th Regiments, apparently the infiltration groups' training regiment designations.

b. Estimated Enemy Composition, Strength, and Disposition as of 30 April 1969:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
3 Front HQs	1,000	Unlocated in Cambodia
1st 316th Trans Gp	500	Kontum and Pleiku Provinces
10th Arty Regt HQs	300	Tri-Border Area
10th Bn	300	Tri-Border Area
21st Bn	300	Unloc west of Plei Kleng
21st Bn	300	Tri-Border Area
21st Bn	300	Tri-Border, Fiel Trap Areas
21st Bn	300	Unlocated
21st Bn	300	Tri-Border Area
21st Arty Bn	300	North and NW of Pleiku City
25th NVA Regt	1,600	Tri-Border Area
60th NVA Regt	1,200	Northern Fiel Trap
22th NVA Regt	1,200	SJ of Kontum
95B NVA Regt	800	Base Area 202 (VC Valley)
95th NVA Inf Bn	300	NJ of Pleiku
K-16 Armer Bn	200	Unloc in Tri-Border Area
K-20 Sapper Bn	250	North of Tanh Canh
K-37 Sapper Bn	250	SW of Kontum
108th Sapper Bn	250	NE of Pleiku
K-28 Recon/Sapper Bn	250	West of Plei Kleng
K-25A Ingr Bn	250	Tri-Border Area
K-25B Ingr Bn	250	West of Plei Kleng
304th LF Bn	250	East of Tanh Canh
306th LF Bn	250	SW of Mang Buk
H-15 LF Bn	250	NE of Pleiku
X-45 LF Bn	250	West of Pleiku
Hqs & Spt Units 18th NVA Regt	500	Vicinity BR 7363
7th Bn, 18th NVA Regt	450	Vicinity BR 6672
8th Bn, 18th NVA Regt	450	Vicinity BR 5950
9th Bn, 18th NVA Regt	300	Vicinity BR 6936
Local Guerrillas	2,500	
Infrastructure	6,000	
Total Enemy Forces	21,900	

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c. Enemy Battle Losses (1 Feb - 30 Apr)

(1) Personnel:	KIA (BC)	1,434
	NVA CIA	13
	VC/VAC CIA	<u>25</u>
	TOTAL	1,472
(2) Weapons:	S/A	234
	C/S	<u>65</u>
	TOTAL	299
(3) Ammunition:	S/A rds	362,881
	C/S rds	1,712
	Grenades	690
	Mines	261
(4) Miscellaneous Captured Items:	Explosives	762 lbs
	Documents	1,158 inches
	Rice	303.6 tons
	Salt	1,103 lbs
(5) Enemy Facilities Destroyed:	Structures	614
	Fortifications	2,391

d. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action:

(1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) Elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment can still conduct attacks by fire in the DAK TO-BUN HET and DAK SONG areas utilizing 85mm and 105mm howitzers, 122mm rockets, mortars, and recoilless rifles.

(b) The 46th and 28th NVA Regiments can conduct attacks in up to multi-battalion size against BAN HET, DAK TO, POLEI KLANG, and KONTUM City.

(c) The K-25A and K-25B Engineer Battalions are capable of extending the road systems in the PLEI TRAP area. They are also capable of building fortifications and artillery positions, while at the same time committing company-sized elements to attack lines of communication.

(d) The enemy can mount battalion-sized armor attacks against BAN HET Special Forces Camp and possibly conduct convoy security in the PLEI TRAP road system, once the K-25A and K-25B Engineer Battalions complete the roads in the PLEI TRAP.

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- (e) The K-26 Sapper Recon Battalion can make company to platoon-sized reconnaissance of allied installations and conduct sapper attacks against these installations.
- (f) The 20th Sapper Battalion has the capability to attack allied installations and conduct in-depth reconnaissance of the same installations.
- (g) The 306th Local Force Battalion can conduct mining and small scale ambushes along Highway 14 North of KONTUM City. This unit can also conduct company to battalion-sized attacks against villages and hamlets along Highway 14. The 306th Local Force Battalion is capable of conducting company to battalion-sized attacks against the villages and hamlets in the KANG BUN Special Forces area (LS9842).
- (h) The 24th NV Regiment is capable of conducting multi-battalion attacks against allied installations in western PLIKU Province.
- (i) The K-31 Artillery Battalion, employing 122mm rockets and 82mm mortars, can conduct attacks by fire against allied installations in the PLIKU-Camp Ameri area. All or part of the 966th NVA Infantry Battalion, elements of the 24th NVA Regiment, and the K-37 Sapper Battalion can follow up attacks by fire with ground attacks.
- (j) The 408th Sapper Battalion can conduct sapper operations in up to company strength against allied installations in the KONTUM City area.
- (k) Local Forces can conduct attacks against lightly defended villages and hamlets anywhere in the 4th Division's area of operations. They can also interdict lines of communication utilizing mines, R-40 rockets, rifle arms, and automatic weapons.
- (l) The K-34 Artillery Battalion can perpetrate standoff attacks against installations at BAN KH THUOT employing 75mm Recoilless Rifles, 60mm and 82mm mortars, and 122mm rockets while the K-39 Battalion provides security.
- (m) The 95B Regiment has the capability to conduct attacks in up to battalion strength against fire support bases, isolated camps, and populated areas; interdict LOC's by ambush and mining, attack bridges, interdict the pipeline along Highway 19, and disrupt the pacification program by terrorism and attacks on lightly defended and undefended hamlets.

## (2) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

- (a) Enemy units are vulnerable to artillery and air strikes when in bivouac or when passing for an attack.



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(b) Enemy lines of communications are sufficiently extended to make them vulnerable to interdiction by LPF teams or small conventional units.

(c) Enemy supplies stored in established base areas are vulnerable to battalion-sized search and clear operations.

(d) Enemy movement is vulnerable to detection by airborne detector devices.

(e) Because of shortage of food and medicine, sickness, heavy losses, and repeated failure to accomplish his mission, the enemy is vulnerable to psychological operations.

(3) Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Conduct attacks by fire on BEN HET, POLEI KLONG, PLEI MRONG, and DUC CO Special Forces Camps.

(b) Conduct combined armor and infantry attacks against BEN HET Special Forces Camp with up to two regiments, supported by all available artillery, rockets, mortars, and recoilless rifle fire.

(c) Continue to harass Highway 14 by mining and sniper attacks.

(d) Conduct company to battalion-sized attacks against villages and hamlets in an effort to disrupt the pacification program.

(e) Increase infiltration of troops into the POLEI KLONG and BEN HET areas.

(f) Increase terrorism, assassinations, and small scale attacks by sapper and infantry units in the TANH CANH and KONTUM City areas.

(g) Conduct limited squad, platoon, and company-sized ground attacks against bridge security elements, pump stations, and convoys along Highway 14 and 19 in conjunction with attacks by fire or fire support bases. The area of most activity will most likely be on Highway 14 between KONTUM and PLEIKU, and on Highway 19 between the MANG YANG Pass and LZ SCHUELLER (EF36 457).

(h) Conduct attacks by fire against allied installations, including airfields in the PLEIKU vicinity.

(i) Intensify activity in the DUC CO, PLEI DIERENG, PLEI MRONG, and POLEI KLONG areas in support of increased activity in the BEN HET, BAK TO, and TANH CANH areas.

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## 3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

### a. Operations.

(1) In the latter part of January, the 4th Infantry Division was disposed as follows: (See Inclosure 6, Map 1)

(a) The 1st Brigade, having transferred its command post from DAK TO (ZB004217) to SOU DOI (ERG23522) on 20 January, continued operations in the vicinity of the DAK PAYOU Valley and the MANG YANG Pass. In anticipation of renewed enemy offensive operations, the 1st Brigade remained alert for deployment as required within the II Corps Tactical Zone. The first element to be committed would be the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry.

(b) The 2d Brigade, in an economy of force role with two battalions, occupied blocking positions in KONTUM Province. The 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and pacification operations in the region between KONTUM City and PLEI NRONG. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry occupied fire bases in the vicinity of DAK TO and BEN HAT.

(c) The 3d Brigade continued operations in conjunction with the ARVN 24th Special Tactical Zone in the CHU PA Mountain (YA9567) region northwest of PLEIKU City. While ARVN rangers and infantry blocked west of CHU PA and the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry blocked to the south (See Inclosure 6, Map 2), the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry combat assaulted onto the mountain and attempted to drive the enemy from their stronghold and trap them against the blocking force. When Airborne Personnel Detector sensings indicated that the enemy was attempting to flee northward across the KA KONG BOLAH River, three companies combat assaulted into the area between the river and CHU PA to cut off the enemy withdrawal (See inclosure 6, Map 3). Companies of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry then swept northward across the CHU PA, encountering heavy resistance from entrenched enemy forces. Plagued by heavy ground-to-air fire that prevented dustoff helicopters from evacuating the wounded, the companies withdrew to link up with companies of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, which had combat assaulted onto CHU PA. The 1st of the 14th then relieved the 1st of the 35th and continued offensive operations on CHU PA.

(2) Approximately 20 January, while the CHU PA battle was in full swing, a large enemy force, believed to be a regiment, entered the region 15 kilometers north of CHU PA, beginning the campaign that was to develop into the Winter-Spring Offensive. From their staging area they threatened POLAI KLING, PLEI NRONG, and KONTUM City. On the night of 24-25 January (See inclosure 6, Map 4), the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a tactical road march from SOU DOI to KONTUM in order to seize the high ground to the southwest of POLAI KLING the following morning.

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Occupying LZ's BUNKER HILL (YA995826), BRILLO PAD (YA962855), ALAMO (YA950880), and ROUND BOTTOM (YA937852), the 3d of the 12th made sightings and small contacts that indicated the enemy was attempting to slide northward around the battalion's blocking positions. On 7 February (See inclosure 6, Map 5), the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, released by the 1st Brigade, moved by truck to PLEI KRONG and then combat assaulted to occupy the high ground in an arc north and west of LZ MILE HIGH (YA936930) to again block the enemy force. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry combat assaulted south from BAK TO to protect the 2d Brigade's northern flank from infiltration.

(3) After 7 February, when the last ARVN battalions withdrew to protect the cities during the approaching TET holidays, the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry continued their operations in the CHU PA region. They proceeded deliberately through the mountain area, working downward from the heights and relying on artillery and air support to soften the enemy positions. The 1st Brigade, with its one remaining battalion, terminated operations in eastern PLEIKU Province and joined forces confronting the threat in KONTUM Province.

(4) With the enemy effectively blocked, the Division elected to realign its forces, thereby creating a more responsive reserve. On 16 and 17 February, the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, after terminating their operations in the CHU PA region, moved to the 2d Brigade's area of operation (See inclosure 6, Map 6). While the 1st of the 12th occupied the east bank of the YA KRONG BOLAH to prevent infiltration toward KONTUM City, the 1st of the 14th relieved the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry in place. The 3d of the 12th combat assaulted to the high ground west of PLEI KRONG, thus extending the Division's defensive screen southward across the YA KRONG BOLAH. Then, on 23 February (See inclosure 6, Map 7), the 1st of the 12th and 1st of the 8th exchanged positions and returned to the operational control of their parent brigades. The realignment proved to have been effective when, on 23 February, the NVA Spring Offensive began, since it freed the entire 1st Brigade to once again become the Division's reserve, alert for commitment anywhere in the area of operations. The Division was now aligned with the 2d Brigade, controlling three battalions, west of the YA KRONG BOLAH River (See inclosure 6, Map 8) blocking the enemy's advance and the 1st Brigade east of the YA KRONG BOLAH, protecting the approaches to KONTUM City and being prepared to combat assault to smash the enemy or cut him off from his sanctuaries.

(5) As part of their Spring Offensive, the NVA attempted to interdict Highway 14 North between PLEIKU and KONTUM Cities. On 24 February the 3d ARVN Cavalry smashed two attempted ambushes along the highway, killing 63 NVA and taking four prisoners. While these actions were in progress, a new threat developed in the BEM RT area with heavy

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attacks by fire against the CIDG Camp. To counter these threats the 4th Infantry Division deployed elements of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor to BIN HET and DAK TO and sent the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, just returned from seven months of operations in DARLAC and QUANG BUC Provinces, into the CHU PRONG Mountain complex east of Highway 14 (See Inclosure 6, Map 9). In a month of reconnaissance in force and denial operations, the 2d of the 35th killed 69 NVA; captured large amounts of ammunition, medical supplies, communications equipment, and documents; and saturated an enemy regimental command post and hospital complex with crystalline CS.

(6) On 1 March, the 1st Brigade (See Inclosure 6, Map 10), composed of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry; the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry; and the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, combat assaulted west of the 66th NVA Regiment to effect a vertical envelopment and cut the enemy off from his lines of communication. Heavy fighting began as soon as the lift ships reached their LZs. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry drove an NVA platoon off LZ SWINGER (YAG3745), killing 30 while losing only one man of their own. On 3 March, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry intruded into the base of an enemy battalion, suffering heavy casualties in the ensuing battle.<sup>1</sup> From 4 through 8 March other companies of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry combed the area of contact, destroying remaining enemy forces. Confirmed enemy losses in the fighting with 3d of the 8th were 189 NVA killed.

(7) At BIN HET, the 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor confronted the first enemy tank attack in the Central Highlands. Of an estimated ten enemy tanks, two were destroyed. One US tank was damaged and two crew members were killed. The remainder of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor<sup>2</sup>, operating with the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry in an economy of force role in western and southern PLEIKU Province, was alerted for immediate deployment to KONUM Province. Moving by night, one tank platoon reinforced the armor already at BIN HET. Company A and the Battalion command post reinforced ground elements at POLAI KLENG. These tanks were centrally located to react to enemy attacks on population centers.

(8) When intelligence reports indicated that the 66th NVA Regiment was moving south toward the CHU PA, the 4th Infantry Division continued its efforts to envelop the enemy (See Inclosure 6, Map 11). On 14 March, the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry combat assaulted from the vicinity of LZ SWINGER to establish a new fire base, LZ CIDAR (YAG28799), 27 kilometers southwest of POLAI KLENG. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, which had been

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1 See the enclosed Combat Operations After Action Report, "Reconnaissance in force, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry" at Inclosure 4.

2 The Battalion was operating minus Company C, which remained on the Central Coast under operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

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deployed to BAN HET in anticipation of further attacks in that area, airlifted to blocking positions west of the PLSI MRONG CSF Camp.

(9) The enemy conducted harassing attacks to cover his withdrawal. While his already decimated artillery shelled BAN HET, SWING R, and CID R, his infantry and coppers attacked US patrol bases. On the night of 28-29 March, two companies of the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry repulsed a sapper attack on their ridge-top patrol base (YA8285), killing at least 33 of the attackers. The enemy continued harassing attacks into early April. The Division responded by requesting Arc Light strikes on suspected enemy headquarters and assembly areas. By mid-April, the 66th NVA Regiment was no longer a threat to KONTUM Province. Similarly, the 24th NVA Regiment ceased to be a threat to Highway 14 and northern PLAIKU Province.

(10) With the offensive of first-line enemy forces defeated, the 4th Infantry Division returned to large scale support of the Republic of Vietnam pacification program. The 1st Brigade airlifted out of the PLSI MRONG Valley and then travelled by convey and C-130 aircraft to a new area of operations far to the east of the Division's usual sphere. Establishing its base at AN KHU, the former home of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the 1st Brigade began operations in support of pacification in BINH DINH Province.

(11) At the close of the reporting period the Division was deployed over an unprecedentedly wide area of the Central Highlands (See Inclosure 6, Map 12).

(a) The 1st Brigade with the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 69th Armor; and 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry (-) continued pacification operations in coordination with province and district authorities in BINH DINH.

(b) The 2d Brigade continued its Operation PUTNAM PANTHER west and northwest of POLEI KLING, with the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry on LZ KIL HIGH (YA936930), and the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry occupying patrol bases half way between POLEI KLING and DAK TO. South of KONTUM City, the 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry conducted pacification operations. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry departed the 2d Brigade's area for operations with the 3d Brigade against rice caches and infiltration routes of the 95B NVA Regiment in southern PLAIKU Province.

(c) Under 3d Brigade control, Operation GREENE QUEEN, with the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, two air cavalry and two ground cavalry troops, conducted reconnaissance of suspected infiltration routes between TIEU ATAR and BAN BLECH Special Forces Camps. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, conducting search and clear operations west of the OASIS, prepared

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to join the 1st of the 14th for operations against the 95B Regiment's infiltration routes.

(12) For the present, the Division will remain dispersed over a vast area, assisting the local VIETNAMESE authorities and self-defense forces. The ARVN 24th STZ confronts the only substantial threat in the Highlands—the concentration of the 28th NVA Regiment and other enemy units in the vicinity of BINH HIEP. Should front-line NVA units attack in force, the Division will reinforce the 24th STZ as required to defeat the invaders.

b. The following OPLANS/OPORDS were prepared:

(1) OPORD 4-69 (BINH TAY-HINES), dated 30 January 1969, is described in paragraph 1d (1) above.

(2) OPLAN 6-69, dated 25 February 1969, directed the 1st Brigade to conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy forces, prevent reinforcement and resupply of the 66th and 21st NVA Regiments, and destroy enemy forces attempting to withdraw into CAMBODIA. Final plans for the 1st Brigade's vertical envelopment operation of 1 March differed from the OPLAN, and as a result the OPLAN was cancelled without implementation.

(3) OPLANS 7-69, 8-69, and 9-69, dated 10 March, 16 March, and 16 March respectively, outlined operations to block the withdrawal of the 24th and 66th NVA Regiments. Because NVA forces avoided the anticipated routes of withdrawal, all three OPLANS were cancelled without implementation.

\* (4) OPORD 10-69 (WASHINGTON GREEN - 4th Infantry Division), dated 15 April 1969, is described in paragraphs 1d (2) and 1e (3) above.

\* (5) OPLAN 11-69 (Project SONJIA), dated 28 April 1969, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(6) OPLAN 12-69 (ROGERS BLUE), prepared during the reporting period but not published until 5 May, directed the formation of a task force to reinforce the ARVN 24th STZ on order should multi-regimental forces attack the BINH HIEP-DAK TO area.

(7) OPORD 13-69, dated 30 April 1969, directed the formation of a task force to conduct rice denial operations in the vicinity of PHU NHON (AQ8699) to locate enemy rice caches and to destroy enemy elements carrying rice for the 95B NVA Regiment.

c. Air Support:

(1) The following close air support missions were flown in support

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of Operation DAN QUYEN - HINES. 1 February - 30 April 1969:

TYPE MSN	REQ	FLOWN	SORTIES	A5	B52	F4	A4	F100	A6	AC47	AC119G	A7
FAC/PP	175	634	1261	149	12	292	0	802	6	0	0	0
FAC/IMM	461	417	847	52	0	250	0	543	0	0	0	2
CSS/PP	314	127	169	0	1	12	0	155	0	0	0	0
CSS/IMM	361	260	448	0	4	154	4	286	0	0	0	0
SPOOKY	92	86	86	0	0	0	0	0	0	86	0	0
MOONSHINE	15	12	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0
SHADOW	138	137	137	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	137	0
TOTAL	2975	1673	2960	201	17	703	4	1786	6	98	137	2

## (2) Bomb Damage Assessment:

TYPE MSN	EST KBA	SEC BKRS	SEC FTRES	SEC EXPLO	AA/ AW	MTR FSNS	STRUC TURES	FOX- HOLES	EDGES	TRK	TNL/ CAVE	BOA
FAC/PP	10	225	59	118	24	3	55	43	11	0	8	0
FAC/IMM	178	232	52	262	25	37	28	25	2	8	7	3
CSS/IMM	0	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CSS/PP	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SPOOKY	50	0	0	202	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SHADOW	0	0	7	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	238	457	120	625	49	40	83	68	13	8	15	3

## (3) B52 Strikes.

B52's struck known base areas, infiltration routes, strong points, and major NVA headquarters. Both primary and secondary strikes were delivered in support of Operation DAN QUYEN - HINES. The following figures show the number of B52 strikes carried out during the period 1 February - 30 April 1969:

## PRIMARY MISSIONS

4th Div	49
II Corps	0
Total	49

## TOTAL SORTIES

265
0
265

## SECONDARY MISSIONS

4th Div	31
II Corps	0
Total	31

## TOTAL SORTIES

82
0
82

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TOTAL MISSIONS

4th INF DIV	80
II CP PS	0
TOTAL	80

TOTAL MISSIONS

347
0
347

## d. Training.

(1) The 4th Training Detachment trained 7,785 enlisted men and 241 officers during the reporting period.

(a) Combat Noncommissioned Officer Leadership School produced 155 graduates.

(b) Replacement Training Committee trained 7,558 enlisted men and 241 officers.

(c) Long Range Patrol School produced 72 enlisted graduates, 20 of whom went on to graduate from the MACV Reconno Course.

(2) The Division continued to operate the RF/PF Leadership School to assist the Republic of VIETNAM and MACV advisory programs in upgrading the RF/PF within II Corps Tactical Zone. The Provinces of KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, QUANG BUC, KHANH HOA, and CAM RANH participated. Three 15-day courses during the reporting period graduated 108 noncommissioned officers. Areas of study included leadership skills, weapons, artillery adjustment, first aid, communications, and small unit tactics. Because of the varied educational background of the students, examinations were practical rather than written.

(3) The Combat Noncommissioned Officer Leadership course adopted a grade and peer rating system. An evaluation report delineating strengths, weakness and potential was forwarded to each student's commanding officer. The honor graduate of each class received a one grade promotion. The attrition rate of 19 percent is considered acceptable in view of the outstanding performance of recent graduates.

(4) With a complement of 26 National Match M14 rifles with M84 scopes, the Division began a sniper course. The first class of seven sniper teams (14 snipers) began its 6-day course on 4 April. The 4th Engineers constructed a 900-meter known-distance firing range for use by the snipers in training. The Division is acquiring M14 rifles as an interim measure pending receipt of more National Match rifles.

(5) A Senior Officer Orientation Course of 1.5 days was developed to familiarize battalion and brigade commanders and S3s with weapons and fire support means available in the Division. The course is available on request. Since its inception, one brigade commander and one battalion



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Commander have taken advantage of this course.

(6) Each reconnaissance platoon of the Division attends a 17-day course in techniques of reconnaissance and ambush. This course includes a five-day combat operation in hostile territory and emphasizes thorough planning.

(7) Replacement Training for combat MOS'S, officers, and senior NCO's was expanded from three days to four. Training for other replacements lasts only two days. Three groups, E7 through O3 E5 and E6 and E4 and below, attend separate classes. An expanded training day, from 0700 to 2100 hours, allows the Training Detachment to increase instruction without impeding the flow of replacements.

(8) Long Range Patrol School continued to produce well-trained men to meet Division requirements. During the last ten months all 4th Infantry Division students at MACV Recondo School have graduated in the upper 10 percent. Four students were honor graduates. Although the Division's LRP school has an attrition rate of 50 percent, the commendable performance of its graduates justifies the rigor of the present training program. The course has been extended from eight to fourteen days and now includes an overnight combat operation in hostile territory.

e. Chemical.

( ) The Division Chemical Section and the 43d Chemical Detachment continued to support combat operations within the Division during the reporting period by employing riot control agents (RCA), supervising the defoliation program, operating and maintaining the Division's Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD) rendering technical advice on the use of flame field munitions, operating a chemical ASP, and inspecting unit CER readiness, equipment, and supply.

(2) Increased haze and fog in target areas caused a reduction in defoliation (TRAILDUST) missions. Crop destruction operations, employing sprayer-equipped helicopters, increased during the latter part of the reporting period as grasses and crops emerged from their dormant state. See Inclosure 5 for a statistical summary of defoliation operations.

(3) Riot Control Agent (RCA) munitions were used in direct support of combat troops and played a vital role in the destruction and demoralization of enemy targets detected in the PLEI TRAP Valley. Persistent and nonpersistent riot control agents were employed extensively throughout the Division area of operations in direct support of ground troops and in interdiction of routes of withdrawal. See Inclosure 5 for statistical summary of RCA operations.

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(a) Bulk Fuel Central Agent CS. Employment of persistent CS quadrupled from the last reporting period. Persistent CS was used to contaminate infiltration routes, firing positions, bunkers, tunnels, assembly areas and selected special intelligence targets. Artillery was fired into the fringes of drop zones to catch disoriented enemy troops in the open. Persistent CS was used extensively in the northern FLEET TRAP Valley to hinder enemy withdrawal.

(1) M28 "Brown Bag" CS Dispenser. The six dispensers used during the reporting period continued to prove their effectiveness. They were found extremely suitable for attacking multiple targets. In one instance the dispenser was used to contaminate seven abandoned villages, thereby preventing resettlement and aiding the population consolidation program.

(2) Bulk CS Drum. The Chemical Section employed 1190 drums during the reporting period. The majority of the drums were rigged with C-4 explosives, detonation cord and a 15 second delay fuse. Agent burn was reduced 50 to 75 percent by enclosing the C-4 explosive in a sandbag filled with dirt.

(b) Nonpersistent CS. Riot Control Agent CS continued to be effective in close contact support, force defense and convoy security. The effectiveness of R-32 strikes in the Division's area of operations has been enhanced by the saturation of target areas with non-persistent CS 15 to 20 minutes prior to NT. Fifteen R-52 strike zones were prepared with 20 XM-15 munitions on each target. Non-persistent CS has also been used extensively to increase the effectiveness of artillery on acquired intelligence targets. During the reporting period 176 XM-15 munitions were employed by the Chemical Section.

(4) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Employment. Airborne Personnel Detector operations continue to be centrally controlled from the Division base camp. Detector operations continue to include AH-1G gunships armed with flakette rockets, one APD LOH and one chase LOH called the SCORPION Team. The team continued to conduct standard APD missions through intelligence sources.

(a) The Team conducted 92 missions on February '03 in March, and 94 in April.

(b) The requirement of having the aircraft commander of the chase/CS LOH masked during flight has been eliminated through the construction and employment of a rack suitable for mounting through the rear doors of the LOH. The rack is constructed of aluminum and holds four E15CR2/XM-15 canister clusters. The clusters are pre-set for a given altitude and can be released singly, in pairs, or all at one time by lanyards accessible

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to the aircraft commander. The munitions are completely outside of the aircraft and therefore eliminate the requirement for the pilot to remain masked. The rack has been flight and operationally tested and is an integral portion of the hunter-killer SCORPION Team.

f. Research and Development. Items of equipment evaluated during the reporting period were:

(1) Pop-up Flame Mine (ENSURE-225): Four mines were detonated during demonstrations and six mines were emplaced on the Camp Anari perimeter. Recommendations were that the mine be redesigned as a directional device so that it can be employed closer to friendly troops and be covered by fire, and that the mine's weight be reduced so that it can be carried on ambush patrols.

(2) Portable Fluorescent Lamp (ENSURE-250): These lamps aided nighttime aircraft maintenance. The Division requested operational quantities.

(3) Radio Camouflage Net: Although this net functioned as intended, breaking up the outline of the man pack radio, it was found unnecessary and was not recommended for adoption by the Army.

(4) The following items are presently under evaluation:

- (a) XM203 Grenade Launcher.
- (b) M72A1E1 Light Antitank Weapon (LAW).
- (c) Chain link fence standoff shielding.
- (d) Barbed tape obstacle.

4. (C) Logistics:

a. Logistical Operations, DAN QUYEN - HINH.

(1) Emphasis continued on utilization of land lines of communication (LLOC) throughout the Division's area of operations for movement of all classes of supply. Air lines of communication (ALOC) were reserved for supplementary and emergency movement of supplies.

(2) Forward Support Elements (FSE) from Division Support Command,<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Company A, 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion operates Division FSE's.

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elements of the 45th General Support Group, Logistic Support Activity (LSA) facilities of the 593d General Support Group, and QUI KHON Support Command provided logistical support to the 4th Infantry Division in Operation HINES. The massing of the Division's combat power in western KONUM Province required concentration of logistical activity at LZ MARY LOU, where, in early March, the FSE supported nine infantry battalions simultaneously.

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, FSE SOU DOI, renamed FSE McHERNEY<sup>4</sup> in February, supported the 1st Brigade and the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry with Class I, III, II and IV fast moving items, and barrier material. The 243d Field Service Company, a subordinate unit of the 45th GS Group, provided shower point and graves registration services. Logistical operations at McHERNEY decreased as units of the 1st Brigade deployed to KONUM Province. On 18 April, when the last element of the 1st Brigade departed for AN KHE, the FSE terminated all its activities except the JPA point, which continues operations at the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry's LZ BLACKHAWK.

(b) During most of the reporting period, FSE MARY LOU supported both the 1st and 2d Brigades with A and C rations, bulk and packaged POL issues, barrier and construction materials, and graves registration service. The 1st Log's QUI KHON Support Command operated the ammunition supply point (ASP) at MARY LOU. Companies of the 45th General Support Group provided laundry and shower service. Even before the 1st Brigade's deployment to KONUM Province, FSE MARY LOU's work load was heavy. On 23 January, when FSA DAK TO closed (the 1st Brigade having moved to McHERNEY), FSE MARY LOU resumed support of non-divisional units—the 299th Engineer Battalion and elements of the 52d Artillery Group. The FSE continued this support until 1 March, when the 45th General Support Group opened a small FSA at DAK TO in order to support expanding offensive operations.

(c) FSE GAMB continued to support units operating in western PL HU Province with Class I, bulk and packaged Class III, Class IIIA, Class V, barrier material, and graves registration. Companies of the 45th General Support Group provided bath and laundry services.

(d) At Camp McDUFF (AN KH2), a Logistic Support Activity supported the 1st Brigade after 18 April. Composed of elements of the 593d General Support Group and QUI KHON Support Command units, and augmented with personnel and equipment from Division Support Command,

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4 The 1st Brigade's fire support base at SOU DOI was renamed Firebase McHERNEY in honor of 1SG David H. McHerney, Medal of Honor winner, formerly of Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry.

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the ISA provided Classes I, III, IIIA, and V, plus fast moving Class II and IV items, barrier material, general supplies, maintenance support, and bath and laundry service. ISA RADCLIFF is supported directly from 1st Log Command facilities located at QUI NHON.

(e) After the 2d Brigade's departure from BAN ME THUOT in November 1968, a skeleton FSE continued to support the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry until 25 February, when the battalion departed for operations in PLEIKU Province.

(f) On 24 April, personnel of the 4th S & T Battalion established FSE BAN BLECK to support the task force operating in the vicinity of TIEN ATAR. The FSE provided Classes I, III, fast moving II and IV items, and barrier material. The 4th Aviation Battalion provided JP4 fuel, a rear point for Army aircraft, and an airfield control element. The 4th Aviation Battalion's support facility at BAN BLECK was organized as a Forward Airfield Operations and Control Team (FAOCT) consisting of an airfield control officer and NCO, a two-man air traffic control team, a logistical team of two PSL handlers and an ammunition handler, a two-man pathfinder team, and a two-man Military Police ground traffic control team. This was the first instance that such an organization was employed in the Division's area of operations.

(3) Supply and Services:

(a) Division Supply Office (DSO).

1. Requisitions received:	17,621
2. Requisitions passed:	4,287
3. Requisitions filled:	9,678
4. Total due out releases:	5,949

(b) Class I.

1. Rations Issued (three meals per ration):

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>A RATIONS</u>	<u>C RATIONS</u>	<u>LAP RATIONS</u>	<u>SUN PACK</u>
Camp Nhari	640,000	-	-	-
FSE Mary Lou	668,813	77,353	17,661	7,290
FSE Oasis	224,587	19,179	2,053	2,674
FSE McNornoy (Soui Doi)	125,564	17,038	2,396	1,465
FSE Ban Block	<u>550</u>	<u>3,276</u>	<u>374</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTAL	1,659,824	116,846	22,504	11,457

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2. Headcount and number of A Ration Broaks, 30 April 1969:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>A RATION HEADCOUNT</u>	<u>TOTAL RATION HEADCOUNT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNIT BR.</u>
Camp Dhari	7,200	7,200	37
FSE Mary Lou	5,884	6,244	19
FSE Oasis	2,085	2,802	14
FSE McNernoy (Soul D-1) *	913	2,059	11
FSA Ben Bluch	521	1,470	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16,605</b>	<b>19,775</b>	<b>85</b>

\* As of 12 April, the last day of A Ration issue.

(c) Class III Issues:

1. Bulk POL Issues in Gallons:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>MOGAS</u>	<u>DF-2</u>
Camp Dhari	1,280,000	32,100	643,000	803,000
FSE Mary Lou	1,193,000	-	256,000	321,000
Kontum *	928,000	94,000	194,000	302,000
FSE Oasis	527,000	13,500	225,500	341,000
FSE McNernoy & Blackhawk FB **	238,500	-	89,000	254,000
FSA Ben Bluch	55,000	-	3,700	10,000
FSA Dak To ***	375,000	31,000	69,000	194,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,616,500</b>	<b>170,600</b>	<b>1,480,200</b>	<b>2,229,000</b>

\* The KONTUM POL points are not operated by the 4th Infantry Division units. The JP-4 and AVGAS points are operated by the 57th Assault Helicopter Company, (from 52d Aviation Group, Camp Holloway) at KONTUM Airfield. The 299th Engineer Battalion operates the MOGAS and DF-2 points at their compound in KONTUM. Divisional aviation units make considerable use of the KONTUM Airfield fuel points. Divisional units occasionally have used the 299th Engineer fuel points, but this use has fallen since Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry departed.

\*\* MOGAS and DF-2 tanks at FB MCNERNY, JP-4 tanks at FB BLACKHAWK.

\*\*\* FSA DAK TO is operated by the 45th General Support Group at PLEIKU. All units, divisional or non-divisional, in the DAK TO area use the DAK TO POL points.

2. Packaged POL Issues:

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>07-10*</u>	<u>07-30*</u>	<u>07-50*</u>	<u>GAA**</u>
Camp Enari	16,575	18,919	6,141	14,612
FSE Mary Lou	2,255	5,060	2,970	7,645
FSE Oasis	2,475	8,965	4,730	10,725
FSE McNerney	770	1,540	1,265	1,485
FSE San Hlech	110	110	110	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22,185</b>	<b>34,594</b>	<b>15,216</b>	<b>34,567</b>

\* In Gallons

\*\* In Pounds

(d) Class IV Issues:

<u>LOCATION:</u>	<u>ROLLS OF</u>		<u>PICKETS</u>			<u>BALES CCNC</u>
	<u>BARBED WIRE</u>	<u>SANDBAGS</u>	<u>2' &amp; 3'</u>	<u>5' &amp; 6'</u>	<u>8'</u>	
Camp Enari	1,460	1,214,600	2,351	372	266	53
FSE Mary Lou	74	2,131,400	25,378	18,350	27,958	456
FSE Oasis	619	812,000	10,783	11,064	13,956	146
FSE McNerney (Soui Doi)	417	487,400	8,769	4,585	7,992	88
FSE San Hlech	114	26,400	300	400	400	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,774</b>	<b>4,671,800</b>	<b>47,585</b>	<b>35,171</b>	<b>50,572</b>	<b>746</b>

(e) Baths. 59,630

(f) Graves Registration.

1. Human remains processed. 209
2. Personal property shipments processed. 281

(g) The US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III and V in support of Operations:

<u>1. Class III</u>	<u>Qty (each)</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Fighters		4,883,333 gals
B-52's		16,833,333 gals
<u>2. Ordnance</u>	<u>Qty (each)</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
Bombs	10,993	3,683.75
CBU	470	152.1
Napalm	1,911	700.375
Rockets	324	64.8

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3. Delivered by fighters and AC-47 (Spooky):

<u>Ordinance</u>	<u>Qty (Each)</u>	<u>Weight (g/t)</u>
20mm	430,400	107.6
7.62mm	3,500,000	95.5

4. Delivered by B-52's

<u>Ordinance</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Weight (g/t)</u>
Bombs	338	6,909

(4) Transportation services.

(a) During the reporting period there were 924 convoys with a total of 36,997 vehicles. Company B, 4th S&T Battalion, based at Camp Dhari, hauled supplies to the FSJ's. When required, the company's trucks augmented the organic vehicles of units involved in moves.

(b) Aircraft Support:

1. Total cargo tonnage moved by dedicated air:	138.6
2. Total passengers moved by dedicated air:	2,447
2. Total cargo tonnage moved by special mission air:	46.8
4. Total passengers moved by special mission air:	541

(c) The hold baggage facility, operated by the 45th General Support Group, was relocated to a new and larger building. The new facility will increase the efficiency of this operation.

(d) Aircraft Control Operations. Traffic of C-7A aircraft at Huseal Air Field was controlled by one NCO from Division Transportation Office.

(e) Retrograde cargo continued to move in heavy volume during the period. Project STRIP, initiated in the previous reporting period to retrograde excess serviceable material from DSO and Tech Supply, officially ended when the last of the designated items were shipped to QUI NHON. Although a sharp decrease in retrograde shipments followed the completion of project STRIP, the 4th S&T Battalion and the 704th Maintenance Battalion continued the program unofficially, identifying additional excess serviceable material for retrograde. All heavy-lift assets were placed under control of the 8th Transportation Group, based at QUI NHON, thereby increasing



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heavy-lift support for the Division. The following table shows weight and value of material retrograded during the quarter:

Feb 1969	279.4 tons	\$254,432
Mar 1969	80.5	8,176
Apr 1969	<u>86.7</u>	<u>51,788</u>
TOTAL	446.6 tons	\$314,396

(f) In late January, VLET CONG and NVA blew the QUI NHON-AN KHE-PLAIKU pipeline in several places. Until the pipeline could be repaired, it was necessary to haul bulk POL from QUI NHON to AN KHE and PLAIKU by tanker. Although the line to AN KHE was operational by the first part of March, the pipeline to PLAIKU did not function until 7 April. As a result, all available 5000 gallon semi-trailers hauled POL until the pipeline was operational. Because so many 5 ton tractors were hauling tankers, leaving 12 ton stake and platform semi-trailers idle, levels of supply declined. Items that were in especially short supply were penicillin, lumber and construction materials, concertina, sandbags, and similar barrier materials. A number of construction projects, including work at Fire Base MCNERNEY, were seriously delayed.

(5) Medical Service. The 4th Medical Battalion, with Companies B, C, and D supporting the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades respectively and Company A supporting Camp Xuri, provided the following medical services:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PATIENTS SEEN</u>	<u>ADMITTED</u>	<u>RETURNED TO DUTY</u>
Hqs and A Co	10,870	415	296
Company B	1,720	133	2
Company C	6,660	1,235	151
Company D	1,235	373	125

**b. Material Readiness.**

(1) During the reporting period the operational readiness rate of all categories of equipment improved. The Weekly Deadline Report (DA Form 2406) has proved effective for monitoring maintenance management at unit level. The report is reviewed each week to insure that units have initiated the required supply actions to remove equipment from deadline or that equipment has been evacuated to Direct Support Maintenance within established time limits. The percentage of tactical vehicles deadlined declined from eight percent at the onset of the period to a low of six percent on 19 April. At the end of the reporting period, the combat vehicle deadline rate was seven percent, well below the USARV norm of 15 percent.

(a) The failure rate of tank and APC engines continued to be high.

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Efforts to discover the cause of this high failure rate continued. Cracked fuel cells (integral type) continued to be a problem. No problems have been encountered with the new bolt-in type fuel tank installed in rebuilt APC's.

(b) The generator deadline rate decreased from eight percent at the start of the reporting period to a low of three percent on 19 April. The availability of engines and substitution of serviceable parts from retrograded equipment have contributed to this improvement.

(c) The deadline rate of AN/VRC-12 series radios, particularly the AN/VRC-46, remained high. At the end of the reporting period, it was 16.3 percent. The 704th Maintenance Battalion's Signal Maintenance Section repaired an average of 100 VRC-12 series radios each week. A representative of the US Army Electronics Command (USAECOM) liaison office, USAFV, visited the Division to investigate the failures of VRC-12 series radios. Although no particular cause for the failures could be identified, the USAECOM representative suggested that the Division adopt the following measures:

1. Insure that drivers turn radio sets off when starting vehicles.
2. Insure adequate circulation of air around radio sets mounted in personnel carriers, tanks, and other confined spaces.
3. Require organizational maintenance personnel to clean accumulated dust from within radio sets at least once each month.

(2) The repair parts status remained approximately the same as in the preceding reporting period. Headquarters and Company A, Technical Supply, 704th Maintenance Battalion completed a 100 percent wall-to-wall inventory of its warehouse space. Since the inventory, the demand satisfaction rate has risen from approximately 25 to 70 percent. Armored personnel carrier and tank roadwheels, batteries and electrolyte, engines for 3/4 ton and 5 ton trucks, tires for 2½ ton trucks, and tank transmissions were critical items of supply. On 1 April, roadwheels were placed in direct exchange supply channels. This was necessary in order to recover unserviceable roadwheels from using units. The availability of tank and APC engines has improved considerably during the reporting period. Clutch disks for 2½ ton trucks, tires, batteries, and electrolyte were received in sufficient quantities to prevent an increase in the deadline rate.

### (3) Maintenance Support.

(a) The 704th Maintenance Battalion, with three forward support companies, the base camp maintenance support company, and the aircraft maintenance company, provided maintenance support and supply of spare parts.

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for all divisional and attached elements.

(b) Emphasis is placed on repair by forward maintenance companies with supplementary contact teams provided by Headquarters and Company A, 704th Maintenance Battalion.

(c) Job orders completed by divisional maintenance:

1. Tanks	103
2. APCs	205
3. VTRs	9
4. Wheeled Vehicles	735
5. Heavy Engineer Equipment	34
6. Artillery	113
7. Generators	361
8. Small arms	2,145
9. Instruments	573
10. Signal-repaired	2,508
11. Signal-evacuated	305
12. Aircraft	542
13. Aircraft components	1,454

(d) Repair parts requisitions processed and level statistics:

1. Total requests received	45,020
2. Total ASL requests received	36,133
3. Total ASL issued	16,042
4. Total receipts	9,659
5. Total due-cut releases	10,459
6. Total passing orders	10,722

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7. Total replenishment requests	8,120
8. Total warehouse denials	3,445
9. Total transactions posted	58,625
10. Total lines on ASL	14,724
11. Total lines zero balance	4,775
12. Zero balance percentage	33%
13. Demand accommodation	80%
14. Demand satisfaction	44%
(e) Retrograded Items:	423 vehicles

(4) During the reporting period the Division CMMI Team completed 14 formal inspections. Results indicated improvement of the Division's maintenance management. Fewer errors were noted in repair parts supply and TAERS records. The Division Support Command's PLL and TAERS assistance team, visiting each battalion and separate company once each quarter, assisted in the review of records and provided instruction concerning procedures.

(5) The daily roadside spot inspection program continued. Because inspection reports indicated that operator maintenance was unsatisfactory, the G4 initiated spot checks of unit motor stables. Emphasis on motor stables has resulted in an improvement in roadside spot check scores.

e. Administration. Action was completed on 77 Reports of Survey with 43 currently pending final action. Thirty-four Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved and 717 Combat Loss Reports were processed.

## 5. (C) Military Civic Action:

a. TAOR: The consolidation program is having increased effectiveness in the TAOR. Through the use of PFs, PSDFs and Cadre Teams, the villagers have been able to repel all attacks and probes by the enemy. During this reporting period, the following consolidations were completed:

### (1) 3d Brigade Sector:

#### (a) PLEI DO (AR813435)

PLEI DO GUAN (AR795408)

PLEI GRAM HAN (AR810398)

consolidated at PLEI DO (AR812434)

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- (b) PLEI CHOM NGOL (AR814398)  
PLEI CHOM BOM (AR810398)  
PLEI CHOM PRONG (AR818407) consolidated at PLEI CHOM PRONG (AR821.  
PLEI HET (AR818408)  
PLEI BONG GOLAR (AR824425)

(2) During this quarter enemy activity in the Division Base Camp TAOR has decreased slightly over past months. In the Division's area of operations however, volunteer informat program (VIP) payments have increased. There were approximately 200 payments totalling 260,460 \$VII.

(3) The Division is currently engaged in an experimental rice program. Through US/GVN support, IR-5 and IR-8 rice have been made available to ten pre-selected villages. A total of 2.5 acres will be planted in the TAOR. Instructions on how to grow this new rice have been given to all CA Teams involved with the program.

## b. PLEIKU Province:

(1) The 3d Brigade continued Civic Action responsibility along Route 19W and in the PLEI MEONG area.

(2) The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry continued Civic Action along Highway 19 from PLEIKU City to the MANG YANG Pass. High Impact Civic Action Projects (MICAPS) were conducted in conjunction with combat operations in the DE GROU area west of the DAK AYUN River and west of VC Valley as part of a LE TRUNG District Pacification Campaign. Four hamlets asked and received assistance in relocating along Highway 19.

(3) PLEIKU Province Hospital has continued the preventive medicine program in the 4th Division's TAOR. Additional people in Sectors Black, Blue, and Red have been inoculated against plague and cholera.

(4) During the attack on PLEI BREL DOR on 23 February 1969, the combined efforts of the PF, PSDF, and CA Teams repelled the foray. This was the first time the VC/NVA had been denied entrance to the village. Previously, this village did not have an organized PSDF.

(5) On 23 February 1969, the village of PLEI HO BY was attacked by 20 VIET CONG who entered the village and set fire to 10 huts and departed. Later that night, they returned to the village and set fire to 33 more huts. Additionally, they kidnaped 17 men: 10 PSDF and seven chiefs. Five of the PSDF escaped and five were later returned. All seven chiefs have been returned to the village.

(6) On 16 February 1969, an enemy loudspeaker team was employed against a US CA Team. Its message --"Don't Die GI."

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c. KONTUM Province: The 2d Brigade while operating in the DAK TO and DAK SUT Districts carried on normal Civic Action.

d. DARLAC Province: During this quarter, the 4th Infantry Division sponsored no CA activities in DARLAC Province.

e. BINH DINH Province: On 15 April 1969, the 1st Brigade moved to Camp M/DCLIFF in AN KHE. A Civic Action program has been started with the villages in that area.

f. Nation Building Program:

(1) Government.

(a) The Pacification Program 69 was initiated in the 4th Division TAOR on 25 April 1969. On 29 April 1969 all personnel in the Division involved in the Civic Action program were briefed byCORDS representatives from MHA TRANG. The Pacification program is oriented to a stronger hamlet/village government with increased representation at province level.

(b) As a part of Campaign 69, over 400 individual weapons have been issued to People's Self Defense Forces. Additionally, four Revolutionary Development teams have been introduced into the TAOR.

(c) Education: There still remains a teacher shortage in the TAOR. PLIEU Province will receive five teachers from the normal at BAN ME THOCT. The Chaplains are planning to send several MONTAGNARD children to school. The type and location of the schools are being determined at this time. Also, during this period, provincial school officials visited all hamlets having schools to determine what support would be given by the GVN.

(a) Development of Standard of Living:

1. The MONTAGNARDS are beginning to retail native wares in the PLIEU-Camp Enari area. This new income bolsters their earnings and aids them in supporting their own teachers and medical personnel.

2. Team number 8, 41st Civil Affairs Company conducted a plow demonstration in the majority of the hamlets in the TAOR. Although the VIETNAMESE use this labor saving device the MONTAGNARDS in this area do not use it. In a few of the villages where the idea was accepted, the people purchased communal plows and are using their cattle as draft animals.

(e) Health Program:

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1. MEDCAPS remain one of the Division's strongest assets in the pacification campaign. During the reporting period there were 102,968 MEDCAPS in the 4th Division's area of operations.

2. The 1st Brigade is training eight MONTAGNARDS to be medics.

(2) Assistance to PLEIKU Province: The 4th Division assisted the Province in Operation Clean Up from 11 February 1969 to 17 February 1969. Each CA Team was assigned a sector of road for police call. Although the official program has ended, the Division is still supporting the province by constantly policing the villages within the T40R and the lines of communication connecting all Division elements.

(3) People's Self Defense Forces: At present there are 12 consolidations with a combined PSDF of 1388. Eighty-eight of these men are presently undergoing training. A total of 463 weapons have been issued by L3 THUPUNG District.

## g. Statistical Summary of Civic Action:

### (1) Construction.

<u>PROJECTS</u>	<u>BUILT</u>	<u>REPAIRED</u>
Dwellings	37, 10 (J)	172, 433 (J)
Roads (km)	14	3.5
Hospitals	2	0
Dispensaries	2, 4 (J)	4
Schools	13 (J)	11
Latrines	1, 11 (J)	0
Bridges	1	2
Bunkers	1, 173 (J)	13, 302 (J)
Fence (km)	4, 5 (J)	1, 2 (J)
Spillways	4, 5 (J)	1, 2 (J)
MEDCAP huts	0	4
Cattle pens	22, 35 (J)	26, 13 (J)
Pig pens	22,	4
Defense Perimeter	8, 800 (J)	2, 1900 (J)
Fish pond	1	0
Playgrounds	2, 14 (J)	1, 3 (J)
Corrals	1 (J)	7
Volleyball Court	1	0

Note: (J) indicates joint projects.

### (2) Health.

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MHCAPS	100,968
Youth Health	37,398
Dentists	463
Immunizations	2,248
Health Items	5,704 pounds

(3) Services.

Food	19,864 pounds
Clothing	3,539 pounds
Canvas	80 Lays
Tin Sheets	341
Lumber	93,202 board feet
Paint	29 gallons
Concertina	192 (50m coils)
Nails	1,787 pounds
Barbed wire	93,900 feet
Engineer stakes	5,630
Culvert	100 sections

(4) Recovered goods returned to GVN.

Rice	430,581 pounds
Cotton	262 pounds
Tobacco	50 pounds
Salt	302 pounds
Beans	435 pounds

b. Intelligence collected as a result of Civic Action.

(1) 12 February 1969 - A village chief furnished information of the location of an armed VC who wanted to CHI N HOI. A VIP payment was made to the chief.

(2) 23 February 1969 - Voluntary informants supplied information and guided US troops to two mines, consisting of three 81mm mortar rounds each, and two satchel charges.

(3) 11 March 1969 - Villagers reported seeing individuals southeast of their village carrying mortar tubes.

(4) 17 March 1969 - It was reported that propaganda was placed outside one of the villages. Investigation revealed it was booby trapped.

(5) 23 March 1969 - Villagers from PLEI HLU KLAH provided information which resulted in the apprehension of four VMC from PL J BRANG.



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(6) 5 April 1969 - Villagers from PLMI HO BY (AM815245) found pungl sticks and propaganda messages written on boards.

(7) 22 April 1969 - Villagers from PLMI HO BY found a grenade booby trap.

## i. ARVN Dependent Housing.

(1) ARVN troops must travel excessive distances in order to visit and provide for their families. To alleviate this condition, GVN has undertaken a program of constructing dependent housing. Annual funding by the GVN is limited and cannot provide sufficient housing to cover the total requirement in a timely manner.

(2) To supplement the GVN funded program, US units have undertaken the task of providing material and technical assistance. The 4th Infantry Division has accepted the task of supporting three ARVN units: the 22d Regiment, 2d Ranger Group, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron.

(3) During the past three months considerable progress has been made. One house consisting of ten family apartments has been completed and construction of six others has begun. To date the ARVN units have been provided with 5,000 bags of cement and 8,500 board feet of lumber. Also provided were salvaged canvas and salvaged water trailers.

(4) The construction sites have been given cement block making machines. At present, total production is approximately 1,500 bricks per day. This will allow a construction rate of two houses per month.

(5) The current goal is more than 200 buildings of the 10-apartment type. The 4th Infantry Division will continue to support this construction program until the needs are met.

## j. Psychological Operations.

### (1) Significant Activities.

(a) During the reporting period, a representative of the 4th Infantry Division joined the PLMIKU PSYOP coordinating committee, which coordinates all PSYOP activities in the Province. In addition to the Division's representative, the committee includes the chief of VIETNAM Information Service, PLMIKU; the PLMIKU ARVN S6; the chief of the PLMIKU CHINH HOI Division; a representative of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAC); and representatives of MACV and 5th Special Forces.

(b) In an effort to coordinate PSYOPS activities more closely with Province Headquarters and other units operating in the 4th Infantry

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Division's area, a PSYOP Situation Report (SITREP) has been instituted. Prepared each Wednesday and Saturday and sent to PLIKU, KONTUM, and BINH DINH Province Headquarters; 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigade PSYOP Officers; 5th Special Forces; and 52d Artillery Group, the SITREP includes the target coordinates of all leaflets, the type of tape, and a general target description. This information helps prevent duplication of PSYOP efforts.

(c) Voluntary Incentive Program, with the move of the 1st Brigade to AN KHE, the VIP effort doubled. Over 1,000,000 VIP leaflets were dropped over populated areas near AN KHE. As of the end of the reporting period, this campaign had produced 29 VIP responses and 29,500 \$VN paid in rewards.

(d) The Division PSYOPS section acquired an \$VN interpreter in order to expedite production of leaflets in VIETNAM SA. The interpreter has two years of university and is an accomplished artist. Ideas for leaflets are discussed and produced in VIETNAM SA first, and then translated into English. This procedure largely eliminates the product-of-the-American-mind stamp from the leaflets.

(e) Filling the demand for news and increasing face-to-face contacts in the PLIKU area, G5 personnel distributed newspapers such as THE DO and HUEI MINH and magazines such as THUONG CANH and Free World to the 3,000 VIETNAMESE employed on Camp Thari. Having out the reading material to the people as they passed through the MP checkpoint at the main gate, PSYOPS distributed a total of 8,000 newspapers and magazines during the reporting period.

(f) During the reporting period, the 4th Infantry Division Band gave two concerts at MONTAGNARD villages and one in the city of PLIKU. A total of 4,750 people attended the concerts and their response was enthusiastic. The MONTAGNARDS showed particular interest in Dixieland music.

(g) The early Ward ground to air loudspeaker transmission system is now installed in all C2-B aircraft of Flight B, 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS). This innovation permits ground elements to make direct appeals over loudspeakers through any FM radio transmitter. It has been found effective up to a range of 30 to 50 miles.

(2) Statistics.

	<u>February</u>	<u>November</u>
(a) Leaflets	266,580,000	749,563,000
(b) Speakers hrs - air	160 *	818
(c) Speakers hrs - grd	60	Not reported
Teams employed	3	4
(d) Audio/Visual hrs	104	166 1/2

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Attendance	36,052	Not reported
Teams employed	1	2
(e) Cultural/Drama Teams		
Performances	12	2
Attendance	6,500	3,000
(f) HOI CHANH		
	9	3
(g) VIP Responses		
	60	Not reported
Money paid	55,600 \$VN	Not reported
(h) VIS Visits		
	14	Not reported
(i) Band Concerts		
	3	0
Attendance	2,750	0

\* An error was discovered in previous reporting procedures. The amount reported differed from what actually was broadcast. This difference varied from one fifth to one half of actual speaker time.

6. (C) Personnel.

a. Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Beginning of reporting period (1 Feb 69)				
	OFF	WO	M	AGG
(a) Authorized - organic units	1,113	194	16,370	17,677
Authorized - attached units	<u>49</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>942</u>	<u>1,027</u>
TOTAL	1,162	230	17,312	18,704
(b) Assigned - organic units	1,244	165	16,968	18,377
Assigned - attached units	<u>50</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>942</u>	<u>1,015</u>
TOTAL	1,294	198	17,900	19,392
(2) End of reporting period (30 Apr 69)				
(a) Authorized - organic units	1,116	195	16,483	17,794
Authorized - attached units	<u>50</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>963</u>	<u>1,050</u>
TOTAL	1,166	232	17,446	18,844
(b) Assigned - organic units	1,231	185	16,550	17,966
Assigned - attached units	<u>55</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>948</u>	<u>1,035</u>
TOTAL	1,286	217	17,498	19,001

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b. Replacements: A total of 224 officers and 4,282 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period, Division losses were 178 officers and 3,013 enlisted personnel. Emergency leaves processed during the reporting period totalled 235.

c. Promotions: A total of 5,067 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

d. Casualties:

UNIT	NON-HOSTILE	HOSTILE		NON-HOSTILE		
		DEAD	MISSING	INJURED	MISSING	D.Y.D
1st Bde	453	104	7	44	0	0
2d Bde	263	49	0	35	0	2
3d Bde	327	34	0	27	0	2
DIVARTY	81	11	0	11	0	0
DISCOM	18	0	0	17	0	0
2-1	45	3	0	17	0	3
1-10	61	3	0	16	0	1
1-69	38	4	0	6	0	0
4th Engr	17	6	1	12	0	1
4th Avn	12	1	0	6	0	0
124th Sig	11	1	0	1	0	0
HHC, 4th Inf Div	0	0	0	1	0	0
4th MP	0	0	0	3	0	0
4th Admin	5	0	0	1	0	0
Secut Dog	3	1	0	0	0	0
K/75	5	3	1	5	0	0
4th AC	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,341</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>

e. Moral and Personnel Services:

(1) Decorations Awarded

	Feb	Mar	Apr
Distinguished Service Cross	0	0	0
Silver Star	19	15	78
Legion of Merit	2	1	3
Distinguished Flying Cross	5	6	33
Soldier's Medal	16	0	13
Bronze Star (Valor)	75	33	132
Army Commendation (Valor)	44	15	47
Air Medal (Valor)	10	10	12
Bronze Star (Service)	120	113	154
Army Commendation (Service)	518	562	1,256
Air Medal (Service)	306	387	291
Purple Heart	152	297	357
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,267</b>	<b>1,439</b>	<b>2,386</b>

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(2) Badges	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
Combat Infantryman Badge	919	843	241
Combat Medical Badge	76	42	54
Aircraft Crewman Badge	2	44	15
Miscellaneous Badge	<u>0</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>63</u>
TOTAL	997	945	373

f. Reenlistments: A total of 197 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was as follows: First Term RA Reenlistments: 153; AUS enlistments: 34; RA extensions: 6; AUS extensions: 4.

g. Postal:

(1) Money Order Sales: \$3,466,263.76  
 (2) Parcel Post and Postal Fees: \$46,827.32  
 (3) Incoming Mail: 19,328 sacks and 2,470 pouches. Daily  
 Average: 92 sacks and 8 pouches.

(4) Outgoing Mail: 4,624 sacks and 2,138 pouches. Daily  
 Average: 52 sacks and 9 pouches.

(5) Number of Mail Days: 89

h. Special Services:

(1) The 4th Infantry Division was visited by the following:  
 14 USO Shows:

Rev. J. Jy	The Charades
Sebastian Cabot	The Ma Begg Show
Pat O'Brien	Carman D'oro and Los Dorados
Trey Donahue	Skip Young and Girls
Gene Striedel Show	The Country Coalition
Henry Wilcoxon	Grog Morris
The Allen Fitz Show	Bryan

(2) R&R quotas received were 4,935 out-of-country and 668 in-country.

(3) A total of 60 movies circulated within the Division.

i. Chaplain Activities.

<u>DENOMINATION</u>	<u>NO. OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Roman Catholic	788	22,282

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Protestant	1,227	23,325
Jewish	21	214
Memorial Services	64	6,126

## j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

General Courts-Martial:	9
Special Courts-Martial:	193
Summary Courts-Martial:	22

## k. Health.

(1) Malaria continues to be a serious problem in the Division. Over the past three months there were 338 confirmed cases of malaria of which 107 were vivax and 231 were falciparum. With the coming of the monsoons the mosquito population will increase and continued emphasis of prophylactic medication along with mosquito control and personal protective measures will be mandatory.

(2) For the past three months the units of the Division have been conducting tests to detect the presence of chloroquine in urine, the purpose being to determine the number of people who do not take the weekly malaria prophylaxis tablet. Since the onset of testing the average percentage of negative readings has dropped from 36 percent to eight percent. The most complete testing has been done in base camp and trails areas. Because the malaria problem is more serious in the forward areas than in base camp, practical methods of testing in forward areas are necessary and are being developed at this time.

(3) Recently the Division preventive medicine officer, the environmental sanitation, and two members of the 3d Preventive Medicine Detachment trained 56 field sanitation team personnel at LZ MARY LCU. These teams, one to a company, are essential to the continued health of the combat. They are trained in insecticide spraying and dusting techniques, mess hall inspection, latrine and urinal inspection, proper water treatment, and conduct of the malaria prophylaxis urine test. They are also taught about the nature of the disease they are fighting. Further training can be furnished either at Camp Xmeri by appointment or at trails areas.

## 7. (U) Engineer.

a. General. During the reporting period, the 4th Engineer Battalion (Combat) continued combat support of the Division. In almost all instances, operations of rifle company size or larger included engineer representation in direct support. Companies B, C, and D continued direct support of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades respectively. Company A continued general support at Camp Xmeri. Company E (Bridge) supported the Division

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with tactical bridging; tanks, including two Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV's); and assistance in base camp projects. Headquarters Company provided heavy equipment and water purification units.

## b. Operations.

(1) Company B, in support of the 1st Brigade, constructed the new 1st Brigade base area, Fire Base MENERNEY, in early February. In addition to constructing a tactical operations center (TOC) of three 30' x 50' bunkers, the company built observation towers, and improved the roads and drainage. In early March, when the 1st Brigade combat assaulted to begin heavy fighting in the PLEI TRAP, all available engineers went forward to expedite the clearing of LZ's and the construction of defensive positions. Airmobile bulldozers of Headquarters Company performed much of this clearing and construction. The Engineers' two Case 450 mini-dozers were used extensively on fire bases of the 1st and 2d Brigades in western KONTUM Province.

(2) Company C continued direct support of the 2d Brigade at LZ MARY LOU. Squad-sized or smaller elements accompanying infantry into the area west of POLEI KLANG destroyed numerous enemy bunkers and fortifications. One of the Company's chief undertakings was sweeping for mines along Route 511 from KONTUM to POLEI KLANG. In February, after enemy sappers destroyed a bridge on Highway 14 near DAK TO, Company B launched an Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) to reopen the Highway. On 9 March, the company conducted a rappelling mission to clear a one-ship LZ for the evacuation of casualties.

(3) Company D, supporting the 3d Brigade, cleared new fire bases in the CHU PA Mountain area. During the battle on CHU PA, the Company performed the one-shot destruction of a complex of 200 bunkers. The Company conducted two rappelling missions, one to evacuate wounded from CHU PA and another to destroy a bunker complex west of PLEI KRONG.

(4) In addition to supporting the Division with tactical bridging, Company E engaged in construction at Camp Enari, including an underground tactical operations center at Division Headquarters. The Company's INSURE 202 tank-mounted mine roller traversed 596 miles during the reporting period, mostly in the vicinity of KONTUM. At the end of the reporting period, the mine roller was being modified to mount on the M-60 chassis of the Combat Engineer Vehicle.

(5) Company A, in general support to the Division, constructed 83 corrugated sheet metal and lumber perimeter bunkers at Camp Enari and laid 600 meters of six inch pipe for a new refueling point at Hensal Army Airfield.

## 8. (C) Army Aviation Operations.

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a. Operational Totals of the 4th Aviation Battalion were as follows:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Sorties	10,660	10,955	8,667	30,282
Hour. Flown	3,368	3,629	3,148	10,145
Troops Lifted	14,016	13,251	12,961	40,258
Tons of Cargo	232	246	181	719

Aviation Expenses:

7.62mm	252,365	937,161	313,718	1,533,244
2.75 rockets	2,402	3,660	2,074	8,136
40mm	6,265	9,197	7,811	23,273
Flares	1,046	1,572	384	2,808
Smoke	752	241	120	1,113

Results:

Avn Per KIA	0	1	0	1
Avn Per WIA	4	11	3	18
Aircraft Dest	0	3	1	4
Aircraft Dam	13	10	8	31

b. Scheduling per day during the reporting period averaged:

40 UH-1H aircraft  
 12 Gunships (UH-1G, AH-1G)  
 8 CH-47  
 2 CH-54

c. Time flown by aircraft of the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion was as follows:

UH-1 12,500 hours  
 CH-47 2,296 hours  
 AH-1G 552 hours  
 TOTAL 15,440 hours

9. (U) Inspector General.

a. Annual General Inspections of seven divisional units were conducted along with four courtesy inspections in preparation for unit AGI's.

b. No complaints were received during the reporting period. Two hundred-sixty requests for assistance were received during the period.

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10. (U) Signal.

a. General. Installation of multichannel VHF communications remained the 124th Signal Battalion's chief activity in support of Division operations.

b. Operations.

(1) On 27 February 1969, elements of Company C, which had been supporting the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry near BAN ME THUOT, returned to Camp Enari.

(2) On 2 March, Company C dispatched a crew with one AN/MRC-112 four channel VHF system to POLMI KIENG to support the 1st Brigade TAC CP. On 5 March, a team from Company B deployed to POLMI KIENG to begin operation of an AN/MRC-69 24-channel VHF system.

(3) From 6 through 14 March, Companies A and C provided communications for the Division TAC CP at LZ MARY LOU. Equipment included one MRC-112, one MTC-10 switch board, and one secure FM radio.

(4) On 6 April, Company B dispatched one MRC-69 and team to Camp RADCLIFF (AN KHE) to establish communications prior to relocation of the 1st Brigade.

(5) On 15 April, when the TAC CP at POLMI KIENG closed, the team that had been supporting the 1st Brigade returned to Camp Enari.

(6) On 23 April, one MRC-69, one MRC-112, and one GRC-142 radio-teletype of Company C deployed to BAN BLICH to support the 3d Brigade's Operation GREENE QUEEN.

11. (U) Infiltration Activities.

a. During the reporting period a total of 26 civilian correspondents covering a variety of subjects from hometown material to combat operations, visited the 4th Infantry Division. Included among the news media personnel were representatives of CBS, ABC, and NBC News. Military correspondents from MACV, USARV and IFFV visited the Division. Also, members from the French press, Overseas Weekly, UPI, and Stars and Stripes were represented.

b. Four hundred and twenty-five members joined the 4th Infantry Division Association during the quarter, bringing the total membership to 8,284. During the same period, \$50,729.50 was contributed to the 4th Infantry Division Scholarship Fund, bringing the total of \$219,716.13.

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c. The Radio-Television section prepared 400 Mother's Day tapes and 190 regular hometown tapes during the quarter. Other productions included a 20-minute special radio-TV show on the 4th Infantry Division war dogs. A special radio story was prepared on a distress call from KOREA which was picked up by a 4th Infantry Division RTO. Motion picture film and audio tracks were also made by the radio-TV section on the following events during the February-April quarter: The opening of the new 4th Infantry Division Post Exchange, the Provost Marshal General's visit to the 4th Infantry Division, and the graduation ceremonies of the Division's ROTC Leadership Academy. The following additional work was also accomplished during the quarter: 12 Pacific Reports, a five minute long program to HQ, USARPAC; Five weekly programs, each five minutes long, for the US Army reenlistment program. Seven 2½ minute chaplain's messages were recorded each week, 78 total for the February-April period. Promotional spots in support of Command Information were also prepared. These included spots on Law Day, Savings program, R&R Information, Hold Baggage, War Souvenirs, and Provost Marshal spot announcements. Six special spots in support of procurement of US Army recruiters were written and recorded. Each day the radio-TV shop does three radio newscasts for a total of 252 during the quarter. A total of 200 news releases were submitted through USARPAC and MACV for clearance. Total broadcast time during the February-April span was 86.3 hours.

d. For the fourth consecutive quarter the 4th Infantry Division, with approximately 9,300 DA Form 1526, led all Army units worldwide in the production of Home Town News Releases.

e. Owing to improvements in the distribution of Command Information material, troops are now receiving information faster than ever before. Four Radio-TV spots were produced during the period covering Income Tax, the Martin Luther King Jr. Fellowships, drugs and accidental shootings and explosions. Arrangements were coordinated and material prepared for the publication of the third edition of the Division orientation booklet, Each of the Men of the 4th Infantry Division. The first press run will consist of some 15,000 copies and should be available 15 June for distribution. USARPAC and MACV information officers who have examined the prospective layout have commented that this may be the best orientation booklet in VIETNAM.

f. Thirteen editions of the Ivy Leaf were published during the period. More combat art is being used than previously and is enhancing the attractiveness of the Division newspaper. More space is being devoted to civic actions and combined efforts of American-VIETNAM.S. agencies.

g. During the period, the Photo Section of the Information Office processed some 461 rolls of film. A total of 2,750 prints were made for distribution to news media and radio-TV. During the quarter, the lab processed, for the first time in VIETNAM, motion picture material for use

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on the local TV station.

h. The Combat Illustration Section produced some 39 combat situations for publication in the Ivy Leaf. Three of these illustrations were also used in the MACV Observer.

i. The 4th Infantry Division received the following coverage in other publications during the February-April period: Saigon Daily News, 36 column inches and one two-column picture; Stars and Stripes, 105 column inches and one two-column picture; Army Times, 58½ column inches; MACV Observer, 221 column inches and 7 pictures; Army Reporter, 517½ column inches; Army Digest, 27 column inches and one picture; and Overseas Weekly, 21 column inches and two pictures.

## SECTION 2 (C) LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

### 1. (U) Personnel. CONTROLLING BASE CAMP AND TRAINS AREA STRENGTHS.

OBSERVATION: Infantry battalions often exceed authorized base camp strengths. Personnel becomes unaccountable when controls are not imposed in the forward trains area.

EVALUATION: Assignment of an assistant adjutant or first sergeant to process and account for personnel in the trains area has been found effective. By processing all men moving from the trains area through one individual, units can maintain accurate personnel rosters and control the flow of men. A forward controller can organize groups of transients and provide rosters to be delivered to the CIC or NCOIC at each group's destination.

RECOMMENDATION: That infantry battalions employ a personnel NCO, first sergeant, or assistant adjutant in the trains area to control, coordinate, and document the movement of personnel.

### 2. (C) Operations.

#### a. CONVOY ESCORT AND SECURITY.

OBSERVATION: A recent study has shown that a heavy truck, used as lead vehicle of a convoy, offers greater crew protection than an armored personnel carrier used in the same capacity.

EVALUATION: One of the Division's cavalry squadrons used a truck with driver and assistant driver to precede convoys. The equipment on the truck includes sandbags on the floor of the cab, a mounted machine gun and an FM radio. Armored personnel carriers and tanks move interspersed

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throughout the convey, both on and off the road, while the truck leads the convey on the road. The study revealed that when a truck strikes a mine or is hit by a B-40 rocket, fewer casualties are received than is the case when animal personnel carriers are used for the same mission. The following statistics were compiled during the period 1 October 1968 to 2 March 1969:

## (1) MINES incidents.

<u>TYPE VEHICL</u>	<u>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</u>	<u>NUMBER CASUALTIES</u>	<u>CASUALTIES/INCIDENTS</u>
2 1/2-ton trucks	43	33	.63
APC	42	72	1.70

## (2) B-40 rocket incidents.

2 1/2-ton trucks	5	6	1.20
APC	6	26	4.30

RECOMMENDATION: That all mechanized and armored units compile statistics on a terrain the value of this technique for their own use.

### b. USE OF HIGH POINT ELEMENTS.

REMARKS: The NVA often locate bivouac areas, caches, and other non-tactical facilities in deep draws and small steep-sided valleys.

CONCLUSION: During recent operations, US Infantry repeatedly discovered NVA bivouac areas in draws. Such locations offer convenient water supply, good cover, and excellent protection from air and artillery fire. Security was maintained as enemy installations were located on the surrounding high ground. The presence of small NVA forces on high terrain overlooking a valley indicates the possible presence of a non-tactical bivouac area in the valley.

RECOMMENDATION: That after adequate air and artillery preparation, units conducting search and clear operations investigate small valleys and draws for possible enemy facilities.

### c. USE OF A DOUBLE POINT ELEMENT.

REMARKS: Because of the thick vegetation and rugged terrain of the Central Highlands, moving troops are vulnerable to ambush.

RECOMMENDATION: Units have been using a double point element as an extra precaution against ambushes. The point elements move by alternate bounds, one covering while the other moves ahead to the next vantage point.

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Thus, an element is always in position to return fire should the lead element discover a kill zone.

RECOMMENDATION: That units employ two point teams, particularly when moving through thick vegetation.

d. MEASURES TO DEFEAT ENEMY ANTIHELICOPTER TACTICS.

OBSERVATION: The enemy is making increasing use of antiaircraft fire and antihelicopter devices to cover old landing zones and unoccupied fire bases that are likely to be used by friendly forces reacting to an enemy threat.

EVALUATION: Recently, after completing a combat assault onto a temporarily unoccupied fire base, the assaulting unit found a 12.7mm antiaircraft machinegun and numerous antihelicopter mines. Artillery preparation of the hilltop had killed the machine gunner and rendered many of the mines inoperative.

RECOMMENDATION: That intense artillery preparations utilizing mixed fuse be employed on unoccupied fire bases to destroy enemy antihelicopter defenses prior to a combat assault.

e. FIRECRACKER ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF ARMORED UNITS IN CONTACT.

OBSERVATION: Firecracker rounds fired directly over armored vehicles cause negligible damage to the vehicles and no injuries to the crews, yet have devastating effect on troops in the open.

EVALUATION: When in close contact with enemy forces, armored or mechanized forces can call in firecracker artillery fire on their positions, buttoning up when they receive the word "splash" from FDC.

RECOMMENDATION: That all personnel in armored and mechanized units be informed of this method of repelling infantry attacks.

f. MARKING ENEMY POSITIONS WITH M-79 SMOKE ROUNDS.

OBSERVATION: Long Range Patrols often have difficulty marking enemy locations for airstrikes and gunship runs without compromising their own positions.

EVALUATION: By marking an enemy position with a smoke round fired from an M-79, a LRP team can remain hidden and then direct bombing and strafing passes accurately and safely.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That IRPs, SRPs, and small ambush patrols carry M-79

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grenade launchers and 40mm smoke rounds for use in adjusting aerial-delivered ordnance.

### 3. (U) Training.

#### BATTLE DRILL TRAINING.

ORGANIZATION: One of the basic tactics employed by the rifle platoon is fire and man over. Units in the field rarely conduct training in these basic infantry tactics.

TRAINING: Usually there is terrain around a fire base where squad and platoon battle drill can be conducted. By freeing each platoon at least once every two weeks to conduct battle drill training, units have improved their reaction and control in combat.

REGIMENTATION: That companies make regular battle drill training part of their SOP.

### 4. (U) Intelligence. None.

### 5. (U) Logistics.

#### EMERGENCY LIGHTING.

ORGANIZATION: Often there is a shortage of emergency light sources such as Coleman lanterns and candles for use in command posts and fire direction centers.

TRAINING: Field expedient light sources can be made from the waterproof wrapping found on artillery and mortar ammunition. This readily available material makes an excellent light source when twisted into the shape of a candle.

REGIMENTATION: That field expedient candles be made of waterproof material when emergency light sources are needed.

### 6. (U) Organization. None.

### 7. (C) Tactical Cover and Deception.

#### PROTECTION OF SEMI-PERMANENT LP's.

OBSERVATION: The enemy will zero indirect fire in on semi-permanent observation and listening posts.

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EVALUATION: By constructing multiple bunkers in an area and then occupying them randomly, a unit can maintain a semi-permanent OP/LP with less risk that the OP/LP will be eliminated in the first stage of an attack.

RECOMMENDATION: That units occupying semi-permanent fire bases construct multiple OP/LP bunkers and occupy them in random fashion.

## 8. (C) Other.

### a. Measures to Prevent Sapper Attacks.

#### (1) NVA DIVERSIONARY TACTICS.

OBSERVATION: Enemy forces utilize indirect fire and diversionary infantry attacks to draw fires of a patrol base so that sappers may more easily infiltrate the base's perimeter.

EVALUATION: Recently an engineer and Special Forces Camp took incoming mortar fire from the southwest of their perimeter followed by an infantry attack along the northern and western perimeter. While attention was focused along those sides of the perimeter, approximately 35 to 40 sappers breached the perimeter on the east side.

RECOMMENDATION: When hit by indirect fire, probes, or standoff attacks, units should automatically be alert for sappers attempting to infiltrate through the inactive side of the perimeter. All troops should be assigned sectors of responsibility and should give those sectors their fullest attention.

#### (2) COMMAND AND CONTROL.

OBSERVATION: It is difficult to command a large perimeter defense from a central control headquarters. The communications system is overloaded, response to requests for fires is slow, and subordinate commanders are not utilized.

EVALUATION: Response to attack is more rapid when forces are controlled by unit commanders rather than by an ad hoc central base headquarters.

RECOMMENDATION: That established command lines be retained in the conduct of a perimeter defense.

#### (3) INTERIOR DEFENSE.

OBSERVATION: Sapper infiltrators may succeed in penetrating the

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perfactor under cover of the initial mortar barrage.

EVALUATION: Men seeking shelter in bunkers under the shock of the first rounds of incoming mortar fire tend to ignore local defense of bunkers and tents. Sappers take advantage of initial disorganization to throw satchel charges and to fire small arms into shelter bunkers.

RECOMMENDATION: That troops be trained not to play ostrich when occupying shelter bunkers. Interior guards must be posted at the entrances to bunkers and near Tactical Operations Centers. Prepared foxholes or bunkered guard posts are recommended within interior areas and near perimeter bunkers.

## (4) WIRE OBSTACLES.

OBSERVATION: Wire is not an obstacle to sapper attacks unless it is continuous, close enough for observation, and covered by fire.

EVALUATION: Under cover of darkness and of mortar fire, sappers can quickly move through most wire obstacles.

RECOMMENDATION: That wire not be relied upon to deter the enemy. It will aid in detecting him if it is properly laid, covered by fire and observation, and rigged with trip flares.

## (5) STANDOFF SCREEN.

OBSERVATION: Although offering considerable protection from shaped charge projectiles, chain link standoff screen is difficult for defenders to see through or shoot through.

EVALUATION: A compromise solution to this problem--cutting a firing port in the standoff screen--improves the defenders' field of fire while retaining good protection against B-40 and B-41 rockets.

RECOMMENDATION: That a six-inch horizontal strip be cut in each standoff screen to improve observation and fields of fire.

### b. Civil Affairs.

#### CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAMS.

OBSERVATION: A Civil Affairs team is effective only if it can remain in a given village for several weeks or months.

EVALUATION: As a rule, a battalion's forward CA Team accompany the battalion CP and move whenever the CP moves. Thus, a team may spend a week



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or less in one village before moving to a new location. Current plans envision battalions operating in stabilized areas and collocating with district headquarters. There will be times, however, when the tactical situation makes such stabilized operations impossible.

RECOMMENDATION: That when stabilized battalion operations are impossible, forward CA Teams consolidate at the brigade CP and begin stabilized civic action programs under the supervision of the brigade S5.

c. Safety.

## (1) REDUCING AIRCRAFT FLARE FAILURE RATES:

OBSERVATION: Mark 24 aircraft flares have a high dud rate.

EVALUATION: The ground ignition of an aircraft flare, which resulted in the death of a small MONTAGNARD child, prompted a systematic attempt to reduce the aircraft flare dud rate. The flare that killed the child had been set and dropped according to local and USARV SOP. In the weeks that followed the accident, air crews took extraordinary precautions while applying flares. All flares on hand were rechecked for proper setting. Thereafter, all flares were set by experienced personnel, that is crew chiefs and gunners with 8 to 11 months in country and with many flare missions flown. The work was supervised by an S5 and checked by an officer. Flare settings were changed from five second ejection and 15 second ignition to five second ejection and 10 second ignition. Crews were required to carry flashlights and check each flare for setting, proper pulling of the safety pin, and proper securing of the lanyard before the flare was thrown. Pilots were instructed to fly at altitudes 500 to 1000 feet higher than normal. In spite of all the precautions the high rate of flare failures continued. Typical was a mission on 21 March in which a total of 65 flares were dropped. The flares were checked for proper setting, the lanyards were hand held, and all flares were timed by stopwatches for ejection and ignition. All lanyards separated from the flares; none of the flares hit a skid. Still, one flare streamed to the ground as its chute failed to open; six flares ignited late and landed while still burning; five flares ignited on the ground, starting three ground fires. Some of the flares used were manufactured in 1967. Some of their polyfoam containers had water in them, and some of the flares were corroded. Aviation personnel suspected that the power trains of the time fuses were damp and therefore unreliable. Statistical data was as follows:

### FLARE REPORT

<u>DATE</u>	<u>FLARES THROWN</u>	<u>DUDS</u>	<u>STREAMERS</u>	<u>GOOD</u>	<u>LOT NUMBER</u>
16 Mar	93	8	13	72	57-C-67 11/67

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17 Mar	45	5	0	40	57-C-67 11/67
18 Mar	76	8	1	67	"
19 Mar	29	4	0	25	"
20 Mar	30	3	0	27	"
21 Mar	189	14	8	167	" & 13-KC-06 68 11/68
22 Mar	30	1	1	28	13-KC-0668 11/68
23 Mar	23	1	1	21	"
24 Mar	13	2	0	11	"
27 Mar	40	1	0	38	14-KC-0668
29 Mar	4	1	0	4	"
30 Mar	3	0	0	3	"
2 Apr	14	2	0	12	15-KC-0668
4 Apr	36	2	2	32	"
6 Apr	20	1	0	19	"
8 Apr	11	2	0	9	"
10 Apr	13	3	0	10	"
11 Apr	30	4	0	26	"
14 Apr	30	11	0	19	"
17 Apr	27	4	0	23	"
18 Apr	41	19	0	22	"
20 Apr	6	2	0	4	"
21 Apr	11	2	0	9	"
22 Apr	<u>123</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>101</u>	" & 5-BFR-0168
TOTAL	937	122	26	789	

Total Duds: 13.0%  
Total Ground Ignitions: 2.3%  
Total Faulty: 15.8%  
Total Good: 84.2%

Lot # 57-C-67

Duds: 21.0%  
Ground Ignitions: 0.9%  
Faulty: 21.9%  
Good: 78.1%

Lot # 13-KC-0668

Duds: 5.5%  
Ground Ignitions: 3.4%  
Faulty: 8.9%  
Good: 91.1%

Lot # 15-KC-0668

Duds: 21.0%  
Ground Ignitions: 0.9%  
Faulty: 21.9%  
Good: 78.1%

Lot # 5-BFR-0168

Duds: 8.1%  
Ground Ignitions: 0.0%  
Faulty: 8.1%  
Good: 91.9%

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RECOMMENDATION:

1. That flare stocks in RVN be monitored closely to insure that shelf life is not too great.
2. That pilots regard the safety of friendly troops and civilians on the ground by not dropping flares directly overhead.

(2) CONTROLLING BRUSH FIRES STARTED BY ILLUMINATION OPERATIONS.

OBSERVATION: During the dry season the employment of high intensity aircraft flares creates hazards of grass and brush fires.

EVALUATION: The crews of aircraft dropping flares are in the most advantageous position to report fires started by their operations.

RECOMMENDATION: That all aircraft working over areas of fire hazard be assigned the secondary mission of detecting fires and reporting them to the nearest ground element.

d. Signal.

(1) MODIFIED CABLE FOR KY-38 AND AN/GRC-125 POWER SUPPLY.

OBSERVATION: The mounting MT-1029/VRC and the amplifier-power supply OA-3633/GRC components of the AN/GRC-125 may be used to furnish power for the portable speech security element KY-38.

EVALUATION: If the spare snap type fastener is removed from the side of the KY-38, the mount MT-1029/VRC will accept the KY-38 and it can be locked securely in place.

The AN/PAC-77 radio connector end of the KY-38/PAC-77 interconnecting cable will mate with the "set power" receptacle on the amplifier-power supply OA-3633/GRC. Wires are soldered from pin "A" and "E" of the connector to pin "2" and "3" of the Z-ACC battery pack on the KY-38.

If the KY-38 is to be used with the AN/PAC-77 radio it will be necessary to solder a 10 pin audio connector to pin "B" of the connector in order for the speaker in the amplifier to function. A 10 pin audio connector is not required if the KY-38 is used with the RT-524. Normal volume will be received through the speaker on the RT-524.


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PRC-77 CONNECTOR END OF PRC-77/KY-38  
INTERCONNECTING CABLE (ON108149-3)

NOTE: Pin B will furnish a positive 19 to 30 VDC. This pin may be used to supply the B + power for the KY-38/RT-524 audio cable.

RECOMMENDATION: That the modification described above be used when necessary to enhance the flexibility of a unit's portable speech security equipment.

(2) MODIFIED CABLE FOR KY-38 & RT-524 RADIO.

OBSERVATION: A requirement exists for an interconnecting cable that will enable the KY-38 portable speech security element to be used with the RT-524 radio in order to obtain greater transmitting distance. In the 4th Infantry Division's large area of operations, the KY-38/PRC-77 combination does not have sufficient range for units to communicate in secure voice.

EVALUATION: The fabricated KY-38/RT-524 interconnecting cable was found to be highly successful and dependable. The 4th Infantry Division has approximately 35 KY-38's being used with the RT-524 radio at the present time. The KY-38, when used with the RT-524, was found to be superior to the KY-8 for the following reasons:

- (a) It has a low power consumption.
- (b) It does not heat up and malfunction.
- (c) It is lighter in weight and smaller in size.

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(d) It can be zeroized quickly.

(e) Several KY-38's may be keyed with one KYK-28 code changer.


(f) When the KY-38 is in cipher, a radio transmitting in plain will still be received by the KY-38.

RECOMMENDATION: That units adopt the expedient described above in order to improve long range secure mode radio transmission. (See Appendix 1).

6 Inclosures

- ~~1. Organization Structure~~
- ~~2. Key Personnel~~
- ~~3. Abbreviations~~
- 4. Combat Operations After  
Action Report, Co A, 3d Bn,  
8th Inf
- ~~5. Chemical Operations~~
- ~~6. Maps~~

Incl 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 wd Hq, DA

  
DONN R. PEPER  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-CC-MH

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Additional Lessons Learned

SEE DISTRIBUTION

As an addition to the 4th Infantry Division's regular Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), the following lessons learned are submitted:

SECTION 2 (C) LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. (U) Personnel. N/A
2. (U) Operations. N/A
3. (U) Training. N/A
4. (C) Intelligence.
  - a. USE OF CAPTURED ENEMY MAPS.

OBSERVATION: Interrogation of PW's and captured enemy documents often provide names of villages, rivers and other terrain features which cannot be found on US maps.

EVALUATION: Captured enemy maps generally contain the same names for terrain features as those used by the enemy in their documents. Places named on NVA and VC maps normally do not conform to those found on commonly used Allied maps.

RECOMMENDATION: That intelligence sections make maximum use of captured enemy maps to assist in locating terrain features and villages identified in captured documents and through PW interrogation. Copies of captured maps are available through normal supply channels.

b. IDENTIFICATION OF VC/VMC PERSONALITIES.

OBSERVATION: Adult MONTAGNARD villagers are reluctant to point out VC/VMC personalities in their home village.

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SUBJECT: Additional Lessons Learned

EVALUATION: Agents have learned that small children (age group of 10-15) can provide a wealth of information as to VC/VMC activities. Past operations have revealed that children will relate names of individuals in their village who contribute in any manner to enemy activities.

RECOMMENDATION: That when in support of cordon and search operations, one agent team be instructed to gain the confidence of the children and to exploit all information obtainable.

c. IMPROVED UTILIZATION OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

EVALUATION: By combining the visual reconnaissance provided by the C-1 aircraft with the photographic capability of the OV-1A Mohawk, a more responsive and concrete method of obtaining information of significant sightings may be realized.

EXPLANATION: Each day, four to six C-1 aircraft fly visual reconnaissance missions in direct support of the 4th Infantry Division. In addition, on a totally separate mission, an OV-1A Mohawk is targeted against areas designated by the G2. Heretofore if a VR mission located a large enemy area such as a bunker complex, it often took several passes of the aircraft over the area to ascertain what was there. This procedure subjected the plane to possible anti-aircraft fire and the information gained was limited by what the pilot and observer could see and remember. After considering the problem it was decided to combine the capabilities of both aircraft. When an C-1 aircraft on a VR mission located a non-perishable target, the pilot contacts the Mohawk on a pre-established frequency and arranges to meet at a rendezvous point away from the area. At the appointed time final coordination is made and the C-1 returns to the target area and marks the target with smoke grenades. If a linear target is observed, two grenades are used. The Mohawk then photographs the target and both aircraft leave the area. Within hours imagery of the target is read out and prints made available for study and evaluation.

RECOMMENDATION: That all units with the C-1 and OV-1A aircraft in support employ the concept described above.

d. LARGE SCALE MAP.

EVALUATION: A large scale map is often required for detailed tactical planning or for briefing purposes.

EXPLANATION: Working in conjunction with the Division Signal Facility, the Imagery Interpretation Section developed a large scale map to facilitate detailed tactical planning. The signal section took pictures of a ten kilometer square area of a 1:50,000 map sheet; the picture was then blown up five times and pasted together like a mosaic.

SUBJ CT: Additional Lessons Learned

RECOMMENDATION: That units having the capability for photo enlargement take advantage of the capability described above when the need arises.

g. ELUCIDATION OF WEAPONS POSITIONS.

OBSERVATION: The enemy attempts to sketch former weapons positions, bunkers and wire of abandoned fire bases.

EVALUATION: An enemy document captured by the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry on 7 March at Lab 15880 showed a detailed, to scale, sketch of LZ ANW located three kilometers southeast of POLAI KLANG. The sketch showed exact positions of all bunkers, LZ's and wire. The sketch contained arrows showing directions of attack into LZ ANW. Writing on the sketch indicated that LZ ANW was at that time vacant, but it is clear that it was being observed in the event of US or ARVN reoccupation. This gives us documented intelligence that our vacant fire bases are being closely observed, studied and reconnoitered, with enemy plans for future attacks being made.

RECOMMENDATION: That upon reoccupation of a fire base, the location of weapons positions, bunkers and other defensive positions be changed in so far as is practical in order to reduce enemy intelligence of our positions.

f. USE OF AERO RIFLE PLATOONS IN CORDON AND SEARCH MISSIONS.

OBSERVATION: The sole use of conventional infantry units in cordon and search missions often gives the VC an opportunity to conceal items since they have more prior warning.

EVALUATION: Utilization of Aero Rifle Platoons increases the effectiveness of cordon and search operations. The village can be sealed off at first light before any villager is able to leave the area. CI Agents can be given an aerial view of the village, affording the opportunity to pre-plan for the ground coordination. In this manner the villagers can be taken by complete surprise, decreasing their opportunity to conceal items from US forces.

RECOMMENDATION: That Aero Rifle Platoons be used in conjunction with cordon and search operations when the situation permits.

g. UNDERGROUND RICE CACHES:

OBSERVATION: The VC/VE have begun to cache their rice, which is pre-husked and separated, in large huts buried in the ground thus making them more difficult to find.

EVALUATION: Rice huts buried in the ground are generally the same size and type as the rice hootches found above the ground with the exception that the buried huts are not on stilts. The hut is placed in a large hole with a few feet of space on all sides to allow for circulation of air, then the hole is covered with thick bamboo poles, bamboo matting, six or eight inches of dirt, dead flora, and sometimes topped with fallen or cut trees to make it appear to be unused and unwarded for areas. These caches have all been



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
4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Additional Lessons Learned.

located approximately four feet from the edge of steep rice paddy banks 10 to 12 feet high, and usually within a bamboo thicket. Entrances to the caches have been protected by punji stakes implanted within the hole.

RECOMMENDATION: That units searching for rice caches be made aware that the enemy uses underground caches and that they be informed of the indications of the presence of underground caches.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


  
GORDON J. DUQUAIN  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

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MODIFIED CABLE FOR  
TS-12/KY-38 & 524 RADIO

TS-12/KY-38  
J-1  
CONNECTOR

RT-524  
5 PIN AUDIO  
CONNECTOR



TS-12/KY-38  
J-2  
10 PIN AUDIO CONNECTOR

X-MODE CONNECTOR  
RT-524 RADIO

15 JUN 1969

AVFA-GC-HLST (30 Apr 69) 1st Ind


SUBJECT: Operation Report of the 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending  
30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHSC-DST,  
APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs in subject report, with the following comment reference Section 2, para 2e: The firing of artillery upon friendly positions is, at best, extremely hazardous and should only be used in dire situations for force preservation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
FREDERICK E. HOLLAND  
1LT AGC  
ASST AG

Cy Furn:

2 - ACSFOR, DA  
1 - 4th Inf Div

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WHOC-DST (21 May 1969) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division for Period  
Ending 30 April 1969, HQ USFOM-65 (11)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 9 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DI,  
APO 96594

1. (C) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons  
Reported for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters,  
4th Infantry Division.


2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Firecracker Artillery Support Of  
Armored Units In Contact," section II, page 45, paragraph 2c. Nonconcur  
with that portion of the evaluation which states, "buttoning up when they  
receive the word plash from fire direction center (FDC)". From splash  
to ejection is usually a matter of seconds and does not normally allow  
enough reaction time for all friendly troops to receive notification and  
button up before the ICM bomblets begin impacting. Sufficient time must  
be allowed for notification of and reaction by all personnel unless the  
commander is prepared to take casualties from the friendly fire. Exact  
times will vary depending on means of communications used, ability of  
troop to react quickly, and other factors.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Modified Cable For KY-38 And  
AN/CAC-125 Power Supply," section II, page 51, paragraph d(1). Although  
this appears to be an acceptable expedient measure, it involves modification  
of speech security equipment and requires knowledgeable technical evaluation.  
Recommend this item be referred to the U.S. Army Security Agency at Arlington  
Hall, Virginia for further evaluation.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Modified Cable For KY-38 And  
RT-5... Ratio," section II, page 52, paragraph d(2); concur. This matter  
has been previously recognized by USAFV. A number of the required inter-  
connect cables have been locally fabricated and distributed to units. A  
quantity of 300 additional cables are currently being fabricated by the  
USASCOM and will be shipped to USAFV for distribution at a rate of 100 per  
month commencing in September 1969. No further action required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furn:  
4th Inf Div  
I FFV

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CPROP-DT (21 May 69) 3d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Inf Div for Period Ending  
30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (21) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96358 12 AUG 69

To: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding  
endorsements and concurs in the report as endorsed.
2. (C) Reference Section 1, paragraph 2, page 49. CONUS and USARPAC  
(less USARV) stocks of the MK24 flare are exhausted. A more reliable  
and safer flare, MK45, is currently being produced and will be provided  
USARV as quantities become available from production. Available MK24  
assets in USARV are to be consumed prior to utilization of the MK45  
flare.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*C. J. Hall*  
C. J. HALL  
CPT, ACC  
AM 115

Cy furn:  
CG USARV

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-CS

14 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report  
(RCS: TAGV 73-J2)

THRU: Commanding General  
INFANTRY  
APO 96350

TO: Commander  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: G3  
APO US Forces 96375

1. NAME OR IDENTIFYING NO./OR TYPE OF OPERATION: Reconnaissance in force, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 2 March 1969, through 4 March 1969.
3. LOCATION: PLEI TRAP, KONTUM Province (YA803879). Map 1:50,000 sheet 6537 IV, series LG14.
4. CONTROL OR CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Pennel J. Hickey.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION: Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.
7. SUPPORTING UNITS:
  - a. B and C Btry, 1/29 Arty (105) DS.
  - b. C Btry, 1/52 Arty (155) GS.
  - c. A Troop 7/17 Cav.
  - d. 52d Aviation Bn.
  - e. 7th US Air Force.
8. INTELLIGENCE:
  - a. The 66th NVA Regiment was known to be in the general area of contact.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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14 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report  
(RCS: MACV J3-J2)

Several intelligence reports and heavy Snoop readings were plotted approximately five kilometers to the south of the contact.

b. After the battalion seized the ridgeline east of the contact, documents confirmed the presence of the K-25 Sapper Battalion and K-8 Infantry Battalion of the 66th Regiment.

c. The terrain in the area of contact (see sketch, Incl #1) was a north-south ridgeline extending east-west with fingers, and steep slopes on either side. The area was vegetated by triple-canopy jungle. Fields of Observation were limited to 25-30 meters. The weather was clear with afternoon temperatures in the 80's. At dusk visibility for aircraft was impaired by a haze of smoke and dust.

9. MISSION: The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry had the mission of conducting combat assaults into the southern portion of the 1st Brigade area of operations, and conducting reconnaissance in force and ambush operations along main enemy infiltration routes and in known or suspected base areas.

## 10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was directed to conduct combat assaults with three companies to YA784879 and conduct reconnaissance in force operations in respective areas of operation.

b. Company A was to combat assault to YA784879 following Company D, and conduct reconnaissance in force in the northern sector of the Battalion AO.

c. Company E was to combat assault to YA784879 following Company A and conduct reconnaissance in force in the southern sector of the Battalion AO.

d. Company C was to secure FB Pause and the Battalion CP.

e. Company D was to combat assault to YA784879 and conduct a reconnaissance in force in the center of the Battalion AO.

f. The Reconnaissance Platoon was to conduct a reconnaissance in force south of YA784879.

## 11. EXECUTION:

a. On 2 March at 1049H Company A combat assaulted from POLMI KLENG to YA784879. The assault was made without incident and the company began a reconnaissance in force sweep to the north east. A night location was established at YA793879.

b. On 3 March Company A was scheduled to continue the reconnaissance in force.

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14 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report  
(RCS: MACV J3-J2)

to 162120Z where they were to establish a night location. At 1200H the Company moved for the noon meal and then continued up the finger toward the crest of a north-south ridgeline. An eight-man ambush force was left for rear cover. At approximately 1530H the Company reached what they believed to be their night location. Actually they were at YAM11478. Captain Ison, the Company Commander, who was new to 3D BATTAL, assuming command on 12 February, established a company perimeter, assigning the 3d Platoon the sector covering the portion of the trail leading up the finger of the ridgeline. Lieutenant Williams, the platoon leader, dispatched a two-man team to reconnoiter the trail running up the ridgeline. The team surprised a NVA soldier who ran up the hill. The two soldiers returned to the perimeter and reported the information to Lieutenant Williams. Lieutenant Williams conveyed the information to Captain Ison. Lieutenant Flannigan, the forward observer with the Company, recommended that the area be prepared with artillery before the Company investigated. Captain Ison elected to investigate immediately, and dispatched the 3d Platoon. Lieutenant Williams halted them in a clearing immediately behind a log across the trail. He had the squads set up a perimeter and moved on up the trail with three other men. They found an NVA OP with a cooking pot in it and continued a short distance up the trail. Suddenly, the point man saw a NVA soldier rise from behind a bush. The point man engaged and killed the NVA. Lieutenant Williams observed three other NVA and fired at them. A machine gun position behind some logs opened up and was silenced with mortar rounds. The element withdrew back to the platoon location. Lieutenant Williams called Captain Ison and reported that he was in contact with a platoon or company of NVA. The enemy started firing at the platoon from the front and gradually encroached on the sides. Some of the NVA were wearing fatigues, others shorts or black pajamas. The weapons squad located behind the log returned fire, as did the rest of the platoon.

Captain Ison, when he received word that the platoon was in contact, reported the contact to the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry CP at 1621H. Electing to remain, Lieutenant Williams, Captain Ison left one squad from each platoon in the night location and proceeded up the trail. The Company was in a file with the Headquarters element leading, followed by the 2d, 4th, and 1st Platoons. The last two platoons received sniper fire from the left as they moved north-east up the finger. Captain Ison and the Headquarters element were able to join Lieutenant Williams behind the log, but the rest of the company had to take shelter at the rear or behind the 3d Platoon position. Lieutenant Griffith, the 2d Platoon leader, was killed shortly after reaching the 3d Platoon positions. The NVA forces pinned down the Company with machine gun fire from the front. Meanwhile, NVA soldiers climbed trees to the flanks and started shooting down at the US soldiers. The Company commenced taking casualties, and at 1635H, Captain Ison reported to the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry CP that he was in contact with a battalion-size force and was receiving casualties. A short time later the RTO was wounded, and Captain Ison, going to his aid, was killed. This left Lieutenant Williams and Lieutenant Flannigan, the FO, as the only surviving officers. The troops holding the left side of the perimeter were either dead or wounded, and the entire 3d Platoon Weapons Squad had been killed. Lieutenant Williams gave



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(RCS: MACV J3-J2)

the order to withdraw. Specialist Gwin, a squad leader of the 3d Platoon, pulled back to the rear of the clearing and turned to see if there were any remaining wounded. One man was crawling across the clearing to reach them. So Gwin and two others provided covering fire. Both of the men with Gwin were killed and when the wounded man crawling towards him was hit, Specialist Gwin withdrew. Later it was determined that the wounded man moving towards Specialist Gwin was Specialist Sowa.

d. The Company retook their night location at approximately 1700H. They had suffered 17 MIA and 10 KIA. The force heard firing in the contact area, but were receiving only sporadic sniper fire at the night location. The Company dug in and prepared for an expected enemy attack. Lieutenant Flannigan called in gunships and artillery around the contact area but not upon it. A resupply helicopter brought in ammunition, claymore mines, and trip flares, which were emplaced around the perimeter.

e. Later Specialist Fear Sowa called the Company on the radio. He said he was being wounded in the contact area and asked for help. An eight-man patrol moved to the contact area and recovered Sowa and another wounded man and returned to the night location. A dustoff helicopter was requested, and, after receiving enemy fire twice, it managed to evacuate three wounded. This left 68 men in the perimeter. AC-47 (Spooky) and artillery fired supporting fires all night. The Company remained on 75% alert for an anticipated enemy attack that did not materialize.

f. Early the next morning, Lieutenant Williams directed the clearing of a landing zone to evacuate the wounded. Lieutenant Williams received the order to secure the bodies left in the previous contact area. He requested an artillery preparation or gunship coverage, but his request was denied due to the possibility of friendly personnel remaining alive in the area of contact. Gunships were on standby on call if needed. Sergeant Jones, the 4th Platoon leader, organized a twenty-six man force and moved out of the perimeter at 0900H. The force had not cleared the perimeter when a NVA soldier stepped from behind a tree and engaged the point element. The first four men took cover and returned fire. The rest of the men ran back to the perimeter. Sergeant Jones, employing fire to maneuver, pulled his remaining elements back into the perimeter. The force directed heavy fire from all around the US position. Small arms, grenades, satchel charges, M79, and M-60 fire from captured American weapons were employed. Lieutenant Flannigan called in artillery fire, but the enemy was too close to allow for effective fire. The claymore mines were triggered, but the ones on the north side of the perimeter had been disarmed. The remainder temporarily stopped the NVA attack. It quickly resumed as both sides exchanged heavy fire. Again enemy soldiers were observed in trees firing small arms and throwing grenades. The contact had continued for about thirty minutes, when some NVA soldiers on the north side of the perimeter yelled in English, "Hey Joe, don't shoot, its Bravo." The enemy soldiers had evidently learned from radios captured the previous afternoon that Company B was to reinforce Company A.

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g. The reaction by the US soldiers was almost instantaneous as they jumped out of their foxholes and yelled to Company B. It was not until they saw a NVA platoon emerge from the area to the north that they realized the use of a ruse de guerre. They returned to their foxholes and continued firing. Their fighting spirit seemed to break under the great pressure, and all they could think of was getting out of the area. One man bolted out of the perimeter, and was not seen again until two days later when he walked into a firebase. Lieutenant Williams passed the order around the perimeter to withdraw down the hill. Some of the personnel were carrying the wounded. A number of men were without weapons as a result of enemy action, and most were short of ammunition. Sergeant Jones, who temporarily lost his hearing, observed the withdrawal and was the last to leave the position. He became separated from the company during the withdrawal and evaded for ten days before he managed to reach a friendly fire base.

h. The Company withdrew off the ridgeline to a creek bed at the bottom of a draw, where it regrouped and proceeded in a westerly direction in a single file. The NVA continued to shoot at them from the top of the hill and sent a squad-size element to pursue them. Lieutenant Williams attempted to contact the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, but the batteries for the radio were too weak. NVA could be heard moving in the heavy undergrowth, so the Company moved on top of a small hill. A small enemy force was observed coming up behind them in the stream bed and was fired upon. The Company then moved into another stream bed and commenced moving west. Radio contact was finally established, and gunships covered the Company's withdrawal. A LOH guided the Company to a landing zone where it was extracted at 1525H.

## 12. RESULTS:

a. Company A sustained 20 infantry KIA, one artilleryman KIA, and one engineer KIA. One infantryman remains MIA. Fifty-two men were wounded, and three originally missing in action managed to evade to friendly positions. In addition, one man captured by the NVA was recovered on 6 March by Company D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

b. Enemy confirmed losses are 50 KIA by body count in the contact area. Further, the soldier captured by the NVA and subsequently recovered reported seeing a large number of NVA wounded along the top of the north-south ridgeline of the scene of action.

## 13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. An initial resupply of ammunition was accomplished at 031825 March by Alligator 108, a UH-1 aircraft. The helicopter received ground fire as it approached the position and gunships were employed. Ground fire and the lack of LZs dictated that this ammunition be "kicked out" at a low level above the company.

b. The wounded were treated by company medics. Three of the most serious

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were evacuated by Dustoff 32 by hoist at 032300 March. AC-47 (Spooky) Z3 covered the evacuation.

c. The dense terrain and hill mass between Company A and the Battalion CP rendered constant communications difficult. During the initial contact, the battalion commander maintained radio contact by orbiting in an O5-A LCH. At night, communications were maintained by relay through Spooky aircraft and Head Hunter O-1 aircraft. From 2230-0030H the Battalion Commander remained overhead in a DC-8 ship to maintain communications.

## 14. COMMAND ANALYSIS:

a. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was a well-trained, combat-hardened unit. It had participated in the actions in the BAK PAYOU Valley and was adept at the type of warfare employed in VIETNAM. The Company Commander was not a combat veteran and had only commanded the Company for a short time. He was, however, assisted by two quite capable platoon leaders, Lieutenants Griffith and Williams. The Company executive officer and two platoon leaders were in base camp on administrative matters. The 1st Sergeant was on RER. This left the Company Commander, two platoon leaders, and one staff sergeant to run the Company. The loss of the Company Commander and the most experienced platoon leader detracted from a strong chain of command and partially attributed to the loss of cohesiveness on the morning of 4 March.

b. Later intelligence has revealed that Company A probably encountered the A-3 Battalion, 4th Regiment. The statement of a US soldier captured by the NVA and recaptured by Company D, revealed that the 66th NVA Regimental Headquarters may have been in the area. The chain of events indicates that the NVA were surprised by the intrusion, but quickly reacted. Their size and close proximity of their base area gave the NVA a decided combat superiority.

c. Company A met a superior enemy force and aggressively engaged it. The numerically superior NVA force occupying the dominant terrain forced Company A to withdraw. No firepower was employed with unknown results during the night. The dense jungle aided the enemy by preventing either a reinforcement or withdrawal. It also provided excellent cover and concealment which was used by the enemy to surround the Company the morning of 4 March. Thus the NVA were able to exploit devastating fires around the perimeter. The dusk, combat fatigues, casualties, and weakened chain of command, compounded by the enemy ruse, combined to reduce combat effectiveness. The Company consequently withdrew under difficult conditions.

d. Casualty reporting was complicated by the loss of the Company headquarters element. No one else in the Company had a knowledge of the unit field strength or the whereabouts of the missing personnel. Consequently, Lieutenant Williams was unable to make an accurate account of his losses.

e. Smoke and haze conditions in the area presented a major obstacle to

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accomplishing resupply and medical evacuation. Poor visibility prevented pilots pinpointing Company A's location. The Dustoff helicopter, with flare ship assistance, spent about one and one-half hours trying to locate the Company at night.

15. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry became involved in a contact with a larger enemy size force in dense double to triple canopy jungle. Because of the vegetation, the Company could not be reinforced or withdrawn prior to the major enemy contact. Had a landing zone been available, the results of the operation could have been very different. RECOMMEND: Landing zones be preselected or a rapid means to cut a landing zone be supplied to small units and this be undertaken as soon as an area is occupied.

b. The loss or absence of key Company personnel adversely influenced the action. The casualty reporting, chain of command, and company structure were impaired by the shortage of key company personnel. RECOMMEND: Battalions review any shortage of critical personnel prior to any major operations and make adjustments accordingly.

c. If another company-size unit could have reinforced Company A within a reasonable period of time the tide might have been turned. RECOMMEND: When units move into an area where contact with a superior force is probable, company-sized elements should operate within reasonable supporting distance.

16. SOURCES: This report is based on the after action report submitted by the Battalion Commander (Incl #2) and additional research and interviews conducted by the 29th Military History Detachment. There are some differences between the two as a result of the additional research accomplished after the Battalion Commanders report was submitted.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

HERBERT J. McCHRISTAL, JR.  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

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SCALE: 1:1700  
(APPROXIMATE)

- 1-CONTACT 3 MAR
- 2-CONTACT 4 MAR

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